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 I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Although the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was the largest industrial takeover 
in history (1998), this case study shows that the acquisition of Chrysler was a 
sub-strategy within Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s plan to place 
Daimler-Benz and the Mercedes brand as the focal point of a global Welt AG 
for the passenger and commercial vehicle industry of the 21st century. 
The reasons for the failure of both DaimlerChrysler AG and the Welt AG are 
rooted in the inherent contradictions of the two strategies. The lack of attention 
paid to post takeover integration processes combined with the shift of focus to 
Schrempp’s Asian strategy made the hegemony of the Welt AG plan and the lie 
of the ‘merger of equals’ metaphor clear to German, American and Japanese 
stakeholders. As a result, the takeover failed to realize any of the goals of 
increasing shareholder value, implementing operative synergy effects, and 
enhancing customer satisfaction. 
In addition, the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG can be traced to the failure of 
Mercedes-Benz Car Group, Chrysler Corporation and Mitsubishi Motor 
Corporation to perform satisfactorily in their respective markets. It is 
particularly salient to show how the significant drop in the quality of Mercedes 
products was a direct result of the decison to globalize and mass produce the 
brand. The drain of German managers needed to troubleshoot issues at 
Mitsubishi Motors and Chrysler only supplemented and accelerated the downfall 
of the Welt AG.  
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure provides no proof for the necessary 
failure of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, the failure highlights 
the strategic role of consistent communication and trust in the process of 
integrating differing company national and organizational cultures. 
Finally, the resiliency of national institutions as evidenced in the 
DaimlerChrysler takeover failure draws attention to the fact that it is still 
premature to envisage the creation of a truly global company. 
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THE DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG TAKEOVER FAILURE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK 
OF THE FAILED DAIMLER-BENZ WELT AG STRATEGY 
1 INTRODUCTION   
1.1 Key research questions 
When the takeover of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz was announced in May 1998, it surprised, 
delighted and shocked Germany, the United States of America, the stock markets, the global 
car industry, and the stakeholders and shareholders of both companies respectively 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1).  
For Americans, it was the takeover of one of the country’s most famous and biggest industrial 
firms and at that time (1998) America’s most successful automobile manufacturer. Under 
German (Daimler) and later Italian (Fiat) ownership it would be the beginning of the end of 
The Big Three, culminating with Chrysler’s initial bankruptcy in April 2009 (The New York 
Times April 30th, 2009).  
For Germans, it was the Chrysler takeover that encouraged concrete hope in the country’s 
ability to manage the challenges of globalization. Germany’s hitherto coordinated market 
economy (Hall and Soskice 2001), which had provided the economic and political framework 
of post-World War II success, had seemingly stopped functioning in the 1990s. 
DaimlerChrysler AG offered the promise of a German-led Welt AG. Using methods more 
reminiscent of corporate America and “Neutron” Jack Welch, CEO Jürgen Schrempp had 
restored Daimler-Benz from record losses to record profitability within two short years (Der 
Spiegel 30, 1996). His decision to acquire Chrysler as part of his Welt AG strategy of global 
expansion in the core competencies of passenger and commercial vehicle production was 
universally applauded in Germany (Der Spiegel 20, 1998). The unfolding Welt AG offered 
the opportunity of superseding the seemingly obsolete and inefficient Deutschland AG within 
a global framework.  
For the American stock market, early enthusiasm (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000) was 
replaced with fear about the institutional ramifications of DaimlerChrysler AG’s proposal of 
creating the world’s first truly global stock, a move which threatened to jeopardize the power 
of American banks (Karoyli 2003). Both shareholders at Daimler-Benz and Chrysler profited 
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until the appearance of the new common DCX share in November 1998. This success was 
short-lived. After briefly surging, it would never again reach its highest level of $108 USD in 
January 1999 (The Economist April 30th, 2006). The average price of DCX during the 
Schrempp era at around $40 USD (Wall Street Journal July 29th, 2005) stands in stark contrast 
to the record high of 1272 DEM in 1987 at Daimler (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). 
And although the global car industry was caught up in merger and takeover frenzy in the late 
1990s (Table 1), Daimler’s aggressiveness surprised everyone (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 
2000). Ironically, only the intervention of the Ford family had stopped the Ford Board from 
taking over Daimler-Benz AG a few months earlier (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). Going from 
“hunted” to “hunter”, Daimler-Benz AG reversed its position as the primmest luxury model 
takeover candidate by itself buying Chrysler. Now DaimlerChrysler AG, as CEO Schrempp 
promised at the press conference on May 7th, 1998, was aiming to create the world’s global 
passenger and commercial vehicle enterprise for the 21st century (DaimlerChrysler AG Video 
Appendix 1.1).  
Table 1: Overview of the Global Automobile Industry 1998 
Largest Carmakers Earnings Revenue Car sales Cash Rumoured merger 
partners 
General Motors     $ 2.8 bn $ 140 bn 7.5 million $ 16.6 bn Isuzi, Suzuki, Daewoo 
Ford Motor $ 6.7 bn $ 118 bn 6.8 million $ 23.0 bn Honda, BMW 
DaimlerChrysler $ 6.5 bn $ 147 bn 4.0 million $ 25.0 bn Nissan, Fiat 
Volkswagen $ 1.3 bn $   75 bn 4.6 million $ 12.4 bn BMW, Fiat 
Toyota Motor Co. $ 4.0 bn $ 106 bn 4.5 million $ 23.0 bn Daihatsu, Hino 
Honda Motor Co. $ 2.4 bn $  54 bn 2.3 million     $  3.0 bn BMW 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Appendix 1.1 
The shock was greatest for the vast majority of the 421,000 employees at both companies. 
Less than ten people had been involved in the 4 month deal between January and May 1998 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000). Executives were confused with the image of a “merger of equals”. 
The roles, the language and the first details announced at the press conference made it clear to 
executives on both sides that it was a takeover (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). 
What could be “equal” between two such radically differing corporations and profit strategies 
(Boyer and Freyssenet 2000)? Especially those executives who had been involved in Daimler-
Benz and Chrysler cooperation talks back in 1995 questioned the possibility of creating 
synergy effects between the Germany luxury carmaker and its new American middle-class 
division (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
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Nevertheless, such doubts seemed negligible throughout the rest of 1998. The first year’s 
results as described in the DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report for 1998 appeared to confirm 
Jürgen Schrempp’s vow that this “merger of equals” was indeed a marriage “made in 
heaven”. Revenues grew by 12%. Operating profits increased by 38% to €8.6 billion. 
Earnings per share were up 30% to €5.58. DaimlerChrysler AG sold 4.4 million passenger 
vehicles, commercial vehicles and light trucks. In addition, 19,000 new employees joined the 
company (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998).  
However, less than 9 years later on the occasion of so-called Valentine’s Day Massacre, 
Daimler announced on February 14th, 2007 that it was selling its Chrysler division (The New 
York Times February 15th, 2007). The “marriage made in heaven” had disintegrated into a 
“divorce in hell”. What happened and how could it happen? That question is the central focus 
and main question of this case study of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. 
In the quest to answer this question the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover provides us with the 
opportunity to review, test and expand both macro- and microeconomic theories and 
conjectures in the areas of cross-border mergers (Meyer and Mirvis 1998), national (Hofstede 
1980) and organizational intercultural conflicts (Porter 1980; Kreps 1980), and national 
varieties of capitalism within the context of increasing globalization (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The DaimlerChrysler AG case covers comprehensively the complete spectrum of issues 
regarding cross-border takeover strategies and their implementations. As such the story of 
DaimlerChrysler AG extends beyond the obvious role played by management “hubris” on 
both the German and American sides (Roll 1996).  
With such a myriad of management issues involved, it is crucial to ascertain the right place to 
start our investigations. As Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) point out in their comprehensive 
analysis of value creation in the early stages of DaimlerChrysler AG; one critical question 
stands at the beginning of this cross-border deal and transcends the specificity of the largest 
industrial takeover in the history of the world at the time: “Can a company truly be global?” 
That simple question seems, prima facie, to be superfluous and almost ridiculous in an epoch 
of human economic history characterized precisely as being the era of an emerging global 
economy, in which huge multinational enterprises are the most important actors. It is therefore 
perhaps all the more surprising to learn that Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) are pessimistic 
already at a very early stage of the Daimler takeover on the chances of success for all cross-
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border mergers and acquisitions. Their comprehensive analysis of value creation of the first 
year of the takeover correctly predicted major problems for the future of DaimlerChrysler AG 
already in the year 2000. Researching independently from Hall and Soskice (2001) they also 
see national institutional differences in corporate culture, compensation policies, ownership 
structure and the legal environment as major “roadblocks” for any effort for a company to 
become “truly global”. Such an interpretation would have radical ramifications for all cross-
border globalization strategies and makes it necessary to determine whether or not certain 
aspects of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover strategy and implementation were avoidable 
whatsoever. Indeed, the spectacular nature of the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
risks tempting the researcher into concluding that all cross-border mergers and acquisition 
must fail (Weber and Camerer 2003). However, comprehensive empirical research shows that 
a significant number of German-American takeovers have succeeded in this time frame 
(Kröger 2005; Wübben 2007; Bassen, Schiereck and Wübben 2010). It is therefore necessary 
to look at the specific nature of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure in particular before 
venturing any theoretical generalizations. This justifies a case study approach, but warns of 
the difficulties in generating a comprehensive theory of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(Yin 1984; Eisenhardt 1989). 
1.2 Methodology 
 
A multimethod case study approach embedded in a longitudinal framework was employed to 
gather information about the pre-merger situation at both Daimler and Chrysler (1886-1998), 
the immediate period leading up to the takeover (1998) and post-takeover events (1998-2007). 
This included piecing together the storyline using company histories, annual reports, 
academic papers, media reports and other non-academic renditions. It also involved the 
author’s pre-case study access to an extensive internal network of Daimler-Benz and 
DaimlerChrysler employees over a period of 14 years on a daily working basis. 
As Eisenhardt (1989) points out, the case study method “is a research strategy which focuses 
on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989 534). Case 
studies can be used to provide description, test theories or generate theories (Eisenhardt 
1989). This case study of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure attempts primarily to 
clarify strategical inconsistencies between the Welt AG strategy and the DaimlerChrysler 
takeover strategy and inconsistencies between the specific strategies and their 
implementations surrounding the interaction between the Mercedes passenger car division and 
Chrysler. Although it would be too ambitious to claim that the study “generates” a new 
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theory, its unique explanation of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure does allow us to 
test existing theories of mergers and acquisitions (Marks and Mirvis 1998), intercultural 
theories of management behavior (Hofstede 1980) and institutional approaches to firm 
strategies within national and global political economic frameworks (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
In terms of the process of gathering and qualifying information the case study builds on a 
comprehensive analysis of the emergence of the overriding Welt AG strategy within the 
Daimler-Benz organization, which entails an understanding of the complete history and profit 
strategy of the organization (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000). The pre-takeover history of 
Daimler, Benz and Daimler-Benz is comprehensively covered by major histories such as dealt 
with by Grunnow-Osswald (2006) and Thieme (2004), both of which had wide-ranging 
access to internal Daimler archives. The Chrysler story from the company’s founding in 1925 
until the Daimler-Benz takeover is most extensively documented by Hyde from an academic 
perspective (2003). However, the tools of academia become increasingly superficial the closer 
the researcher approaches the Schrempp era at Daimler-Benz, which began in 1995 (Grnnow-
Osswald 2006). Certainly the company annual reports shed light on Schrempp’s intentions, 
but a comprehensive evaluation of the conflicts inside the company has to rely on newspaper 
sources. On the German side, every article in Der Spiegel on Daimler was reviewed between 
1985 and Schrempp’s removal in 2005. The Spiegel articles contain more extensive 
background information than German newspaper articles and exhibited a degree of correlation 
to the author’s own experiences within the company. On the American side, Bob Lutz’s 
biography (1990) on the 1990s turnaround at Chrysler breathes additional life into Hyde’s 
(2003) more academic approach. 
The events leading up to the 1998 takeover are best documented in Vlasic and Stertz’s (2000) 
comprehensive analysis of the years between the first contacts between the two companies in 
1995 and the subsequent events culminating in the 1998 takeover. Their examinations are 
substantiated by media reports on both sides of the Atlantic, including articles primarily from 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Both journals exhibited a high degree of 
accuracy as exhibited in the case of articles from Der Spiegel in German. 
A unique aspect of the multimethod case study approach is determined by the fact that the 
author had direct contact with employees of DaimlerChrysler from the operational to strategic 
level throughout the history of the takeover. The employment both at Daimler-Benz and 
DaimlerChrysler included projects in the areas of design, development, engineering, factory 
planning and production across a broad range of post-takeover projects. It also included 
extensive contact with Mercedes attempts to globalize its production facilities in Alabama, 
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South Africa and France. Ironically this perspective offers both advantages and disadvantages. 
Inside knowledge allows the case study to filter out truth and rumor in the popular press. At 
the same time inside knowledge poses the risk of possible legal repercussions from former 
senior executives. The methodological challenge was to find a sufficient number of 
independent confirmations for any claims made in the case study, in order to preclude such 
thrests and to ensure academic robustness.  
This case study is a study of failure. Failure is something which managers are either 
understandably unwilling to discuss openly or do so in a self-praising and idealized manner 
(Grube 2005). This excludes therefore the use of surveys or public interviews to obtain raw 
data. It also requires a more critical evaluation of all contributions from major actors (Lutz 
1998). Nevertheless, the author is convinced that this case study provides the most objective 
and comprehensive explanation of one of the most dramatic failures in the history of cross-
border industrial takeovers. 
1.3 Main themes 
 
The title of this case study is: The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure within the framework 
of the failed Daimler-Benz Welt AG strategy. The use of the formulation “DaimlerChrysler 
AG takeover failure” is intended. The present case study of DaimlerChrysler AG differs from 
all other known studies in two critical aspects; its consistent use of the term “takeover” and its 
consistent use of the term “DaimlerChrysler AG”. Both conventions are related to and 
complement each other. Hitherto the “proof” that the “merger” was actually a takeover is 
primarily traced to Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s interview in the Financial Times on 
October 30th, 2000 (The Financial Times October 30th, 2000; The New York Times 
November 26th, 2000). However, a clear understanding of the relationship between the vision 
of a Welt AG and the DaimlerChrysler AG deal necessitates the use of the phrase “takeover” 
from the very beginning of the announcement of the deal on May 7th, 1998. This is critical to 
the argumentation of this case study and provides a main thread for explaining the rationale 
behind the most salient strategical decisions. Moreover, this understanding of Daimler-Benz’s 
takeover allows us to follow why events unfolded as quickly as they did and the reasons for 
their failure. For although the illusion of a “merger” between Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler 
Corporation would exist publicly until April 2007, it was clear to insiders and observant 
commentators that the new company was a German AG and that the deal was a takeover from 
the beginning. Most importantly, insiders and observant commentators realized that the 
strategy was in serious trouble already in late 2000 (The New York Times May 8th, 1998; The 
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New York Times November 26th, 2000). The New York Times coverage of the event was one 
of the few commentaries to get it right from the very beginning with its headline “Daimler-
Benz Takes Over Chrysler as VW Acquires Rolls-Royce: Fast Lane for German Firms” (New 
York Times May 8th, 1998).  
On the other hand the announcement of a “Merger of Equals” was a key psychological 
instrument used by CEOs Schrempp and Eaton to sell the idea of the takeover to their 
shareholder and stakeholders respectively. Part of the reason for an initial acceptance of the 
“merger of equals” image by the outside world was the mistaken conflation of two different 
strategies; “Welt AG” and “DaimlerChrysler AG takeover strategy”. This was understandable 
given the sheer size of the Chrysler deal. But although the Chrysler takeover was the largest 
industrial takeover in history, it was only a sub-strategy of Daimler’s overall Welt AG 
strategy. The superordinate Welt AG strategy would determine the German side’s approach to 
Chrysler. Even more surprisingly, Jürgen Schrempp was not really the creator of the strategy. 
Former Mercedes CEO Helmut Werner had initiated a globalization of development, 
production and marketing processes encompassing all aspect of Mercedes passenger and 
commercial vehicle in the early 1990s as illustrated in Figure 1 below. After the crisis at 
Daimler-Benz also reached the Mercedes unit in 1992, Helmut Werner had begun radically 
restructuring the Mercedes organization. In line with the industry-wide MIT study from 1985-
1990 (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990), Werner attempted to replace outdated Mercedes 
processes with methods of lean development and production. He also intended to stretch the 
Mercedes brands to ensure the company could survive by producing the magical number of 1 
million vehicles per year (Brady and Lorenz 2000; Daimler-Benz Annual Report 1997). These 
goals entailed also a shift from costly, inflexible and union-dominated German factories to 
new locations in France (Smart), Brazil (A-Class), and the United States (M-Class). Even new 
greenfield factories in Germany such as Rastatt (A- and B-Class) were to employ radically 
new production methods and relationships with suppliers (Der Spiegel 5, 1993). These 
decisions had already been made before Schrempp succeeded Reuter in 1995. At that time 
Werner’s strategy was still in the making and it is interesting to note that Schrempp’s main 
rival inside Mercedes had already approached Chrysler in 1995 about a possible merger or 
joint venture before the power struggle between Schrempp and Werner broke out (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). 
The green colors in Fig. 1 illustrate the extent of Werner’s progress. Particularly the 
commercial vehicle division had emerged as the world’s largest producer of trucks and buses. 
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It had acquired America’s largest truck maker, Freightliner, in 1981. Under German 
leadership the company was allowed to continue its North American based strategy. Within 
the Mercedes commercial vehicles division, new production facilities in Spain and Turkey 
provided a wide spectrum of vehicles in all competitive price markets. The situation in the 
passenger car market was less optimistic. In the last year before the Chrysler takeover, the 
Mercedes brand would sell a record 122,300 vehicles in the USA (Daimler Annual Report 
1997). However, this was only about 1,4% of the total US market (U.S.A. National 
Transportation Statistics Appendix 1.1). Mercedes would also sell more than 40,000 vehicles 
in Japan for the first time, but that was also only a 1, 3 % share of the market (Daimler 
Annual Report 1997). Despite these record results Mercedes executives realised that the 
market for luxury vehicles was limited and the market was becoming harder to dominate 
alone. Facing increased competition from other German (Audi, BMW, Porsche) and Japanese 
(Lexus, Infiniti) brands, Mercedes had to change its strategy. In addition, there was no 
strategy for the emerging markets in India and China in either the area of passenger and 
commercial vehicles. 
Figure 1: Globalization of Mercedes Facilities before Schrempp’s Welt AG 
 
Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 1.1 
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Facing the absolute collapse of his predecessor’s (Edzard Reuter) dream of a 
Technolgiekonzern (technology consortium), Schrempp embarked in a headlong rush into 
completing the missing parts of a globalized company in Daimler-Benz’s core competences. 
The strategy to radically globalize and expand even further all fields of passenger and 
commercial vehicle endeavors under German hegemony became known as the Welt AG 
(World Inc.) strategy (Fig. 2). That strategy entailed finding partners or taking over 
companies in North America (NAFTA) and Asia. Daimler-Benz was an Aktiengesellschaft 
(German publicly listed stock trading company) and so was DaimlerChrysler AG. They were 
both German companies following German strategies of globalization, albeit with different 
weightings. DaimlerChrysler AG would attempt to reposition the traditional Daimler-Benz 
range of products within the passenger and commercial vehicle sectors as the focal point of 
the company’s vision, and complement their presence with strong local brands in NAFTA and 
Asia. However, one condition was always clear for CEO Schrempp. Any form of cooperation 
with other companies would be under German leadership (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
Figure 2: CEO Schrempp’s WELT AG Strategy 
 
Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 1.2 
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So while Chrysler was a dramatic first step undertaken by Schrempp in his pursuit of global 
expansion, it was only meant to be the beginning of his continuation and expansion of 
Werner’s strategy. As Chrysler had almost no presence in Asia, they could not be considered 
an equal partner. This explains the emergence of the first major dispute between Chrysler 
members of the Board and Daimler members of the Board in January 1999 (Blaško, Netter 
and Sinkey 2000). Although the post takeover integration process between Mercedes and 
Chrysler had just begun, Schrempp switched his focus to buying Nissan. The Board did stop 
Schrempp at the time, but the strategy was retained as evidenced by Schrempp’s partial 
acquisition of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC) in the year 2000 (The New York Times 
March 23rd, 2000; Vlasic and Stertz 2000). Moreover, this strategy of a globalized production 
system was called “Welt AG” and not “World Inc.”, although English was the language for 
executives at DaimlerChrysler AG. Finally, Eaton’s announcement in the very first press 
conference that he would be resigning within three years leaving Schrempp as sole CEO made 
it obvious to Chrysler executives and the American press that he had sold out to the Germans 
(The New York Times May 8th, 1998; Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
Although it would be Daimler who would sell Chrysler in 2007, it would be empirically 
incorrect to claim that Chrysler was a one-way downward slide from Day 1. True to its 
history, Chrysler would experience a series of dramatic slumps and equally dramatic 
recoveries over the next 9 years. Chrysler was certainly the economically more efficient 
company at the beginning of the takeover and at times between 2003 and 2005 it often 
appeared that DaimlerChrysler AG needed Chrysler to compensate dramatic losses at 
Mercedes. The Economist in an article entitled “DaimlerChrysler: In Tandem (at last)” could 
still write as late as April 30th, 2006: 
It has taken eight years, billions of dollars and blood on the carpet, but a big merger is 
finally starting to work (...) But none of that [the mistakes made by Schrempp: Author] 
should obscure the vindication of Mr Schrempp’s chief insight. Without Daimler, 
Chrysler would be in liquidation; and without Chrysler, Mercedes would be confined to 
a limited future of narrowing horizons, as rivals encroached on the luxury market. 
Strategic mergers may sometimes be necessary, even if they are mighty hard to pull off 
(The Economist April 30th, 2006).  
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Figure 3: Overview of 6 Strategical Failures (6) in Welt AG 
 
Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 1.3 
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Notwithstanding The Economist’s optimism, the eventual fate of Chrysler begs the main 
question. The Welt AG had failed before Chrysler was put up for sale in February 2007. As of 
July 2005 Jürgen Schrempp was no longer CEO precisely because the Welt AG had failed. 
This case study will show that this failure had six interconnected strategic flaws (Fig. 3 
above). However, to be fair to the architects of these strategic blunders, it must be said that 
the ramifications of these strategic mistakes were exacerbated and accelerated by weaknesses 
in the Japanese and American economies during this time (2000-2004) and increased 
competition for the Mitsubishi, Chrysler and Daimler brands respectively.  
Firstly, the takeover of Chrysler must be seen within the context of CEO Schrempp’s Welt 
AG strategy, which continued to pursue and extend former Mercedes CEO Werner’s 
expansion and production globalization of the Mercedes brand. Daimler-Benz underestimated 
the difficulties involved in trying to introduce Japanese and American production systems 
within the Mercedes organization. This included a complete underestimation of differences 
between the commercial and passenger vehicle sectors. Both Werner and later Schrempp 
believed it was possible to simply copy the strategy, which had been successful in the 
commercial vehicle division of Mercedes-Benz.  
Secondly, the ramifications of the contradiction between global production systems and the 
Mercedes quality strategy with an emphasis on “Made in Germany” were also 
underestimated. This approach was a major strategical mistake, which was directly 
responsible for the dramatic drop in quality at Mercedes during Schrempp’s tenure as CEO. 
Serious launch problems with the Smart, the A-class, the E-class and the M-class between 
1996 and 2003 had devastating effects on Mercedes quality and brand image (The New York 
Times July 10th, 2005). Most studies underestimate the role of Mercedes quality issues, especially in the US market, in the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG. The decision within the 
Mercedes organization to adopt the paradigms of lean production and globalized mass 
production (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) led to the erosion of the most important factor in 
the hitherto success of the Mercedes brand, quality made in Germany (Boyer and Freyssenet 
2000). The national institutional framework of the German coordinated market economy had 
hitherto enabled the generation and success of the Mercedes quality strategy, as was the case 
with BMW, Audi and Porsche. The Welt AG strategy was at odds with this German tradition 
of production. Globalizing and expanding the Mercedes brand represented a major strategic 
mistake independent of the decisions to takeover Chrysler and acquire a share of Mitsubishi 
Motors Corporation. The takeover of operations at Chrysler and Mitsubishi Motors 
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Corporation only impacted this change in Mercedes production strategy indirectly, by 
draining additional Mercedes manpower, which would have been needed to restore Mercedes 
quality image sooner. The increasing quality issues at Mercedes increased pressure to 
abandon the weakest parts of the Welt AG strategy, first Mitsubishi (2005) and then Chrysler 
(2007).  
Thirdly, in order to significantly increase market shares in both the North American and Asian 
regions this new Mercedes development and production strategy had to be supplemented with 
strategies involving other car companies. Instead of aiming for strategic alliances, the Welt 
AG strategy aimed to implement Mercedes decision-making dominance in four critical areas; 
the two German Supervisory and Management Boards, the senior executive levels in its 
relations with Chrysler (as of 1998) and finally the senior executive levels at Mitsubishi 
Motors Corporation (MMC) as of the summer of 2000. Mercedes executive hegemony does 
not mean that Chrysler and Mitsubishi should be “mercedesized”, but rather refers to the 
placing of executive decision-making power in the exclusive hands of Mercedes officials. 
This decision excluded the experience and know-how of both the Chrysler and Mitsubishi 
organizations. 
The mistake of creating German decision-making hegemony was further compounded by the 
fourth strategic decision mistake, namely the creation the myth of a “merger of equals” as a 
means of selling the takeover to shareholders and stakeholders alike. This mistake alienated 
Chrysler executives and triggered an immediate breach of trust (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). The 
vast majority of executives responsible for Chrysler’s pre-takeover success had all left 
DaimlerChrysler AG by the year 2000 (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000).Without trust it was 
impossible to create synergy effects at the operational level. In particular, Chrysler Board 
member Thomas Stallkamp was frustrated at Mercedes’ rejection of his proposals to merge 
the Mercedes M-Class and Jeep Grand Cherokee platforms under Chrysler leadership. The 
Board also rejected his suggestion to create a Chrysler-built modified American version of the 
Mercedes E-Class (The New York Times November 26th, 2000). He was eventually forced to 
retire in September 1999 and Chrysler was placed under direct German management a year 
later when Stallkamp’s successor Holden failed to turn around the company’s fortunes. By the 
time (late 2001) Chrysler’s new German management under CEO Zetsche and COO Bernhard 
re-established faith in the company, almost four valuable years had been lost. 
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The “merger of equals” lie will be examined in chapter 6 from the perspective of issues in 
organizational culture and the role of trust in developing a new culture for a new firm. One 
immediate ramification of the lie is important to mention at this stage. In the field of post-
merger implementation strategies, the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was accompanied by the 
rhetoric of a “best of both” solution, which would have required a transformational integration 
of cultures, processes and brands in order to achieve “best practices”. Mercedes executives 
completely underestimated the difficulties in merging two completely different production 
systems. This post integration strategy is at odds with the starkly divergent production 
strategies. As the case of Renault and Nissan implies, differing production systems and 
organizational cultures do not necessarily mean that integration is impossible but a “merger of 
equals” strategy would then be the wrong strategy. Announcing and aiming at a best of both 
strategy of production system integration is another reason for the takeover failure (Harzing 
and Van Ruysseveldt 2004).  
Daimler and Chrysler had developed production strategies that were historically determined 
by their varieties of capitalism respectively (Hall and Soskice 2001), in particular the tradition 
of vocational training in Germany and of taylorism and later innovation/flexibility in the USA 
(Boyer and Freyssenet 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). The path dependent nature of the 
differing production systems renders post-takeover integration a difficult task. As will be 
shown in the course of the case study, within the framework of the DaimlerChrysler AG very 
little was done initially to master these problems together, primarily due to Mercedes 
executives’ insistence on a rigid separation of the brands. Although related to the Welt AG 
strategy, this decision points to the inability of Mercedes managers to seriously attempt to 
adapt advantages from both Chrysler and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation and draws our 
attention to the 5th strategical mistake. 
Despite this study’s focus on the relationship between the Mercedes and Chrysler passenger 
car organizations, the timeline of the undoing of the Welt AG was primarily determined and 
triggered by the failed Asian Strategy, which can be considered the 6th strategical failure. 
Schrempp’s attempt to acquire Nissan in early 1999 alienated the American members of the 
Board of Management, who favored a maximal concentrated effort in implementing the 
integration of Mercedes and Chrysler combined know-how (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). The self-
created pressure to find an Asian partner forced Schrempp into the ill-fated decision to 
acquire Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC) in the year 2000 and represents a sixth major 
strategic mistake. Despite the Chrysler division’s recovery in 2003 and 2004, it was the 
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failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover of Mitsubishi in 2004 that triggered the series of 
events leading to the Board decision to fire Schrempp on July 28th, 2005 (Der Spiegel 31, 
2005).  
From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to comprehend how such basic strategical 
mistakes could be made, but some of the reasons are equally simplistic. From the perspective 
of 1998 both Mercedes and Chrysler had limited options for the future. Furthermore, the 
radical attempt by Schrempp’s predecessor to diversify in other fields had been a major 
disaster (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). In addition Schrempp did not have a deep knowledge of the 
operational reality of the Mercedes organization. Tellingly, the authors of the Welt AG 
strategy and most important support players under Schrempp had mostly no experience and 
no acceptance within the Mercedes passenger car division in the 1990s. Schrempp came from 
the aerospace division of Daimler-Benz, DASA. His power struggle with Mercedes CEO 
Helmut Werner between 1995 and 1997 created a basic situation of mistrust against him and 
robbed him of the executive most suited to dealing with quality issues arising within the 
context of the new strategy (Der Spiegel 4, 1997). The organizer of his strategic “war-room”, 
Rüdiger Grube, also came from DASA by way of MBB, the former military division of 
Daimler-Benz. Rolf Eckrodt was Chairman of ADtranz, the railway division of Daimler-
Benz. It would be Eckrodt’s poor handling of the Mitsubishi takeover that would jeopardize 
Schrempp’s control of the company (Gill 2012). Manfred Bischoff was CFO at Deutsche 
Aerospace, serving DASA head Schrempp in the early 1990s. Finally, although Eckhard 
Cordes did have experience working within the passenger and commercial vehicle divisions 
of the company, his open criticism of the highly respected Dieter Zetsche alienated him from 
most Mercedes executives. Cordes’ tenure as successor of Jürgen Hubbert as head of the 
Mercedes Car Group between October 1st 2004 and 31st August 2005 witnessed the largest 
fall in Mercedes quality ratings in history as a result of cost-cutting and shortened 
development cycles (The New York times July 10th, 2005). Cordes left DaimlerChrysler AG 
immediately after Dieter Zetsche was named Schrempp’s successor in the summer of 2005. 
The strategy team of Schrempp’s version of the Welt AG strategy failed to realize the basic 
contradictions between Mercedes’ successes as a quality brand made in Germany and the 
ramifications of globalizing Mercedes production. Furthermore, the strategy of stretching the 
Mercedes brand and increasing volumes would jeopardize Mercedes’ reputation for highest 
quality, particularly in the critical North American market. Paradoxically the dilution of the 
Mercedes brand was accompanied by a fear of commonizing development and production 
platforms with Chrysler and Mitsubishi, which could have produced synergy effects.  
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Finally, almost all studies mention the role played by difference in national culture in the 
tradition of Hofstede (1980, 2002) and the GLOBE report (2007). These include Beamer and Varner (2001); Schindler (2000); Finkelstein (2002); Pruett (2003); Wolf (2005); Trajanov (2008); Varner and Beamer (2008). This case study will show that such an approach is on the wrong track and misinterprets the degree of intercultural integration withing the global automobile industry. National cultural animosities increased as things started to go wrong, but national cultural differences merely added fat to the fire. They did not start the fire. 
In order to elucidate the complexity of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure the next 
chapter will outline the order of topics to be covered in this case study. 
1.4  The structure of the case study 
1.4.1  Goals of the takeover and reasons for optimism 
This case study of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure will proceed in the following 
manner: In chapter 2 the main goals of the takeover will be considered as stated in the first 
press conference and reiterated in numerous interviews, annual reports and addresses to 
shareholders (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). This will be followed by an 
overview of the initial optimism surrounding the takeover and the initial successful facts and 
figures for the first year of the new company (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998). 
This positive reaction will be corroborated with an overview of previous merger/takeover 
successes at both Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. In addition, the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
will be placed within the context of the paradigm of lean production, globalized mass 
production and merger frenzy, which characterizes the global automobile industry in the late 
1990s (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000; Brady and Lorenz 2000). 
Knowing that the takeover failed, but in the face of such overwhelming optimism in May 
1998, the second chapter will end by posing 2 central research questions, which the case study 
attempts to answer: 
1. Why did the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover fail? 
2. What are the implications of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure for the 
theory and practice of cross border mergers (Marks and Mirvis 1998)? 
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1.4.2 Conventional and unconventional approaches  
Chapter 3 turns its attention to the academic community and begins with a general overview 
of the existing literature on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. The main focus of 
attention, however, will be directed to Hofstede’s (1980, 2002) work on cultural dimensions 
and secondly, the so-called Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach from Hall and Soskice 
(2001).  
As much of the literature (Beamer and Varner 2001; Schindler 200; Finkelstein; 2002 Pruett 
2003; Wolf 2005; Trajanov 2008; Varner and Beamer 2008) of the DaimlerChrysler AG 
takeover failure draws attention to the role of cultural differences between American and 
German executives in the takeover failure, it is worthwhile to assess the case from the 
perspective of Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensionality (1980). Although Hofstede’s work 
continues to be one of the most cited sources (Hofstede 2002) and the foundation of the most 
comprehensive academic research on intercultural studies (GLOBE 2007), this case study will 
try to show that many aspects of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure point to serious 
weaknesses in Hofstede’s overall approach. Specifically, Hofstede’s idea of cultural values as 
a kind of generic “software of the mind” will be shown to be the result of historically outdated 
survey results. It will be argued that intercultural differences play a minor role in the failure of 
DaimlerChrysler AG.  
Chapter 3.3 is devoted to Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001) approach. The 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover seems ideally suited for an analysis from the VoC perspective. 
Companies are the main strategic actors within the VoC approach. Secondly, Daimler and 
Chrysler are manufacturing companies, the sector analyzed by Hall and Soskice in their initial 
publication (2001). Furthermore, Daimler is a German company and Chrysler was an 
American company. In their approach, Hall and Soskice take Germany and America as the 
most important ideal types of a coordinated market economy (CME) and liberal market 
economy (LME) respectively. In addition, the 1998 takeover was contemporary with the 
emergence of the VoC approach. Finally, VoC has a unique approach to explain the “global” 
behavior of companies embedded within CME and LME national institutions.  
This case study will argue that VoC’s understanding of the resiliency of national institutions 
despite the pressure and tension of supra-national (EU and NAFTA) and global institutions, 
provides us with a suitable framework for positioning the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG 
within the political and economic context of the first decade of the 21st century. This 
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framework is enhanced when combined with the most comprehensive and accurate 
assessment of the global automobile industry in the 1990s as elucidated by Boyer and 
Freyssenet (2000). The VoC approach, despite certain important limitations, helps us to 
understand the restrictions of the concept of a “truly global company” as a result of the 
national institutions of differing varieties of capitalism (Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2008). 
1.4.3 Daimler-Benz’s Welt AG strategy (1983-1998) 
One of the major shortcomings of hitherto studies is their starting point, the 1998 
announcement of the takeover. However, the Chrysler takeover was merely one chapter in the 
middle of a larger story. At the centre of this story is the role of Daimler-Benz’s Welt AG 
strategy in the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. Chapter 4 researches the 
roots of the Welt AG strategy between the early 1980s and 1998. Utilizing categories from the 
revolutionary MIT study of the automobile industry (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) the 
chapter begins by analyzing the continuing shift from “craft” to “mass” production at 
Mercedes. However, a closer analysis of the situation at both Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 
the 1980s and early 1990s reveal serious shortcomings in the MIT approach. Boyer and 
Freyssenet (2000) provide us with more comprehensive strategy categories (quality versus 
innovation and flexibility), which are central to understanding the root incompatibility 
between Mercedes and Chrysler strategies. Moreover, their categories allow us to explain the 
basic contradiction between the traditional Mercedes quality strategy and the emerging Welt 
AG strategy. 
Chapter 4 also looks at the period of diversification and expansion at Daimler-Benz under the 
leadership of Schrempp’s predecessor Edzard Reuter. An understanding of the extent of the 
failure of Reuter’s vision of Daimler as a technological consortium, producing everything 
from Alpha Jets to electric toothbrushes, makes clear the seriousness of the challenges 
Schrempp was facing when he took over as Daimler-Benz CEO in 1995. There was a radical 
need for Schrempp to quickly change the direction of the company. It would be therefore 
unfair to place the complete blame for the failure of the Welt AG alone on Jürgen Schrempp’s 
shoulders. Indeed in 1995 he had inherited and was himself not solely responsible for “the 
greatest destruction of market capitalization in peacetime German history” (Der Spiegel 31, 
1995). 
The following section looks at the most critical problems facing Schrempp after he took over 
as CEO in 1995. In order to return Daimler-Benz to profitability he used shareholder value 
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and a Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)  rate of 12% as a measurement of sustainability. 
13 of 36 business units were disbanded. More importantly, Schrempp had become CEO of 
Daimler-Benz at a time when the CEO of Mercedes (Helmut Werner) was more powerful 
than former Daimler-Benz CEO Reuter. Werner was so powerful that he had entered 
negotiations to merge with Chrysler in 1995 without informing his boss, Daimler-Benz CEO 
Reuter (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). In a long two year power struggle, Schrempp outmaneuvered 
Werner by adopting his rival’s own strategy and declaring Mercedes to be the central business 
activity of Daimler-Benz. Schrempp adopted a Welt AG strategy focusing on global 
expansion in the passenger car and commercial vehicle, which had been initiated originally by 
Werner. Schrempp’s pronouncement of his Welt AG strategy as the main strategic focus for 
the entire company rendered the previous separation of an overall Daimler-Benz CEO 
(Reuter) and a Mercedes CEO (Werner) superfluous. Schrempp became Daimler-Benz and 
Mercedes CEO and forced Werner to resign (Der Spiegel 4, 1997). 
Chapter 4 ends with a brief view of the reasons behind Chrysler’s decision to sell out to 
Daimler in 1998 although the previous Q-Star and Lone-Star benchmarking studies in 1995 
had come to the conclusion that both companies were completely incompatible (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). 
1.4.4 Measuring the takeover failure 
Chapter 5 concentrates on measuring the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. It looks 
closely at the three goals outlined by Schrempp and Eaton when they first publicly announced 
the creation of the new company in May 1998: 
1. Increase in shareholder value 
2. Implementation of cost-savings by realization of operational synergy effects 
3. Increased customer satisfaction through quality enhancement 
After reaching a high of $108 USD in January 1999, DaimlerChrysler shares (DCX) dropped 
to an all-time low of $38 USD by November 2000 (The Economist March 30th, 2006). It 
would stay around that level until the announcement of Schrempp’s resignation in the summer 
of 2005. Ironically, that announcement would trigger one of the largest single-day jumps in 
the history of DCX. This section of chapter 5 builds on the work of Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 
(2000), Karoyli (2003) and Stout (2012). It will draw attention to key mistakes in the attempt 
to establish DCX as the world’s first global stock. The pre-issue delisting from S&P’s 500 list 
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on October 1st 1998 and the subsequent retreat of American investment and trust funds, which  
triggered a massive American sellout of DCX shares in 1998 and 1999 (Blaško, Netter and 
Sinkey 2000). Throughout its history, activity on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
accounted for less than 5% of total DCX trading (Karoyli 2003). In addition, Schrempp’s 
attacks on the NYSE and Chrysler’s biggest stockholder Kerkorian’s legal action against 
Schrempp augmented the damage to shareholder value (The New York Times December 2nd, 
2003). 
Chapter 5 also looks at the reasons behind DaimlerChrysler AG’s inability to achieve synergy 
effects. Unlike Chrysler, Mercedes entered the 1998 deal without a standardized approach to 
production and development processes (Clarke 2005). It would be the year 2000 until the 
beginnings of a Mercedes Development System (MDS) and Mercedes Production System 
(MPS) would slowly start to emerge. It was only after Zetsche and Bernhard took over 
leadership of Chrysler that it became clear that very little was happening in the post takeover 
integration (PMI) projects designed to ascertain and implement synergy savings at the 
operational level. This led to the creation at Board level of the so-called Executive 
Automotive Committee (EAC) in the year 2000 (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000 
16). This organizational asymmetry was augmented by Mercedes’ insistence on a strict 
separation of the brands. Zetsche’s efforts to change the strategy of brand separation as late as 
2006, just 6 months before the decision was made to sell Chrysler, as a last attempt to save 
Chrysler, were short-lived and failed to stimulate sales. His German-American engineering 
advertising campaign emphasizing the Mercedes contribution to Chrysler group was a failure 
(The Economist September 21st, 2006). 
The final section of chapter 5 is devoted to the role of quality issues at Mercedes, Chrysler 
and Mitsubishi as contributing factors to the overall failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG. Based 
on J.D. Power, Consumers Reports and National Highway and Traffic Safety Association 
(NHTSA) data, the case study will draw attention to the seriousness of quality issues at 
Mercedes. Although Chrysler and Mitsubishi played no direct role in this measurable drop in 
quality, the Welt AG strategy was viewed as being responsible for the deterioration. The need 
to send managers to fix problems at Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and Mercedes plants in France 
(Smart), the Netherlands (Smart), the USA (M-Class), Brazil (A-Class), and South Africa (C-
class) stretched Mercedes resources and depleted development, production planning and 
production capacity at home. This was confounded with reduced development times and the 
resulting launch of vehicles, which lacked serial production part and process maturity.  
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Chapter 5 continues with a brief overview of quality issues at Chrysler, which were 
augmented with increasing competition as Japanese brands eclipsed the American division’s 
initial competitive edge in the area of innovative marketing. 
Chapter 5 concludes by analyzing how the massive quality problems at Mitsubishi Motor 
Corporation (MCC) triggered the end of the Welt AG. Despite restructuring attempts (Gill 
2012). The ensuing recall of millions of vehicles and evidence of criminal activity at the 
Japanese division resulted in a dramatic loss of market share in Japan and the USA. As was 
the case with Chrysler, Schrempp was judged to have acquired Mitsubishi at precisely the 
worst possible moment (The New York Times April 24th, 2004). 
1.4.5 The “merger” lie and trust 
Whereas Chapter 5 ends with an analysis of the failed Welt AG strategy, Chapter 6 takes a 
closer look at the sub-strategy pertaining to the relationship between Daimler-Benz and 
Chrysler and the role of the “merger of equals” lie in the takeover failure. The chapter begins 
with a look at the semantics of “merger”, “acquisition” and “takeover” and reviews the 
existing strategies for post-merger outcomes (Marks and Mirvis 1998; Harzing and Van 
Ruysseveldt 2004). The resulting theoretical possibilities are then applied to the global 
automobile sector to emphasize the difficulties facing any “merger of equal’s strategy”. 
Secondly, chapter 6 considers the question whether diverging organizational cultures were 
responsible for the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure (Kreps 1980; Porter 1980; Weber 
and Camerer 2003). Despite the obvious differences in organizational culture between 
Mercedes and Chrysler, the case study will argue that such differences are not sufficient in 
themselves to explain the negative outcomes. Otherwise almost no merger or takeover would 
have a chance to succeed. Furthermore there is no comprehensive and conclusive empirical 
evidence to substantiate that argument. Specifically in the car industry, the spectacular failure 
of DaimlerChrysler AG has to be contrasted with the equally spectacular although unexpected 
success of the Renault Nissan Alliance (Gill 2012). Furthermore, there have been a large 
number of successful acquisitions of American firms by German companies during the last 
decade (Wübben 2007). 
Organizational or corporate culture is not a self-explanatory category for economists 
(Hermalin 2000) and is often relegated to the “sloppier” realms of sociology (Schein 1980) or 
political economy (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, building on the work of Porter (1980), 
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Kreps (1980) and Baron and Kreps (1999) a consistent framework will be generated for an 
analysis of the roles of differing organizational cultures in the success or failure of cross-
border mergers from the perspective of economic theory. Specifically, it will be argued that 
although organizational culture plays a significant role in the fate of a merger, it is not a 
showstopper in itself. It is rather the case that the greater the cultural differences in a “merger 
of equals” the more important it becomes to build on the creation of trust in order to both 
facilitate reciprocal decision-making and enable the possibility of overcoming incomplete and 
inefficient contracting (Williamson 1981).  
In a further step, the next section of chapter 6 will consider the organizational pre-requisites 
that are necessary for an atmosphere of trust to be created and allowed to exist, to be 
maintained, and to thrive or to decline. As can be shown from the structure of organizations, 
any form of reciprocal interaction requires a certain amount of trust and fairness. Therefore in 
a further step the following section will look specifically at the degree of trust necessary in 
order to deal with radical changes in organizations such as mergers or takeovers. In order to 
accomplish this task the section will utilize Cohen and Prusak’s concept of “social capital” 
(2001). 
The analysis of social capital will consist of an examination of the functions of the 4 factors 
Cohen and Prusak consider essential in order to create the high social capital that is necessary 
to deal with volatile and demanding issues of change management such as a “best of both 
cross-border mergers”. Those factors are trust, networks and communities, space and time to 
connect, and social talk and storytelling. The four factors will be applied to the 
DaimlerChrysler AG case to demonstrate how all four actually led to the destruction of 
whatever levels of social capital were available at the beginning of the takeover within the 
Daimler and Chrysler organizations respectively. Without this social capital the promise of a 
merger of equals was over as early as November 2000, when Schrempp’s interview publicly 
documented a clear breach of trust (The Financial Times October 30th, 2000; The New York 
Times November 26th, 2000). 
1.4.6 Lessons learnt 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter of the case study and considers lessons learnt. As Yin (1984) 
points out, case study research is pained to demarcate the boundaries between empirically 
investigating current phenomena and defining their overall context. Although short, the final 
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chapter will suggest that this case study offers a number of lessons to be learnt, independent 
of the specificities of the current case (Eisenhardt 1987). 
The study will conclude with drawing attention to the important limits of this research. Large 
cross border takeover are very public events and the subject of daily public scrutiny. Success 
stories result in allowing the public to peak behind the scenes. Failures, such as 
DaimlerChrysler AG set off the exact opposite reaction, silence and deception. The final 
version of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure can only be written with access to all the 
records and minutes of the history of the company between 1998 and 2007. Two phrases 
survived the initial press conference from May 1998; “merger of equals” and “marriage made 
in heaven”. It has already been pointed out that the “merger of equals” lie did not survive the 
press conference inside the company and began to deteriorate outside the company with the 
Standard & Poors 500 decision not to list the new DCX stock from October 1st, 1998 (Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). As a result this case study will refer consistently to the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. The marriage metaphor will serve as a barometer of the 
degree of stakeholder acceptance of the takeover and the following headline from the New 
York Times made it clear how quickly the perfect match started to fall apart:  
  Scenes from a Marriage 
The DaimlerChrysler takeover is similar, in many ways, to the wedding of Prince 
Charles and Lady Diana. An elite, old-line company, Daimler-Benz, had asked for the 
hand of a beautiful, populist bride, the Chrysler Corporation, and its petition had been 
accepted. It was a dream match—a “wedding made in heaven,” as Daimler’s C.E.O., 
Jürgen Schrempp, called it in May 1998. The wedding party—among it, Wall Street and 
its analysts and even major stockholders like the billionaire Kirk Kerkorian—was 
enthusiastic. The new company’s shares rose to a dream high of $108.62 a few months 
after its stock was first traded on Nov. 17, 1998. By this spring, the dream couple had 
undergone a remarkable transformation. The American bride had apparently vanished; 
or, to be more precise, she had turned into a German with a bald spot and a mustache. 
To American ears, the name of the Chrysler division’s new German C.E.O., Dieter 
Zetsche, sounded more like “Mrs. Thatcher” than like “Princess Di.” Daimler still 
looked terrific, but Chrysler was all gloom and doom. “We have to face facts,” said 
Jürgen Schrempp, by then the chairman of DaimlerChrysler AG. “The U.S. situation 
has taken a serious turn for the worse.” (New York Times August 12th, 2001). 
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2 THE GOALS AND RATIONALE FOR THE TAKEOVER 
1997 was the hitherto most successful year in the history of Daimler-Benz. Having reduced 
the number of business units by 13 to 23, operating profit rose by 79% to DM 4.3 billion. 
Setting a goal of return on capital employed at 12% the performance of the business units 
almost doubled from 5.8% to 10.2% (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1997).  
Schrempp confirmed his commitment to raising shareholder value by deciding on an 
extraordinary payout to shareholders of DM 10.3 billion. In addition, the company’s stock 
option plan was extended to all 1,400 senior executives. In a preview of upcoming events 
Schrempp emphasized the role of globalization as one of the three core elements of his 
strategy: 
Daimler-Benz is firmly rooted in Germany with a proud tradition of engineering quality 
and innovation. But today, we serve customers in more than 200 countries around the 
world. More than two thirds of our revenues come from outside Germany and more than 
one third of our stock is held internationally. And the key to further growth is to tap new 
markets for our products. So we have to be where the markets are. For example, we 
have said that we aim to increase our group revenues in Asia from 8% in 1997 to 
between 20 and 25% in 10 years’ time. (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1997 4) 
The proposed goals for the passenger car division pointed out the importance of emerging 
markets and a continued radical expansion of production capacity. Sales had risen strongly 
from 645,000 to 715,000 from 1996 to 1997, but the goal of 1 million units demonstrates the 
extent to which Schrempp valued high volumes in order to survive the current wave of 
takeover threats in the automobile industry (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). 
The newly industrializing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe will 
probably exhibit the most rapid growth in terms of volume in the coming years. In the 
industrialized nations, the growth in passenger car demand will primarily be supported 
by vehicles such as minivans, off-road vehicles, roadsters, and convertibles. The aim of 
the Passenger Car division is to continue to expand the Company’s position in the 
market for luxury cars worldwide and to open up new markets and market segments. 
We intend to further improve our earnings by the year 2000 and increase our sales 
volume to more than one million vehicles. Our new products such as the A-Class, the 
M-Class, and the Smart will be instrumental in this effort. The new S-Class will 
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reinforce our leading position in the high-end market segment (Daimler-Benz AG 
Annual Report 1997 12). 
When Schrempp approached Chrysler CEO at the Detroit Auto Show in January 1998, he 
knew that Ford was interested in acquiring Daimler-Benz as part of their strategy of taking 
over luxury models. Jaguar, Daimler (Jaguar), Land Rover, Aston Martin and Volvo would all 
end up in Ford’s Premiere Automotive Group (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). Schrempp also knew 
that Daimler-Benz was the last independent luxury brand without family support to protect it 
against any hostile takeover attempt. Despite the success of 1997, Daimler-Benz was also a 
relatively inexpensive takeover object for the likes of Ford or GM. The possibilities of 
expansion in the luxury car segment were limited and the competition had caught up to 
Mercedes in terms of quality and innovation (Der Spiegel 18, 1996). In 1998 it was also 
unclear whether the new A-Class and M-Class would establish themselves as luxury brands in 
their respective market segments. The realization of Schrempp’s Welt AG required a 
partnership, an alliance, a merger or a takeover. The Chrysler Board was also conscious of 
continuing consolidation within the automobile industry. In addition, Chrysler executives 
realized their overdependence on the NAFTA region (93% of sales). Despite high growth 
rates since 1992, America’s third largest automobile manufacturer could not be expected to 
achieve more than 20% of the American market. In their record performance year Chrysler 
had managed to attain 16% of the US market in 1997 (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
In 1995, both Chrysler executives and new Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp had rejected 
Mercedes CEO Helmut Werner’s efforts to bring the two companies together (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). This time it would Schrempp himself who would approach Chrysler CEO 
Robert Eaton. In 1995 hundreds of specialists had compared up to twelve options for 
cooperation for almost a year before ending talks. In 1997 fewer than 10 people negotiated the 
takeover in just a few months and the results were presented to the public on May 7th, 1998. 
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Figure 4: DaimlerChrysler AG Takeover Timeline 1998 
Jan. 12th Jürgen Schrempp, CEO of Daimler-Benz, suggests “merger” to   
  Chrysler Chairman Robert Eaton while in Detroit for the 1998 North  
  American International Auto Show. 
Mid Feb. Initial discussions on a possible takeover between representatives and  
  consultants. 
March 2nd  Eaton and Schrempp meet in Switzerland to discuss organizational  
  structure for takeover 
March-April  Teams from both companies work out acquisition. 
April –May Teams negotiate takeover agreement and related documents. 
May 6th Takeover agreement signed in London. 
May 7th “Merger of equals” announced.  
May 14th Daimler-Benz supervisory board approves takeover. 
June 18th Daimler-Benz management team visits Chrysler headquarters in Auburn  
  Hills, Mich. 
June 25th Chrysler management team visits Daimler-Benz headquarters in Stuttgart, 
  Germany. 
July 23rd  European Commission approves takeover. 
July 31st  Federal Trade Commission approves takeover. 
Aug. 6th  Announcement that DaimlerChrysler shares will be traded as Global  
  Registered Shares 
Aug. 27th Management teams meet in USA to discuss post-takeover plans. 
Sept. 18th  Chrysler (97.5%) and Daimler-Benz (99.8%) shareholders approve. 
 
Oct. 1st  Announcement not to include DaimlerChrysler on S&P500 Index 
Nov. 9th  98% of Daimler-Benz stock exchanged for DaimlerChrysler AG shares. 
Nov. 17th DaimlerChrysler stock (DCX) begins trading in Germany and USA  
 
 
Source: Adapted by John Riach; DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 2.1 
Whereas Chrysler CEO Eaton was left to struggle with the pronunciation of German names as 
he announced the Members of the Board, it was Schrempp who delivered his vision of the 
new company at the first press conference on May 7th, 1998:  
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The two companies are a perfect fit of two leaders in their respective markets. Both 
companies have dedicated and skilled workforces and successful products, but in 
different markets and different parts of the world. By combining and utilizing each 
other’s strengths, we will have a pre-eminent strategic position in the global 
marketplace for the benefit of our customers. We will be able to exploit new markets, 
and we will improve return and value for our shareholders. This is a historic merger that 
will change the face of the automotive industry. This is much more than a merger; today 
we are creating the world’s leading automotive company for the 21st century. We are 
combining the two most innovative car companies in the world (DaimlerChrysler AG 
Video Appendix 1.1; also quoted in Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). 
At the same press conference Schrempp announced the three main goals of the takeover: 
1. Increase shareholder value 
2. Achieve operational synergy effects 
3. Satisfy customers with high quality 
It was the second goal, which appeared particularly contradictory during this first press 
conference and the subject of a number of questions from the press (DaimlerChrysler AG 
Video Appendix 1.1). On the one hand both Eaton and Schrempp emphasized the 
complementary nature of both companies. Daimler-Benz was stronger in high-end and luxury 
cars whereas Chrysler’s strength lay in the market for minivans, jeeps and sport-utility 
vehicles. With the possible exception of the Jeep Grand Cherokee and Mercedes’ new M-
Class there was no overlapping. Secondly, Daimler-Benz was strong in Europe (63% of sales) 
while Chrysler sold over 90% of its vehicle in the NAFTA region (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 
2000). Daimler-Benz’s reputation for excellence in engineering was said to complement 
Chrysler’s strengths in speedy product development and product innovation. Although 
Daimler-Benz had introduced ten new models in the previous three years compared to 3 in the 
10 year period prior to that, it was still far away from Chrysler’s 24 month development cycle 
time. For their part, Chrysler could profit from Mercedes’ tradition of quality. Although 
Chrysler had adopted Honda’s model of innovation and flexibility in the 1990s, the company 
continued to be plagued with quality issues (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000; Vlasic and Stertz 
2000). As a result of their complementary relationship Schrempp stressed the importance of 
brand demarcation, especially conscious of the risk to the Mercedes brand. However, it was 
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completely unclear to industry insiders, where synergy effects could be realized. No plants 
were to be closed and both CEOs expected an increase in the number of employees. The 
promise of initial synergy benefits of $1.4 billion and annual benefits of $ 3 billion within 3 to 
5 years seemed unrealistic without a major integration of shared technologies, purchasing 
power and the use of common parts, processes and platforms. Such a degree of integration 
would exactly thrEaton the brand demarcation that Mercedes executives adamant on 
retaining.  
2.1 Reasons for optimism 
In the face of the takeover’s failure it is easy to forget the economic excitement, confidence 
and optimism that were triggered by the announcement of the takeover on May 7th, 1998 in 
London.  
On paper, the deal would provide both companies with big advantages: Chrysler, which 
sells more than 90 percent of its vehicles in North America, would have a formidable 
new base in Europe. Daimler, by contrast, would secure a huge presence in the United 
States, the world’s biggest market, as well as a way to expand into middle-priced cars 
without tarnishing the prestigious Mercedes brand name (New York Times May 8th, 
1998) 
The reaction of the otherwise industry critical German weekly magazine Der Spiegel (20 
1998) was even more euphoric at the time: 
Mit DaimlerChrysler entsteht die erste Welt AG unter deutscher Führung – die neue 
globale Wirtschaftswelt wird Wirklichkeit. Die Fusion verändert nicht nur den 
deutschen Vorzeigekonzern – der gesamten Wirtschaft des Landes steht ein Umbruch 
bevor. (Author translation: The creation of DaimlerChrysler AG is the first global 
company under German leadership – the new global economy is becoming reality. The 
merger not only transforms Germany’s showpiece corporation, the merger also signals 
the coming of a radical revolution of the country’s complete economy). 
The next section will look at the public reactions of the stock market, the Boards, the 
shareholders, the unions, industry experts, the press, and the politicians in order to illustrate 
the degree of overwhelmingly popular optimism for the takeover in May 1998.  
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The most salient stakeholders have been left out of this list of optimists, namely the more than 
400,000 employees of the newly founded DaimlerChrysler AG. The reasons for this exclusion 
at this point in our analysis are twofold. Firstly, there is no reliable empirical evidence to 
document any claims. Secondly, a lot of the publicly recorded interviews appear “politically 
correct” and misrepresentative of the actors’ real thoughts. One prominent example suffices as 
evidence. Robert Lutz, the second most powerful man inside the Chrysler Corporation at the 
time of the deal, had opposed a merger with Daimler in 1995 (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). For 
this reason he was excluded from the secret talks between the two companies 3 years later 
(Ibid). Notwithstanding the fact that Lutz was the only Chrysler top executive who spoke 
German and had working experience in Germany at BMW, Opel and Ford, both Schrempp 
and Eaton saw him as a threat to the deal. Upon being informed that he would not be a 
member of the Board and would have no role to play in the new company, Lutz resigned 
within 14 days after the announcement of the takeover. The case and circumstances are well-
known and amply documented (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). However, Lutz published his 
autobiography of his life at Chrysler just a few months later (Lutz 1998). The last chapter, 
devoted to the future of DaimlerChrysler AG, was clearly the price Lutz had to pay to gain 
permission from DaimlerChrysler AG to publish the book. The last chapter expresses 
diametrically opposed opinions to the ones, which had led to his forced resignation just a few 
months earlier. The Lutz example shows the unreliability of information about the employees 
inside the company, especially the most important executives. This was especially the case in 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, which involved only a handful of people in the negotiation 
phase. The first reaction was surprise and shock. It would take months for people to figure out 
the ramifications for their jobs. And even today, more than 10 years later, the vast majority of 
Daimler employees who were addressed by the author refused to be interviewed.   
2.1.1 Initial DaimlerChrysler AG facts and figures  
One of the main reasons for the optimism at the beginning of the takeover was the sheer size 
of the deal. In terms of turnover, it was the largest industrial takeover in history. Before the 
sale, Chrysler was 15th and Daimler-Benz 8th in the rankings of the world’s largest industrial 
companies. After the agreement DaimlerChrysler AG skyrocketed to 3rd position, ahead of 
giants such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Exxon, Toyota, General Electric and IBM (Der Spiegel 20, 
1998). Only Ford and General Motors were bigger. Experts rationalized that the sheer size of 
the new firm would allow them to better steer through the cyclical volatility of the car 
business, chronically prone to recession in both the luxury (Daimler) and economical 
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(Chrysler) market segments. More importantly, DaimlerChrysler AG had more cash reserves 
than all of its rivals in the industry, including Ford and Toyota. This would enable the new 
company to find the Asian partner, preferably Nissan, needed to round-up CEO Schrempp’s 
vision of the Welt AG. The cash reserves would also ensure that the company could continue 
to invest in new technologies and facilities. Innovation was at the center of Daimler-Benz’s 
success in the automobile sector and Chrysler would profit from this. In 1997 Daimler-Benz 
had spent DM 9.8 billion in research and applied for 5,700 patents (Daimler-Benz AG Annual 
Report 1997). At the same time Chrysler was considered an industry leader in the area of 
economically efficient manufacturing, one of the most serious issues facing the Mercedes 
passenger car division (Clarke 2005). Another positive figure is the relationship between car 
sales and earnings. DaimlerChrysler AG was earning $6.5 billion dollars on sales of 4 million 
cars. In comparison, General Motors sales of 7.5 million vehicles were matched by only $2.8 
billion dollars in earnings. Although DaimlerChrysler AG was only in fifth position in terms 
of the number of cars sold, this was seen as a positive aspect due to their comparatively high 
earnings. Sales volume was paradoxical in the car business in 1998. A certain minimum 
volume (1 million vehicles) was considered a necessary pre-requisite for survival, but in an 
industry plagued by dramatic production overcapacity and market volatility, increasing car 
sales was less important than maintaining sales levels. This was seen as one of the major 
strengths of DaimlerChrysler AG, Volkswagen and Toyota whereas industry leaders in 1998, 
General Motors and Ford, were regarded as weak in this regard as the following table 
illustrates: 
Table 2: Global Automobile Industry 1998 (Condensed) 
Largest Carmakers 
1998 
Earnings Revenue Car sales Cash 
General Motors     $ 2.8 bn $ 140 bn 7.5 million $ 16.6 bn 
Ford Motor $ 6.7 bn $ 118 bn 6.8 million $ 23.0 bn 
DaimlerChrysler $ 6.5 bn $ 147 bn 4.0 million $ 25.0 bn 
Volkswagen $ 1.3 bn $   75 bn 4.6 million $ 12.4 bn 
Toyota Motor Co. $ 4.0 bn $ 106 bn 4.5 million $ 23.0 bn 
Honda Motor Co. $ 2.4 bn $  54 bn 2.3 million $  3.0 bn 
Source: Adapted by John Riach; DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Appendix 2.1 
The only numbers, which could be interpreted as questionable, were the number of employees 
in each company. With its 121,000 workers Chrysler was considered more efficient as an 
organization in terms of costs and time per vehicle than Daimler-Benz with over 300,000 
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employees. But even that figure is relativized if one takes into account the fact that only 
around 95,000 people worked in the Mercedes-Benz passenger car division (Daimler-Benz 
AG Annual Report 1997). At the time of the Chrysler takeover Daimler-Benz was still highly 
diversified in prducts and services as divergent as airplanes, satellites, rail vehicls, financial 
services and commercial vehicles. 
The numbers for the first 6 months of DaimlerChrysler support the optimism at the beginning 
of the takeover. The first DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report for 1998 sees a continuing 
upward trend for all key numbers. Revenues leaped ahead by 12% to $146.5 billion dollars. 
Operating profits even soared by 38% to reach almost $10 billion dollars. The company sold 
4, 4 million vehicles. As a result of this excellent performance an additional 19,000 jobs were 
created. DaimlerChrysler AG also delivered good figures in terms of shareholder value. 
Earnings per share exploded by 30% to reach $6.55 and the dividend of € 2.35 was a strong 
statement on shareholder value, especially directed to European shareholders who were now 
expecting a higher return on their investment than in 1997 (Daimler-Chrysler Annual Report 
1998). DaimlerChrysler AG did indeed seem to be moving very fast. It had introduced the 
first “global share”, DCX, trading on 21 stock exchanges worldwide without the need for 
depository receipts and even the Annual Report was ahead of its time. DaimlerChrysler AG 
was one of the first companies ever to report in Euro (DaimlerChrysler Video Appendix 1.1).   
2.1.2 Initial stock market reaction  
The most successful phase of the takeover was definitely the first 8 months until the end of 
1998 and was the clear result of the speed, secrecy and dynamism of the major actors on both 
sides of the company, but in particular DaimlerChrysler CEO, Jürgen Schrempp. At a time 
when Mercedes’ executives were trying to fend off approaches from Ford, Schrempp had 
hammered out a deal with Chrysler CEO Bob Eaton in less than 4 months. Fewer than 10 
people had worked on the details of a takeover, which joined together 400,000 employees 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000; DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998). In his short time as 
Daimler-Benz CEO, Schrempp had turned around the fortunes of the German company by 
implementing a radical “Americanized” cure to the ailing empire he had inherited from his 
predecessor Reuter. Focusing on a return on capital employed (ROCE) targeted at 12% and 
preaching the virtues of “shareholder value”, Schrempp reduced the number of business units 
at Daimler from 36 to 23 and had turned record losses into record profits within a period of 
two years.  
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Figure 5: Daimler-Benz Operating Profits/ Losses 1995-97 
 
Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 2.2 
In 1997 Daimler-Benz AG was the largest industrial group in Germany with revenues of DM 
124 billion ($68.9 billion). Schrempp’s decision to takeover Chrysler was immediately 
rewarded. The stock market, especially in the USA, greeted the news of the takeover 
enthusiastically. Chrysler’s stocks gained 18.7% and 10.5% on May 6-7 for a combined gain 
of over 30% (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). The reaction of the German stock exchange, 
DAX, was less euphoric, but Daimler shares still gained 4.57% over the same two-day period. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, the combined market capitalization of the two 
companies jumped from $84.9 billion to $95.2 billion within 48 hours. Wall Street and 
Frankfurt had accepted the DaimlerChrysler AG storyline. As Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 
(2000) have calculated, the abnormal increase in the combined value of the two companies 
corresponded to the announced expected benefits in the upcoming 5 years. However, the 
honeymoon between Daimler-Benz, Chrysler and the markets would last only a few months 
after the first official day of trading of the new combined DCX stock on November 17th, 1998. 
Its highest level would be over $108 dollars in January 1999. 
This early enthusiasm for DaimlerChrysler AG’s stocks was critical for Schrempp for a 
number of reasons. One of his explicitly stated goals for merging was to increase shareholder 
value and the jump in market capitalization provided reason for optimism. Secondly, the 
initial stock market success temporarily silenced critics still doubting the wisdom of 
abandoning the coordinated national institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001) of Deutschland AG 
to take on the full risks of open world markets. 
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2.1.3 The reaction of the respective boards 
The Chrysler Board approved the takeover unanimously. Their approval was outlined in the 
Chrysler Corporation proxy statement for the special meeting of Chrysler shareholders in 
September 1998 to accept the terms of the deal. The main reasons for the Board’s approval of 
the takeover were due to: 
1. the likelihood that the automotive industry will undergo significant 
 consolidation, resulting in a smaller number of larger companies surviving 
 as effective global competitors; 
2. the two companies’ complementary strengths: Daimler-Benz is stronger in 
 luxury and high end cars, and Chrysler is stronger in sport-utility vehicles 
 and minivans; Daimler is stronger in Europe, Chrysler in North America; 
 Daimler’s reputation for engineering complements Chrysler’s reputation for 
 product development;  
3. the opportunities for significant synergies afforded by a combination based 
 not on plant closings or layoffs, but on such factors as shared technologies, 
 distribution, purchasing, and know-how; and expected benefits of $1.4 
 billion in the first year of merged operations, and annual benefits of $3 
 billion within 3 to 5 years (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 82-83). 
The unanimous approval of the takeover by the Daimler-Benz Board of Management took 
into account factors such as: 
1. Daimler’s strengthened competitive position through an immediate 
 expansion of its automotive product range and through a geographic 
 expansion in the U.S., and thus reducing the risk associated with the 
 dependency on the premium segment of the automobile market; 
2. Enhanced liquidity for Daimler’s stockholders by creating the third largest 
 automotive company in the world in terms of revenues, market 
 capitalization, and earnings; and potential short-term synergies in 
 purchasing, distribution, and research and development, and the potential 
 long-term synergies in the development and growth of markets (Blaško, 
 Netter and Sinkey 2000 83-84). 
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Although both Boards of Management approved the takeover unanimously, the Chrysler 
Board did voice some potential dangers in the takeover (Vlasic and Stertz 2000; Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). They included the issues involved in integrating two large 
corporations incorporating such widely geographically isolated operations and also the risk 
that the proposed synergies and benefits might not be implementable (Vlasic and Stertz 
2000; Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). 
2.1.4 The reaction of the unions 
The unions in both Germany and America had been among the losers in the transformation of 
the car industry in the 1990s. Both at Chrysler and Daimler-Benz, production facilities were 
being established outside of their traditional territories. Suppliers were also relocating in 
Mexico with the new possibilities under the NAFTA agreement. In Europe, the fall of the Iron 
Curtain had encouraged German suppliers, whose members were also in the union, to 
establish factories in cheap eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and Rumania. In 
addition, retiring blue-collar workers were not being replaced. Technological innovation and 
the sinking costs of industrial robots led to increased production capacity and a dramatic 
reduction of jobs in areas of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. At the largest Mercedes 
assembly plant in Sindelfingen the number of workers employed in production dropped from 
52,000 at the beginning of the 1990s down to around 34,000 in 1998 (Daimler-Benz AG 
Annual Reports 1990-1997). Areas of production such as the press shop, the body shop and 
the paint shop had rates of semi- and fully-automated operations at over 90%. Given this 
background it is surprising to learn that unionized workers at Chrysler and Daimler applauded 
the deal (New York Times, May 8th, 1998). From all written accounts (Vlasic and Stertz 
2000) and from numerous personal conversations with both labor and human resources 
managers, it seems that the unions were surprised and overwhelmed by the complex 
international dimensions of the takeover. Each side focused on their immediate own goals, 
namely preserving and creating jobs at Chrysler and Daimler respectively. The promise of a 
takeover of complementarities served to placate fears of job losses on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It was to be a Jeep meets Mercedes venture and not a Jeep vs. Mercedes clash of 
interests. In actual fact, DaimlerChrysler AG reported the creation of 19,000 in 1998 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998).  
In his first press conference after the takeover was announced, United Auto Workers (UAW) 
president, Yokich, commented; “I don’t believe it weakens us, not at all” (Vlasic and Stertz 
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2000). However, the UAW had no experience outside of the NAFTA region and no 
understanding of the German system of co-determination and the respective roles in 
Germany’s two-tier system of corporate governance. It is not surprising then, that the politics 
of the German labor movement and the power of the unions at different facilities within the 
passenger car and commercial units at Mercedes resulted in the UAW gaining only one of the 
10 seats reserved for labor representatives on the Supervisory Board (Blaško, Netter and 
Sinkey 2000). 
More positive for the UAW was the presence of the non-unionized Mercedes production 
facility in Alabama. The strength of the UAW had been weakened since the mid 1980s with 
the shift of production from UAW-controlled states such as Michigan to the non-unionized 
mid-western, south-western and southern U.S. states as well as to Mexico. In addition, 
Japanese hybrid factories had established non-union facilities in North America, which were 
now being copied by German firms such as BMW and Mercedes. Daimler’s takeover would 
now provide the UAW with the opportunity to negotiate directly with DaimlerChrysler AG 
management to acquire the right to unionize the Tuscaloosa facility (Chicago Tribune May 
8th, 1998). In actual fact, this was one of the major points of dissension in the first contract 
negotiations between DaimlerChrysler AG and the UAW.  
The most salient reason for UAW acceptance of the deal was much simpler, money. In both 
the crisis of 1980 and 1992 the UAW had been forced to make painful concessions in order to 
stave off bankruptcy at Chrysler. The union was aware of the boom to bust cyclical nature of 
the U.S. car industry and the fact that the bust years hurt the smallest member of the Big 3 
hardest. Chrysler had been booming for 5 years now, but no one expected that to last forever. 
The addition of Daimler-Benz’s $60 billion value in market capitalization provided security 
for the UAW’s biggest fear, again being left like in 1992 with a non-funded multi-billion 
dollar pension plan (Vlasic and Stertz 2000) 
On the German side, Walter Riester, vice-chairman of the IG-Metall and member of the 
Supervisory Board at Daimler-Benz welcomed the deal (Der Spiegel 20, 1998). Schrempp 
had learnt that his initial Rambo style of management could not function without the 
cooperation of the unions and he had been careful to inform them in advance of his plans. The 
German unions were particularly pleased that DaimlerChrysler AG would be a German legal 
entity and the continuation of the German system of corporate governance was assured, 
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including the principles of co-determination and the guarantee of labor representation on the 
Supervisory Board. 
However, there was also a general lack of knowledge of the role of the UAW at Chrysler on 
the German side of the company. In the late 1980s the German unions had been embarrassed 
with their pro-German worker stance against the expansion of the Mercedes East London 
facilities in South Africa. At a critical time in the fight against Apartheid, Mercedes 
management appeared to be politically more progressive than the labor leaders from IG 
Metall. Globalization was a de facto threat for the German labor movement, due to the high 
costs of production and the above-average wages and social benefits of German workers, 
especially in the car industry and especially at Daimler-Benz. As such, the issue was 
approached with great caution. They did however grasp the possible advantages of having the 
UAW unionize their American facility in Alabama, as a means of better aligning the working 
conditions and compensation systems within the Mercedes organization. 
2.1.5 The reaction of the financial analysts 
Wall Street had been an enemy of Chrysler Corporation going back to the late 1970s and 
Chrysler’s efforts to achieve financial help from the U.S. government (Hyde 2003). CEO 
Iacocca had fought a two-year battle concerning the merits of government intervention, free 
market ideology, Japanese protectionism, American jobs and other values central to the 
American understanding and self-perception of their liberal market economy. Many bankers 
and financial experts saw the billion-dollar package in January 1980 as a major sellout of 
market-driven economics and continued to view the ups and downs in Chrysler’s fate with 
tremendous suspicion. The comeback in the late 1980s was followed by the financial crisis at 
Chrysler in the early 1990s. Some experts were therefore surprised at the almost unanimous 
support for the takeover on Wall Street. But in actual fact relationships between Chrysler and 
Wall Street had been improving. The banks had been heavily involved in majority shareholder 
Kirk Kerkorian’s attempted leverage buyout of the company in 1995 and had sided with the 
Detroit executives, led by Eaton (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). At the time of the takeover, 
Chrysler was one of America’s highest performing corporations. Chrysler had earned a record 
$1.03 billion in the first quarter of 1997 and its profits per vehicle were more than double the 
profits of Ford and General Motors (Vlasic and Stertz, 2000). Daimler’s financial liquidity 
seemed to provide Chrysler with the protective volume of capital it would need in a global 
future. 
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The highest praise for the takeover came from the financial analysts who supported Daimler 
and Chrysler respectively in unraveling the myriad of financial, legal, accounting and taxation 
issues involved in a cross border takeover between a German and American firm. Chrysler 
made use of the services Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) and Daimler-Benz engaged the 
support of Goldman Sachs. Interesting for our later discussion of takeover strategies, an 
integral part of the financial analysis and predictions involved a study of twelve previous 
“merger of equals” deals (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 89). 
In their official analyst ratings at the time of the takeover, Goldman Sachs Investment 
repeated Schrempp’s intention of creating a company “prepared for the 21st century” (Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). They see DaimlerChrysler AG as a “global powerhouse”, with 
“complementary strengths in terms of product, geography and organizational skills” 
Credit Suisse First Boston went even further in their praise for the deal: 
We believe that the merger of Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz has created the 
world’s most formidable competitor in the automotive industry. In our view, 
DaimlerChrysler AG represents an attractive investment opportunity, with a superior 
industry position, a very strong balance sheet and significant cost savings potential. We 
are introducing a price target of US$ 101, representing 15% upside potential from the 
current price. (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 83) 
2.1.6 The reaction of the politicians 
In their first coverage of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in May 1998 Der Spiegel (20 
1998) reported of the unique and curious agreement amongst all political parties. Everyone 
was in favor and even enthusiastic about the creation of a German dominated Welt AG. 
Schrempp had been a controversial critic of the Deutschland AG, which was regarded as one 
of the main cornerstones of the German economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) after World 
War II. But in the late 1990’s the German system appeared in radical need for reform and this 
need was having an impact on political reality. For the first time in decades it seemed there 
could be political and economic reforms. SPD-chancellor candidate Schröder, himself a 
member of the Board at Volkswagen as head of the state government of Lower Saxony, 
praised the takeover as “eine reife unternehmerische Leistung” (Author translation: a mature 
entrepreneurial achievement). The SPD’s economic expert, Siegmar Mosdorf, went even 
further: 
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Zum ersten Mal steigt eine erste Adresse aus Deutschland in die globale Champions 
League auf. Das ist ein Hammer (Der Spiegel 20, 1998). (Author translation: For the 
first time a first class German company has made the jump into the global Champions 
League. That is absolutely amazing).  
The ruling CDU federal government, anxious to profit from any positive signal from the 
economic front, gave its unequivocal approval. Their expert on economic affairs, Friedhelm 
Ost commented on the deal; “nur positive” (Author translation: only good news). Even the 
economic expert for the anti-globalist Green party, Margareta Wolf, said something positive 
about the deal: “Besser so, als wenn General Motors Daimler geschluckt hätte” (Der Spiegel 
20, 1998). (Author translation: Well, it’s better than if General Motors had taken over 
Daimler.) Little did she know how true her comment could have been. The intention of the 
President and CEO of the Ford Motor Company to expand his buying spree of luxury brands 
to include the Mercedes label had only been blocked by the intervention of the majority 
stockholding Ford family (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
On the American side political reaction to the deal was quieter. Washington Chrysler lobbyist, 
Robert Liberatore, made sure that all the members of both the House and the Senate were 
assured that no American jobs had been sacrificed (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). For most 
politicians, the future of DaimlerChrysler AG even as a German AG (publicly trading stock 
company) seemed brighter than the fate of a smaller Chrysler Corporation. The political issue 
of nationalism and trade protectionism in the American car industry had always been against 
the Japanese, who were producing the same kinds of cars as GM, Ford and Chrysler. German 
companies were renowned and indeed revered for their track record in manufacturing luxury 
vehicles.     
2.1.7 The reaction of the shareholders 
DaimlerChrysler AG was truly global in one important aspect at the time of the takeover in 
May 1998, namely in the structure of their global ownership. Stock ownership was equal 
between American and European shareholders at 44% (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). 
German stockholders held 37% of DaimlerChrysler AG shares. The remaining 12% were held 
by investors mainly in the Middle East, such as the Emirate of Kuwait (6.5%). This was an 
investment going back to the Quandt’s family decision in the 1970s to sell off their Daimler 
holdings in order to support BMW (Grunow-Osswald 2006). In the years of the oil crisis, the 
Emirate of Kuwait had been keen to diversify their investments. Together with Deutsche 
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Bank and the Las Vegas billionaire, Kirk Kerkorian, the Emirate of Kuwait constituted a core 
of stockholders controlling 27% of DaimlerChrysler AG’s outstanding stock. A further 
17,000 institutional investors possessed 49% of the company. 1.3 million retail investors 
owned 24% of stock. The remaining 3% of DC shares were controlled by “insiders” (Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). These insiders were executives at both Daimler and Chrysler. On 
September 18th, 1998 97.5% of Chrysler shareholders approved the merger. On the same day 
99.9 % of Daimler shareholders voted their support for the takeover. 
Based on the Annual Reports for 1997 from Daimler-Benz and Chrysler the three largest 
stockholders were Deutsche Bank, the Emirate of Kuwait and Kirk Kerkorian, owner of the 
Las Vegas gambling investment firm, Tracinda Corporation. Before the takeover Deutsche 
Bank had had 23% and the Emirate of Kuwait about 12-13% of ordinary shares from 
Daimler-Benz. Kerkorian had 11% of Chrysler stock. Despite the fact that he would have 
diminished power in the new company, the Los Vegas billionaire was attracted by 
Schrempp’s focus on shareholder value and return on investment. Eaton’s refusal to increase 
shareholder dividends had triggered his aggressive insider takeover attempt back in 1995 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000). The first months after the takeover seem to have verified this 
estimation of the new ownership and he agreed to vote all his shares for the creation of the 
new company (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
The positive attitude towards the emerging Welt AG from the Deutsche Bank is interesting 
because the bank had been one of the most prominent members of the Deutschland AG, using 
their power on the Supervisory Boards and Boards of Management within the “coordinated” 
(Hall and Soskice 2001) network of Germany’s most important financial, industrial and 
political players. The bank had more than once in its history intervened to nudge Daimler in a 
particular direction (Grunow-Osswald 2006). In the late 1980s Board Member Herrhausen 
had brought in an outsider, Helmut Werner; to restructure Mercedes. In the creation of the 
Welt AG current member of the Board, Kopper, was a prominent supporter of Schrempp’s 
“Americanization” of the firm and the shift of focus to shareholder value. The Deutsche Bank 
underlined this intention with the decision in December 1998 to sell off all of its industrial 
holdings, including DaimlerChrysler AG. A new investment unit, DB Investor, was to be 
created to manage each block of shares (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). Later, Deutsche 
Bank would radicalize this shift of paradigm even more dramatically by announcing it would 
no longer seek membership in the Boards of Germany’s DAX 30 companies, including 
DaimlerChrysler AG. Not coincidently, and this time under Swiss leadership, Deutsche Bank 
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would announce the sell-off of DB Investors last shares in DaimlerChrysler one day before 
Schrempp was forced to resign in July 2005 (The New York Times July 29th, 2005). 
On November 17th 1998 trading started for the newly created DCX share in Frankfurt and 
New York. As Karoyli (2003) has analyzed, DCX was the first attempt to become the world’s 
first truly global share. 
2.1.8 The reaction of industry experts 
The announcement of the takeover in 1998 shocked the automobile world. After decades of 
Japanese domination of the industry, the Germans appeared to be making a comeback. The 
New York Times article on the takeover mirrored this feeling within the industry: “Daimler-
Benz Takes Over Chrysler as VW Acquires Rolls-Royce: Fast Lane for German Firms” (New 
York Times May 8th 1998) 
Volkswagen had expanded its collection of brands extensively with the acquisition of Skoda, 
Seat and other firms. Even tiny BMW had taken over the Rover Group with its powerful 
Mini-Cooper and Land Rover brands. But somehow the dimension and sheer size of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG deal caused some industry experts to agree with Schrempp’s promise to 
create the car company for the 21st century. The praise of industry insiders was primarily 
based on perceived cost-efficient synergy possibilities and in general pointed in the direction 
that Chrysler had been practicing in the 1990s. Andrew Card, president of the American 
Automobile Manufacturers Association compared the takeover to the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000). He hoped mega-mergers would generate economies of scale and 
drive down the prices for cars and trucks for consumers. And although platforms had been 
developed successfully for luxury models such as Lexus together with Toyota, their success 
was quite controversial in the German market. VW had been accused of eclipsing their own 
market share when Skodas and Seats using Polo (Fox), Golf and Passat technical platforms 
started selling very well in the German market. The issue of brand identity will be expanded 
on in later chapters. At this point of the analysis the focus is on the initial optimism, which 
greeted the takeover. In terms of the reaction of industry experts, the enthusiasm focused on 
the size of the new company: 
It comes down to economies of scale. This kind of merger (DaimlerChrysler AG) 
allows manufacturers to cut costs and fund the lower car prices needed to survive (Garel 
Rhys, Cardiff Business School quoted in Vlasic and Stertz 2000).  
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At the time of the takeover Daimler-Benz was Germany’s largest industrial company, whose 
activities included building trains, planes and commercial vehicles. Mercedes-Benz was, 
however, one of only three remaining independent builders of luxury cars. The other two were 
Porsche and BMW, who unlike Daimler were both protected as a result of either family 
ownership or de facto control. In the merger frenzy of the 1990s it seemed only a matter of 
time before someone bought Daimler. The enthusiasm from industry experts stemmed for 
their admiration of Schrempp, who had struck first and acquired Chrysler. The combined 
revenue of Chrysler and Daimler at the time of the takeover was almost double the turnover of 
Volkswagen. 
Table 3: DaimlerChrysler vs. Volkswagen 1998 
1998 Earnings Revenue Car sales Cash 
DaimlerChrysler $ 6.5 bn $ 147 bn 4.0 million $ 25.0 bn 
Volkswagen $ 1.3 bn $   75 bn 4.6 million $ 12.4 bn 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Appendix 2.2 
2.1.9 The reaction of the press 
The press played an important role in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in terms of 
documenting the most important events as well as having an influence on the new company’s 
stockholders and shareholders, especially concerning the anti-Germanism of the American 
press as early as 1998 (Golitsinski 2000). However, limiting our focus to major actors such as 
Jürgen Schrempp risks oversimplifying the reasons behind the failure of the takeover and 
must be counterbalanced by taking other factors into consideration. Nevertheless, at the 
beginning of the takeover, the press on both sides of the Atlantic was one of the most 
important spreaders of confidence and optimism. The DaimlerChrysler AG was a very public 
event, especially in Germany. Schrempp had originally had a rough time with the German 
press. Until he was chosen as the new head of DASA (German Aerospace Unit of Daimler-
Benz) and elevated to the Management Board, Schrempp had spent the majority of his 
Daimler career in relative seclusion in South Africa. His arrival at DASA coincided with the 
period of CEO Reuters’ attempt to transform Daimler into a “Technolgiekonzern” 
(technology consortium), when everything started to go wrong. Schrempp was judged to be 
one of the main culprits in this madness, a perception culminating with his catastrophic 
acquisition of the Dutch airplane builder, Fokker (Der Spiegel 36, 1994). However, he 
publicly admitted his mistakes and became one of Reuter’s clear critics and cleverly aligned 
key players, such as Deutsche Bank representative Kopper on the Board, in order to force 
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Reuter out. His methods were criticized in Germany as more appropriate for Hollywood 
“Rambos” rather than conservative corporate Germany. This seemed to be confirmed when he 
ousted popular Mercedes chief, Helmut Werner, in 1997 (Der Spiegel 4, 1997). Schrempp’s 
focus on shareholder value and return of investment saw the press dub him the “American” of 
German business. But success forced a change of opinion in the German press. He took apart 
Reuter’s technology concern disaster within two years and brought the company back from 
record losses to record profits. The press and public perceived the conservativeness of 
corporate German to be an integral part of the “German illness” and Schrempp appeared as 
the tough surgeon, willing to operate and cut out the bad parts in order to save the patient. 
With the announcement of the world’s largest industrial takeover, Schrempp had the German 
press from the political left to right wings lying at his feet. He was the creator of the world’s 
first Welt AG and a symbol of hope for Germany’s chances for survival in a globalized future 
(Der Spiegel 20, 1998).  
On the American side the press was more critical, although the American stock markets had 
reacted more positively than their conservative German counterparts. Especially in the case of 
The New York Times it was clear from the very beginning that the Daimler-Benz AG and 
Chrysler Corporation deal had been a sellout and not a “merger of equals” (The New York 
Times May 8th, 1998). The article would be the beginning of a very exact scrutiny of CEO 
Schrempp’s promises and actions until his resignation in July 2005 (The New York Times 
July 29th, 2005). 
2.2 Historical merger and takeover precedents at Daimler and Chrysler 
A further reason for optimism at the beginning of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was the 
merger and acquisition track records of both companies. One of the reasons for the failure of 
Ford’s 1999 acquisition of Volvo was the simple lack of experience with mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers (Bruner and Spekman 1998; Bruner 1999). Ford is perhaps unique 
in the car industry because of its historically monolithic history. General Motors expanded 
globally by acquiring but preserving foreign firms such as Opel (Germany), Vauxhall (Great 
Britain) and Holden (Australia). Ford has always been Ford. Its 1931 Cologne factory is a 
clone of its American facilities and the Mondeo brand is meant to be a global car. Both 
Chrysler and Daimler are different.  
The 1998 takeover was reminiscent of the wave of mergers that had swept the industry in the 
1920s and witnessed the 1926 merger of Benz Cie. and Daimler, but also the global buyout of 
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the largest German manufacturer Opel by the American company General Motors in 1929 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006). Walter P. Chrysler was a child of this era and had made a reputation 
for himself as a man able to save car companies and divisions from bankruptcy (Abodaher 
1982; Hyde 2003). Taking over the Buick factory in 1912 he turned it into General Motors’ 
most profitable brand within 4 years. He was offered $1 million dollars in the early 1920s to 
save Willys-Overland. Walter Chrysler was again successful and the same group of bankers 
brought him in to save the ailing Maxwell car company. It was here that he built the first 
“Chrysler” and bought out Maxwell to create his own company in 1926. Chrysler realized that 
he would have to expand production capacity in order to compete with Ford and GM. Not 
having the money to invest in new facilities the only answer was to merge or takeover another 
company. His acquisition of the Dodge Company in 1928 was one of his most important 
achievements, making Chrysler the third largest car manufacturer in the USA. In the 1930s 
Chrysler would even surpass Ford and occupy the number 2 position behind General Motors 
(Abodaher 1982; Hyde 2003). Chrysler did experience merger failures. In the 1960s and 70s 
they failed to gain entry in the European market with their acquisition of French manufacturer 
Simca in 1963 (Hyde 2003). That was followed by the purchase of the British Rootes Group 
in 1968. Both international ventures failed and Simca was sold to Peugeot in 1978 as part of 
the company’s efforts to prevent bankruptcy at the end of the 1970s (Abodaher 1982; Hyde 
2003). 
After new CEO Lee Iacocca had brought Chrysler back into profitability, the company 
acquired the fourth largest car manufacturer in the USA, American Motors Corporation, in 
1987 from its French parent company Renault (Abodaher 1982; Hyde 2003). AMC’s Jeep 
brand was successfully assimilated into the Chrysler portfolio of brands and gave them 
valuable merger and takeover experience in maintaining strong brand identity under new 
ownership. It was exactly the type of multi-brand company that DaimlerChrysler AG should 
become. Furthermore, Chrysler had also proven that it could profit from acquired companies. 
The head of AMC engineering, a Frenchman originally from Renault, was made head of 
Chrysler engineering and together with Vice Chairman Bob Lutz they implemented a 
“Honda” approach to the company (Lutz 1998). The move led to internal fights and 
eventually the removal of Iacocca as President, but it was the start of the prosperity Chrysler 
had been experiencing since 1993 and continuing into the 1998 takeover from Daimler. These 
positive experiences with mergers, acquisitions and takeovers helped fuel some optimism. 
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On the German side, Daimler-Benz was also no stranger to merger activity and global 
cooperation. Although Benz invented the first automobile, it was Daimler who perfected the 
art of engine building. Daimler Motoren Gesellschaft became famous for supplying engines 
for cars, trucks, zeppelins, airplanes and ships around the world. The company’s three start 
logo symbolized this dominance on land, in the air and at sea (Grunow-Osswald 2006). The 
first racing cars in the 1890s were handcrafted in Paris, France but ran on Daimler engines. 
Similarly, the first British car manufacturer was called the Daimler Car Company, because of 
the patented German engines, which were produced under a licensing agreement in 1895 
(Montagu and Burgess-Wise 1995): Indeed the name “Daimler” would survive in the Anglo-
Saxon world as a brand of Jaguar and later Ford. Daimler was global from the very beginning 
because of the high costs of their products. Whereas the American car industry was aiming to 
build cars affordable for everyone, Daimler’s philosophy of “the best or nothing” aimed at a 
customer base of the extravagantly superrich. It was the disappearance of this international 
customer base after World War I and the introduction of luxury taxes that eventually forced 
Daimler to merge with its biggest rival Benz in 1926 (Grunow-Osswald 2006). And although 
workers in Stuttgart still say they work for “Daimler” whereas their counterparts in Mannheim 
work for “Benz”, the merger has been successful because of the company’s ability to preserve 
the legend of the Mercedes Brand. The exclusive nature of the Mercedes brand was partially 
the reason why the acquisition of Audi in 1958 only lasted 4 years (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
However, in other areas the company has been successful with mergers. In particular the 1981 
acquisition of America’s largest producer of commercial vehicles, Freightliner, serves as 
proof that a German company can successfully acquire and manage an American icon 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006). The same is true of the acquisition of Sterling in the USA, makers 
of trucks and buses. Indeed with a series of international acquisitions and excellent multi-
branding production and marketing, Daimler-Benz had advanced in the 1990s to become the 
world’s largest manufacturer of commercial vehicles. More importantly the commercial 
vehicle division had broken into difficult markets such as Africa and South America, where 
German and American car manufacturers have traditionally failed. The truck makers had 
found a way of penetrating the complete spectrum of the commercial vehicle price market. In 
Europe, for example, the luxury models coming out of the German facility in Worth have 
been successfully supplemented with the more economical platforms produced in Turkey. 
Under the leadership of Helmut Werner, Mercedes was confident that this strategy could be 
applied to the passenger vehicle division (Grunow-Osswald 2006). Daimler’s plans to build a 
“sister plant” in Brazil to partner with the new A-Class production facility in Rastatt were 
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proof of this emerging global “confidence” within the Mercedes passenger car division. In 
addition, the new M-Class facility in Alabama, a hybrid offspring of Toyota’s American 
production methods, were evidence that the brand was so powerful that the famous motto 
“Made in Germany” could be replaced with “Made by Mercedes” (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
Historical precedents at both Chrysler and Daimler provided executives on both sides of the 
Atlantic with justifiable optimism that a globally present multi-brand company could shape 
the industry in the 21st century, but the next chapter will reveal the first weaknesses. 
2.3 The car industry in the 1990s: lean production and merger frenzy 
An overview of the car industry in general in the mid 1990s, and the situation at Daimler-
Benz and Chrysler in particular, makes the 1998 takeover look more like a self-inflicted 
shotgun wedding than a “marriage made in heaven”. 
By the mid 1990s a surprisingly common consensus and industry-wide mindset had emerged. 
The comprehensive and revolutionary MIT study on the industry had come to the conclusion 
that a car is a car is a car (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). More specifically the report came 
to the conclusion was that there was a simple equation for predicting the success any 
company would have to adhere to in order to survive the upcoming decade: 
Car designing /building/marketing = Japanese approach = Toyota = lean production = 
elimination of waste = lower production costs = success 
As we will see later in our critical analysis of the MIT study this formula was inaccurate, but 
prima facie The Machine that Changed the World (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) seemed to 
provide a bona fide explanation for the consistent decline of the American automobile 
industry since the 1960s and the parallel meteoric rise of the Japanese car industry. Most 
worrying for the Americans was the success the Japanese had had in their own domestic 
stronghold, despite protectionist help from the American government (Lutz 1998). Ironically 
these restrictive measures had induced Japanese automakers to establish assembly plants in 
the States which not only produced better cars but with the aid of non-unionized workers, thus 
adding more woe to Detroit’s dilemma. Even innovative leaps such as Chrysler’s introduction 
of the minivan in the mid 1980s were being countered by the methodical consistent “fast 
follower” Toyota approach, in which the Japanese company was able to duplicate styling and 
  
 
53 
function while eliminating the mistakes in the original American model in order to sell a more 
practical overall product at a lower cost. 
Moreover, the MIT study seemed convincing in terms of the amount of empirical data that 
had been assembled. The list of active supporters and participants of the project reads like a 
Who’s Who list of the industry between 1985 and 1990. In addition MIT had gathered 
together an impressive army of scholars and analyzed more than 50% of all car production 
facilities in the world, including those at Daimler-Benz and Chrysler (Womack, Jones and 
Roos 1990).  
The results corroborated the generally perceived consensus of the American consumer that the 
Japanese had just become faster, cheaper and simply better at building cars. The academic 
conclusions of one of America’s most prestigious universities were dovetailing elegantly with 
the “man on the street, Joe Six-pack” gut feeling, a feeling that was also captured in American 
popular culture. Symbolically this changed reality was presented microscopically in American 
John Updike’s successful “Rabbit” trilogy, in which the protagonist’s downhill life in a small 
Pennsylvania town itself mired in the economic decline of the American automobile industry 
is miraculously saved by him opening up the town’s first Toyota dealership. Ron Howard’s 
film Gung Ho (1987) equally brought to the screen the mixture of fear, hope and intercultural 
comic-tragic contradictions, which characterized the dilemma of the situation. The seemingly 
unavoidable meltdown of the American car industry in the 1980s was a major shock to the 
nation’s psyche. 
Even before the study MIT appeared, companies like GM and Chrysler were starting to admit 
that they had something to learn from their Japanese counterparts, as the NUMMI, AMC-
Honda and Chrysler-Mitsubishi Diamond Star projects testify (Lutz 1998). It was not 
surprising that the study ascertained lean production methods to be superior to something they 
called “mass production” as their exemplary analysis of the derelict GM assembly plant in 
Framingham, Massachusetts illustrated (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The 1947 plant was 
a child of GM’s heydays and the Sloanist approach, which had been in decline since the early 
1960s.   
However, more surprising and indeed shocking for European companies like Daimler-Benz, 
was the MIT conclusion that the “craftsmanship” associated with luxury automobiles had de 
facto ceased to exist with the introduction of the assembly line at Ford in 1914. Daimler 
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produced 1,404 vehicles in that year compared to 1,747 from rival Benz (Grunow-Osswald 
2006). Meanwhile, Ford had increased production from around 170,000 to over 300,000 
vehicles between 1913 and 1914 (Banham 2002). In the eyes of the MIT scholars, there were 
no significant differences between building a Toyota or building a Chrysler or building a 
Mercedes. The added time and rework they had witnessed at plants such as the Mercedes 
facility in Sindelfingen were not the results of “Meister” quality made in Germany, but rather 
documented proof of outdated, poorly organized, overly expensive and wasteful production 
processes. The MIT study correctly predicted that the Japanese would soon be in a position to 
build luxury cars, which exceeded European quality standards at lower prices. In a chilling 
four pages they even announced the end of European luxury carmakers if they refused to 
adopt the superior approach of their Japanese counterparts. This result was threatening for 
Mercedes because it cut deeply into their brand identity, marketing philosophy and 
manufacturing approach. Only a few years earlier Mercedes executives had confidently 
proclaimed that it would take the Japanese “generations” until they could build luxury cars 
comparable to the S-Class (Spiegel 38 1985).  
For our current considerations, however, the important result was that the whole industry 
accepted the equation; Car A = Car B = Toyota = Chrysler = Mercedes.  
That meant all production facilities could be compared quantitatively for each and every facet 
of production.  Downtime equals downtime and it doesn’t matter whether the tool and die 
change is happening at a Mercedes or a Fiat plant. Industry-wide benchmarks such as the 
Harbour Report would become, albeit painfully for companies like Daimler, universal 
standards. In these annual exercises in benchmarking, manufacturing facilities were compared 
and measured in terms of the hours per vehicle required to produce automobiles. Similarly 
quality studies such as J.D. Power would focus on mistakes per vehicle as industry 
measurements of quality. Although the German luxury carmaker would do its best to deny 
this reductionist approach even after the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in 1998, the study had 
significant repercussions for Mercedes head Helmut Werner’s restructuring of the company 
during the 1992 crisis at Daimler and in the creation of his new 1990s production philosophy.  
Even Mercedes could not ignore all of the “facts” the MIT study had gathered about the 
industry and to a certain extent it did indeed mirror the industry’s reality between its origins in 
1886 and 1990. To its credit the MIT study also provided companies like Chrysler with “well-
founded academic evidence” to justify taking the risk of deviating from long-standing and 
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unquestioned American marketing and manufacturing axioms in order to learn from the 
Japanese. Companies like Daimler, however, were thrown into a schizophrenic dilemma. 
From a production perspective they had to reduce waste and “learn” from the Japanese and 
seriously restructure everything from development to production planning to assembly. From 
a brand perspective, however, it would be almost suicidal to admit that building a Mercedes 
was basically the same as building a Toyota or even to suggest that building a Mercedes C-
class was basically no different from designing, engineering and producing an S-Class. 
A second characteristic of the automobile industry in the 1990s embodied a further diabolical 
paradox of conflicting perceptions. Firstly, the industry was perceived to be suffering from 
chronic overcapacity. With world production hovering around the 50 million vehicles per year 
mark in the early to mid 1990s, experts estimated that overcapacity was somewhere between 7 
and 22 million units (Meyer et al. 2002). Chrysler CEO Eaton estimated overcapacity in 1997 
at over 18 million vehicles (Der Spiegel 41, 1998). The range in these estimates is in itself an 
excellent barometer of the industry’s panic-driven uncertainty. Developing cars and creating 
the facilities to build those takes years and the expert’s predictions of demand were hazy at 
best. This was confounded by increased productive capacity. Progress in rationalization had 
definitely increased factory capacities in existing brown-field facilities and had dramatically 
and simultaneously led to massive reductions of manpower in press shops, body shops and 
paint shops as the precision of low cost robot and other fully-automated technologies flooded 
into car factories worldwide. Jobs seemed safe temporarily only in the area of final assembly, 
which still required a high amount of manual and semi-manual labor. But even here the 
introduction of semi-aided devices was decreasing the need for highly trained workers.  
At the same time, experts were expecting a dramatic increase in demand and seeking green-
field solutions in low cost countries to meet this demand cost-effectively. In fact demand did 
rise worldwide from 46 million units in 1993 to reach 52 million units in 1997 (Meyer et al. 
2002). Furthermore, the fall of the Iron Curtain opened up eastern European markets. The 
American economy started to rebound at the start of the Clinton administration. The prospects 
of the emerging NAFTA agreement promised hope for more prosperity and demand in the 
complete American hemisphere. The Asian “tigers” were stimulating demand in Asia, and 
somewhere along the road experts were hoping for new markets in India and China. Although 
the latter was still some time away, the common perception was that the future lay in 
producing an outstanding amount of cheap, small, fuel-efficient compact cars. This news was 
bad news for both Chrysler and Daimler. Chrysler had almost no presence outside of North 
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America. Daimler had no small cars and very little to offer in terms of fuel efficiency. 
Moreover, their presence in Asia was restricted to the extreme wealthy in cities such as 
Tokyo, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
In addition the expectations for increased demand unfortunately were superseded throughout 
the 1990s by the industry’s creation of even more overcapacity. Korean models joined the 
exodus to an already crowded North American production scene. The Big 3’s shift to Mexico 
became a shift to South America, which also had radical implications for the design and 
engineering of new models. When Daimler planned to create a South American version of the 
new A-Class at a Brazilian facility the model had to be downgraded from German customer 
standards in order to attempt to bridge the gaps between overseas production realities, 
customer buying power in South America and standards associated with the Mercedes brand. 
The contradiction of overcapacity and expected increasing demand led to a further 
complication of the industry’s self-perception. The 1990s are often referred to as “the urge to 
merge” (Meyer et al. 2002) or “merger frenzy” (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). The 
consolidation of the automotive industry had been dramatic. From the 42 manufacturers in 
1960 only 20 remained in 1997 (Meyer et al. 2002). The situation was even more dramatic in 
the world of suppliers as economies of scale and investment demand for new technologies 
overwhelmed many smaller companies, such as the clustered “Mittelstand” (medium-sized 
companies) in Baden Württemberg. The demand from local companies like Mercedes or Audi 
or even BMW was too low, as was their own capitalization to expand. At the same time their 
innovative know-how made them attractive targets for “cherry-picking” by larger first-tier 
non-German suppliers like Oxford, TRW, Johnson Controls and Magna. It was beginning to 
appear that the future of the automobile industry would be staged by a handful of automakers 
managing mega platform strategies and dependent on a handful of first-tier global suppliers. 
The emerging common perception of the industry was almost unanimous. In order to survive 
a car company had not only to implement lean production methods, it would also have to 
generate high volumes. In the mid 1990s the magic number was 1 million units (Daimler-
Benz AG Annual Report 1997), later that number would be raised to 1.5 million. That was 
threatening news to companies like BMW and Daimler, whose numbers were around 400,000 
to 500,000 units in the early 1990s. This led BMW to acquire the British Rover Group, a 
disastrous project which would end up costing the company an estimated 5 billion Deutsche 
Marks (Brady and Lorenz 2000).  
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Mercedes boss Helmut Werner and Daimler-Benz AG adapted a different strategy. They 
decided to expand their production spectrum to both small compact cars and other evolving 
segments such as SUVs. The emerging A-Class was to produce 300,000 units per year. In 
addition it was decided to develop a SUV for the North American market. The M-Class 
should add another 60,000 units to the total. Furthermore it was planned to upgrade the CKD 
facility in East London, South Africa to a full assembly facility in order to handle demand for 
right-hand drive vehicles and create more capacity at the existing assembly facilities in 
Sindelfingen and Bremen in Germany. Mercedes believed the strategy could work if it were 
possible to create the premium market product in each segment. However, the development of 
this strategy took place in a period of extreme uncertainty within the company. This frenzied 
modal expansion was a reaction to one of Mercedes biggest crisis in 1992 (Der Spiegel 8, 
1992). The new S-Class model had been a flop both in the USA and Germany, something that 
had never happened before in the history of the company. The car was stylistically 
unappealing to Americans and its size was no longer compatible with European customer 
demand. Furthermore the otherwise premium marque of the luxury Mercedes brand contained 
serious engineering blunders. Some engine models were so heavy that the vehicle could only 
legally transport 3 adults. The image damage was so extensive that the head of the 
development department, Wolfgang Peter, was relieved of his position (Der Spiegel 8, 1992).  
The million-unit target had a further impact on the complete industry as the BMW example 
shows. It triggered a wave of mergers and takeovers (see Table 4) reminiscent of the 
industry’s early phases such as the formation of GM or Chrysler’s acquisition of Dodge and 
the Daimler-Benz merger in the late 1920s. The industry became a buzz of rumors and fear 
and very quickly the proviso emerged, “eat or be eaten”. According to estimates by 
PriceWaterhouse, the automotive industry combined to tally up 750 mergers, acquisitions and 
alliances between 1990 and 1997 (Meyer et al. 2002). This situation was very precarious for 
Daimler. Together with BMW and Porsche they formed the last independent luxury 
carmakers in the mid 1990s. However both BMW and Porsche had powerful family 
ownership, which could block any unfriendly takeover attempts. This was not the situation at 
Daimler.  
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Table 4: Overview of Rumored Takeovers in 1998 
Largest Carmakers Rumured partners 
General Motors     Isuzi, Suzuki, Daewoo 
Ford Motor Volvo, Honda, BMW 
DaimlerChrysler Nissan, Fiat 
Volkswagen BMW, Fiat 
Toyota Motor Co. Daihatsu, Hino 
Honda Motor Co. BMW 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Appendix 2.3 
The target of building one million units (Brady and Lorenz 2000) had further implications. 
Increasing production volume only made sense if companies could achieve economies of 
scale. In order to do this, companies had to develop common parts which could be shared 
across brands and models. Very quickly developers start to distinguish between “appearance” 
and “non-appearance” parts as a means of bridging the gap between manufacturing reality and 
customer perception, depending on the value of the brand. For companies like Chrysler it was 
no major problem to admit that their Chrysler model and the Mitsubishi Galant were produced 
in the same factory on the same lines and for the same price (Lutz 1998). The cars were even 
presented together in American car magazines. The Mitsubishi-Chrysler Illinois facility in 
Normal was proof that Chrysler had learned from their meticulous study of Japanese 
production methods. As Chrysler head Bob Lutz points out in his autobiography (1998) the 
extended Chrysler production platforms dovetailing stylists – designers – engineers – 
production people – suppliers actually gave them an innovative advantage and allowed them 
to regain high volumes. For other companies platforms presented more challenging threats to 
established brands. The extension of the VW Passat platform to the Skoda Octavia seemed to 
make sense in the hopes of an expanding eastern European market. But when German 
customers started to buy the cheaper looking but VW-equipped technically sound Skoda, 
brand experts sounded the alarm bell. The fear of brand dilution was nowhere more evident 
than at Mercedes, even long before the Chrysler takeover. The creation of an alternative to the 
S-Class in the mid 1960s was already an issue of contention between engineers and managers 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006). The same discussion was repeated in the early 1980s with the 
creation of the Baby Benz. And in the 1990s executives still feared the consequences if C-
class vehicles started looking like or sharing parts with S-Class vehicles more than 3 to 4 
times more expensive. As such the platform issue only compounded Daimler’s dilemma 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006).     
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2.4 Conclusions 
The second chapter serves to offset the false impression that the DaimlerChrysler AG 
takeover was perceived by everyone to be doomed to failure from the very beginning. 
Daimler-Benz CEO Schrempp certainly surprised the world on May 7th, 1998. Prima facie 
there appeared to be many reasons for appraising the takeover positively.Within the 
framework of the successes at Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in the time immediately before the 
deal, most commentators were optimistic about the emergence of a global automaker for the 
21st century. This included a wide range of stakeholder, shareholders and industry experts. 
The mega-deal seemed suited to the mindset of the late 1990s in the automobile industry. 
Despite this initial optimism two key questions will guide the remainder of the case study: 
1. Why did the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover fail? 
2. What are the implications of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure for the 
theory and practice of cross border mergers (Marks and Mirvis 1998)? 
The overview of the literature on DaimlerChrysler in chapter 3 will illustrate how this initial 
optimism began to disappear within the first year following the May 1998 deal.  
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3 CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Chapter 3.1 will begin with an overview of the literature on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
failure, which spans a wide-variety of micro- and macro-economic issues. In addition, the 
influence of the most influential papers for this case study will be explained. These papers 
will provide the support material for the argumentation in chapters 4-7. As there is no single 
factor explanation for the failure of the takeover it is necessary to analyze the unfolding of 
events from a number of perspectives. 
Chapter 3.2 focuses on critically examining one of the most conventional and common 
explanations of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure, intercultural differences between 
Americans and Germans. The DaimlerChrysler AG case study provides us with the 
opportunity of critically examining Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensions (1980), which is 
the most cited approach in the field of intercultural studies (Hofstede 2002). This case study 
will claim that DaimlerChrysler AG is at odds with major parts of Hofstede’s approach. 
Processes of globalization and transnationalisation (Lange 2010) within the automobile sector 
illustrate the out datedness of the data, which form the backbone of Hofstede’s categories of 
cultural dimensionality. 
Chapter 3.3 is more unconventional. Working from the perspective of the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001), this chapter will apply their ideas on 
comparative national institutions and complementarities in order to explain the takeover 
failure. The eventual failure of DaimlerChrysler does provide evidence of the resiliency of the 
respective varieties of capitalism as described by Hall and Soskice (2001) and the role of 
nationally embedded institutionalism for profit strategies in the automobile industry as 
described by Boyer and Freyssenet (2000). 
3.1  The literature on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
 
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure provided the academic community with a wide 
array of topics ranging from cross-border mergers, intercultural and interorganizational 
conflicts, shareholder value, and changes in German and American national institutions. 
Moreover, the unfolding of this major economic failure in global business was the subject of 
close media scrutiny. This media scrutiny provides insight into facets of the takeover failure, 
which are not easily accessible to the academic community, but which help enhance the 
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quality of this case study. 
When it became clear as early as 1998 (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000) that the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was facing severe challenges, analytic efforts to explain the 
reasons for the difficulties began appearing in rapid succession. Bruner et al. (1998) 
documented the negotiations between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. Neubauer et al. (2000) 
published a case study analyzing the role of the boards in the deal.  Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 
(2000) documented the developments in the first year of the takeover. They focused on the 
issues impeding the creation of value, including the delisting of the new DaimlerChysler stock 
(DCX) from the Standard & Poors 500, the resignation of American executives from Chrysler 
and the negative impact of Schrempp’s plans to acquire Nissan in January 1999.  Their paper 
stands out as perhaps the first comprehensive academic paper revealing the major strategical 
failings of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover and will be referred to extensively in this case 
study.  
In a further paper concentrating on shareholder value, Karoyli (2003) provides a 
comprehensive overview of DCX, the world’s first global share. His study monitors the 
dramatic fall in shareholder value starting in 1999 and the lack of stock market trading 
activity on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). These results are corroborated by Murphy 
(2003). Both studies document the advantages and disadvantages of Global Registered Stocks 
(GRS) and American Deposit Receipts (ADR). Jürgens et al. (2000) scrutinize shareholder 
value within the German economy. This was followed by a more specific look at shareholder 
value within the context of the European automobile industry (Jürgens et al. 2002). Goutas 
and Lane (2009) compare shareholder value at DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen AG, arguing 
that the ideology of shareholder value has changed both companies less than previously 
assumed. Indeed, they see the adaption processes at both companies as proof of the resiliency 
of national economic institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001). Related to the issue of shareholder 
value, Ball (2004) looks at the impact of a shift from stakeholder to shareholder value on 
corporate governance and financial reporting at Daimler-Benz (as of 1993) and 
DaimlerChrysler (as of 1998). Gilbert’s study (2005) concentrates on the contradictions in the 
field of corporate governance between German and American institutions resulting from the 
DaimlerChrysler takeover. 
In the field of tax law Rowe (2005) contrasts the Alcatel-Lucent merger with the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover to show how German corporate law did not actually allow 
Daimler-Benz to own its American subsidiary. In a similar vein, Gebhardt (2009) uses the 
DaimlerChrysler AG case to examine emerging global standards in accounting practices. 
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Huizinga and Voget (2009) point out the role of international double taxation in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in the decision to locate the parent company in Germany in the case 
of DaimlerChrysler.  
All of these papers focus on specific technical issues related to issues of corporate 
governance, tax laws, global shares and shareholder value within the framework of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. It is however also important to consider more general issues 
surrounding global M&A activity. Stahl et al. (1998) point out that a “merger of equals” is the 
most complicated post-merger outcome strategy to implement. Specifically, they predict the 
DaimlerChrysler case as highly unlikely to succeed. Their work will be salient for this case 
study’s examination of the undoing of the “merger of equals” in chapter 6. 
The general issue of globalization in the automotive industry is the subject of Balestini’s work 
(2000). His paper appeared at the height of the global merger frenzy in the sector and mirrors 
the atmosphere of the era. Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) provide a comprehensive study of 
strategies within the global automotive industry and deliver a fundamental critique of the 
1990 MIT study of the industry (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). Specifically, they draw 
attention to the oversimplifications of the MIT study and illustrate why lean production was 
not able to establish itself as the sole global strategy in the 1990s. They also point out the 
ramifications of the different profit strategies at Daimler-Benz and Chrysler respectively in 
terms of takeover failures. This case study will use their paper to supplement Hall and 
Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach in chapter 3.3 below. 
The success of Renault-Nissan in contrast to DaimlerChrysler’s failure to integrate Mitsubishi 
Motors Corporation (MMC) has also led to a number of comparative academic articles. 
Froese and Jintae (2010) compare Renault, General Motors and DaimlerChrysler in Japan and 
South Korea based on interviews with Asian managers. Froese and Goeritz (2007) focus on 
Renault-Nissan and DaimlerChrysler in a further study in order to make a link between 
human integration and organization integration in Japanese cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. Gill (2012) relies extensively on Hofstede’s (1980) theory of cultural dimensions 
to highlight DaimlerChrysler’s cultural insensitivity at Mitsubishi. Bremner and Thorton’s 
(1999) journalistic overview of the Mitsubishi’s financial difficulties provides invaluable 
information regarding DaimlerChrysler’s strategical mistakes in this area. Their assessment is 
substantiated by Begley and Donnelly (2011). They view DaimlerChrysler’s decision to 
takeover Mitsubishi as a wrong time wrong firm mistake, which place an additional drain on 
Mercedes management capacity: 
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It could, however, be argued, nevertheless, that the decision to enter partnership with an 
ailing Mitsubishi in 2000, a group whose management culture stood in sharp contrast to 
that of Daimler was a serious error of judgment in terms of timing due to the long 
running recession in the Japanese economy. Had Daimler to deal solely with an 
underperforming Chrysler, the haemorrhaging of capital and managerial talent from 
Daimler-Benz to its partners may not have proven so serious as the German managerial 
resource base became seriously overstretched. The dual challenge of both a troubled US 
operation in conjunction with a failing Mitsubishi Motors Corporation proved too much. 
In essence it is legitimate to ask whether or not a full evaluation of Mitsubishi had been 
carried out prior to the merger to establish its strengths and weaknesses (Begley and 
Donnelly 2011 46) 
 
A large amount of literature focuses on the combined effects of differing national and 
differing organizational cultures on the takeover failure. Badrtalei and Bates (2007) trace 
strategical mistakes and organizational issues during the negotiations, transition management 
and post merger cultural issues. Similarly, Epstein (2004) investigates the organizational 
factors behind the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. Most business case studies 
also attempt to combine an analysis of German-American intercultural and Daimler-Benz / 
Chrysler interorganizational conflicts (Meyer et al. 2002; Finkelstein 2002: Dermidoff 2004; 
Bartel and Guadalupe 2008; Gill 2012). Some studies concentrate more on intercultural 
factors in the tradition of Hofstede (1980; 2002) and GLOBE (2007). These include Schindler  
(2000); Finkelstein (2002); Pruett (2003); Wolf (2005); Trajanov (2008); Varner and Beamer 
(2008); Gill (2012). Dermidoff’s monograph (2004) focuses on communication issues related 
to culture and post-merger change processes. The sheer number of papers focusing on 
intercultural conflicts between German Daimler and American Chrysler justifies a closer 
examination of the major theory in the field, Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensionality 
(1980), which this case study will undertake in the next chapter. 
A number of non-academic accounts also appeared around the takeover both in German 
(Appel and Hein 1998; Grässlin 2000) and English (Lutz 1998; Vlasic and Stertz 2000; 
Waller 2001). Former Chrysler President Lutz provides us with valuable information about 
the revolutionary changes in Chrysler’s production system in the 1990s. Vlasic and Stertz 
(2000) publication is the best researched and most realistic account of the events leading up to 
the takeover and will be quoted extensively in this case study. Their account is heavily cited 
in U.S. billionaire Kirk Kerkorian’s suit against DaimlerChrysler in November 2000. All of 
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these publications help to fill in the voids left by comprehensive histories of Daimler-Benz 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006), which end their research with the beginning of the takeover. 
Grunow-Osswald provides a well-documented and comprehensive history of the 
internationalization of Daimler-Benz from 1886 until 1997. In order to supplement this 
information, it is necessary to draw on sources outside the academic community. This case 
study will rely extensively on articles from Der Spiegel, The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal and the Economist to achieve this goal. 
Chapter 3.3 of this case study involves the implementation of an unconventional approach to 
explaining the DaimlerChrysler takeover failure. No academic paper has hitherto explicitly 
used the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach to examine the deal (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
In this chapter it will be argued that the framework, despite its limitations, is well-suited to 
analyzing corporate cross-border merger strategy. 
The next chapter, however, will first address the question whether intercultural differences as 
understood by Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensionality (Hofstede 1980) can explain the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. The case study will limit itself to explaining why 
Hofstede’s approach cannot explain the takeover failure but stops short of a comprehensive 
critique of his theory of cultural dimensionality. 
3.2 Can intercultural differences explain the takeover failure? 
Expanding on Meyers (1976) comment that “Mergers are tricky; the benefits and costs of 
proposed deals are not always obvious,” Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) conclude at the end 
of their critical study on value creation in the early phase of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
that “International mergers are even trickier; the benefits and hidden costs of these 
combinations are even less obvious” (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 100). Indeed the 
spectacular nature and ensuing failure of the world’s largest industrial takeover in history cast 
a long shadow on the evaluation of all cross-border mergers. Weber and Camerer (2003) use 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover to provide further evidence that “a majority of corporate 
mergers fail” and draw attention to comprehensive empirical studies carried out by 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) using extensive data from the Federal Trade 
Commission to compare pre and post-merger performance. Similarly Lucks (2005) points to 
DaimlerChrysler AG’s demise as providing sufficient evidence that “large-scale transatlantic 
M&A projects have a particularly low success rate, destroying vast assets within national 
economies in their wake” (Lucks 2005 11). The existence of inherent a priori reasons for 
cross-border merger failure would indeed pose a serious threat to cross-border globalization 
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strategies currently being pursued in most countries and economic sectors. If the idea of a 
“Welt AG” were proved implausible per se, due to necessarily conflicting intercultural factors 
such as the dimensions described by Hofstede (1980; 2002), global strategists would have to 
rethink their practices. 
Nevertheless, this study is not primarily concerned with all cross-border mergers in general, 
but with one failed German-American takeover in particular. Comparing the DC failure to 
other German-American mergers allows us, however, to relativize the comprehensive tenor of 
the previously noted pessimistic assessments. A survey by Bassen, Schiereck, and Wübben 
(2010) investigates 78 German acquisitions in the United States of America between 1990 
and 2004 and confirms “the previous finding that cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
activity yields on average wealth gains for shareholders of the acquiring companies”. The 
authors draw specific attention to the DaimlerChrysler AG failure as a misrepresentation of 
German-American merger reality during this period. Deutsche Telekom’s acquisition of 
VoiceStream in 2000 and Fresenius Medical Care AG’s capture of Renal care Group (2006) 
had been, at the time of writing, successful expansions and provide examples of German 
companies being able to position themselves in the NAFTA trade region as part of their 
global strategies (Bassen, Schiereck, and Wübben 2010; Wübben 2007). It would thus be 
misleading and erroneous to claim that all mergers and takeovers fail and all German-
American takeovers must fail. As such, more than a quantum of skepticism is permitted when 
we now examine possible national cultural differences as a sufficient and necessary condition 
for the DC takeover’s failure. This skepticism does not contradict, of course, the fact that the 
American popular business magazines (i.e. Business Week) and, in particular, the Detroit area 
press (e.g. The Detroit Free Press) became increasingly disillusioned with the takeover during 
the course of 1999/2000, climaxing in an extremely negative anti-Teutonic reaction to the 
official German takeover of Chrysler management in November 2000 and the firing of 23,000 
Chrysler employees in January 2001 (Golitsinski 2000). Closer scrutiny of this antipathy 
reveals that much of the venom was directed not against Germans in general, but 
understandably towards the cultural insensitivity, condescending arrogance and plain rudeness 
of CEO Jürgen Schrempp in particular. Schrempp was equally unpopular on the German side 
of the company (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). Indeed, an extreme dislike for DaimlerChrysler AG’s 
CEO was one of the few things employees on both sides of the Atlantic shared in common. 
One highly-publicized example suffices as evidence. In the USA the increasing defection of 
Chrysler managers to competitors Ford and GM and first tier suppliers such as Magna was 
arrogantly brushed aside by Schrempp upon questioning from the American press in an 
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aggressive tone, “We don’t need their (Chrysler’s) know-how, you can quote me” (Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). Paradoxically, the very same American press was full of praise for a 
job well-done, when then Chrysler CEO and German Zetsche left Chrysler to become 
Schrempp’s successor in 2005 (Fast Company Sept. 1st, 2005). Therefore it seems to be less 
an issue of Germans vs. Americans but rather a question of the ramifications and 
repercussions of good vs. poor management. That was not, however, obvious at the time. Gill 
(2012) draws attention to a similar situation with German DaimlerChrysler CEO Eckrodt at 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC). 
 
Due to the high media presence of the problems at Chrysler the academic community’s 
reflection for the reasons behind the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover has therefore 
partially focused understandably on the role of German-American cultural conflict (Wolf 
2005; Finkelstein 2002; Varner and Beamer 2008). The takeover exhibited a very publicly 
perceived increasing Germanization of Chrysler as of September 2000 culminating in the 
installation of a German CEO (Zetsche) and COO (Bernhard) in late 2000 and the immediate 
firing of about 25% of the Chrysler workforce in January 2001. Prima facie this provides 
reason enough to look at the exact nature of German-American cultural conflict in the case 
study. Before turning to Hofstede, however, it is necessary to clarify the exact meaning of 
Daimler-Benz as “typically German” and Chrysler as “typically American” within the context 
of the global automobile industry. 
3.2.1 The car industry: A global and national phenomenon 
Although the automobile industry has been global in nature since its very inception, e.g. 71% 
of the production of Daimler (DMG) and Benz & Cie in 1908 was for foreign markets 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006), it is possible to define a German, American, British, French, Italian, 
Japanese and Korean car industry, each embodying unique national strategies and practices 
respectfully. And although different strategies can exist within different national frameworks, 
each strategy is connected to the institutional framework of the respective societies (Boyer 
and Freyssenet 2000). But when we look at the “Germanness” of Mercedes or the 
“Americaness” of Chrysler it will be important to reflect critically, whether these two 
company cultures correspond to the attribute of cultural dimensionality as described by 
Hofstede (1980; 2002; 2006).  
Both Daimler-Benz and the Chrysler companies have been iconic firms for a substantial 
period of their respective national histories within the automobile industry. Carl Benz had 
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invented and patented the automobile with a combustible engine in 1886 before the company 
was later taken over by Daimler during the period of hyper-inflation in the Weimar Republic 
in 1926 to form Daimler-Benz (Thieme 2004; Grunow and Osswald 2006). The Daimler side 
of the firm, founded in 1890, was a fierce competitor of Benz and famous for the quality of its 
high-performance engines and innovative engineering. As of 1900 Daimler was best known as 
the builder of the Mercedes brand, the very epitome of quality and manufacturing in German 
automotive design and engineering (Grunow-Osswald 2006). The company’s conscious 
decision to focus on the needs of the very rich is diametrically opposed to the democratizing 
role the automobile played between 1900 and 1929 in American society, and underlines the 
role of luxury and quality in the German trademarks Mercedes, Porsche, Audi and BMW.  By 
comparison, over 15 million Tin Lizzies, for example, were produced up to 1928 in America 
(Banham 2002; Wiedt 2006). Chrysler was the number four producer of automobiles in 1927, 
turning out about 200,000 vehicles per annum (Hyde 2003). By contrast, Daimler-Benz 
produced 7,918 cars in 1927 (Thieme 2004). Paul Daimler, the son of the company’s founder 
expressed the philosophy of Daimler in the following quote: 
“Nur das Beste kann für die Erzeugung gut genug sein! So weit wie in Amerika, wo 
jeder Kommis sein Automobil hat, sind wir noch lange nicht. Bei uns ist das Automobil 
zum größten Teil das Fahrzeug bessersituierter Klassen” (quoted in Thieme 2004). 
(Author translation: Only the best can be good enough for our production. We have not 
yet reached a point like in America, in which every John Doe can afford a car. For us 
cars are for the most part reserved for the upper class). 
This quote mirrors the famous brevity and succinctness of the very first Rahmenheft 
(technical specifications) of the very first Mercedes in 1900: “The Best or Nothing!” 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006; Lengert and Dreher 2010). 
On the other side of the Atlantic, and despite the fact that Chrysler appeared on the scene 
much later than Ford and General Motors in 1926, the spirit of Chrysler seems to personify 
commonly perceived aspects of the American spirit. Whereas Ford with its 
Taylorism/Fordism approach to production had already established a cloned plant in Cologne, 
Germany in 1931 and GM’s philosophy of glocalization led it to acquire Opel in 1929, 
Chrysler has always remained rooted in North America (Abodaher 1982; Hyde 2003; Weiss 
2003). At the end of the 1920s Chrysler was rapidly challenging Ford and General Motors as 
one of the Big Three, with an unfolding history of highly individualistic, charismatic, but 
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often blindly power-hungry CEO’s (Weiss 2003). Chrysler’s roller coaster history of 
extraordinary success and abysmal failure, as Hyde’s comprehensive chronology documents, 
would accompany the American people for most of the 20th century and even resulted in the 
United States government passing the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, the 
first time the federal government ever bailed out a private corporation (Bickley 2008; Hyde 
2003). Characteristically a maverick leader, Lee Iacocca, once again brought Chrysler back 
from the brink of bankruptcy by creating new innovative markets with the minivan and he 
even managed to repay the government loan, before later embarking on a path of irrational 
dictatorship, which led to a new downturn in the company’s fortunes and resulted in his ouster 
in the early 1990s (Lutz 1998; Hyde 2003; Iacocca 1986).  
Even at the time of the Daimler takeover in 1998, more than 95% of Chrysler’s market was on 
NAFTA soil and its range of products from sporty Dodges to soccer moms’ vans mirrored the 
American psyche and style of the 1990s (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 3.1). Their 
success was characterized as the result of the “creative collection of industry renegades” 
(Golitsinski 2000) leading the company. Fighting again back from near bankruptcy and 
failing shareholder value in 1992, Bob Eaton and Bob Lutz had turned Chrysler into the 
“hottest company in America” by the second half of the 90s (Lutz 1998; Hyde 2003). Indeed 
when things started to go wrong after the takeover CEO Schrempp lamented: “What happened 
to the dynamic, can-do cowboy culture I bought” (Sueddeutsche Zeitung July 12th, 2001; 
Finkelstein 2002).  
On the one hand, therefore, both Daimler and Chrysler seem to clearly represent important 
aspects of German and American culture respectively. There is an argument for claiming that 
both companies are “typically” German and “typically” American respectively. On the other 
hand the automobile industry has been global from its very infancy and its history has been 
riddled with takeovers, acquisitions, mergers, alliances, joint ventures and cooperative 
projects. Despite failures such as Daimler and Chrysler or Fiat and Chrysler or Renault and 
Chrysler (American Motors Company), a number of mergers and acquisitions have been 
international and successful. GM successfully took over Opel in 1929 and flourished for 
decades to come (Grunow-Osswald 2006). VW has been able to integrate numerous foreign 
brands into its global platform strategy. Daimler itself successfully took over America’s 
largest truck producer, Freightliner in 1980. Germans can seemingly work with non-Germans 
both within and beyond the national borders of the German car and truck industry. In its early 
years Daimler engines were built into coaches at the prestigious Panhard et Levassor 
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manufacturer in Paris and F.R. Simms Coventry-based Daimler model’s dating back to 1895 
provide early evidence of a successful German-British partnership (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
But this globalism is not only restricted to Germany. Most recently and most spectacularly 
(1998) has been Renault’s successful takeover and restructuring of Nissan, a deal which many 
predicted to fail due to the radical differences between French and Japanese culture (Gill 
2012) and conflicting profit strategies (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000).  
Furthermore, the automobile industry has always been a history of comparing, benchmarking 
and adapting across national borders. The reasons are partially grounded in the fact that the 
two dominating but diametrically opposing design, manufacturing and marketing strategies in 
the early phase of mass production were both American. Ford’s success was based on 
economies of scale as symbolized in the famous Model T. This strategy was cloned by Ford 
worldwide and is still in operation today as exemplified in the Mondeo brand. In Europe this 
approach was most closely copied by Citroen (Thieme 2004) On the other hand, at General 
Motors Pierre du Pont introduced a strategy of economies of scope, striving to satisfy “every 
purse and purpose”. This strategy was enhanced and perfected by Alfred P. Sloan, the creator 
of the modern corporation and one of the father’s of professional management training, which 
he brought to MIT in 1930 (Farber 2002). By bundling brands such as Chevrolet and Pontiac 
or Buick and Oldsmobile to cut production costs but widen the scope of the market, GM was 
able to overcome Ford’s initial domination of the world car market. Sloan standardized tools 
and parts but changed the external appearances of vehicles to stimulate changing consumer 
tastes. Ford’s dictum that you can have any color “as long as it is black” was suddenly very 
outdated. Chrysler followed the GM strategy, which allowed the new company to bite into 
Ford’s share of the market (Abodaher 1982; Hyde 2003).  
All other car manufacturers worldwide had to look at both Ford and GM in order to 
rationalize their own systems. Although Daimler-Benz followed its own strategy, it 
consciously compared its possibilities to the existing American models. This can be seen in 
the following marketing publication dating from 1925: 
In den Mercedeswerken der Daimler Motoren Gesellschaft, die nach alter Tradition 
auch heute noch auf höchste Qualitätsarbeit Wert legt, ist eine bis ins Äußerste gehende 
Arbeitsteilung nach amerikanischem Muster  nicht durchgeführt, da darunter die 
Zuverlässigkeit und Präzision der Bearbeitung leiden würden. Man kann also nur 
bedingt von amerikanischen Fabrikationsmethoden sprechen. Die heute in den 
  
 
70 
Daimlerwerken  angewendeten Produktionsmethoden sind eine glückliche Vereinigung 
von Zeit-, Arbeit- und Kosten-sparendem maschinellem Betrieb und höchste Qualität 
garantierender handwerksmässiger Bearbeitung (Thieme 2004). (Author translation: In 
the Mercedes plants of the Daimler Motors Corporation, which even today places great 
value in achieving the highest quality, there is no implementation in the slightest of the 
division of labor following American approaches.  Both the reliability and precision of 
our manufacturing would suffer. As such one can only speak of a very limited 
application of American production methods. The applied production methods in 
Daimler plants are a happy combination of time, work and cost saving machinery joined 
together with a degree of craftsmanship, which guarantees the highest quality). 
This sense of uniqueness and success was shared by management and workers alike. But it is 
a uniqueness shared among luxury car builders such as Daimler, BMW and Jaguar, and not a 
specifically German uniqueness. Volkswagen and Opel both followed completely different 
strategies. Daimler was always different. Already in 1924 a representative of the works 
council (Betriebsrat) at the Benz Mannheim plant described American workmanship as “billig 
aber schlecht” (Author translation: cheap but poor) (Thieme 2004). This consensus between 
workers and management in their rejection of Ford and GM philosophies was important for 
Daimler’s success. One of the major arguments of the proponents of Fordism was that it 
improved the standard of living dramatically for normal workers with Henry Ford’s “5 dollars 
a day” promise in 1914 (Banham 2002). Daimler has always countered this philosophy by 
offering wages, benefits and conditions much better than the official tariff agreements. This 
attitude and practice would continue right on to the mid 1980s. In a cover article celebrating 
Daimler’s domination of the car industry in 1985 from the German news magazine, Der 
Spiegel, the authors describe how Ford and Fiat, Toyota and GM were being forced to work 
together. Only Daimler they claim was beyond that necessity and as such “sind die Daimler-
Manager auf Hilfe von ausserhalb nicht angewiesen.” (Author translation: Daimler managers 
do not need to rely on help from outsiders). 
“Solche Hilfe wäre eher schädlich. Der Mythos der Marke wäre dahin, wenn ein 
Mercedes nicht mehr reinrassig wäre, wenn der Motor aus Wolfsburg oder die 
Vorderachse aus Detroit zuliefert wurde” (Der Spiegel 37, 1985). (Author translation: 
Such help would be damaging. The myth of the Mercedes brand would be ruined if it 
were no longer purebred, if the engine came from Wolfsburg or the front axle was 
supplied by Detroit). 
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At the same time, Mercedes production head Niefer would point to the upcoming 100th 
anniversary of the firm as proof that there was still a place for traditional craftsmanship. For 
him the idea of robots putting together a car without the aid of skilled laborers and Meister 
was unthinkable. This 1985 Mercedes attitude stands in stark contrast to Ford’s  
rationalizations, which reduced the average task cycle time per worker from 514 to 2.3 
minutes between 1908 and 1913 and this without the aid of moving assembly belts (Womack, 
Jones and Roos 1990; Banham 2002). 
Die menschenleere Roboterfabrik ist für Niefer “völlig ungeeignet einen Mercedes zu 
bauen” (Der Spiegel 37, 1985). (Author translation: A factory just filled with robots and 
without any people is completely unsuitable for building a Mercedes according to 
Niefer). 
This haughty stance and aura of invincibility at Daimler would soon be forced to change. 
Despite Daimler’s attempt to distance themselves from the Americans, the pressure inside the 
industry after 1985 forced all companies to compare, imitate and enhance production 
methods. Most famously Toyota had adopted the American Deming’s ideas on quality 
management to evolve their own Japanese version of “just in time” delivery and lean method 
production. Having already penetrated the U.S market the Japanese invaded Europe in the 
1980s at a time when the industry was already suffering from chronic overcapacity and 
saturated markets. The MIT study documenting this worldwide success story, The Machine 
that Changed the World (Womack, James and Roos 1991), would become a publication that 
even Daimler could no longer afford to ignore in the way they did back at the time of Fordism 
and GM, especially when things started to go wrong in the early 1990s. Writing in a special 
Spiegel edition on important new books in 1991, German management consultant Roland 
Berger would reiterate the warning to Germany luxury automakers (Berger 1991).   
Although Daimler-Benz AG had its unique identity, which is also connected to its German 
roots, it will be argued below that their philosophy radically deviates from stereotype 
descriptions of German culture as defined by national cultural theorist Hofstede (1980; 2002). 
The evolution of both Daimler’s and Chrysler’s respective company cultures are the result of 
a mixture of the historical development of the automobile industry influenced by both 
national and trans-national contexts, as Lange has argued for the bio-tech industry (Lange 
2009). 
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In this regard Chrysler is no different than Daimler. At the time of the takeover it is possible 
to pose the question; How “American” was Chrysler anyway? The man behind Chrysler’s 
profit-bringing platform strategy in the 1990s was a Frenchman, Francois Castaing, who 
started working for Renault and came to America during the years of the alliance between 
Renault and the America Motor Company (Lutz, 1998). When AMC was acquired by 
Chrysler in 1987, Castaing stayed on with Chrysler. His manufacturing strategy was based on 
a Chrysler study of Honda, the Japanese car maker. His boss, Robert Lutz, a further key 
player in Chrysler’s success in the 1990’s was a Swiss-American with extensive experience 
working for BMW, Opel and Ford in Germany.  
Chrysler’s longstanding “gutsy” (Lutz 1998) reputation for being able to fight back from the 
brink of bankruptcy and other disasters is nothing exclusively “American”. Indeed their 
company values of leanness, quickness and guts are in part derived from a self-image that 
wants consciously to differentiate itself from the behemoth cultures of the other Detroit 
members of the Big 3, General Motors and Ford. Nonetheless they also are “American” 
companies. These considerations have to be blended with the “cowboy” image, which equally 
forms a central moment in the company’s self-perception. 
So this brief overview of the global car industry presents us with a heterogeneous picture. It is 
somehow both global and national at the same time. But these findings are incomplete and 
inconclusive from an academic perspective. What is “national culture” and how important is it 
in a globalized world? If differences in national culture are so critical and impeding, how can 
any cross-border deals ever actually prosper and thrive and how could a global industry 
evolve? Therefore it is important to critically examine theories of national culture in terms of 
possible ramifications for this case study. 
3.2.2 Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensions 
Any consideration of national cultural differences has to take into account the pioneering 
work of Geert Hofstede (1980). Hofstede was the first scholar on the topic of “culture”, who 
provided comprehensive quantified empirical evidence to support his theories. Hofstede refers 
to culture as a “collective programming of the mind” and compares his theoretical conceptual 
construction to the concept of “forces” in physics (Hofstede 1980). Hofstede assumes the a 
priori existence of national cultural entities in much the same manner as Newton and Kant 
assumed a priori fixed coordinates of time and space. In a revealing and abrasive response 
(Hofstede 2002) to an equally abrasive criticism from Brendan McSweeney (2002) of his 
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work, Hofstede proudly points out how his 1980 study led to a revolutionary multi-disciplined 
paradigm shift in the field of intercultural studies. Over 20 years later he can draw attention to 
an astronomical number of citations in a wide variety of journals and publications. Moreover 
he claims some 400 significant and independent correlations of his results (Hofstede 2002). In 
the meantime he himself considers his theory of cultural dimensions to be the paradigm of the 
field intercultural studies for “normal science” in Thomas Kuhn’s sense of the concept (Kuhn 
1962). In his own eyes, he is the scientific community (Hofstede 2002). Certainly Hofstede’s 
use of questionnaires and the sheer size of his data base brought about a quantum leap in 
terms of quantitative research in the field of cultural studies, which has certainly been one of 
the reasons for his success and recognition amongst other members of the scientific 
community (Nakata 2009). Even in 2012 it is impossible to consider intercultural issues 
without taking Hofstede into account, even if it eventually means pointing out ways to go 
beyond his pioneer achievements. 
In his theory of dimensions of culture Hofstede differentiates between “values” and 
“practices”. Values have “centuries-old roots” and are “hardly changeable” or if they change 
it is not the result of “anybody’s intentions” (Hofstede 2002). “Practices” on the other hand 
are the tools, which allow international companies to function despite intercultural 
differences. The hypothesized universal values provide the framework for interpreting the 
data amassed, and enable him to construct culture dimension indexes. 
Hofstede’s (1980) image of culture as a kind of collective “programming of the mind” is 
obviously rhetorical , but as McCloskey (1983) has argued, the use of rhetorical imagery may 
not be unavoidable. In Hofstede’s early work (1980) his use of the “software of the mind” 
image approaches a kind of deterministic generic “programming”, in which both family and 
school socialization also involves inevitable cultural value determination. In his later work 
(2010) the reader feels that the “programming” can be modified and updated and seems more 
malleable to the interference of company practices, although one would expect family and 
school socialization to be more determinant. The genesis of his thinking reflects both critical 
reception of his work over the years and increasing awareness of the role of company culture 
in cross-border business activity within the scientific community, resulting subsequently in 
Hofstede’s attempts to incorporate this factor into the corpus of his thought (Nakata 2009). 
Culture, according to Hofstede, can be measured using 4 universal cultural dimension 
indexes; power distance, masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism and risk 
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avoidance. A fifth dimension, long/short term orientation, was added in a later study 
(Hofstede & Bond 1988) as a reaction to criticism of the overly westernized perspective of the 
original study, and was initially referred to as “Confucian Dynamism” (Fang 2003). Although 
the number of conducted interviews by Hofstede (116,000) is impressive, closer scrutiny of 
the 32 factored questions reveal a questionable correlation between the categories of behavior, 
cultural dimensionality and national culture. The original strength of his work, a survey of 
116,000 people all working for the same company at the same period of time, can be shown to 
be the approach’s greatest weakness. The theoretical assumption that international differences 
in one single company in one single industry in the 1970s can be generalized to support an a 
priori hypothesis about the role of cultural differences in all companies is highly questionable. 
IBM, Microsoft, Sun Systems, Apple, Cisco, HP are all American companies within one 
sector, but their leadership, business styles and indeed cultural values in Hofstede’s sense of 
the concept differ radically from one another. Some of them take more risks; some of them 
have strong authoritarian structures, others more democratic; some of them are more feminine 
etc. But all of them are American. Furthermore, the national and company cultures of all of 
these firms have changed and evolved over time and been subject to increasing glocalization, 
the adopting of an international company’s culture to local business environment conditions. 
The same critique can be applied within the context of the global automobile industry if one 
takes into account the existence of differing transnational strategy differences (Boyer and 
Freyssenet 2000; Lange 2010). 
3.2.3 Hofstede applied to the takeover failure 
In terms of the specific focus of this case study on the German-American DaimlerChrysler 
AG takeover, it is perhaps interesting to note that in 3 of the 5 cultural dimensions from 
Hofstede there are no real significant differences between the USA and (West) Germany, 
remembering that at the time of his publication (1980) only data from the Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) had been assessed. In the Power Distance Index 
(Germany 35; USA 40), Masculinity Index (Germany 66; USA 66), and Long Term 
Orientation Index (Germany 31; USA 25) the results are surprisingly comparable (Figure 5 
below). However, significant differences can be ascertained in the Individualism Index 
(Germany 67; USA 89) and the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (Germany 65; USA 35). The 
key question is whether these assumed differences in cultural dimensionality can be applied to 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. 
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Figure 6: Hofstede Cultural Dimensions (USA vs Germany) 
 
Source: John Riach adapted from Hofstede (1980). DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 3.1 
The USA scores very high on the individualism index. Hofstede characterizes collectivist 
societies as ones in which “people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue 
protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” (Hofstede 2001 225) This definition 
of collectivism captures, however, very much the underlying spirit of the United Auto 
Workers in the American car industry. Combining both the function of the German 
“Gewerkschaft” (union) and the German “Betriebsrat” (works council), this organization is 
one of the most “collectivist” institutions in any variety of capitalism. This conflicts with the 
admittedly highly “individualistic” nature of much of Chrysler’s management decision-
making. The whole history of the company is dominanted by sudden unprecedented CEO 
intervention and radical changes in strategies (Hyde 2003). The point, however, is that 
Chrysler exhibits both extremely highly “individualistic” and “collectivistic” behavior within 
the confines of one American cooperation. 
Similar reservations can be raised when considering the issue of risk avoidance. The GLOBE 
study (2007), following in Hofstede’s tradition points to high risk avoidance as a major 
societal cultural practice related to Germany’s long history of division, traumatic historical 
events (Bauernkrieg) and describes traditional Prussian state orientation as a tool for reducing 
uncertainty and other factors. On the other hand taking risks is at the very heart of the 
innovative Mercedes approach to engineering. The first Benz only completed its first drive 
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with the aid of Berta Benz’s hat pin and garter. And Mrs. Benz did not inform her husband 
that she was taking the car on the long trip from Mannheim to Pforzheim for fear he would 
not allow her (Lengert and Dreher 2010). This living story and legend underlines a more 
comprehensive point. The whole history of Daimler-Benz is the history of innovation in the 
car industry. Risk is intimately connected to innovation. The luxury segment of the German 
car industry in general and Mercedes in particular thrive on being “first to market” and looks 
down at the Japanese tradition of “imitation” and “fast followers”. This attitude towards risk 
and innovation is substantiated by Daimler-Benz’s (DaimlerChrysler) commitment to research 
and development. Figure 6 illustrates spending differences on research and development from 
1998 until 2007. It is interesting to note that dramatic increases to Chrysler’s research and 
development funding were effected after the German side took control of top management in 
2000 (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000).  
Figure 7: Research and Development Costs at Mercedes and Chrysler (1998-2006) 
 
Source: Compiled by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 3.2 
As the Mercedes “best or nothing” TV commercial puts it; Mercedes is built on “the promise 
to build the world’s first automobile and the promise to never stop reinventing it” 
(DaimlerChrysler Video Appendix 3.2). Leading engineer Wilhelm Bauer was killed in one of 
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the very first Mercedes in 1900 during the Nice- La Turbie mountain race (Grunow-Osswald 
2006). The reaction to the accident reveals both the risk taking and risk avoiding conflict at 
the centre of innovational strategies within an engineering context; 
Cannstatt’s first reaction was to make excessive engine outputs responsible for the 
accident and to stay away from any speed events in future. However, Emil Jellinek 
convinced Wilhelm Maybach – Gottlieb Daimler had died shortly before, in early 
March – that the car’s high centre of gravity was responsible for the accident: “Victories 
bring world fame. People buy the winning brand, and will always buy it. It would be 
commercial suicide to abstain from racing,” Jellinek argued. “What we need is a new 
vehicle of completely different design.” DMG yielded to Jellinek’s urging, and on 2 
April 1900 Jellinek ordered the development of a new kind of car: it was to have an 
output of at least 26 kW, a lightweight engine, a lower centre of gravity – in short, it had 
to be light, well-proportioned and fast. Jellinek proposed that the new model series be 
named “Daimler-Mercedes”, and so in 1900 “Mercedes” appeared for the first time as a 
brand name in its own right and not as a designation for an individual car or driver.” 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 3.1) 
This high risk approach causes managers to launch products even if their product maturity has 
not reached serial production standards. It was true in 1900 and it was true in the late 1990s 
with the launch of a number of quality-plagued models, including the A-, M and E-Classes. 
CEO Schrempp boasted in the 1998 Annual report that Daimler-Benz had developed ten new 
models in less than 3 years and 80% of revenues were derived from products, which had been 
developed in the last 5 years (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998 6). However, the 
ramifications for serial production stability were significant. According to the Financial Times 
Deutschland Mercedes warranty costs exploded by more than 340 % between 1998 and 2000 
to 3.4 billion Euros (The Financial Times May 7th, 2001). This became an even more critical 
issue when the radical increase of the number of electronic functions in high end luxury 
vehicles in the 1990s overwhelmed brands such as Mercedes, whose chief decision makers 
were exclusively mechanical engineers. Interestingly enough, the company nevertheless 
pushed ahead with market introductions, although the ensuing warranty and good will costs 
for recall actions were astronomical (The Financial Times May 7th, 2001). This covers both 
manufacturing processes and automotive engineering and development. There is ample 
evidence to support this claim if one looks closer at the kinds of patents being taken out by the 
German car industry and if one look at the time line of feature introduction of innovative 
  
 
78 
technology to the market. Innovation is perhaps the German car industry’s key competitive 
edge against both Japanese and American manufacturers. Company sources report that 
Daimler and Benz have taken out over 80,000 patents in their 125 year history (Lengert and 
Dreher 2010). This zeal for innovation became increasingly interdisciplinary during the 1980s 
and 90s as mechanical systems were merged with electronic, pneumatic and hydraulics. The 
Mercedes brand also made significant contributions in the area of new materials such as 
aluminum and carbon fibers. This can be documented by examining the number and nature of 
new patents and production implementations. Even in 2009, a year of economic recovery, 
Daimler AG still registered more than 2,000 patents (DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 
3.2). Such an approach radically contradicts the claims of Hofstede (1980) and GLOBE 
(2007). But the impressive empirical research conducted in the GLOBE report was taken from 
the food, finance and telecommunications sectors and as such not necessarily reflective of the 
role of “risk taking” in the German car sector.  
Risk taking is not only limited to technological strategies but also applies to management 
strategy. As Thieme (2004) points out, the behavior of Daimler management contradicts the 
Chandler (1990) theory of German “cooperative managerial capitalism”. The basic strategy of 
Schrempp’s “Welt AG” reflects a radically innovative and high-risk approach to shaping the 
automobile world for the 21st century. This initiative stemmed from the German and not the 
American side of the takeover. Chrysler had always been reluctant to venture outside North 
America. It was also Chrysler management which voted against Schrempp’s plans to takeover 
Nissan in 1999 (Vlasic and Stertz 2000) 
Furthermore, Schrempp was not the first risk-taker at Daimler. Reuter had equally ambitious 
and high-risk plans for the shift to diversification which characterized Daimler in the mid 
1980s. The venture into fields of activity where the company had no know-how was at first 
celebrated by the press and the stock markets as a brilliant chess move for the future and a 
brilliant answer to the growing uncertainties of the global car business. This strain of risk 
taking can be further traced back to Alfred von Kaulla, who successfully resisted Benz’s 
attempts to cooperate in 1919 and his insistence on fighting the advice of the banks and all 
economic evidence to change Daimler’s strategy after World War 1 (Thieme 2004; Grunow-
Osswald 2006). Indeed, we again have diametrically competing values within one company. 
At Daimler, the banks and specifically Deutsche Bank have often been at loggerheads with 
Daimler’s managers during the whole history of their company. Deutsche Bank’s decision in 
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the first years of the 21st century to dispose of their 28.5% stake in the firm was indication 
that they were no longer to bear the risk of Schrempp’s vision of creating a “Welt AG”. 
On the whole, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are unable to capture similarities and 
differences between the American and German car industries. As Nakata (2009) argues, 
Hofstede’s world is still a world where nations are “fairly bound, stable and intact”. In her 
opinion that is precisely one of the reasons why it is now time to “go beyond Hofstede”. 
In this age of globalization, cultures are transversing national borders, co-mingling, 
hybridizing, morphing, and clashing through media, migration, telecommunications, 
international trade, information technology, supranational organizations, and 
unfortunately terrorism. (Nakata 2009 4) 
In the case of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, intercultural misunderstandings and clashes 
certainly contributed to and deepened existing difficulties in the takeover, but it would be 
superficial and erroneous to turn them into German-American main events. Neither Daimler 
nor Chrysler is particularly well-suited for the intercultural analytical concepts provided by 
Hofstede (1980) or the GLOBE report (2007). The differences between Americans and 
Germans tended to merely worsen inter-organizational cultural conflict, once the radically 
different company cultures made the takeover difficult to consummate. At the beginning of 
the takeover, for example, many Chrysler managers and executives likened Daimler to Ford 
or GM in terms of their approach to making decisions, as well as designing, engineering and 
building cars. The focus was on differences in organizational processes rather than focus on 
Daimler’s “Germanness”. Indeed, at the time of the takeover with Chrysler, A “lean” Chrysler 
organization was producing more than 3 times as many vehicles combined with operating 
profits more than double those of Daimler-Benz (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998 
27 and 30). The efficiency of Chrysler was impressive, despite the fact that the American 
division had 32% more employees (123,000) than the Mercedes passenger car division 
(93,000). 
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Figure 8: DC Operating Profits 1998 ($ Million) 
 
Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 3.3 
 
Table 5: Passenger Vehicle Production 1998 
Daimler-Benz AG 922,795 
 
 
Chrysler 
Corporation 
3,093,716 
 
 
  Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Appendix 3.1     
“Germanness” did not play a determining role at the outset of the takeover. The Germans had 
already executed an economically efficient takeover of an American giant some 20 years 
earlier. Daimler had successfully integrated America’s largest truck maker, Freightliner, into 
its worldwide commercial vehicle strategy. So, at least on prima facie evidence, there was no 
obvious reason in 1998 to believe that Germans cannot work with Americans. Whether or not 
this achievement was the result of successfully blending American and German attributes or 
other factors specific to the world of commercial vehicles is indeed difficult to analyze, but in 
the case of Daimler and Freightliner it has worked. Of course, people on both sides of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover perceived themselves as being “German” and “American” 
respectively, but these differences in nationality played a smaller role than the radical 
differences between the two companies’ respective approaches to developing and building 
cars. The national differences added fat to the fire, they didn’t start the fire. 
A good example of this “adding fat to the fire” point of view can be seen in an incident within 
the IT division of DaimlerChrysler AG, which was headed by an American. Few employees 
Daimler-Benz 
2,338 
32% 
Chrysler  
4,942 
 68% 
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in any company of any nationality like the idea of having to change or update software. IT 
departments in large corporations are about as popular as Human Resource departments. So 
when DaimlerChrysler AG decided to replace Daimler’s use of Outlook with Chrysler’s Lotus 
Notes as their email tool most people at Mercedes were unhappy, especially when the plan ran 
into major data migration issues. In the midst of this frustration criticism of the “stupid 
Americans” of course surfaced, but the reaction had more to do with Lotus Notes than 
Americans per say. Furthermore, although it was clear those German managers had more 
power in the new organization, German employees complained loudly about the unfairness of 
having to speak English in departments, such as IT, which were headed by Americans (The 
New York Times March 24th, 1999; DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 3.3; Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000).  
A more beneficial examination of the framework of national cultures is possible if one 
analyzes the concrete political and social institutions which have evolved within these 
frameworks. The existence of the so-called “Duales Bildungssystem” (dual educational 
system) and the training of “Meister” (certified master) as compared to the American practice 
of employing semi-skilled and unskilled workers “learning on the job” do point to radical 
differences between German and American workers in the automobile sector. The “Meister” 
or the “FH” (Fachhochschule / Poytechnical) engineer are something unique to German 
culture, easily identifiable, but hard to translate into Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The 
varieties of capitalism approach seem more promising in this respect and will be at the centre 
of our attention in the next section (Hall and Soskice 2001).   
3.3 Was the takeover a conflict between Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)? 
National cultural and institutional environments differ, and these differences may hamper a 
successful integration after cross-border mergers and acquisitions. More particularly, 
Aguilera/Denker (2004) argued that it may be especially difficult to integrate HRM policies 
when mergers and acquisitions involve companies from opposing varieties of capitalism. 
They frequently referred to the case of the failed DaimlerChrysler AG (DC) takeover. In their 
influential varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach Hall/Soskice (2001) discussed Germany 
and the USA as the chief exemplars of a coordinated market economy (CME) and of a liberal 
market economy (LME), respectively.  
This section will examine the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover from the VoC perspective, 
shedding light both on the reasons for the failed takeover and on the strengths and weaknesses 
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of the VoC perspective on firm-level strategies and behavior. No study has hitherto applied 
the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach systematically to understand whether institutional 
differences may help explain the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG. That is rather surprising as 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was at that time the largest industrial takeover in history 
involving companies from the manufacturing sector, the sector that was the main focus of 
Hall and Soskice’s initial publication (Hall and Soskice 2001). The 1998 takeover was also 
executed at the same time as the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach was evolving. The 
DaimlerChrysler AG case, therefore, renders a unique opportunity to examine the extent to 
which mergers and acquisitions across the CME-LME distinction may be influenced by 
differing institutional environments. 
In the literature related to this section the VoC approach has served as an important theoretical 
point of departure for examining at the firm level how competitive advantage and corporate 
change are influenced by institutional environments, for example in telecommunications, the 
airline, clothing and biotechnology industry (Lange 2009; Doellgast 2008; Lehrer 2000; Lane 
and Probert 1997; Batt and Darbishire 1997). In line with that literature, the VoC approach 
provides a useful theoretical framework, despite its weaknesses. Even critiques of the VoC 
approach (Hancké et al. 2007) agree on the useful core of the VoC approach, namely the 
notion of “institutional complementarities”, an alignment of company strategies and 
institutional frameworks, and the idea that global forces will trigger different responses from 
firms in different types of capitalism. That core renders the approach attractive to company 
case studies in general and the DaimlerChrysler AG case in particular.  
The VoC approach shifts the focus of attention away from single institutional differences. 
VoC concentrates rather on how configurations of institutions interact to embed companies in 
an environment that shapes their strategies and capabilities. VoC also shifts the focus from 
simple, single-level explanations to a story that is based on the complex interplay of 
institutional frameworks with company strategies, industry-specific factors, and globalization. 
This chapter will argue that the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover cannot be 
assigned to a single cause, and the strategies of Daimler and Chrysler, as well as the 
difficulties in the post-takeover phase, cannot be understood unless the complex varieties of 
institutional comparative advantage provided by differing national economies are taken into 
account. Moreover, as DaimlerChrysler AG strove to become the world’s first “truly global 
company”, the case allows us to scrutinize how the VoC approach understands and attempts 
to predict globalization strategies. The VoC approach, ultimately, can account for the fact that 
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both companies in a path-dependent way were locked into their strategies (Hancké, Rhodes 
and Thatcher (2008). The lock-in is the main reason why synergies envisaged by Daimler and 
Chrysler did not materialize, in turn explaining the takeover failure. 
The following section will then analyze the takeover itself and argue that the VoC approach 
helps to identify two important reasons for the takeover failure: First, the country-specific 
institutional environment set each company on a path-dependent strategy track which 
hindered a successful integration at the operational level. Second, it that seems the 
institutional differences that VoC focuses on have influenced – as stereotypes – the image 
among the actors involved in the takeover, thus deepening the misunderstandings.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) took Germany and the USA as the two real types of the CME and 
LME variety of capitalism, respectively. Each type of capitalism is characterized by a 
configuration of mutually reinforcing, complementary institutions. Institutional 
complementarities imply that the institutional set will remain relatively stable, and that each 
type of capitalism is consistent, in the sense that it affords companies resources that may be 
leveraged into specific competitive advantages. In particular, the more arms-length, flexible 
relationships that characterize the US economy supposedly facilitate radical (rather than 
incremental) innovation processes. Conversely, the more long-term relationships that 
characterize the German economy supposedly facilitate firm-specific learning and more 
cumulative, incremental innovation processes. 
The particular institutional differences between CMEs and LMEs extend to four institutional 
“spheres”: the labor market system, the occupational/educational training system, inter-firm 
relations and the financial system. In these spheres, Germany and the USA differed markedly 
prior to the takeover (and still do). In particular, the German in comparison to the US labor 
market is characterized by stricter employment protection regulation, more long-term 
employment contracts and a much broad coverage of workers by collective agreements (labor 
contracts). In Germany, the training system (Berufsausbildung) involving instruction in 
schools and practical work has been an important institution in German manufacturing, which 
is almost absent in the USA. Inter-firm relations are more collaborative and of a network-type 
in Germany, but more arms-length in the USA. Finally, the financial system in Germany is 
dominated by large banks holding stocks of large companies or maintaining long-term lender 
relationships with firms, while in the USA the stock market and dispersed ownership of 
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shares are much more important in providing financial capital to firms and controlling 
management.  
There is also evidence that institutional differences between CMEs and LMEs produce 
marked differences in important economic outcomes. In particular, wage inequality was much 
higher in the USA than in Germany in 1995 (Rueda and Pontussen 2000). Furthermore, the 
USA (and LMEs in general) revealed comparative advantages (measured in terms of export 
performance) in the high-tech sector such as computers or biotech. Conversely, Germany (and 
CMEs in general) show comparative advantages (measured in terms of export performance) 
in the medium high-tech sector (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu 2010; Schneider 
and Paunescu 2012). 
3.3.1 How VoC helps to  understand the takeover failure 
The LME-CME distinction helps understand why the takeover, as it was conceived, was most 
likely to fail. One of the main arguments in VoC’s interpretation of globalization is that LME 
and CME differences will continue to exist and have an impact on decision-making. The 
creation of DaimlerChrysler AG as a German AG is a case in point. It is impossible for any 
foreign company to execute certain “global” strategies within the economic institutions of the 
USA. The most damaging institutional restriction, which impacted the takeover initially, was 
Standard and Poors’ decision not to list the DaimlerChrysler AG share, DCX, on their S&P’s 
500 list. This had significantly negative repercussions for the fate of the stock, as institutional 
trust fund investors sold their shares within the first 6 months after DCX’s November launch 
on the New York Stock Exchange. The initial equal German-American distribution of 
shareholders was destroyed, as American participation dipped from 44% to under 25% 
(Blaško 2000; Karoyli 2003). This made it very difficult to reach one of the most important 
goals of the takeover, namely an increase in shareholder value. After reaching a record high of 
$108 in January 1999, within a year that value had dropped to below $40 (Karoyli 2003). The 
situation would be further exacerbated due to the facts that around 7% of the remaining 25% 
of American shares were controlled by one person, Kirk Kerkorian; His major focus was on 
shareholder value. He would end up suing Schrempp and DaimlerChrysler AG for misleading 
shareholders (New York Times November 28, 2000). Although DaimlerChrysler AG would 
win the lawsuit, the whole proceedings severely damaged both DaimlerChrysler AG’s image 
and cast a very public shadow on Schrempp’s leadership abilities. VoC predicts both a 
tendency of firms located in CME economies to try and exploit the comparative advantages 
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such as markets in LME environments and also the ability of existing national institutions to 
absorb the impact of external intervention. DaimlerChrysler AG completely misread how the 
NYSE, S&P’s and their own American shareholders would react. The attempt to establish 
DCX as the first global share, allowing investors to sidestep the Wall Street practice of 
issuing American Deposit Receipts for foreign investors, failed miserably, with only about 
3% of the share’s activity being handled in the US (Karoyli 2003). 
A further official goal in the takeover was to achieve synergies in an industry with excess 
capacity and a perceived need both to contain costs and to market the full range of cars. The 
announced strategy of integration to achieve the synergies was a “best of both” in which both 
companies are seen as having to change considerably (Marks and Mirvis 1998; Stahl 2004). 
For synergies in such a “cultural integration” to materialize, it would have been necessary to 
integrate the key production strategies. This strategy, however, was at radical odds with the 
institutionally-dependent strategies at both Daimler and Chrysler. In this situation the work of 
Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) helps to supplement the basic tenets of the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach. Although this case study will analyze their work when it looks at the 
shortcomings of the MIT analysis of the automobile industry it suffices here to draw attention 
to how Boyer and Freyssenet tie strategies in the automobile industry into national institutions 
of production. Daimler pursued a strategy of “diversified quality production” during the 
1980s and the 1990s (Streeck 1991; Boyer and Freyssenet 2000). That is, their main goal was 
to produce luxury cars with superior quality for which price competition was weak. The goal 
was to produce such cars in as many market segments as possible. Daimler and other German 
companies were able to maintain diversified quality production because of the institutional 
configuration that constitutes a CME. Perhaps most importantly, the German system of 
occupational training for young workers (duale Berufsausbildung) secures a highly skilled 
workforce that is able to perform non-production tasks, for example maintenance and 
continuous improvements. The occupational training system is expensive and hinges on a 
more long-term approach. Here, the block holding at Daimler provides a good example of the 
more patient capital that does not focus on short-term shareholder value (Dore 2000). And as 
Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) have pointed out, the “quality” strategy has the most stable 
market permanence because almost all societies have a very wealthy class of people who are 
willing to pay lots of money as a means of defining their wealth to the rest of the world. That 
seemed to be threatened in the late 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, when all models 
started to look the same and everyone was copying everyone else and the really rich started 
buying yachts instead of Maybachs or S-Classes that were increasingly being imitated by the 
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Japanese competition (The Economist January 6, 2005). In the mid 1990s Daimler was 
convinced it would only survive if it could find a way into Asia with small, fuel-efficient cars. 
But that idea was as unrealistic as the decision at Daimler back in the 1920s to build bicycles 
and typewriters in case the luxury car market failed (Grunow-Osswald 2006). The current 
(2012-3) success of the company has been its ability to attract the wide base of rich people in 
China and India, who are buying E- and S-Class cars, not the Smart (Daimler 
Zwischenbericht Q1 2011). This success reinforces Boyer and Freyssenet’s (2000) analysis of 
the automobile industry.  
In contrast, Chrysler’s production system’s deviation from classical “American” models in the 
1990s renders a more complex explanation in terms of a firm’s activities within an LME 
environment. Chrysler clearly showed the marks of the lessons they learned from Honda. In 
their study of profit strategies within the automobile sector Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) point 
out that Honda’s philosophy of “innovation and flexibility” was able to thrive at Honda and 
Chrysler because of the emerging economic prosperity in the mid 1990s, which was 
especially true during the years of the Clinton administration in the United States where 
Chrysler sells more than 90% of their vehicles. The bottom line for success within an LME 
environment is short-term market performance. Copying Honda’s approach to manufacturing 
and combining it with their own traditional strengths in the area of styling and design allowed  
Chrysler to quickly get products to a market of people defining their individuality in terms of 
the innovative new models they were driving. Quality was not the main issue as can be seen 
in the success of the PT Cruiser retro-model. Built in Mexico, the Cruiser was both a styling 
and commercial success. Unfortunately the vehicle was plagued with a number of quality 
issues which lead to recalls by American authorities.The revolution at Chrysler was primarily 
in the area of marketing innovation and it meshed perfectly with the economic prosperity and 
customer expectations in the NAFTA region being experienced through the late 1990s. 
Chrysler’s strategy was distinct from Fordism or GM’s Sloanism to be sure, but for our 
purposes it is important to remark that all three could thrive at various points in history in an 
LME environment. The main feature of the Chrysler/Honda approach was its short-term 
targeting of an enthusiastic market and a customer base willing to try something different 
quickly. That can be best implemented in a LME environment and explains the enormous 
short-term success Chrysler had at the time in North America. Their vehicles were more 
appealing than Toyota, Ford and GM. However, quality was neither a perceived nor attainable 
goal within the framework of Chrysler’s profit strategy (Vlasic and Stertz 2000, Boyer and 
Freyssenet 2000). Chrysler products stopped being appealing when quality issues started to 
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crop up and when the Japanese had once again imitated Chrysler’s innovative designs, but at 
even lower costs and providing more technical reliability. Daimler seems to have taken over 
Chrysler at exactly the worst time, at the height of its success and shortly before another 
radical plummet (New York Times May 14, 2007). 
Although global technological and market changes have triggered changes in all production 
systems since the 1990s (Jürgens 2004), it is remarkable how stable the main differences 
between Daimler and Chrysler have been, reflecting those between the German and the US 
industry in general. The stability suggests that the wider institutional context, encompassing 
different varieties of capitalism, has locked the two companies into their respective production 
system, mirroring strong inertia and path-dependency at the societal level. Efforts by the 
Mercedes organization to break out of their traditional national production contexts have 
resulted in radical threats to the brand’s overall quality profit strategy (A-Class, M-Class, 
Smart). 
In fact, a closer analysis of the Daimler production system, to be exact the production system 
at the Mercedes brands, would have shown that an integration leading to synergies within 
DaimlerChrysler AG was extremely difficult to implement. A clear characteristic of the 
Daimler production system is its fragmentation as a result of the institutionally driven high 
degree of uniqueness for each model line. Within Mercedes at the time, even in one factory, 
Chinese walls were erected between the development and production of the main brands; C-, 
E- and S-Class Mercedes (Clarke 2005). In other words, the possibility of synergies was 
systematically impossible within Mercedes, reflecting diversified quality production even 
within Mercedes. It was not until the late 1990s that Mercedes realized this and attempted to 
develop a unified integrated Mercedes Production System (MPS). This attempt would 
radically contradict the hitherto national institutional framework, which had helped guarantee 
its success as a quality brand. 
In their comprehensive study of the history of the automobile industry in the 1990s Boyer and 
Freyssenet (2000) come up with six different profit strategies including the “quality” 
(Daimler) and “innovation and flexibility” (Chrysler) approaches. They view the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover as “cumulating all sorts of risks and challenges 
simultaneously” and argue that no two profit strategies have ever been able to successfully 
exist in one automobile company at the same time. Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) supplement 
the VoC approach and both provide good reasons for explaining why both Daimler and 
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Chrysler were able to thrive within their unique institutional environments and why it would 
be almost impossible to combine the two strategies. Their analysis will play a central role in 
our examination of Mercedes’ efforts to implement the MIT study ramifications for lean 
production. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that Hofstede’s approach to cultural dimensions as framework for 
leadership decision-making does not account for the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. 
Chapter 3.3 focused instead on the role of national institutions, particularly in the 
determination of production systems. Hall and Soskice (2001) view their Varieties of 
Capitalism approach as a historical reaction to the economic problems of the 1990s and as 
such is prima facie of interest when studying the reasons behind the failure of the 1998 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. Companies are considered to be the main actors within their 
national economic institutions. The VoC approach helps understand a main reason for the 
failure of Daimler to integrate Chrysler – the grossly differing production strategies stood in 
the way of any attempt at complete integration with the realization of synergy effects. The 
different production strategies, in turn, need to be understood against the institutional 
frameworks that the German and the US varieties of capitalism confronting the two 
companies. The approach serves to explain the activities of companies, which calibrate 
“embeddedness” within relatively stable institutions of LME and CME environments at 
Chrysler and Daimler respectively. In addition and perhaps surprisingly the VoC approach 
helps to explain some of the behavior of both companies in cross border situations (i.e. 
Chrysler in Austria and Daimler in Alabama). The approach quite correctly dues justice to the 
fact that the advent of globalization is not homogenous across borders and that institutions of 
varying types of economy do not disappear overnight.  
At the same time the DaimlerChrysler AG case reveals a number of serious weaknesses in the 
VoC approach. There is a reductionist tendency to overinterpret companies as representatives 
of their respective national economies and thus underestimate both the internationalism and 
heterogeneous character of the global / national automobile sector. Although part of a CME 
environment, Daimler was more at risk of takeover than BMW or Porsche in 1998. Although 
part of a LME environment, Chrysler could not survive by using the same tactics with their 
suppliers to leverage economies of scale as Ford and GM. However, taking into 
considerations the more specific analysis of the global automobile sector from Boyer and 
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Freyssenet (2000) allows us to maintain our focus on the embedded nature of corporate 
strategies within the framework of national institutions and varieties of capitalism. 
Still, Hall and Soskice perceive their theory as “work in progress” and their attempt to 
interface political economy with micro-economic theory is a remarkable leap of faith, which 
should be further scrutinized in the future. In many ways DaimlerChrysler AG can be viewed 
as a vision, which was ahead of the time and which underestimated the resiliency of the 
political and economic institutions described by the VoC approach. The failure of the Welt 
AG vision remains the tale of two firms very much lost in the translation of the global car 
industry. CEO Schrempp’s infamous battle cry of “speed, speed, speed” is reminiscent of the 
Titantic’s full speed ahead in an ocean of icebergs (Der Spiegel 24, 1999). The company of 
the 21st century, like the ill-fated ship, never survived its infancy. The next chapter will 
analyze the emergence of this Welt AG strategy and show how it fundamentally contradicted 
the core promises and strategies of the Daimler-Benz takeover of Chrysler Corporation.  
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4 EMERGENCE OF DB’S WELT AG STRATEGY (1983-1998) 
As we have seen, much of the literature attributes the DaimlerChrysler AG failure to cross-
cultural national differences. Following Hall/Soskice (2001) and Boyer/Freyssenet (2000) this 
case study has argued that it is more convincing to link the emergence of specific production 
systems to historical institutional roots, which enable the development of economically 
calibrated organizational cultures. Mergers and takeovers are often difficult because of 
mutually incompatible organizational cultures. This is certainly true of the differences 
between Mercedes and Chrysler passenger car divisions. The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
failure was exacerbated by Mercedes efforts to redefine its own approach to production both 
before and after the takeover. This created contradictions and fissures within Mercedes own 
organizational culture, which rendered the chances for a successful integration of Chrysler 
into its new Welt AG strategy even more unlikely.  
In order to understand any post merger industrial strategy it is necessary to trace the origins of 
the current situations at both companies involved. Within the context of the manufacturing 
realities of an automobile company in the 1990s, “recent” means the previous 5-10 years. 
These origins are more instructive than the analysis of last year’s balance sheets. In his study 
of value destructive in the proposed merger between Volvo and Renault, Bruner (1999) points 
out the need to look at management decision strategies, which had been implemented much 
earlier than the actual announcement of the merger. Earlier decisions by executives in both the 
acquiring and acquired company shape and constrain the decisions they will make in the 
future. He hypothesizes that an analysis of this “path dependence” can help explain why 
sound judgment in the past can help predict the fortunes of a good deal and that bad decision-
making in the past will probably converge with bad decision-making in the future. Daimler-
Benz’s obvious misjudgment of the economic viability of AEG and other acquisitions in the 
1980s and early 1990s, for example, is cause for consternation considering their analysis of 
Chrysler in the 1990s.  
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was the clear product of Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s 
extension of the Welt AG strategy as initiated by former Mercedes CEO Werner’s attempt to 
expand and globalize the Mercedes production system within the passenger car division by 
imitating the success of the commercial vehicle division. As such it is necessary to monitor 
the origins and emergence of Schrempp’s vision for the future of the new company. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive historical examination of both 
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companies and their respective production systems, such as (Grunow-Osswald 2006) does in 
her comprehensive economic history of globalism at Daimler-Benz since 1886. Instead, the 
intention in chapter 4 is to briefly review the most important changes in the years leading up 
to the announcement of the DaimlerChrysler AG 1998 takeover in order to enhance an 
understanding of industrial acquisition strategies in general and the failure of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in particular. Specifically, the focus will be on monitoring the 
emergence of Daimler-Benz and CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s Welt AG strategy on the one hand 
and the willingness of Chrysler to accept the takeover in 1998 with the very partner that had 
been rejected during mutual and amicable negotiations 3 years earlier (Vlasic and Stertz 
2000).  
In terms of the emergence of the Welt AG strategy, chapter 4 will examine critical changes at 
Daimler starting in the early 1980s, which would eventually force Daimler to radically 
revolutionize its 100-year old strategy for making cars. In its fight to avoid itself being taken 
over by Ford or GM, these changes would eventually trigger the decision to takeover Chrysler 
in 1998. However, the new Daimler-Benz strategy had a significant disadvantage. Despite 
higher volumes and a broader spectrum of products, the marketing success of the Mercedes 
brand remained dependent on its original reputation for craftsmanship quality (Boyer and 
Freyssenet 2000). The faster the company expanded, the more difficult it became to sustain 
this basic brand truth. Critical incongruencies would start to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s 
and have an impact on the rationale and logic of the decision to takeover Chrysler. The 
growing pressure to expand even further, despite the growing accumulation of brand identity 
contradictions and paradoxes in Daimler-Benz’s situation from the 1980s into the mid 1990s, 
make the 1998 Chrysler takeover appear as a forced marriage of desperation, rather than the 
promised model global firm for the 21st century. This development was intensified under 
Schrempp’s tenure of leadership. Whereas observers could argue that Werner’s Smart, A-
Class and M-Class were not really Mercedes vehicles, the increasing pressure to commonize 
parts across model lines, reduce development times and reduce vertical integration under 
Schrempp would erode even quicker the complete quality strategy of the Mercedes brand. On 
the Chrysler side, the American company’s complete inability to expand beyond the NAFTA 
region, coupled with increasingly limited possibilities of increasing its 15-20% share of the 
US market, rendered it susceptible to any proposal from a foreign automaker. In addition, its 
adoption of a Honda approach to production was unable to free the company from its hitherto 
historical production path as a cyclically dependent roller-coaster enterprise (Hyde 2003). 
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This chapter consists of 5 sub-sections, four of which are related to developments at Daimler-
Benz between 1985 and 1997. The last section will look at the situation at Chrysler in the 
years leading up to the 1998 takeover. First we will look at the evolution of Daimler from a 
craftsman manufacturer of a small number luxury vehicles to its emergence as a player of 
mass production in the mid 1980s. This development is symbolized by the success of the W 
201, the 190er or the so-called “Baby Benz”. The precursor of the current C-class, the W 201 
was the first middle class car produced by Daimler. 1.8 million Baby Benzes were sold 
between the end of 1982 and 1993. That did not turn Daimler into a big player, but it was 
clear that for the first time in 100 years they were competing in the same market as VW, Opel 
(GM) and Ford in Germany. Ford was already making 2 million cars a year in 1923 (Banham 
2002), but the production numbers for baby Benz were a quantum leap in capacity compared 
to such famous models as the 1954 Mercedes 300SL gull-wing masterpiece, which had a total 
production of 3,258 cars (Grunow-Osswald 2006). In the early 1980s, the Baby Benz was 
viewed as an example of successful product spread as it competed against BMW’s 3 series. 
And its commercial success suggested that the Mercedes brand could also compete in non-
luxury markets, when their car sales in Germany even overtook those of massproducer Ford 
Germany (Grunow-Osswald, 2006). 
The second section of this chapter’s analysis will show how the long-term success of the 
Mercedes brand would be questioned at the pinnacle of its commercial success, namely with 
the appearance of the MIT global study of the automobile industry (1990). The MIT study 
would destroy the “myth” of the existence of any “craftsmanship” in the modern automobile 
world, including brands such as Mercedes, BMW, and Jaguar etc. In the eyes of the MIT 
social scientists, Mercedes was comparable to any other mass producer of vehicles in the 
world (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The very success of the Baby Benz would now come 
back to haunt Daimler. The fact that the company had doubled its production during the 1980s 
was less significant than the study’s findings that Daimler was one of the least efficient and 
wasteful automakers on the planet. MIT ripped away Mercedes’ protective veil of 
“craftsmanship”. The study’s findings would actually predict both Daimler-Benz and 
Mercedes slide towards bankruptcy in 1992 amid increasing competition from Asian luxury 
car models such as Lexus (Toyota), Acura (Honda) and Infiniti (Nissan). 
The combined results of the first two sections will help to facilitate an understanding of the 
radical transformation of strategy at Daimler during the mid 1980s, which is the focus of 
section 3. Although outwardly the company appeared to be well-equipped for the future, the 
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Board of Management and in particular Chief Financial Officer Edward Reuter realized the 
precarious nature of the company’s situation. In the third section, therefore, we will be 
looking at Reuter’s attempts, starting in 1985, to diversify Daimler and reduce the company’s 
dependence on the car industry. The result would be the exact opposite of Reuter’s intention 
and jeopardize the very existence of Daimler-Benz in the mid 1990s. Reuter’s catastrophic 
strategy would leave his successor Jürgen Schrempp very few options. Due to Reuter’s 
creation of a mega-holding technology consortium (Technologiekonzern), the former primary 
status of Mercedes passenger car unit within Daimler-Benz was reduced. However, at the 
same time, the automotive division would become increasingly responsible for providing 
additional revenue to support Daimler-Benz’s costly misadventures into the world of 
technology. This was the beginning of a decade of dissension between the management of the 
Mercedes passenger car division and the overall strategy of the Daimler-Benz Board of 
Management, which would culminate in the open conflict situation between CEO Schrempp 
and Mercedes chief, Helmut Werner in 1995-96. When Jürgen Schrempp took over from 
Reuter after a year of record losses in 1994 he had to solve the paradox of the dependence of 
the company on the success of the Mercedes brand and the parallel alienation of the Mercedes 
brand’s management executives from overall company strategy. His solution was the 
Mercedes-led Welt AG strategy, a vision of worldwide expansion within the automotive 
sector, a vision already partially realized by Daimler’s worldwide success in the commercial 
vehicle sector in North and South America, Europe and Africa. 
The emergence of Daimler’s new Welt AG strategy as of 1995 was the vision, which guided 
the takeover of Chrysler Corporation. This strategy, however, was paradoxical within the 
Daimler-Benz organization. On the one hand, Schrempp was rightfully judged as the man 
who rejected his predecessor’s irresponsible misadventures into technology fields, in which 
Daimler-Benz had no resource-based core competencies or no competitive products or was 
facing disappearing markets (i.e. military equipment). His downsizing of the firm from 36 to 
23 business units and his rediscovery of the core competence in the automotive field seemed 
like a solid historical “back to the roots” strategic decision. On the other hand, in order to 
consolidate his own executive power, Schrempp had forced the resignation of the key person 
within the Mercedes passenger car division, Helmut Werner, who had been responsible for 
returning the division to profitability after the crisis of 1992 (Spiegel 27 1996). It is crucial to 
document this development in order to understand that there was no united Daimler front on 
the German side going into the “merger of equals” with Chrysler. By 1998 the Mercedes 
passenger car group was an almost anarchistic collection of individual and isolated model 
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lines and locations in the critical areas of engineering, production planning and production. 
None of these operations were particularly aligned to the strategic vision of the Board of 
Management. The ideas of a commonized Mercedes Production System or a commonized 
Mercedes Development System across all production facilities and model lines were still 
unrealized utopias at the time of the takeover (Clarke 2005). 
In the final section of chapter 4, the focus will switch to developments at Chrysler, which led 
to the American company’s willingness to accept the Daimler-Benz buyout offer. 
Specifically, the most important consideration will be to ascertain the reasons why Chrysler 
accepted a takeover during a period of unequalled economic success in 1997-8, whereas 3 
years previously it had rejected any kind of cooperation with Daimler, despite being under 
takeover attack from its major shareholder (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
4.1 Shift from craft to mass production 
Daimler resisted pressure to move to mass production for an extraordinarily long time, given 
the revolutionary impact and success of Ford’s innovations as early as 1903 (Banham 2002). 
The total serial production numbers for most Mercedes-Benz models up till the 1960s were 
lower than the number of cars being turned out by Ford in a single day in 1913. Figures 8 and 
9 are significant in terms of the differences in scales of reference. Leading up to the merger 
between Daimler and Benz Cie in 1926 it is sufficient to compare production numbers below 
10,000 vehicles per year. Comparisons with Ford at the time would have been absurd. 
Daimler-Benz did not reach the 100,000 annual production mark until the late 1950s. 
However, since there Mercedes models have increasingly approached numbers expected from 
mass producers, thus indirectly verifying many of the claims of the MIT study, which will be 
examined in detail further below.  
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Figure 9: Car production DMG (Daimler), Benz&Cie. and combined 1894-1925 
 
 Source: Compiled by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 4.1. 
Figure 10: Car production Daimler-Benz AG from 1926-1997 
 
Source: Compiled by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 4.2 
Indeed the whole image of the Mercedes brand is that of a handcrafted vehicle with the 
highest standards in innovation and engineering, corresponding more or less to the production 
numbers until the late 1950s. That image is still used in the company’s marketing today, 
despite the disappearance of craftsmanship from almost all of the production process 
(DaimlerChrysler VideoAppendix 4.1). The paradoxes and dilemmas of the shift from craft to 
mass production at Mercedes-Benz help to understand the central role of the multi-brand 
strategy at the heart of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. 
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The vehicle described in the first chapter of the MIT study on lean production is a vehicle 
built by Panhard & Levassor, the Parisian “constructeurs mécanciens” at the end of the 19th 
century and the car was destined to become the first car ever driven in Great Britain 
(Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The MIT authors do not comment that this “French” car 
had a German engine in it, built by the Daimler engine company in Stuttgart (Grunow-
Osswald 2006). The French company, which managed to survive until the early 1960s, was 
famous for its individually produced luxury vehicles. A similar vehicle had won the first-ever 
automobile race from Paris to Rouen in 1894 (Grunow-Osswald 2006) and helped established 
Daimler’s reputation with its German-built engine. In 1901 Daimler was producing only 144 
vehicles per year but was about to become world famous with the emergence of the 
company’s own vehicle with an even more powerful Daimler engine at the 1901 Nizza racing 
meeting. Daimler completely dominated the competition, forcing Panhard & Levassor and 
others to retire from the event (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
The success in racing encouraged one of the Daimler drivers, Emile Jellinek, to commission a 
new line of luxury vehicles for the commercial market (Grunow-Osswald 2006). The line was 
to be branded “Mercedes”, named after his daughter. The famous first technical specifications 
demanded that Daimler engineers simply create the best car, regardless of the costs. Each car 
was a unique construction and the price tag for a 1905 28 HP Mercedes at 23,000 Mark could 
be compared with 68.6 % of the population of Prussia, whose income was not higher than 972 
Mark per annum (Grunow-Osswald 2006). Indeed the Daimler Museum’s calculation that the 
first 36 vehicles cost about 3.5 million dollars in 2005 money compares roughly to the cost of 
a contemporary S-Class and confirms the continuity of the brand in its luxury segment of 
products  (Lengert and Dreher 2010).  
Racing events, international exhibitions and well-situated people in Europe’s high society 
were the early keys to Daimler’s success. This success was thanks to the continuing role 
played by Emile Jellinek, who individually represented Daimler in the Austria-Hungarian 
Empire, France, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain and the USA. His links insured a steady but 
limited flow of international customers. His success however, was also a limit to mass 
expansion and created a problem, which would accompany the company throughout its 
history, namely its inability to keep up with demand for its products. This tension between 
demand, supply, quality and price can be exemplified by a brief overview of Mercedes’ 
market position in the 1950s in America. The dramatic rise in exports to the USA from 13 
units in 1950 to 6,031 in 1957 (Grunow-Osswald 2006) was due to the good reputation of 
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Mercedes from before the war and its innovative design and technology in comparison to 
American cars in the 1950s. Models such as the 300 SL and their rich owners from film stars 
to politicians to industrial magnets all contributed to Mercedes success (Lengert and Dreher 
2010). However, Daimler’s inability to create a distributive network limited further 
expansion. Daimler-Benz had a partnership with the engine maker Curtiss-Wright, who also 
represented Studebaker-Packard vehicles. The organization had a very poor network of 
dealerships, and the dealerships that did exist were faced with competing loyalties. Their 
agents were used to selling much cheaper cars and could not approach the elite of American 
society. More often than not it was the customer who came looking for a Mercedes rather than 
being attracted by a dealer. It would take decades for Mercedes to establish their own network 
of dealerships in the States. The fear of brand dilution and confusion, which Daimler 
experienced in the cooperative with Curtiss-Wright, remained in the consciousness of the 
Board of Management (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
The story was repeated again when major shareholder Friedrich Flick (37.9% of Daimler 
shares in 1957) tried to catapult Daimler into the world of mass production by forcing 
Daimler’s Board of Management to acquire Auto Union (Audi) in 1958 (Grunow-Osswald 
2006). This move was extremely unpopular with Daimler executives, who rejected the notion 
of deviating from their one modal line strategy with a large number of customized design and 
engine variants all in the high price range market. The acquisition failed and Auto Union was 
quickly sold in 1964 to VW. Daimler executives did, however, recognize the opportunities 
presented by middle and upper middle class cars and decided to create a second model line in 
1965, which fuelled a rapid expansion of production, the precursor of the modern E-Class. 
However, even this increased supply still remained below customer demand. Although 
Daimler’s car production jumped from 99,209 in 1958 to 256,713 in 1969, it was still 
insignificant compared to the over 10 million vehicles being produced in the USA in the same 
year (Grunow-Osswald 2006).  
It would be 1979 until the Daimler Board would decide again to expand its production to a 
third model line. It was a dramatic move, which would lead to more than a doubling of 
production between 1970 and 1985 to 550,000 vehicles (Fig. 3.2). The decision was heavily 
debated within the company. Mercedes purists viewed the shift as a radical breach with the 
principles of maintaining a 1:1 ratio of producing only cars, which had already been ordered. 
This philosophy of actively manipulating the market demand and supply of luxury cars had 
spared the company of the boom to bust cyclical volatility being experienced by the rest of the 
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industry, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite producing cars that consumed the highest 
amount of gas industry-wide, the company made record profits even during the Oil Crisis of 
1973/4 (Grunow-Osswald 2006). Daimler continued to expand slowly but steadily, based on 
its conservative “let the customer wait” philosophy. In the 1970s the company was busy 
filling orders, which had been placed years earlier, before the oil crisis.  
In addition, there were also fears in the company to expand production outside of Germany 
because part of the mystique of the brand centered on the fact that all Mercedes cars were 
“made in Germany”. The philosophy of the company was to provide expensive German cars, 
distinguished by their flawless German quality and offering the best in innovation, safety 
features and driving comfort, customized exclusively to each buyer’s personal wishes. Well 
into the 90’s engineers would boast that no two cars were identical, a boast which was a 
nightmare to a newly arrived generation of controllers, trying to reduce development and 
production costs. Mercedes quality strategy provided the individuality that its rich and 
powerful customer base demanded. Still in the 1980s an otherwise critical Der Spiegel 
magazine would sing a praise of Mercedes achievements and the mystique of the brand in the 
USA: 
Das höchste Ansehen unter den deutschen Autofirmen genießt die Marke Mercedes. Der 
„Washington Post“ ist ein Mercedes „Symbol für einen geschmackvollem Konsum“. 
Dem „Wall Street Journal“ erscheint die Aura, die Mercedes Fahrzeuge umgibt, als 
„fast religiös“. Wer in New York, Dallas oder Los Angelas Mercedes fährt, zeigt damit, 
dass er es geschafft hat, zur Elite der Gesellschaft zu gehören (Der Spiegel 35 1985 
131). (Author translation: Mercedes enjoys the highest degree of reputation of all 
German carmakers ((in America)). For the Washington Post a Mercedes is a “symbol of 
tasteful consumption”. The Wall Street Journal describes the aura surrounding a 
Mercedes vehicle as almost “religious”. Whoever drives a Mercedes in New York, 
Dallas or Los Angeles is making a statement that he has succeeded in joining the elite of 
American society). 
Although the mid 1970s oil crisis did not directly slow down Mercedes’ continued growth in 
this period, the economical fallout in the USA would ultimately push Daimler into the 
decision to again expand production. The volatility of currency markets following the oil 
crisis and resulting recession in America made it increasingly difficult for Daimler to control 
its own destiny. In addition, the American government passed The Energy Conservation Act 
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in 1978, which tried to force the automobile industry to produce smaller, lighter and more 
fuel-efficient vehicles. It would be impossible for the existing Mercedes fleet to comply with 
these measures. The big winners were the Japanese manufacturers, who saw their export share 
jump from 1.087 million vehicles to over 6.7 million cars in the years 1970 to 1985 (Grunow-
Osswald 2006). In the same time framework Germany’s totals rose from 2.1 to 2.7 million 
cars. At this stage of a radical shift in the global car business, it was the existing mass 
producers who suffered first against increased competition from the Japanese. VW saw its 
American exports drop from 580,000 to around 200,000 in just 6 years. Although the 
Japanese brands posed no threat to the luxury market in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, 
Mercedes inability to cover demand did allow fellow German competitor BMW and 
Sweden’s Volvo become serious contenders. BMW’s decision in 1975 to develop a Model 3 
line below their Model 5 line put Daimler under increasing pressure to react, despite concerns 
within the company of damage to their luxury car image (Grunow-Osswald 2006). 
Finally the decision was made by the Board in 1979 to introduce a compact class, the W201 
(Baby Benz) with a capacity of 240,000 vehicles per year. This would compare dramatically 
to the existing capacity of 240,000 for middle class and 60,000 for premium class vehicles. 
Despite this jump, Mercedes still saw itself as a non mass production carmaker. In a Spiegel 
magazine interview in 1985, Daimler production boss Niefer could still claim that robots 
would never replace the handcrafting skills of his workers and that this was the key to the 
brand’s quality (Der Spiegel 37, 1985 46-47). The company’s fears about brand dilution 
seemed unnecessary in the early phase of the Baby Benz’s introduction. It was voted “World 
Car of the Year” in 1984 and Daimler’s market share rocketed in Germany from 6.9 % in 
1970 to 11.5 % in 1985 (Grunow-Osswald, 2006 326). Spiegel Magazine referred to the Baby 
Benz as the “Volks-Wagen” from Daimler and in 1985 Mercedes market share had surpassed 
Ford’s portion of the West German market. In the mid 1980’s the Baby Benz became 
Germany’s third most popular auto, after VW’s Golf and Opel’s Kadett, although it was twice 
as expensive. The Baby Benz definitely catapulted Mercedes de facto into the world of mass 
producers. This paradigm switch was about to be confirmed by the 1985-90 MIT study of the 
global car industry, although the precise analysis of the company’s situation was the exact 
opposite of Daimler’s own self-perception and marketing image. The third Mercedes model 
would push production figures above 600,000 by the mid 1980s and set the stage for the goal 
of reaching 1 million by the end of the 1990s (Fig. 11). The rationale for this goal setting 
would be provided by the main results of the MIT study on the automobile industry. 
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Figure 11: Mercedes Car Production 1986-1997 
 
 Source: Compiled by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 4.3 
4.2 The MIT study and the creation of a new industry paradigm 
From an academic point of view it is interesting to observe how the scientific community 
itself played a crucial role in actually shaping the global automobile industry in the 1990s. 
Specifically, the 1990 comprehensive MIT study of the efficiency of Japanese lean production 
methods triggered a shock reaction in the whole industry. More than 50% of all assembly 
plants worldwide were benchmarked and the reported findings were deemed conclusive by 
industry insiders. The report led to what Thomas Kuhn (1962) refers to as a revolutionary 
paradigm shift within a given community. A paradigm requires a given closed community, 
e.g. the global automobile industry or physicists or economists, to tacitly accept and apply 
certain shared assumptions. These assumptions allow the community to get on with the 
business to be done. Such a paradigm also forbids or excludes the questioning of these 
assumptions or working hypotheses. In Newton’s world, it was the Kantian a priori 
assumption that the categories time and space are absolute fixed reference points. In the 
automotive world of the 1990s, it was now the commonly shared mindset that all cars and all 
car production methodologies are equally comparable. This new paradigm of the global car 
sector required the abolition of the hitherto existing paradigms of craftsmanship and mass 
production. 
The 5-year (1985-1990) MIT study of the global automotive industry had enormous 
consequences for Daimler-Benz and other luxury carmakers. In four short pages the study 
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effectively debunked the “myth” that Mercedes vehicles were somehow the unique product of 
“skilled craftsmen”, whose creation of premium segment car quality could not be compared 
with the activities of their American and Japanese counterparts. Indeed, even while the results 
of the comprehensive comparative analysis were being compiled, the head of Mercedes was 
boasting that the Japanese were still “generations” away from Mercedes standards of 
excellence (Der Spiegel 37, 1985). 
The MIT study ascertained the exact opposite. Comparing American, Japanese and European 
luxury models, it found the latter group to be the least efficient in terms of assembly hours per 
vehicle and mistakes per vehicle. The much praised “Meister craftsmanship” was simply not 
true. The gross inefficiency of factories such as the Mercedes Sindelfingen flagship (C-, E- 
and S-Class production) was due to identifiable and avoidable waste or “muda” in the Toyota 
language of lean production. The German carmakers’ production systems were declared to be 
basically equivalent to the methods of mass production being used by Henry Ford at the 
beginning of the 20th century, but at the same time even less efficient than American 
producers of luxury models such as Cadillac or Buick or the Lincoln Continental (Womack, 
Jones and Roos 1990). Even more threatening for the Mercedes brand was the prognosis that 
the Japanese system of lean production would allow Asiatic luxury brands such as Lexus and 
Infiniti to surpass Mercedes and other European premium marques within the next ten years. 
The change in paradigm shift could not have come at a worse time for Daimler. The study 
appeared as Daimler was experiencing serious difficulties for the first time in its passenger car 
division since the end of the Second World War. BMW had brought out a new 5 series to 
compete with the cash cow of the firm, the E-Class. Toyota was developing its own luxury 
brand, Lexus, at an amazing pace and with astounding results in the area of luxury segment 
quality. Mercedes was even having difficulties with its new launch of the S-Class, which 
alienated European trends towards size reduction and styling aggressiveness in an attempt to 
keep American customers happy (Der Spiegel 8, 1991). MIT had initiated the automotive 
paradigm revolution. By the mid 1990s a surprisingly common consensus and industry-wide 
mindset had emerged. The comprehensive and openly prescriptive MIT study on the industry 
had come to the conclusion that a car is a car is a car. Basically speaking, the study concluded 
that there was a simple equation for predicting the success any company would have to 
adhere to in order to survive the upcoming decade: Car designing/building = Japanese 
approach = Toyota = lean production = elimination of waste = lower cost = success 
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Even before the study MIT appeared, companies like GM and Chrysler were starting to admit 
that they had something to learn from their Japanese counterparts, as the NUMMI, AMC-
Honda and Chrysler-Mitsubishi projects testify (Inkpen 2008). It was therefore not surprising 
to American companies that the study ascertained lean production methods to be superior to 
something MIT called “mass production” as their exemplary analysis of the derelict GM plant 
in Framingham, Massachusetts illustrated. The 1947 plant was a child of GM’s heydays and 
the Sloanist approach, which had been in decline since the early 1960s. In fact the facility, 
located close to MIT, would be closed before the actual MIT report was published. In many 
ways the MIT was merely confirming the increasing competiveness of Japanese models on 
the American market, fuelled by the establishment of new production facilities in North 
America.    
As Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) point out in their comprehensive critique of the MIT study, it 
did not matter that the entire industry neither did not quite know that Honda was “Japanese” 
in a manner different from Toyota or Nissan, nor that “lean production” was not actually 
practiced by all Japanese car companies. The global automobile industry paradigm was the 
universally accepted credo: “Become Japanese and produce leanly or become extinct”. The 
power of the paradigm shift was so dramatic, that the industry seemed to lose its common 
sense for the next decade. This can be illustrated in the case of quality studies. In the area of 
quality the American based J.D. Power APEAL rankings emerged as the commonly accepted 
standard of consumer satisfaction. If the ratings said a Toyota was “better” than a 
“Mercedes”, then that was the standard of measurement. “Quality specialists” would spend a 
decade chasing down any customer complaint in order to raise their J.D. Power status and 
extra checks would be applied during the annual assessment period at factories around the 
world. However, J.D. Power APEAL does not actually compare vehicles with each other 
directly. Their main questionnaire attempts to measure customer satisfaction within the first 6 
months of ownership in terms of the ratio between customer expectations and customer 
experiences. That ratio makes quality evaluation more difficult for any European vehicle and 
in particular any European luxury vehicle in the USA. European buyers of cars in America are 
easily more disappointed if there is a small problem, than other buyers of other brands. This 
disappointment is relative to their expectations of a particular brand and cannot be compared 
objectively to the relative expectations of other customers of a different brand. An American 
buyer of a Japanese vehicle, for example, is easily more surprised and pleased than someone 
buying any European brand. That accounts for the consistently poor results of vehicles such as 
the VW Golf or the Volvo 300 series. However, the increasing fixation with commonized 
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industry-wide studies such as J.D. Power (quality) or the Harbour Report (factory efficiency) 
were directly the result of the paradigm shift triggered by the MIT study. The Harbour Report 
compares the production efficiency of car manufacturers worldwide using a commonized 
hours-per-vehicle calculation formula independent of differences in the plant’s degree of 
manufacturing sophistication. Although it is more difficult and time-consuming to install 
glass roofs in cars, this is not taken into account when comparing such facilities with factories 
producing cars with no glass roofs. Hours-per-vehicle is equal to hours-per-vehicle. The 
obvious differences in the sophistication of parts between luxury and other vehicle models 
were simply ignored and the resulting differences in the complexities of tool and die making 
were considered negligible. 
Furthermore, the MIT shock was exacerbated by a growing consensus inside the industry that 
only companies producing more than one million vehicles per year could survive in a lean 
production industry sector (Brady and Lorenz 2000; Vlasic and Stertz 2000; Daimler-Benz 
Annual Report 1997). High volumes guaranteed supplier discipline and were claimed to 
provide a minimum required to obtain advantages through continuous improvement measures. 
Although Daimler had indeed produced the world’s first “serial” production auto at the 
beginning of the century, it had not reached the 100,000 per annum - vehicle mark until 1959 
at a time where Ford and GM were producing between 5 and 6 million vehicles respectively 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006). Mercedes had already almost doubled its production volume to 
around 600,000 in the 1980’s, thanks to the success of the Baby Benz, the forerunner of the 
current C-class (W204). Still the jump from 600,000 to 1,000,000 would be an impossible 
task within its current range of models. In order to reach this goal Daimler-Benz would either 
have to expand its model program or acquire another firm, such as BMW did with its takeover 
of the Rover Group. In retrospect, it is interesting to remark that Daimler followed both 
strategies. In a first step, Daimler-Benz decided to create a compact A-Class as well as a 
luxury sports utility vehicle (SUV), the M-Class. All of these developments taxed Mercedes’ 
manpower exceptionally, not only in terms of the numbers of vehicles which had to be 
designed, engineered and assembled, but mainly due to the fact that Mercedes had no real 
experience in these vehicle segments. By deciding to develop smaller compact vehicles, 
Daimler was already abandoning its resource-based competitive edge in the area of large 
luxury vehicles. Furthermore, the decision to build the M-Class in the USA in a Toyota-
hybrid facility was a radical break from the past. The Smart micro-car was also to be built 
abroad, in France, with the lowest degree of vertical integration in the company’s history (Der 
Spiegel 42, 1997). 
  
 
104 
In a second step, Daimler-Benz would acquire Chrysler in 1998, pushing itself finally into the 
absolute league of mass production companies, with an annual capacity of over 4 million 
vehicles. Ironically, the impact of the MIT study was not matched by its scientific accuracy. 
The next sub-section briefly looks at what MIT got wrong and why the overly simplified 
academic conclusions and strategic prescriptions were almost fatal for companies like 
Daimler-Benz, who took the results seriously. 
4.2.1 MIT study impact on Daimler-Benz strategy 
Starting in the early 1990s, a European-based research group GERPSIA (Groupe d’Etudes et 
de Recherche Permanent sur l’Industrie et les Salaries de l’Automobile / The Permanent 
Research Group on the Automobile Industry and Workers) raised doubts concerning the 
scientific reliability of the MIT study. As Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) expressed rather 
bluntly, the continued prevalence of the MIT study does not detract from its “unfortunate 
inconvenience of simply being a fairy tale”. Their seminal paper entitled “The World that 
Changed the Machine” criticizes the MIT study on a number of fronts. This critique is 
relevant to our case study because GERPSIA has produced perhaps the most comprehensive 
and scientifically sound explanation of the course of the car industry from its origins up until 
the 1990s (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000). In addition, their classification of six different profit 
strategies sheds light on some of the inherent profit strategy incoherencies facing the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. 
Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) criticize the simplicity of MIT’s core classification of the 
industry into three categories; craftsmanship, mass-production and lean production. In their 
opinion these categories confute radically different profit strategies. The characterization of 
the American car industry as mass production due to the universal use of mechanized 
assembly lines ignores the discernible differences between Ford and GM, which allowed each 
company to be the industry leader in different periods of the history of the automobile. Ford’s 
“volume” strategy consisted of the implementation of mass production of a single standard 
vehicle. Ford’s Model T (Tin Lizzy), produced 15 million times between 1908 and 1927 is the 
best-known example of this strategy, making it one of the most produced vehicles in the 
history of the automotive industry. On the other hand, GM introduced a strategy of “volume 
and diversity” by commonizing non-appearance parts on cars, which looked different to the 
customer. To use the most simple example, by the 1920s consumers were fed up having to 
buy black cars from Ford. The introduction of different colors by GM increased their market 
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share dramatically. GM’s “Sloanian” model allowed GM to jump ahead of Ford and dominate 
the American market until the 1960s (Farber 2002).  
Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) point out that both models had been successful, but both the 
Ford and GM strategies failed just when the whole industry accepted them as the best profit 
strategy paradigms respectively. They see the same fate with MIT’s lean production 
mythology in the 1990s. Just when the western world started trying to adopt Japanese 
production approaches, these methods started to fail in Asia itself. Lean production did not 
prevent the Japanese economy from recession during the 1990s, not even at Toyota with the 
restructuring required after industrial unrest during the 1992 crisis year. In addition, Boyer 
and Freyssenet (2000) criticize the confutation of “lean production = Japanese”. They point to 
significant differences between Toyota’s model of “constant reduction of costs at constant 
volume” and Honda’s model of “innovation and flexibility”. These differences are relevant 
for the DaimlerChrysler AG case study because Daimler would attempt to implement a 
Toyota hybrid strategy for its plant in Alabama, whereas Chrysler’s success in the 1990s was 
due to its adoption of Honda’s approach. This adapted Toyota-Honda dichotomy was part of 
the difficulty behind efforts to synergize Mercedes M-Class platform with Jeep’s Grand 
Cherokee after the takeover. Moreover, Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) draw attention to the 
fact that other Japanese car companies such as Nissan and Mitsubishi were close to 
bankruptcy due to their respective inefficiency and lack of a clear strategy. Both would 
require financial support from western carmakers in order to survive. Renault acquired 37% 
of Nissan in 1999 while DaimlerChrysler AG obtained a 33% stake in Mitsubishi in March 
2000 (Gill 2012).  
The GERPSIA approach is conceptually more sophisticated than the categories used by the 
MIT study because it takes into consideration not only production strategies but also 
comparative political and economic situations, which are similar in approach to the work of 
Hall and Soskice (2001). Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) state two essential conditions for 
profitability in the car business in the 1990s: 
1. The pertinence of “profit strategy” in relationship to “national income distribution 
and growth modes” in those countries where the firm evolves; 
2. The solidity of the “enterprise government compromise” that allows the firm’s 
actors to find and implement the means (“product policy”, “productive 
organization”, and “employment relationships”) that are both coherent in light of 
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the adapted profit strategy and acceptable by all these actors, in other words, the 
invention or adoption of a productive model. ( Boyer and Freyssenet (2000: 7) 
Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) identify six profit sources in the history of the automobile 
industry: economies of scale, supply diversity, product quality, pertinent commercial 
innovation, productive flexibility and permanent reduction of costs at a constant volume. 
These profit sources have led to the creation of at least 6 profit differing strategies in the 
history of the car industry: 
1.  volume strategy e.g. Ford 
2.  volume and diversity strategy e.g. GM (Sloanism) 
3.  diversity and flexibility e.g. Morris (Woollardian) 
4.  permanent reduction of costs at constant volume strategy e.g. Toyota 
5.  quality strategy e.g. Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, SAAB 
6.  innovation and flexibility strategy e.g. Honda, Renault and Chrysler 
The quality strategy and the innovation and flexibility strategy are relevant for this analysis of 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, but before progressing to analyze these two types in more 
detail, it is salient to remark that Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) see the possibility of two 
different strategies being relatively successful in the same market at the same time. Honda and 
Chrysler’s success with their innovation and flexibility strategy in the USA in the 1990s did 
not mean that Toyota stopped being successful in this market. All three were taking market 
share away from GM and Ford, but Toyota was not expanding as quickly as it otherwise 
might have without Chrysler’s changed strategy. In addition, Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) 
point out that no single company has simultaneously employed two different profit strategies 
successfully. This would help explain the high number of failed mergers and acquisitions such 
as Ford/Volvo, Renault/Volvo, BMW/Rover Group, GM/Saab and, of course, 
DaimlerChrysler AG. 
4.2.2 The “quality” strategy: Daimler-Benz 
The quality strategy depends on the existence of stable high incomes and customers who 
define their status partially through the conspicuous consumption of luxury object such as 
automobiles. Moreover, the profit strategy depends on the existence of a highly skilled 
workforce, such as in Germany (Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Audi, and Porsche) and Sweden 
(Volvo, Saab). In the opinion of the GERPSIA group, the quality strategy had the longest 
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degree of sustainability both in space and time in the 20th century, because basically every 
society has a class of wealthy people who confirm their social distinction and class ranking by 
their willingness to spend large amounts of money on luxury cars. It is also the reason why 
the luxury strategy has almost always been an international market.  
The term “quality” signifies not only reliability and the vehicle’s performance level, but 
also – and perhaps even more so – the social distinction of a particular style, the use of 
certain materials, refined finishing touches, a high price and the prestige of a brand. 
(Boyer and Freyssenet 2000 18) 
The prestige of the brand is the key to success as is evidenced by Daimler’s ability to 
penetrate the Indian and Chinese markets in the first decade of the 21st century. Despite these 
strengths, Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) see the quality strategy in decline since the 1960s due 
to an increase in competition coupled with an inability to control supplier costs, unstable 
exchange rates and price wars. The difficulties of this strategy led to GM’s acquisition of 
Saab and Ford’s takeover of Volvo. Indeed, in the mid 1990s there were only three remaining 
independent producers of luxury cars, Mercedes, Porsche and BMW. Furthermore, Daimler 
was never able to establish the Maybach brand, although it is much more expensive than the 
company’s S-Class models (Spiegel Online 4th December. 2011). Despite marketing efforts to 
create a “manufacture” image, the Maybach has ceased production due to extremely poor 
sales results.   
4.2.3 The “innovation and flexibility” strategy: Chrysler 
The “innovation and flexibility” strategy has always been Honda’s approach to designing, 
building and marketing automobiles. This approach was adapted by Chrysler at the end of the 
1980s and by Renault in the early 1990s (Lutz 1998). The strategy consists of creating 
innovative models that are able to quickly react to new customer demand. The key to success 
is the ability to anticipate innovative possibilities and then quickly mass produce the vehicles 
required to fill demand before the competition has an opportunity to react to the new situation. 
In order to reduce development times Honda had avoided the erection of classical Chinese 
walls within the development process. Their platform approach entailed the creation of a team 
of stylists, designers, engineer, factory planners, production people and suppliers, who 
worked together from the beginning until the end of the project. This was the reason both 
Chrysler and Honda profited from the emergence of a second automobile market in the 1990s 
(Boyer and Freyssenet 2000). The traditional market for sedans shrank dramatically and was 
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overshadowed by the new market for stylish minivans, light trucks and sports utility vehicles. 
Chrysler’s organizational compactness allowed it to quickly create diverse platforms, which 
were not only first to market but also profitable (Lutz 1998). Such a strategy is of course 
highly risky and there is always the possibility of a “speculative bubble”, as DaimlerChrysler 
AG would experience in the 2001 meltdown of Chrysler profits. The reduced speed in 
development times also poses a risk to quality, which remained a central issue at Chrysler 
despite its marketing successes throughout the 1990s (Vlasic and Stertz 2000) 
Writing in the year 2000, Boyer and Freyssenet (2000) are skeptical about DaimlerChrysler 
AG’s attempt to provide a top-of the-line product in each market sector (Mercedes-Benz) and 
maintain Chrysler’s “innovation and flexibility” strategy. 
Yet as one can easily observe, this involves cumulating all sorts of risks and challenges 
simultaneously. One must remember that up until now, no single firm has successfully 
and profitably implemented the cohabitation of two different profit strategies, 
particularly that of “innovation and flexibility” with any other (Boyer and Freyssenet 
2000: 27). 
The GERPSIA study draws attention to a number of reasons why almost all producers of 
“quality” cars have either gone bankrupt or been taken over, including unfavorable exchange 
rates. In the next section the analysis will focus on Daimler’s earlier attempt in the mid 1980s 
to liberate itself from an over-dependence on the fortunes of the luxury automobile market.   
4.3 Diversification at Daimler-Benz 
From 1970 until 1985 Daimler’s profits had increased dramatically, with an incredible 50% 
jump in 1985 alone. Not only had the car manufacturer survived the oil crisis, Daimler-Benz 
also seemed to be on the best path to transform itself from a craftsmanship manufacturer to a 
mass production manufacturer. But at the height of its success Daimler change its strategy and 
started to venture into fields where it had no expertise and no experience.  
Edzard Reuter had become the Chief Financial Officer of Daimler-Benz AG in January 1980. 
He presented a major strategy paper in August 1984 outlining a radical transformation of 
direction for the company. His analysis of Daimler-Benz’s performance pointed to a serious 
threat, namely that instable currencies and exchange rates could put the company in its present 
structure at great risk in the near future (Grunow-Osswald, 2006). Reuter envisioned a highly 
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diversified company embracing every field of technology. In order to implement this new 
strategy, CEO Werner Breitschwerdt acquired MTU, Dornier and AEG within a period of 12 
months. Daimler invested 680 million DM in February 1985 to acquire the remaining 50% of 
Motoren-und Turbinen-Union (MTU) from the MAN Corporation. MTU was a major 
producer of turbines for fighter jet and tank engines. In May of the same year, Daimler 
invested a further 500 million DM to increase their ownership share of Dornier, the aircraft 
manufacturer, to 66%. Reuter’s buzzword was “synergy effects” arising from the myriad of 
acquired technologies. Daimler-Benz was to become a “Technologiekonzern” (technology 
consortium), a vague and diffuse umbrella-like concept, which stretched from massproducing 
household appliances to building satellites. To further pursue this goal Daimler invested 1.6 
billion DM in the German electronics giant AEG in October 1985. At the time it was the 
largest company takeover in German industrial history. Reuter continued and intensified his 
new vision for Daimler after replacing Breitschwerdt as the company’s CEO in September 
1987. Daimler increased its share of AEG to 80%. More importantly, the Board followed 
Reuter in April 1989 by restructuring the company to deal with these enormous changes. The 
company was divided into four units. The passenger car and commercial vehicle divisions 
became the Mercedes-Benz AG, with its own CEO and Board, but reduced to a junior 
member of the family. MBB, MTU, Dornier and two divisions of AEG formed the new 
aerospace and defence industry segment and christened DASA. The other parts of AEG 
formed its own division and were responsible for a diverse conglomeration of electronic 
industries including office communication, communication and train technologies. A fourth 
business unit was added in July 1990 with the founding of Debis, which included IT, banking 
and real estate services. In order to strengthen the IT unit Daimler acquired 34% of the French 
software company, Cap Gemini Sogeti, for 1.5 billion DM.  
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Figure 12:  Daimler-Benz AG (1990) 
 
                            Source: Created by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 4.4 
Symbolically, the new Daimler-Benz technology concern moved its headquarters for the first 
time in its entire history away from a car production facility. The Stuttgart-Möhringen 
complex opened in 1990 and quickly became the target of growing unrest within the 
Mercedes-Benz AG commercial and passenger vehicle division. Nicknamed “bullshit castle” 
(Der Spiegel 15, 1995), its palatial-like grandeur was the exact opposite of the down-to-earth 
working ethic and understatement of the surrounding Swabian production facilities in 
Untertürkheim and Sindelfingen. The creation of the new headquarters embodied the 
wastefulness of the Reuter-era, as perceived by both the management and the employees of 
the passenger car and commercial vehicle units. Reuter’s expansionism had been financed 
from the profitability of the car and truck division and almost every acquisition was a 
financial disaster (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). AEG had been in trouble since the 1970s and its 
outdated technologies cost Daimler an estimated 2.4 billion DM in losses. Planned joint 
ventures, for example, with Swedish ABB in the field of train technology led to further losses 
above 1 billion DM. The IT division never really got off the ground and was eventually sold 
to Telekom’s T-Systems. The founding of DASA coincided with the radical political changes 
in central Europe in 1989. Suddenly the Cold War was over and combined with a weak dollar 
there was little interest in expensive military technology. Furthermore, Dornier and Fokker 
couldn’t compete in the commercial aviation sector against Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. 
DASA losses were higher than 1.5 billion DM between 1992 and 1993. From a peak of 1272 
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Marks in 1987, the Daimler stock dropped to the 600 Mark range in May 1995. Der Spiegel 
would summarize the Reuter era as the greatest destruction of capital in the German 
peacetime history (Der Spiegel 13, 1995). Reuter was forced to resign in April 1994, but his 
replacement, Jürgen Schrempp, would not take power until May 1995. The uncertainty during 
the ensuing power vacuum between 1994 and 1995 allowed Mercedes-Benz CEO Werner to 
consolidate his standing and executive strength even more, including his initiation of merger 
negotiations with Chrysler in April 1995 without notifying his bosses (Vlasic and Stertz 
2000). 
4.4 The emergence of Schrempp’s expanded Welt AG strategy 
The years 1994-1997 are one of the most dramatic periods of time in the history of Daimler-
Benz. By 1994 it was clear to everyone except CEO Reuter that his strategy of diversification 
had failed (Der Spiegel 22, 1992; Der Spiegel 31, 1995). It was also clear that his successor 
Schrempp was closely tied to the history of that failure in his role as head of DASA, one of 
Reuter’s costliest acquisitions. It was further clear that Schrempp faced a serious threat to his 
leadership in the person of Mercedes CEO, Helmut Werner. In 1994 Werner was the most 
powerful person inside the organization. His unit produced 70% of the turnover and over 90% 
of the complete company’s profits (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1994). It would take 
from May 1995 until January 1997 for Schrempp to gain control of the Mercedes unit and the 
struggle was unique and new to the German corporate world. Both sides openly leaked 
information to the press in a radical break from the discretionary culture of Deutschland AG, 
where the coordinated networking of banks, investors, DAX 30 companies and governments 
at all levels quietly got on with the business of running the country. 
This section relies heavily on the newspaper reporting of the time frame between 1994 and the 
surprise announcement of the acquisition of Chrysler in May 1998 in order to capture the 
seriousness of Daimler-Benz’s problems at the time. Hardly a week went by without the 
company, and in particular its key executives, appearing negatively in the German press. As 
Der Spiegel would comment on the appearance of ex-CEO Edzard’s Reuter’s abrasive 
autobiographical attack on his successors at Daimler-Benz in the spring of 1998: 
Deutschlands größter Industriekonzern unterhält das Publikum mal wieder, als sei der 
erste Geschäftszweck nicht die Produktion von Autos und Flugzeugen, sondern die 
Aufführung von Theaterstücken, mal lustigen, mal eher dramatischen Inhalts (Der 
Spiegel  6, 1998). (Author translation: Germany’s largest industrial concern is once 
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again entertaining the public. It appears that the main business purpose is not to 
manufacture cars or airplanes, but instead to create theatrical performances, some of 
them comedies and some of them with more dramatic content). 
Although it is necessary to take the “comical” and “dramatic” aspects of the DaimlerChrysler 
AG story into account, the main focus of this chapter remains on ascertaining the rationale for 
the 1998 Chrysler takeover. In order to achieve this goal this chapter is divided into two sub-
sections. The first focuses on the “history” of the power struggle between Mercedes boss 
Werner and Daimler CEO Schrempp between May 1995 (Schrempp’s takeover as CEO) and 
January 1997 (Werner’s resignation from Daimler). This historical perspective is legitimate 
and instructive for a number of reasons. Firstly, it shows the extent of organizational dissent 
within Daimler-Benz between Daimler-Benz CEO Schrempp and the Mercedes division of 
the company. This dissent will make it difficult for Schrempp to mobilize the full synergy 
potential of the passenger car division after taking over Chrysler. Winning the battle against 
rival Werner in 1997 increased the likelihood that he would lose the war in the 
implementation of his Welt AG strategy as of 1998. Secondly, a chronology of events 
between 1995 and 1997 makes it evident how desperate the situation at Daimler-Benz was on 
all fronts, including the Mercedes unit. Despite all the criticism of Schrempp, objectively 
speaking he did manage to steer the company through the seemingly endless stream of bad 
news between 1995 and 1998. However, from a chronological perspective, this period of time 
suggests that the 1998 marriage made in heaven with Chrysler was more of a wild headstrong 
panic advance into the future rather than the sophisticated game of chess, which Schrempp 
himself projected. Finally, a brief overview of the events between May 1995 and January 
1997 show that despite their public confrontation, Schrempp adapted much of the Mercedes’ 
strategy from Werner into his own Welt AG strategy. And in actual fact, after the resignation 
of Werner, Schrempp continued to rely on Werner’s two most important executives, Jürgen 
Hubbert and Dieter Zetsche, for running day-to-day business. 
The second sub-section is more analytical and will outline the main aspects of Schrempp’s 
Welt AG strategy. Industrial Germany was passing through difficult times in the 1990s and 
the successful strategies of the past suddenly seemed outdated. Schrempp’s aggressive attack 
on the most deeply held beliefs of Deutschland AG and Germany’s coordinated market 
economy were both feared and admired (Streeck and Hopner 2004). For many analysts his 
vision was one of the few beacons of hope for Germany’s survival in a future globalized 
economy (Der Spiegel 20, 1998). 
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4.4.1 The fight for control of Mercedes inside Daimler (1995-1997) 
The transfer of power from Reuter to Schrempp in May 1995 was dramatic and confusing for 
both shareholders and employees. In his departing speech Reuter left publicly confident that 
the company was in excellent shape and would be able to turn around the futures of all the 
business units, including AEG. Just a few weeks later his successor, Jürgen Schrempp would 
make a clear break from his predecessor and attacked his former boss at the very first meeting 
of the Board of Management. He would continue these attacks openly in the press over the 
next years (Der Spiegel 4, 1996). For his part, Reuter would respond bitterly and 
unapologetically in his autobiography in early 1998 (Der Spiegel 5, 1998). 
Regardless of the infighting and egomania of Daimler’s top executives, one economic fact 
was becoming increasing indisputable; Reuter’s utopia vision of a technology concern 
strategy had cost Daimler-Benz at least 36 billion German Marks (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). 
More embarrassing was the fact that fired Chief Financial Officer Gerhard Liener had 
provided Manager Magazine with a 76-page manuscript outlining the complete details of the 
financial disaster. In a company notorious for its clandestine control of information, a whole 
era of mismanagement had now become public knowledge (Der Spiegel 30, 1995). In addition 
to Daimler’s financial woes, a number of affairs, also involving Schrempp personally, seemed 
to put the whole future of the firm with him as leader in question (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). 
Was ist los mit Daimler-Benz? Kein Konzern mußte in den letzten Jahren so viel 
Negativ-Publicity hinnehmen, in keinem anderen deutschen Großunternehmen 
versickerten so schnell so viele Milliarden. Herrscht unter den Stuttgarter 
Spitzenmanagern eine heimliche Lust an der Selbstzerstörung? Oder ist der 100-
Milliarden-Konzern, in dem Autos und Satelliten, Mikrochips und Postsortieranlagen 
hergestellt werden, inzwischen so groß, dass er vom Vorstand nicht mehr zu führen und 
vom Aufsichtsrat kaum mehr zu kontrollieren ist? Unter dem Stuttgarter Konzerndach 
wurde ganz offenbar zu viel zusammengefasst, was nicht zusammenpasst. Und nun 
kämpft jeder gegen jeden: die Autobauer bei Mercedes gegen die 
Flugzeugkonstrukteure der Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) und alle zusammen gegen 
den Dauerverlustbringer AEG. Innerhalb der DASA bekriegen sich MBB und Dornier, 
weil die einstigen Konkurrenten von Daimler zwangsvereinigt wurden. Gemeinsamkeit 
zwischen den zerstrittenen Konzerntöchtern entwickelt sich nur dann, wenn es darum 
geht, die Konzernzentrale auszutricksen. Über die sagte Schrempp in seiner Zeit als 
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DASA-Chief, das sei ein „bullshit-castle“ (Der Spiegel  31, 1995). (Author translation: 
What’s going on at Daimler? No company has had to deal with so much negative 
publicity in the last years and in no large German enterprise have so many billions 
disappeared so quickly. Are the top executives possessed by a secret desire to destroy 
themselves? Or is the 100 billion Mark enterprise, which produces cars and satellites, 
microchips and postal sorting systems, so big in the meantime that it can’t be managed 
by the Board of Management and can hardly be controlled by the Supervisory Board?   
There is obviously too much bunched together under the roof of the Stuttgart concern 
which simply does not match together. And now everybody is fighting against 
everybody else: the carmakers at Mercedes against the airplane engineers at Daimler-
Benz Aerospace (DASA) and everybody against chronically loss-plagued AEG. MBB 
and Dornier are fighting against each other within DASA, because these former 
competitors were forced to merge together. The only sign of common effort crops up 
when it comes to taking the concern’s central headquarters for a ride. During his time as 
DASA chief, Schrempp himself referred to these very headquarters as “bullshit castle”). 
Ironically, Reuter’s successor’s career had actually initially profited from this failed strategy. 
Schrempp became the CEO of DASA, which catapulted him into the Daimler-Benz Board of 
Management. Under his leadership at DASA Schrempp had followed Reuter’s lead by buying 
Fokker. Although he had been responsible for losing billions, Schrempp had made a name of 
himself by admitting his mistakes publicly and then going on to prove himself as a competent 
and uncompromising downsizer by closing 6 production facilities and reducing the workforce 
by 16,000 employees. His public profile increased and his nicknames as “Rambo” or 
“Neutron Jürgen” were compared to Jack Welch’s restructuring of General Electric (Der 
Spiegel 15, 1995). However, in conservative corporate Germany this form of 
“Americanization” was highly contentious. This criticism peaked when Schrempp set his 
sights on intervening in the operative business of Mercedes-Benz, the business unit, which 
had survived the whole Reuter era because of its independence.  
Even before taking office as Daimler-Benz CEO in May 1995, the press expected Schrempp’s 
expressed intention to interfere directly in all of the company’s business units to put him on a 
direct confrontation course with Mercedes-Benz chief, Helmut Werner (Der Spiegel 15, 
1995).  
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...mit Fokker hat Schrempp dem Daimler-Konzern einen Sanierungsfall angeschafft, der 
noch Milliarden verschlingen könnte. Da kann Helmut Werner, Chef der Automobil-
Tochter Mercedes-Benz, wesentlich mehr vorweisen. Und doch will Schrempp, der sich 
in seiner bisherigen Karriere als ausgesprochener Machtmensch erwies, künftig auch bei 
Mercedes eine Menge mitreden. Bislang konnte der Vorstand von Mercedes seine 
Geschäfte weitgehend selbständig führen und das mit beachtlichem Erfolg. In der 
Automobilfirma wurden fast 40 000 Stellen gestrichen, die Produktion wurde 
durchrationalisiert. Die neue Mittelklasse, die in diesem Sommer auf den Markt kommt, 
wird mit wesentlich niedrigeren Kosten als der Vorgänger produziert – das gab es bei 
Mercedes-Benz noch nie (Der Spiegel  25, 1994). (Author translation: ...with Fokker 
Schrempp acquired a firm in radical need of restructuring for the Daimler consortium, a 
task which could end up costing billions. Helmut Werner, head of the automobile 
subsidiary Mercedes has more to show for his efforts. Despite that, Schrempp, who has 
been proven to be obsessed with exorcizing power, wants to have more of a say even at 
Mercedes. Hitherto the CEO of Mercedes has been allowed to carry out his business 
more or less independently and he has done that with an enormous amount of success. 
Almost 40,000 jobs have been removed and production has been rationalized. The new 
middle class sedan, which will appear on the market in summer, will be produced at a 
much lower cost than its predecessor – something that has never happened before at 
Mercedes). 
Der Konflikt zwischen Schrempp und Mercedes-Chef Werner ist programmiert. Kurz 
nach der Ernennung Schrempps zum künftigen Daimler-Chef hatte Werner gefordert. 
„Ein so großer Konzern ist sinnvoll nur zu führen, wenn die einzelnen Firmen ein sehr 
hohes Maß an Selbständigkeit und Verantwortung haben“ (Der Spiegel  25, 1994). 
(Author translation: The conflict between Schrempp and Mercedes boss Werner is a 
sure certainty. Shortly after Schrempp had been chosen as the new Daimler CEO 
Werner had demanded „It is only meaningful to lead such a large concern, when the 
individual units are allowed to exercise a high degree of autonomy and responsibility”). 
Schrempp’s rise to power posed a future threat to the Mercedes car and truck division, which 
was headed by Helmut Werner. Bringing in fellow colleagues Grube, Cordes and Deininger 
from DASA, Schrempp knew that a key to his success would be his ability to diminish the 
power of the Mercedes unit within Daimler-Benz. During the Reuter years the Mercedes 
division had become increasingly alienated from the rest of Daimler-Benz and pursued its 
  
 
116 
own interests. Actually at the time of Schrempp’s promotion to CEO, Mercedes’ head Helmut 
Werner had been in secret negotiations with Chrysler without Reuter’s knowledge (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). Werner had taken over Mercedes at a time of crisis. Sales had plummeted as a 
result of increasing competition in the luxury car market and Mercedes was perceived both as 
being too outdated in terms of design and overly expensive in production costs and 
marketability. Within a short space of 2 years Werner had been able to save 4 billion DM in 
costs, reduce his workforce by 36,000 employees and start a turnaround of the brand. The 
successful market launch of a revamped W124, now currently known officially as the E-Class 
(W212), would become the cash cow of the Mercedes brand in the 1990s. Not only would the 
vehicle successfully counter attack BMW’s 5 model, this car built for business executives 
model would initiate a period of innovative styling, which had been missing at Daimler-Benz 
for decades. Werner was being celebrated as “Mr. Mercedes” and he was even the only 
German to be voted by the American magazine Business Week as one of the world’s 25 best 
executives (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
In May 1995 new Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp had no such standing, neither inside 
nor outside the company. In fact, at the beginning of his tenure as CEO, Schrempp’s seemed 
to be getting weaker, whereas the Mercedes boss was getting stronger. As Schrempp’s string 
of disasters grew week by week in 1995 (AEG, Fokker and Cap Gemini Sogeti), Werner 
grasped the opportunity to maintain the independence he had had under Reuter. It was Werner 
and not Daimler-Benz CEO Schrempp who leaked to the press in November 1995 that 
Mercedes was considering cooperating with Chrysler, and that these considerations did not 
rule out anything from joint ventures to a possible merger (Der Spiegel 46, 1995). 
Furthermore, Werner was not hesitant to criticize his new boss in public. Just as Mercedes 
was presenting its newest success at the IAA in Frankfurt in the fall of 1995, Schrempp was in 
America for the first time as Daimler-Benz CEO, presenting a new series of financial 
nightmares to Wall Street. Werner’s new E-Class had already made a profit of 1.5 billion 
German Marks (DEM) in the first 6 months of production, but in an interview clearly 
addressed to his new boss he said that despite his success no Mercedes employee or customer 
could be pleased when they hear and read about the endless list of terrible things going on at 
Daimler-Benz (Der Spiegel 38, 1995). Schrempp’s problems were not alleviated when he was 
detained by police for disorderly behavior in Rome, after celebrating his assistant’s birthday 
on the Spanish stairs. Rumors spread quickly that married Schrempp was openly having an 
affair with his assistant. In 1995 it appeared as if Werner was the only sane and professionally 
serious senior executive in the company. Schrempp, on the other hand, appeared to represent a 
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continuation of the excesses of the Reuter era. When Reuter announced his resignation from 
the Supervisory Board in early 1996, the anger of shareholders, employee representatives and 
Mercedes executives now turned wholly towards Schrempp and his Deutsche Bank advisor 
Kopper: 
Schrempp hat, noch nicht einmal ein Jahr im Amt, bereits kräftigen Schrammen 
abbekommen. Seine Entscheidungen, die AEG aufzulösen und die Zahlungen an Fokker 
einzustellen, werden selbst von den Betriebsräten des Konzerns mitgetragen. Die Art 
und Weise, mit der Schrempp den Konzern führt, löst allerdings Besorgnis und Zweifel 
aus. Betriebsratschef Karl Feuerstein hat Schrempp bereits ermahnt: „Mit dem 
Holzhammer sind die Probleme nicht zu lösen.“ Doch genau das ist Schrempps Stil 
(Der Spiegel 4, 1996). (Author translation: Although he has been less than a year in 
office, Schrempp has already taken a tremendous bruising. While his decision to 
disintegrate AEG and cease payments to Fokker have been accepted by the company’s 
employee representatives (Betriebsräte), the manner in which he is doing so is cause for 
concern and doubt. Karl Feuerstein, President of the employee representatives has 
already warned Schrempp “ The problems can’t be solved by smashing everything 
together with a hammer”. But that is exactly how Schrempp does things). 
The uneasy peace between Werner and Schrempp lasted until Schrempp’s direct intervention 
into Mercedes affairs in the summer of 1996. Werner under Schrempp had continued to 
behave as he had done under Reuter, like a fully autonomous CEO. The first open dispute 
came when Schrempp publicly claimed that he had forced through the choice for a new head 
of the commercial vehicle division (Der Spiegel 31, 1996).  The interview was a public 
demonstration of Schrempp’s claim to power and a clear signal to Werner. Half-year results 
pointed to a billion Mark record profits and this first sign of improvement under Schrempp 
provided the new CEO with the opportunity of isolating the Mercedes boss (Der Spiegel 33, 
1996). Unfortunately for Werner it was the success of his own Mercedes division, with a 
jump in production from 590,000 to 650,000 vehicles, which was now helping Schrempp to 
consolidate his complete control of the company (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1996). 
Although it was clear that Schrempp wanted to reorganize the whole company and to have 
control of the Mercedes organization, Werner was still too strong for Schrempp to simply fire 
him, and the powerful employee representatives still sided with the Mercedes boss against 
Schrempp (Der Spiegel 38, 1996).  
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Gegen Werners Willen kann Schrempp eine radikale Reform nicht durchführen. Sein 
Ruf ist noch immer ein bisschen ramponiert, seit er auf der Spanischen Treppe in Rom 
in eine Polizeikontrolle geriet und holländischen Journalisten offen sagte, was er denkt: 
„Daimler-Benz braucht mich mehr als ich Daimler- Benz“ (...) Betriebsrat Karl 
Feuerstein legte sich mit den Konzernobersten an: „Seit Monaten reden Sie nur über 
Profit und Aktionäre“, schimpfte Feuerstein, „gleichzeitig fordern Sie mit einem 
Horrorkatalog Sparmaßnahmen in den Fabriken – so machen Sie die Mercedes-Kultur 
kaputt.“ Bei so viel Gegenwind wurde selbst Schrempp vorsichtig. Nur „im Konsens“ 
mit seinen Vorstandskollegen will er die neue Konzernstruktur beschließen (Der 
Spiegel 38, 1996). (Author translation: It is impossible for Schrempp to push through a 
radical reform against Werner’s will. His reputation is still too tarnished since tripping 
into a police interrogation on the Spanish steps and when in an interview with Dutch 
journalists openly commented: “Daimler-Benz needs me more than I need Daimler-
Benz.” ...Employee representative Karl Feuerstein has been feuding publically with the 
highest executive in the company: “You have been only talking about profit and 
shareholders for months”, criticized Feuerstein, “at the same time you are demanding 
savings in the factory equipped with a horror catalogue of measures – if you continue 
this way you will destroy the Mercedes culture”. In the face of such opposition even 
Schrempp has to be very careful. He plans to decide a restructuring of the company in a 
“spirit of consensus with his fellow members of both Boards). 
In a classical exercise of Machiavellian politics, Schrempp devised a complex strategical plan 
to outmaneuver Mercedes chief Werner in the upcoming months. After Reuter it was clear 
that Daimler had to be restructured. Recognizing that he could not force his will against the 
Mercedes unit and its powerful union representative presence on the Supervisory Board, 
Schrempp altered his tactics. Instead of telling the Board what he wanted, he presented them 
with six options, ranging from complete domination of the subsidiary units by the Board to 
the complete autonomy of the subsidiary units. The fight continued on for weeks with both 
Werner and Schrempp presenting their respective cases to executives and the press for the 
future of Mercedes as if they were involved in a federal election fight. In the end Schrempp 
won and wanted to force Werner to resign immediately.  
Wochenlang setzte sich Werner dafür ein, dass Mercedes-Benz als Tochter des Daimler-
Konzerns mit eigenem Vorstand doch noch erhalten bleibt. Das Mammutprogramm der 
nächsten Jahre, nachdem die Pkw-Produktion von 600 000 auf über eine Million erhöht 
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werden soll, ist nach seiner Überzeugung nur von einem eigenen Mercedes-
Führungsgremium zu bewältigen: “Ich kämpfe für die Einheit Mercedes-Benz. 
...Schrempp kämpft dagegen”. Der Daimler-Chef will die Vorstände der Tochter 
Mercedes-Benz, DASA und Debis abschaffen und alle Entscheidungskompetenz im 
Daimler-Vorstand konzentrieren. Dort hat er das Kommando. Am Mittwoch 
vergangener Woche überzeugte Schrempp die Mehrheit des Daimler-Vorstands: Die 
Manager stimmten mit 6:1 für seinen Vorschlag. Einzige Gegenstimme: Helmut Werner 
(Der Spiegel 43, 1996). (Author translation: Werner had been fighting for weeks to 
retain Mercedes-Benz as a subsidiary of the Daimler concern with its own Board of 
Management. The mammoth program for the coming years, which aims to raise car 
production from 600,000 to over 1 million vehicles is only possible within independent 
Mercedes executive power, according to his conviction: “I am fighting for a unified 
Mercedes. ...Schrempp fought against this approach”. Schrempp wants to disperse of 
separate Boards of the subsidiary firms Mercedes-Benz, DASA and Debis. All of the 
decision-making powers should be transferred to the Daimler Board of Management. 
He is in charge there. ...Last week on Wednesday Schrempp convinced the other 
members of the Board to accept his conclusion with a vote of 6:1. The only dissenting 
voice was Werner’s). 
Despite Schrempp’s initial victory, the 4-member Presidium of the Management Board 
nullified the result and voted just one week later to postpone any decision to restructure 
Daimler until at least early 1997. Both the Deutsche Bank and the employee representatives 
were acutely aware of the importance of Helmut Werner in Mercedes’ attempt to expand 
production to 1 million vehicles. This postponement was both a public rebuke of Schrempp 
and evidence of the degree of uncertainty within the complete organization concerning the 
future of the company. And the result encouraged Werner to continue fighting Schrempp in 
public. The open conflict was the main subject of every newspaper and financial journal for 
weeks, a fight hitherto unknown in corporate German, with each side feeding the press with 
information. In  terms of the relevance for this case study, the fight was seen as the conflict 
between an aggressive American “Rambo” manager focused on short-term return on 
investment vs. “Mr. Mercedes” and the stakeholder tradition of the company.  
Faced with this resistance, Schrempp again changed his tactics to regain support. A few 
weeks later he would address union representatives, toning down his vision of “profit, profit, 
profit”. Instead he would emphsize the need for “consensus” with all employees. He even 
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went as far to promise never to say the word “shareholder value” again (Der Spiegel 47, 
1996). People were confused. Who was the real Jürgen Schrempp? Schrempp needed the 
support of the employee representatives in order to oust Werner and tried to tone down his 
image to what the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine coined “Rambo” light (Der Spiegel 
47, 1996). The fight for the control of Mercedes was finally decided in late January 1997. 
Werner’s most important executives, Hubbert and Zetsche, accepted the jobs of running 
Mercedes under the leadership of Schrempp. Werner rejected an offer to become the 
company’s Chief Financial Officer and decided to resign from the company. 
Notwithstanding the fierceness of the political battle between Schrempp and Werner, 
Schrempp trusted fully in the course embarked upon by his former rival initially. Werner was 
responsible for the decision to expand production Mercedes facilities to Brazil and the USA. 
In his analysis the market for automobiles would expand from 36 million vehicles in 1995/6 
to 53 million by 2005. However, this expansion would take place in South America, 
Southeast Asia and China (Der Spiegel 17, 1996). All of these areas had high import 
restrictions, e.g. 70% in Brazil. The only possibility to enter these markets was to produce 
abroad. This had been the reason for Japanese success in the 1980s in the USA and now the 
same strategy was being applied worldwide. Werner envisaged an increase in the share of 
Mercedes vehicles built outside of Germany from 5% in 1996 to between 20 and 25% in the 
upcoming ten years. He had boasted confidently that the credo “Made by Mercedes” would 
able to supersede the famous “Made in Germany” quality image (Der Spiegel 17, 1996). 
Werner’s decision to build the M-Class in the USA was also motivated by currency concerns, 
which had been the main rationale for Reuter’s diversification strategy in the 1980s (Grunow-
Osswald 2006). Building cars with American suppliers for American customers both paying 
in US Dollars in the USA would help to alleviate the current (1996) US Dollar (USD) - 
German Mark (DM) imbalance flow and instability.  
Werner was also aware of the growing competition in the luxury segment and the need to 
counteract with other models. The S-Class’ market share in the first quarter of 1996 dropped 
31% compared to the same quarter in 1995 (Der Spiegel 18, 1996), partially due to the 
introduction of tax for the private use of company cars and partially due to customers waiting 
for the new S-Class. But increasing competition had now provided customers with realistic 
alternatives. Although the MIT study (1990) had predicted a major assault from Japanese 
brands such as Lexus and Infiniti, this was only part of Mercedes problem. Lexus did make a 
huge impact in the US market, but Europeans were still unwilling to buy Japanese-made 
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luxury cars. Instead, Daimler started facing competition from unexpected sources. Jaguar had 
been acquired by Ford in 1989 and had invested billions in trying to deal with the brand’s 
notorious quality issues. This investment started to reap benefits when Jaguar sales exceeded 
Mercedes S-Class sales in the first quarter of 1997. Jaguar sales soared 29% while the ageing 
S-Class dropped 12% to fall into 3rd place behind European leader BMW 7 (Der Spiegel 20, 
1997). In the same year, British engine maker Vickers decided to sell its Rolls Royce brand. 
Initially Daimler-Benz and BMW entered the race to acquire the prestigious top of the market 
marquee, but Deutsche Bank removed its support for Daimler’s bid. The German car industry 
was then shocked to see Volkswagen enter the race. VW decided to counteract Mercedes’ 
plans to build models to compete with their Golf (Rabbit) and Polo (Fox) by entering the 
luxury market segment (Der Spiegel 45, and 47, 1997). In the end VW did acquire three 
luxury brands; Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini (Audi). BMW acquired the Rolls Royce 
brand. Still the shock was tremendous at Daimler-Benz and forced them into the decision in 
early 1998 to build a luxury model above the current S-Class, the Maybach, and to create a 
new brand. Even while announcing plans Schrempp admitted that the Maybach project was 
not intended to actually make a profit, but rather to ensure that the most expensive top market 
luxury car in Germany was being built by Daimler-Benz (Der Spiegel 16, 1998). 
4.4.2 Die Welt AG 
The idea of Daimler as a “Welt AG” was CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s answer to the failed 
“Technologiekonzern” (technology consortium) vision of his predecessor Edzard Reuter. 
Whereas Reuter had tried to diminish the role of the Mercedes passenger car and commercial 
business unit within the Daimler-Benz technology consortium, Mercedes would be the 
eventual focal point of Schrempp’s tenure at DaimlerChrysler AG. Nobody at Daimler-Benz 
would have believed that in May 1995. The concept of a Welt AG was not Schrempp’s master 
blueprint presented to the Boards, stakeholders, shareholders and the press on day 1 of his 
appointment. The Welt AG slowly emerged as the only option to ensure the future of the 
company, based on Schrempp’s understanding of the challenges facing both the German 
economy and Daimler-Benz AG within the context of growing globalization. However this 
view of the future was not on the agenda at the beginning of his command. Schrempp was 
initially confronted with the confusion of the past ten years’ development at Daimler-Benz. In 
his last public appearance as CEO in May 1995, Reuter had left shareholders and stakeholders 
with the impression that everything was in order at Daimler and he wasn’t being forced to 
resign but instead was going into his well-earned retirement (Der Spiegel 30, 1995). It was the 
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final proof that Reuter had lost complete contact with reality. The fallout of Reuter’s deluded 
departure determined the new CEO’s agenda for the rest of 1995.  
Schrempp’s initial challenges as CEO after May 1995 were focused on almost every aspect of 
Reuter’s crumbling technology consortium except Mercedes. This lack of focus on Mercedes 
was dependent on three factors. Firstly, the dire financial situation at AEG and DASA were 
immediate problems requiring his full attention. Politically speaking, it was also the easiest 
means of withdrawing from his previous membership in Reuter’s inner circle of technology 
executives. It is not usual for an incoming German CEO to launch a full attack on his 
predecessor, especially when the former CEO has just been elected to the Supervisory Board 
and is sitting in the audience. Schrempp’s initial address to both Boards was front page 
headlines in Germany due to its ferocious nature (Der Spiegel 27, 1995). Schrempp’s first 
impression would be lasting. He was a tough guy, who would stop at nothing (“ueber Leichen 
gehen” / Author translation: trample upon corpses) to get what he wanted. 
Secondly, Schrempp’s ideas of profit, shareholder value, increased working times and a host 
of other revolutionary ideas within a coordinated (Hall and Soskice 2001) German and 
European framework would be most difficult to implement in the heavily unionized and 
politically powerful Mercedes organization. Breaking with the past was easiest within the 
context of the business units on the brink of bankruptcy or in need of radical restructuring. It 
is salient to remember that Schrempp had taken over the largest financial disaster in 
peacetime history of industrial Germany (Der Spiegel 31, 1995). When he entered office in 
May 1995, it was already clear that it would not be possible to achieve overall positive results 
in his first fiscal year.  
Thirdly, the Mercedes passenger and vehicle unit was responsible for 90% of Daimler-Benz’s 
profits (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1995). Mercedes head, Helmut Werner, was more 
powerful than Schrempp in May 1995. Werner made no secret of his feelings that he should 
be running Daimler-Benz (Der Spiegel 38, 1995; Vlasic and Stertz 2000). And if he was not 
destined to be CEO of the entire company, he expected to have full autonomy in determining 
the passenger car and commercial vehicle unit’s strategy. Werner had already been 
negotiating with Chrysler since April 1995 about possible forms of cooperation, completely 
oblivious and uninterested whether or not he had Schrempp’s support. In fact, after months of 
negotiations with Werner and his Mercedes team Chrysler officials were surprised that 
Schrempp had not been notified and that he was not interested in any deal with the Americans 
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in 1995 (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). It is therefore surprising, that the birth of Welt AG in May 
1998, less than 3 years later, would center on the role of the Mercedes passenger car and 
commercial vehicle unit as the centerpiece of the “automobile company for the 21st century” 
(Der Spiegel 49, 1998). Even more surprising from the perspective of 1995 was the fact that 
at the time of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover Schrempp would have full control of 
Mercedes, flanked by Werner’s former most important executives, Zetsche and Hubbert. The 
rest of this chapter concentrates on a description of the various aspects of the Welt AG, which 
in many ways was the first radical attempt by a German company to break out of the 
prevailing political and economic framework of corporate Germany. The next sub-section 
considers the general consequences of Schrempp’s focus on shareholder value and profit 
maximization within the contexts of changes in industrial Germany in the 1990s. That will be 
followed by a final sub-section, which describes the emergence of the Mercedes unit as the 
focal point for a global company. 
4.4.3 The impact of shareholder value at Daimler-Benz 
The goals of the Welt AG consist of non-automotive and automotive industry components. 
The non-automotive aspects refer to Schrempp’s attempt to revolutionize the role of Daimler-
Benz within the traditional coordinated market economic framework known as Deutschland 
AG (Hall and Soskice 2001; Jürgens et al. 2000; Streeck and Hopner 2004). Some steps had 
already been taken before Schrempp became CEO. In 1993 Daimler had been listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the company had adapted American GAAP 
accounting procedures. This entailed the issuing of quarterly reports and more transparency 
for possible investors.  
However, although the shift towards a focus on shareholder value had been initiated during 
Reuter’s era, it was Schrempp who catapulted the issue on to center stage of corporate 
Germany. Schrempp, the head of Germany’s largest and most powerful industrial 
conglomerate began publicly attacking the pillars of German industry, which were still widely 
regarded as the guarantee of a human and sustainable form of social market capitalism. In a 
nation, which had experienced the radical conflict between the absolute left and the absolute 
right just 6o years earlier, the German form of co-determination was also revered as a 
necessary pre-requisite for social prosperity and peace. Schrempp quickly became a hated 
target within German society with his brand of “Americanization” in the style of a radical 
form of capitalistic behavior unacceptable to most Germans. The perceived “brutality” of his 
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downsizing and restructuring measure even went beyond Germany’s borders and had far-
reaching political ramifications. His decision to allow the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker 
go bankrupt created a degree of tension in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Netherlands. And although it was Nazi Germany that rolled over the Netherlands in 
1940, people compared Schrempp’s actions to Daimler-Benz’s role during the SS-Regime, 
which had been meticulously, publicly and embarrassingly documented throughout the 1980s. 
Legal cases and negotiations were still underway regarding the possible compensation of 
survivors of the Nazi use of forced slave labor in large German corporations such as Daimler, 
Krupp and Siemens (Der Spiegel 27, 1995). 
Even 6 weeks before Schrempp took over as CEO on May 24th, 1995 Spiegel published an 
article entitled “Profit, profit, profit” (Der Spiegel 15, 1995). The subtitle declared simply that 
the time for visions was now past and the only thing that would count in the future was annual 
economic success. Using a simple formula of 12% Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
legitimated Schrempp’s radical downsizing of the Daimler technology consortium from 36 to 
23 business units. The losers included not only AEG and large parts of DASA, but also the 
integral software unit of Debis. But as much as Schrempp harvested rejection from wide parts 
of Germany society, he was suddenly the darling of international financial institutions, 
anxious for a liberalization of the German market. A 1996 report of the London investment 
J.P. Morgan’s financial analysis of Schrempp’s first 15 months in office as CEO praised his 
restructuring efforts and assessed his focus on shareholder value as futuristic. International 
investors welcomed signs of an opening up of the closed coordinated insider’s world of 
industrial Germany. Daimler’s focus on ROCE at 12% was judged to guarantee a climb in the 
value of the shares from 88 to over 95 DEM per share in upcoming 1997 (Der Spiegel 43, 
1996).  
Die Spezialisten aus London wollten es ganz genau wissen: Ein Jahr lang nahmen Nick 
Snee und Camilla Darwin den größten deutschen Industriekonzern unter die Lupe. 
Danach waren die bei den Automobilexperten des Wertpapierhauses J. P. Morgan 
Securities “äußerst beeindruckt”. ...Das Lob, das sie in einer bislang unveröffentlichten, 
176 Seiten starken Analyse verteilen, gilt vor allem einem Mann: Jürgen Schrempp. 
Und es gilt seiner Strategie: dem Shareholder Value. Dieses Konzept erklärt den Profit 
zum wichtigsten Unternehmensziel  (Der Spiegel 43, 1996). (Author translation: The 
London specialists wanted to ascertain the situation exactly. Nick Snee and Camilla 
Darwin scrutinized Germany’s largest industrial company for a whole year. The 
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automobile experts of stock investor J.P. Morgan Securities were “extremely 
impressed”. ...The praise they heap in a hitherto unpublished 176 page exact analysis is 
directed primarily towards one man: Jürgen Schrempp. And the praise is directed 
towards one goal: shareholder value. This concept declares profit to be the most 
important goal of the firm). 
An important means of realizing this goal of profit maximization and enhanced shareholder 
value was the step to integrate management into a more profit oriented Weltanschauung. At a 
time when thousands of jobs were being destroyed within the Daimler-Benz organization and 
workers in the commercial vehicle division were being threatened with an increase in working 
time from 35 to 38 hours (Der Spiegel 27, 1996), Schrempp was making headlines with the 
Supervisory Board’s approval in April 1996 to introduce an American-style option plan for 
stock acquisition by the company’s own executives (Der Spiegel 15, 1996). It was one of his 
first measures that confirmed his determination to break with the institutional framework of a 
coordinated market economy known as the Deutschland AG. German executives were 
expected to perform independent of the need for external bonus motivation programs. But 
industry leaders were starting to view the missing link between performance, profit-seeking 
and rewards as a weakness. Proponents of a paradigm switch, such as Telekom boss Sommer, 
placed the blame of higher unemployment on a lack of focus on shareholder value in 
Germany. The civil service status of his employees, for example, at the former Deutsche 
Bundespost (Federal German Post Service), was completely out of touch with the current 
market situation (Der Spiegel 15, 1996). Schrempp was to become the main protagonist in the 
shift away from stakeholder to shareholder value. In the early phases of this paradigm shift he 
was radically alienated from employee representatives, who feared a decline into a kind of 
radical American Reaganomic form of capitalism. Not only Schrempp’s rhetoric justified 
these fears. Daimler had already decided to build their new SUV, the M-Class, in the non-
union state of Alabama. 
Despite his public tirades it was equally obvious that Schrempp was not going to be able to 
just steamroller decades of successful co-determination into history. Costly warn strikes and 
work stoppages at both the commercial and passenger vehicle divisions cost the company 
hundreds of millions German Marks and threatened the initial signs of economic recovery, 
which Schrempp desperately needed to solidify his position and legitimize his strategy. In 
addition, Schrempp increasingly had to experience throughout 1996 that his strategy to grasp 
full control of Mercedes still would require some form of consensus with the labor side of the 
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Supervisory Board. They in turn would be expected to defend the concerns of the employees 
and offer stiff resistance to Schrempp’s attempted “cultural revolution” at Mercedes. One of 
Schrempp’s first steps in this direction was to approach the employee representatives with a 
plan to reduce the number of top managers as a further signal to the unions that his 
restructuring was indeed affecting everyone. By starting at the top he was making true his 
promise of cleaning up at the “bullshit castle” headquarters (Der Spiegel 45, 1996). 
Mit dieser Selbstkritik will Schrempp die Betriebsräte für die geplante neue 
Führungsstruktur gewinnen, die auch Mercedes-Chef Helmut Werner entmachten soll. 
Schrempps Plan sieht eine Verschmelzung von Mercedes mit dem Daimler-Vorstand 
vor. Bislang standen besonders die Mercedes-Betriebsräte der Reform ablehnend 
gegenüber. Schrempp hofft, dass den Arbeitnehmervertretern die Zustimmung leichter 
fällt, wenn die härtesten Sparmaßnahmen zunächst das Management betreffen. Durch 
Personalabbau auf den Top-Etagen und kürzere Entscheidungswege sollen die Kosten 
um über 500 Millionen Mark gesenkt werden (Der Spiegel 45, 1996). (Author 
translation: Schrempp intended with this self-critique to convince the employee 
representatives to support his plan for a new management organization, which would 
also remove Mercedes boss Helmut Werner. Schrempp’s plan envisions a melting 
together of Mercedes with the Daimler Board. Hitherto the Mercedes shop stewards 
(Betriebsräte) have been against the reform. Schrempp hopes that it will be easier for 
the employee representatives to approve the move when the toughest cost-saving 
measures impact top management first. The reduction of top-level managers and the 
resulting implementation of quicker decision-making processes are aimed at cutting 
costs by more than 500 million Marks per year). 
This power gridlock within Daimler-Benz influenced a further change of the traditional roles 
of management labor relations at Daimler, which had been hitherto been characterized by co-
determined moderate but continuous wage increases. The “system” had been threatened in the 
1980s with industrial unrest surrounding the fight for a reduction of weekly work time from 
38 to 35 hours, but basically workers at Daimler-Benz felt they had the security of a German 
civil servant combined with a much higher standard of living. Schrempp “cultural revolution” 
foresaw a mindset change, with his scheme allowing normal Mercedes employees to also 
profit from Daimler’s profitability in any given year (Der Spiegel 27, 1997). 
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Den Anfang der neuen Beweglichkeit machte Daimler-Chef Jürgen Schrempp. Im 
Frühjahr kündigte er an, künftig alle am Unternehmenserfolg zu beteiligen. Schrempp 
möchte Gehaltsanteile seiner Beschäftigten variabel gestalten, sie sollen an den Gewinn 
des Konzerns gekoppelt werden. Dem Unternehmen, meint der Konzernlenker, stehe 
eine Kulturrevolution bevor: Jeder Mitarbeiter solle sich künftig fragen, ob der 
Mehrwert, den er für das Unternehmen erwirtschafte, seine Kosten übersteige (Der 
Spiegel  27, 1997). (Author translation: Daimler boss Jürgen Schrempp has initiated a 
new form of flexibility. In spring of this year (1997) he announced that in the future all 
employees would benefit from the company’s success. He wants to make the wage and 
salary remuneration more flexible by making it partially dependent on the company’s 
profit. In the eyes of the company’s strategist, his firm is about to experience a cultural 
revolution. Each and every employee should ask the question in the future, whether the 
added value he generates for the company is more than his other costs). 
The scheme proposed a basic bonus of 270 German Marks per employee if the company’s 
operating profit exceeded 1.5 billion German Marks. Moreover, employees would receive a 
further 38 Marks for each additional 100 Million Marks in profit. Even in the crisis years of 
1995 and 1996 this would have meant 726 and 498 Marks per Mercedes employee 
respectively. This was in fact a real incentive, especially during a period where even 
“protected” groups of workers in the public service were facing holiday cuts, abolition of 
Christmas bonus money and hiring stops. The Mercedes car division’s 1997 operating profits 
of 3.1 billion German Marks and the resulting payouts would go a long way to convincing 
employees of their interest in participating in Schrempp’s vision of the future. His turnaround 
of the company had filled their wallets with more money than years of tedious union 
negotiations. This was especially true at a time when the number of blue-collar workers was 
being reduced but the number of white-collar engineers and MBAs was being increased 
proportionally. This younger group of well-educated and union neutral employees was more 
open to Schrempp’s coupling of company profitability and universal bonus programs.  
Daimler’s criticism of Deutschland AG even extended to the coveted vocational and training 
system (Duale Ausbildung / Dual Education System). In a Spiegel interview, Daimler’s head 
of Human Resources, Tropitzsch, criticized that necessary changes in the system were taking 
too long (Der Spiegel 27, 1997). Especially in the area of professional training, German 
engineers were simply too old at the time of entrance in the company. He also mentioned the 
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willingness of American universities to work closely with Daimler as one of the reasons to 
locate the production of the new M-Class in the USA. 
A final component concerning the non-automotive aspect of the Welt AG was the changed 
relationship to the Deutsche Bank. The Deutschland AG’s complex myriad of holdings, cross-
holdings and proxy majorities had allowed financial institutions such as Deutsche Bank to 
both control and protect industrial companies such as Daimler-Benz. The banks had forced 
Daimler to merge with Benz in the 1920s against the will of the managers and in the 1980s it 
was the Deutsche Bank, who brought in a non-Swabian outsider from Continental Tire, 
Helmut Werner, in order to restructure the Mercedes unit. However, Schrempp came to 
realize that even Deutsche Bank’s 23% ownership could not save Daimler from a possible 
unfriendly takeover. His belief in the stock market notwithstanding, Daimler-Benz status as a 
German AG with a relatively undervalued stock market rating made it a prime takeover 
candidate. In 1995 he had witnessed firsthand how Kerkorian’s attempted leverage buyout 
almost succeeded in taking over Chrysler. The price tag of 22 million dollars at the time was 
easily financeable for the likes of Toyota or General Motors or Volkswagen. He would again 
experience this threat in 1997, with Ford’s open advances (Vlasic and Stertz, 2000). Within 
the context of the merger frenzy in the automobile world in the mid 1990s, it was a case of 
either taking over another company or risk being taken over. The German DAX 30 club was 
no longer protected from international financial interests. Continental Tire was almost taken 
over by Pirelli and “forced” to expand into the field of automotive electronics to protect itself, 
with the founding of Continental Automotive Systems. Even the BMW acquisition of the 
Rover Group seemed “normal”, despite its ownership by the Quandt family (Brady and 
Lorenz 2000). In addition, Schrempp’s close relationship the Deutsche Bank Board member, 
Hilmar Kopper, allowed him to see how the banks were starting to change their attitude to 
German DAX 30 companies. Holding large packages of underpriced shares was also 
impacting their profit margins negatively. Taking shareholder value seriously entailed 
reviewing the bank’s own investment strategies. It is not surprising that within a month after 
the start of DaimlerChrysler AG’s new DCX share on the world’s stock markets, Deutsche 
Bank announced the selloff of all of their industrial holdings in favor of creating a new 
investment company, which would focus solely on the maximization of shareholder value. By 
1997 it was clear to Schrempp that saving Daimler-Benz meant expanding the role and scope 
of the Mercedes-Benz unit.  
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4.4.4 Mercedes as the focal point of the Welt AG strategy 
As has already been discussed, Schrempp inherited and continued to follow the expansionist 
policy within the Mercedes unit, which had been initiated by his rival, Helmut Werner. The 
plans for the A-Class, the M-Class and the Smart had all been laid down years before 
Schrempp became CEO. The planned launches of all 3 new additions to the Mercedes family 
in 1997 coincided with Schrempp’s gaining control of Mercedes in January 1997. Ex-Werner 
executives, Hubbert and Zetsche were responsible for ensuring continuity in the division, and 
they were considered to be the most effective operative executives in the whole company 
(Vlasic and Stertz, 2000). They had played a major role in the Q-Star talks with Chrysler in 
1995 and they would conduct the negotiations with Ford in 1997. Most importantly for the 
emergence of the Welt AG strategy, they were confident that the three new products would 
allow Daimler-Benz to reach the magical 1,000,000-vehicle production mark by the year 2000 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000; Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1997).  
At the corporate strategy presentation to the Board in July 1997, the first time Schrempp 
appeared as boss of Mercedes, the discussion focused on growth possibilities. Since the mid 
1970s Daimler had doubled its revenues every ten years. In 1997 Schrempp advisor Grube 
saw little chance for expansion in the area of financial services (Debis), aerospace (DASA) or 
the commercial vehicle division. That left the passenger car division, Mercedes. However, the 
luxury car market accounted for only 12% of the total global market for automobiles and was 
already overcrowded with increasing competition (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1997). 
The industry did expect high growth in emerging markets such as South America, India, 
Southeast Asia and China. The future lay in radically increased volumes. That meant finding 
suitable partners. Mercedes would be able to reach the 1,000,000 mark by the year 2000 but it 
was already clear that any further expansion would heavily tax management resources and 
endanger the brand’s reputation. The extent of this risk would become increasingly clear to 
Schrempp in the second half of 1997. Werner’s plans to build the A-Class, the M-Class and 
the Smart were all delayed and disrupted before their planned production ramp-ups. The 
impending negative experiences with all three launches would expose the limits of both the 
Mercedes organization and brand identity for the future of the global car industry. It was 
already clear to Schrempp that Mercedes could not survive alone, but the mounting negative 
experiences with the A-Class, the M-Class and the Smart in 1997 radicalized the need for 
quick action.  
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The launch of the A-Class was a crucial part of Mercedes strategy. Similar to the introduction 
of the C-class back in 1982, the small compact car would re-open debates on Mercedes brand 
dilution. Similar to the C-class it would have positive commercial success, selling 1.6 million 
times in the first 10 years. The plan to build a South American version of the model at the 
new Juiz da Fora facility in Brazil was Mercedes’ first car production facility in South 
America and a test of the company’s ability to create modified global platform versions of the 
same vehicle. Technologically speaking, it was one of Mercedes few front-wheel drive 
models and an attempt to introduce more powertrain flexibility in Mercedes factories. Indeed, 
one of the technical reasons for the later inability to marriage Mercedes and Chrysler 
powertrain synergy effects was the former’s reliance on rear-wheel drive models and 
Chrysler’s preference for front-wheel drive vehicles (Bartel and Guadalupe 2008). 
The A-Class had an impact on the emerging Welt AG strategy for a completely different 
reason; the “elk test”. About 3,000 cars had already been sold when the test driver for a 
Swedish car magazine managed to flip over the A-Class while maneuvering to avoid an 
imaginary elk crossing the road. The results ensured the A-Class a place in the list of 
Mercedes’ worst technical disasters (Der Spiegel 45, 1997). The initial enthusiastic reception 
of the auto world at the Frankfurt Motor Show (IAA) was now being torpedoed by fears that 
the car was unsafe to drive. Safety was one of the cornerstones of the Mercedes brand 
identity. Mercedes reacted quickly by recalling all of the sold vehicles. The solution to the 
problem would, however, underscore Mercedes’ basic problem as a luxury brand. In order to 
prevent the car from tipping over a newly developed Electronic Stability Program (ESP) was 
installed as part of the car’s standard package. This had two effects. First it increased the cost 
of building the car, making it more unlikely to be successful in the planned South American 
market. Secondly, it forced German competitors such as VW to install the same system in the 
Golf. The safety consciousness of the German domestic market would make it difficult for 
this segment of cars to compete internationally. Even in Germany the A-Class would be too 
expensive as an “entry” car for first time car buyers. Instead the sales of the A-Class would 
depend on the cash laden 50+ generations, who wanted Mercedes luxury without having to 
pay the costs of the C-class. In a shrinking luxury car market, Mercedes had added a new 
model to the group. In order to save the brand identity, each new Mercedes would have to be 
the car of the highest quality in its market segment.  
This goal would be even more difficult to achieve with the new sports utility vehicle, the M-
Class. Built in the USA, the concept for the M-Class had been a critical part of former 
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Mercedes CEO Werner to produce 25% of Mercedes vehicles outside of Germany. This 
raised doubts whether the Mercedes brand identity could really afford to renounce on its 
“made in Germany”. At the time, Werner’s optimistic prognosis was clear and concise. 
Unser Qualitätsstandard heißt heute Made by Mercedes“. Wir haben mit unserer 
Lastwagenproduktion sowohl in Brasilien als auch in den USA bewiesen, dass dort eine 
hervorragende Qualität herzustellen ist. Das werden wir jetzt auf Pkw übertragen Der 
Spiegel 17, 1996). (Author’s translation: Today our standard of quality is “Made by 
Mercedes”. Our commercial vehicle production facilities both in Brazil and the USA 
have proven that it is possible to achieve excellent quality levels there. This startegy 
will now be adopted the passenger car unit). 
However, by late 1996 and early 1997 it was clear how difficult it would be to establish a 
completely new vehicle concept in a start-up greenfield-factory in the southern state of 
Alabama. More and more manpower had to be deployed from Germany in order to save the 
project. Although the immense quality problems surrounding the project would not hit the 
press until much later, it was clear that internationalization within the Mercedes unit would 
have its limits. 
Mercedes’ plans for innovation in the area of lean production were also running into trouble 
in 1997. The Smart concept aimed to revolutionize production facilities. The industry-leading 
4 hours per vehicle target would be twice as fast as any Japanese competitor (Der Spiegel 42, 
1997). The concept radically reduced the role of Mercedes engineers and production 
specialists with its dependence on eight so-called system suppliers (VDO, Krupp-Hoesch, 
Eisenmann, Bosch, Rhenus, Magna, Ymos und Dynamit Nobel). These companies were to be 
responsible for the majority of both the development and production of the compact vehicle, 
restricting Mercedes managers to a coordinating role. In an era when Mercedes was busy 
bringing the various development departments together in its new Mercedes Technology 
center in Sindelfingen, Smart was located in Renningen. The whole logic and rationale of the 
Smart concept was heavily debated within the Mercedes organization: 
Viele clevere Lösungen sind den Lieferanten zu verdanken, von denen der neue 
Autohersteller Smart „brutalst abhängig“ ist, wie (Werksleiter) Bölstler sagt. Für 
manchen Entwickler bei Mercedes ist dies eine grauenvolle Vorstellung. Jahr- 
zehntelang arbeiteten sie nach der Devise, daß ein Scheibenwischer nur dann ein 
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Scheibenwischer ist, wenn er auch von Mercedes stammt. Doch wenn jetzt beim Smart 
selbst die Konstruktion des Cockpits oder der Karosserie von Lieferanten erledigt wird, 
wieviel Arbeit bleibt für die Mercedes-Ingenieure dann noch übrig (Der Spiegel 42, 
1997)? (Author translation: A lot of clever solutions can be credited to the suppliers, 
who the carmaker Smart is „absolutely dependent“ upon, according to (plant manager) 
Bölster. This is a horrible vision for many Mercedes’ developers. They have been 
working for decades according to the motto that a windshield wiper is only a windshield 
wiper if it comes from Mercedes. However, if now at Smart even the engineering and 
design of a cockpit or the bodyshell comes from suppliers, what’s left for Mercedes 
engineers to do)? 
In a decade which witnessed a continued increase of Mercedes’ dependence on suppliers, the 
Smart experiment took on symbolic character within Mercedes. The fact that the Smart never 
had a Mercedes star made it easier for insiders to hope that it would fail and indeed many 
were pleased when it was announced in December 1997, that the launch would have to be 
postponed by 6 months due to quality and manufacturing issues (Der Spiegel 52, 1997). After 
the A-class disaster due to the elk test, the Smart delay was the second major fiasco for the 
new Mercedes head Hubbert in his first year in office. Daimler-Benz CEO Schrempp 
intervened in both cases, ordering the ESP fix for the A-Class and firing the development 
head of the Smart project. However, he still adhered to Mercedes expansion program. More 
importantly, however, these 1997 experiences confirmed his belief that Mercedes would need 
additional partners in order to remain economically valuable.  
The globalization and product stretching of the Mercedes brand was showing its limits in 
1997. Furthermore, experts within the industry saw expansion in the market for small 
inexpensive cars for South America, India, Southeast Asia and China. Mercedes had no 
experience in this area. Throughout 1997 Schrempp had been asking both his global 
strategists (Grube and Cordes) and Mercedes bosses (Hubbert and Zetsche) for suggestions 
for possible worldwide partners. His one condition was that Daimler had to have the lead in 
any project. So it was clear that he would reject Ford’s advances toward Mercedes in late 
1997. However, if Ford had wanted to launch a hostile takeover, Schrempp would be almost 
powerless to prevent it. He would need the assistance of the same Deutschland AG he had 
been busy attacking since coming into office. Fortunately for Schrempp, it was the Ford 
family, which rejected the deal. By the end of 1997, Schrempp envisioned two possible 
complementary partners, Chrysler in the USA and Nissan in Japan. The implementation of the 
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Welt AG strategy would begin in January 1998, when Schrempp approached Chrysler CEO at 
the Detroit Car Show, the industry’s traditional New Year’s kick-off event.  
4.5 Chrysler’s motivation to merge 
The first merger considerations between Chrysler and the German luxury carmaker had been 
in April 1995, one month before Schrempp became Daimler-Benz CEO. Then Mercedes head 
Helmut Werner offered to “help” defend Chrysler against an unfriendly takeover bid from the 
American company’s largest shareholder Kerk Kerkorian and ex-CEO Iacocca (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). Although Kerkorian would fail to get the financing needed to close the deal, he 
would continue to fight against CEO Eaton for the rest of the year. In order to achieve his goal 
of increasing dividends and increase a focus on shareholder interests, Kerkorian would align 
the services of former Chrysler Chief Financial Officer, York, and force his appointment to 
the Chrysler Board. During this time Mercedes and Chrysler were studying various options 
for cooperation (Vlasic and Stertz, 2000). The two major Chrysler projects were the so-called 
Lone Star and Q-Star plans. The Lone Start plans envisaged a Chrysler future without any 
intervention of an outside company. The Q-Star variation explored possibilities ranging from 
joint ventures to a full merger between Chrysler and Mercedes. In 1995 the discussions failed 
for four reasons. Firstly, it became clear that Kerkorian’s threat was not as serious as at first 
believed. Secondly, initial studies found very few possibilities for working together. Thirdly, 
newly elected Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp wanted no part of any deal, which had 
Mercedes rival Werner’s signature on it. Lastly, Chrysler Vice President Lutz did not want to 
work with Mercedes. Swiss-American Lutz had worked for many years at BMW, Ford and 
Opel in Germany and he knew Mercedes well. He was convinced that Mercedes was just too 
big and too slow for the lean structure and quick-decision making culture of Chrysler in the 
1990s. Both sides agreed to remain on friendly terms but to not pursue any further common 
projects. Indeed, Chrysler went on to sign an engine cooperation deal with BMW for the 
South American market. Lutz was behind the agreement on the Chrysler side and Mercedes 
officials viewed this as an arrogant and unacceptable breach of trust on the part of the 
Americans (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
It is therefore relevant to ascertain the changes between 1995 and late 1997 at Chrysler, which 
made CEO Eaton interested in listening to Daimler boss Schrempp’s offer less than 3 years 
later. Firstly, the Kerkorian takeover attempt had strengthened Eaton’s position inside the 
company. Eaton had come to Chrysler as an unwelcome outsider from GM. Iacocca had 
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picked him as his successor to block his rival Lutz from becoming the new CEO (Vlasic and 
Stertz, 2000). Lutz and others had been responsible for creating Chrysler’s new platform and 
supplier strategy. Even Eaton himself admitted that he had had little to do with the 
architecture responsible for Chrysler’s dynamic success. The Kerkorian crisis was Eaton’s 
first real chance to display his leadership ability both inside and outside the company. 
Furthermore, Eaton was acutely aware of Chrysler’s major weaknesses. His two major areas 
of direct interest were internationalism and quality. Eaton had aimed to increase Chrysler’s 
turnover outside the NAFTA region to 20%. By late 1997 it was clear that this goal was an 
illusion. Chrysler’s foreign source of income remained stagnant at around 8%, as none of their 
models were really suitable for driving styles and infrastructures outside of the United States. 
A special project to create a cheap vehicle for the Chinese market even failed to meet every 
fuel consumption, emissions and safety test. This international failure was coupled with 
Eaton’s awareness of the limits to Chrysler’s growth in the USA. America’s economy had 
been booming during the Clinton years and Chrysler had grabbed 16% of the American 
market with its innovative mini-vans and SUVs. However, even the most optimistic prognosis 
could not envisage more than 20% of the market. Furthermore, Chrysler’s dynamic 
innovation had had its price. The Chrysler platforms had reduced development times and 
costs dramatically, but exploding market demand caused Chrysler to cut corners on quality 
control and part maturity. Their vehicles were market successes, but quality was below 
industry average according to J.D. Power studies. In addition, the Japanese and American 
competition were starting to imitate Chrysler products but with a higher quality and lower 
price. It was only a question of time before Chrysler niche product markets would be as 
oversaturated with vehicles as the conventional sedan market. At the same time, the 
generation of executives responsible for creating the new Chrysler in the 1980s and 1990s 
were now coming to the end of their careers. The thrill of having helped saved Chrysler in 
1992 was slowly being replaced by the realistic awareness that the boom in the American 
economy, which was fuelling their expansion, would soon come to an end. Eaton himself was 
aware of the fact that every CEO at Chrysler in the last 40 years had been forced to leave due 
to a crisis. Chrysler results and earnings for the year ending 1997 had reached record levels. 
Even the company’s enormous pension fund was covered for the first time in 20 years (Vlasic 
and Stertz, 2000), but from Eaton’s perspective they had to change their strategy very quickly 
in order to avoid the previous boom bust cycles of the past. Working together with either GM 
or Ford would mean the destruction of Chrysler. Just as Chrysler had only preserved the Jeep 
brand after its acquisition of American Motors Company in 1987, so too would the Big 2 only 
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cherry pick Chrysler brands such as Dodge and Jeep. The cooperation between both Honda 
and Mitsubishi had been instructive, but the overlap of products was viewed as too extensive 
to justify a more intense form of partnership. That left the German automakers and perhaps 
Fiat. In 1997, the logical choice seemed to be cash-heavy Daimler-Benz. 
Schrempp’s Welt AG strategy was composed of a number of elements. Firstly it foresaw a 
continued increase in automobile productivity. Secondly, he planned an increase of 
productivity outside of Germany to cut production costs and create more protection against 
the continuing weakness of the dollar. Within this period of uncertainty in the automobile 
industry there was a growing trend towards international mergers and acquisitions. The value 
of global M&As involving American firms exploded tenfold between 1990 and 2000 (Stahl et 
al. 2004). According to EU statistics (Jonung 2005), worldwide cross-border M&A activity 
tripled between 1990 and 2000. Within the car industry this trend developed into a frenzy in 
all-out rush to secure large volumes, ignoring the fact that the industry itself was plagued by 
exactly the reality of chronic overcapacity of at least 100% in relation to market possibilities 
and saturation, despite the promise of new emerging markets in eastern Europe, India and 
China. Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) put together the following overview of the car 
industry in 1998. The figures for DaimlerChrysler AG and its market potential appear 
particularly impressive when one compares earnings, revenue and available cash in relation to 
the number of vehicles being produced. These numbers reflect both the cost effectiveness of 
Chrysler at the beginning of the takeover and Daimler’s ability to maximize its earnings per 
luxury car owing to the high costs of their options. 
Table 6: Industry Overview (1998) 
Largest Carmakers Earnings Revenue Car sales Cash Rumored 
merger partners 
General Motors     $ 2.8 bn $ 140 bn 7.5 million $ 16.6 bn Isuzi, Suzuki, 
Daewoo 
Ford Motor* $ 6.7 bn $ 118 bn 6.8 million $ 23.0 bn Honda, BMW 
DaimlerChrysler 
AG 
$ 6.5 bn $ 147 bn 4.0 million $ 25.0 bn Nissan, Fiat 
Volkswagen $ 1.3 bn $   75 bn 4.6 million $ 12.4 bn BMW, Fiat 
Toyota Motor Co. $ 4.0 bn $ 106 bn 4.5 million $ 23.0 bn Daihatsu, Hino 
Honda Motor Co. $ 2.4 bn $  54 bn 2.3 million $  3.0 bn BMW 
*In the spring of 199, Ford Motor acquired Sweden’s Volvo car division for $ 6.5 bn. 
Volvo sold 444,000 cars in 1997. DaimlerChrysler AG called off merger talks with 
Nissan. Subsequently, Renault of France acquired a stake in Nissan. 
Source: (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 78). DaimlerChrysler AG Tables Index 4.1. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown how Schrempp’s Welt AG strategy emerged as a forced reaction to 
the failure of his predecessor’s (Reuter) failed attempt to diversify Daimler-Benz into a 
technological consortium. The tools of shareholder value and profit maximization as defined 
by return on capital employed (ROCE) were employed to downsize the number of business 
units. This downsizing led to a remarkable period of economic recovery at Daimler-Benz 
between 1995 and 1997. 
In addition, Schrempp saw himself confronted with the powerful head of the Mercedes 
business unit, Helmut Werner. In a brilliant strategical move, Schrempp confiscated Werner’s 
philosophy of the expansion and globalization of the Mercedes brand. At the same time 
Schrempp succeeded in joining the positions of Mercedes CEO and Daimler-Benz CEO, thus 
making Werner redundant. Werner was forced to retire from Daimler-Benz in January 1997 
(Der Spiegel 4, 1997). Schrempp adapted Werner’s belief that the future of the company lay 
in the rediscovery of its historical strengths in the passenger and commercial vehicle sectors. 
However, Werner’s strategy was restricted to the Mercedes brands and his radical expansion 
of the power of the brand by creating ten new models in a space of only three years still was 
not enough to achieve the magic number of 1 million units per year (Daimler-Benz AG 
Annual Report 1997; Brady and Lorenz 2000 ). Having focused his recovery strategy on the 
hegemony of the passenger and commercial vehicle units of Daimler-Benz, Schrempp was 
now forced to seek mergers, partnerships, alliances or takeovers with other companies in 
order to complete his vision of a vehicle Welt AG. His vision of a German-led Welt AG made 
Mercedes-led takeovers the most likely strategy. The missing pieces of the strategy were 
North America and Asia in terms of passenger cars. In the field of commercial vehicles, 
Daimler-Benz still lacked a suitable presence in the Asian markets. These two weaknesses 
would determine Schrempp’s decision to first approach Chrysler in January 1998, but not to 
stop there. It also explains his urgency to begin looking for an Asian partner as quickly as 
possible. He approached Nissan in January 1999. Following the rejection of his proposals 
from the Board, Schrempp would begin courting Mitsubishi in late 1999, which would result 
in ownership of a controlling share in 2000. The events and results of this failed Asian 
strategy will be examined in Chapter 5.4.4. In conclusion it is possible to characterize 
Schrempp’s WELT AG strategy as a desperate attempt to create results with takeover targets 
(Chrysler, Nissan and Mitsubishi). In the time frame 1998-2000 the strategic positioning of 
the three takeover targets was even more desperate. 
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On the Chrysler side, by 1998 CEO Robert Eaton had become more conscious of the strategic 
weaknesses of Chrysler compared to the negotiations between Chrysler and Mercedes in 
1995. In 1995 Robert Lutz was still a powerful member of the Chrysler strategic management 
and his adamant rejection of any cooperation with the German firm had prevented a deal 
being made. By 1998 Eaton realized that something had to change. Despite marketing and 
styling successes Chrysler still could not achieve 20% of the NAFTA market. Furthermore the 
company had negligible presence in the rest of the market. Eaton was also highly aware of the 
cyclical nature of Chrysler’s successes and failures. This is perhaps the only weakness of 
Vlasic and Stertz’s (2000) account of the DaimlerChrysler takeover. The authors tend to 
characterize Eaton’s actions as an egoistically driven decision to sell out the company. In 
actual fact, the decision to sell did make sense in terms of providing Daimler capital to insure 
funding of the company’s pension funds. Daimler-Benz ownership of Chrysler would also 
provide investment capital for product innovation and protection from a possible takeover. 
The experiences of the attempted takeover in 1995 provide sufficient evidence of that distinct 
threat. As he expressed in an interview with Der Spiegel after the takeover, his motivation to 
sell was based on his conviction that only ten automobile companies would survive (Der 
Spiegel 41, 1998). 
The situations at Daimler-Benz’s Mercedes unit and Chrysler have been shown to be less 
optimistic than the hype of the May 1998 takeover announcement suggested. Both companies 
faced serious challenges and contradictory strategies. The next chapter will now show why 
and how the takeover failed to reach any of its announced goals. 
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5 MEASURING THE TAKEOVER FAILURE 
This chapter focuses on measuring the extent to which DaimlerChrysler AG failed to meet the 
three most important goals outlined by CEO Jürgen Schrempp in May 1998: 
1. increase shareholder value 
2. maximize synergy effects 
3. enhance customer satisfaction 
It will be argued that the failure to meet any of these targets contributed to the failure of the 
takeover, which led first to Schrempp’s resignation in July 2005 and later resulted in the 
decision to sell Chrysler in February 2007. 
5.1 Financial failure to increase shareholder value 
The story of DaimlerChrysler’s inability to increase shareholder value spans its historic rise in 
January 1999 to over $108 followed by its continuous fall to around $40 until the 
announcement of Schrempp’s resignation in July 2005. Daimler’s shares would ultimately be 
delisted completely from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2010. 
5.1.1 DCX: The first truly global share 
One of the most important justifications for the takeover deal between Daimler-Benz AG and 
Chrysler was CEO Jürgen Schempp’s promise that “we will improve return and value for our 
shareholders” (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 78). Indeed the combination of secrecy and 
shock at the surprise announcement of the takeover on May 7th, 1998 led to an increase of 
value of the combined firms of $10.2 billion within 24 hours. Chrysler shares skyrocketed 
30.9% and even the more cautious German side reacted with a jump of 4.6%. As Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000 point out, this return was consistent with expert predictions of 
synergy benefits of $1.4 billion in the initial year of commonized business and thereafter 
annual savings and benefits of around $3 billion. According to their calculation, at the 
beginning of the takeover the actual combined increase in shareholder value was aligned to 
the new company’s announced expected benefits. In the year following the announcement of 
the takeover, however, DaimlerChrysler AG’s DCX share would underperform all three 
critical German and American indices, DAX30, S&P500 and the DSWorld (Blaško, Netter 
and Sinkey 2000 99). Both measuring in terms of euro-returns (-9%) and dollar returns (-
34%), Schrempp had not been able to deliver on his shareholder value promise. The 
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announcement of poor second quarter earnings on July 29th, 1999, led to a further 8.8% 
plummet of the DCX listing (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 99). 
However, back in May of the previous year the vision of DaimlerChrysler AG’s new share, 
DCX, promised to be the world’s first “truly global share” (Karolyi 2003). Since 1927 most 
non-U.S. companies made use of an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) to facilitate cross-
border dealing. It was also the means Daimler-Benz had employed since its initial listing on 
the NYSE as of October 1993. The ADR had significant disadvantages, including the need for 
an intermediary American depositary bank, acting between investor and issuer (Karolyi 2003 
414). DCX was the very first stock to make use of the new “global registered share” (GRS) 
system, which promised real international decision leeway, flexibility and transparency. ADR 
was de jure and de facto simply a receipt from an American depositary bank. This 
development was not trivial, as more than 10% of all trading on the NYSE involves ADR 
transactions. The new GRS share was to be traded simultaneously both in American dollars in 
New York and euros in Frankfurt. It would allow shareholders easier direct access for the 
registration and transfer of their investments. DCX seemed to promise a major revolution in 
the advancement of global trading and presented a challenge to the hitherto hegemony of the 
New York Stock Exchange (Karolyi 2003). 
The appearance of DCX’s globalism was, however, just an illusion. On the one hand, 
stockholders were equally present in both Europe (44%) and the USA (44%). There were 
three main stockholders, Deutsche Bank A.G. (23%), the Emirate of Kuwait (13%) and 
American billionaire Kirk Kerkorian/Tracinda Corp of Los Vegas). In addition 17,000 so-
called institutional investors held almost 50% DaimlerChrysler AG shares, while 1.3 million 
retail investors were responsible for approximately one quarter of the company’s ownership. 
The remaining 3% were held by managers and other “insiders”. More than 99% of the voting 
shareholders of both companies accepted the conversion of value offers to create the new 
DCX stock (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). On the other hand, this seemingly highly 
diversified global balance of shareholders would melt away within the first year of 
DaimlerChrysler as a result of critical reactions from major American financial institutions 
and their corresponding investment strategies. 
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5.1.2 The Standard and Poor’s 500 mistake 
Legally speaking, the newly created DaimlerChrysler AG was an AG and incorporated under 
the jurisdiction of the legal framework of the Federal Republic of Germany. As pointed out in 
the company’s prospectus on the takeover (DaimlerChrysler AG 1998; Blaško, Netter and 
Sinkey 2000: 92) Chrysler Inc. retained its legal entity status and became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG. A direct merger would have entailed costly tax and 
regulatory issues. This decision was to have an immediate negative impact on shareholder 
value. Before the new stock went public on November 18th, 1998 Standard & Poor’s 
announced a decision, which shocked the evolving management at DaimlerChrysler AG. 
Standard & Poors decided to drop Chrysler from their influential S&P500 index. The 
reasoning was simple; Chrysler was no longer “American”, but had become part of a German 
corporation. As the S&P Index Committee justified its decision: 
The S&P500 covers leading companies in leading industries and reflects the importance 
of the US markets and economy. Investors see the index as the key benchmark for the 
US markets. Moreover investors recognize that companies and markets in one country 
perform differently from companies or markets in other countries. Our action today 
(dropping Chrysler) affirming that the S&P500 represents the US market and companies 
is a reflection of how investors manage their investments. (Blitzer 1998 quoted in: 
Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000  97)  
S&P spokesmen Will Jordan underlined this decision in an agency interview: “It’s a 
German company, it pays taxes in Germany, and it is incorporated in Germany. Our 
long-standing policy is that non-U.S. companies will not be added to the S&P U.S. 
indexes. It’s fairly straightforward”. (Business Wire Oct. 1, 1998 quoted in: Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000 98) 
The market’s reaction in America was immediate and negative. Chrysler recorded a one-day 
drop of 14.6% and share activity doubled in the upcoming weeks, as a myriad of North 
American trust funds attempted to unload their investments in the U.S. carmaker. Not only 
did the S&P announcement trigger the biggest single-day negative event in the first 12 months 
of DaimlerChrysler AG’s existence, it was also an ominous forerunner of more bad news to 
come. Six months later, on March 15th, 1999, DaimlerChrysler AG announced that the 
percentage of U.S. shareholders had dropped to 25%, mirroring mutual fund managers’ 
reluctance to invest in non-U.S. companies. Despite all Schrempp’s efforts to increase 
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shareholder value, there was a remarkable drop in activity on the American side. Karolyi’s 
2003 examination of the impact of GRS (global registered share) trading revealed the exact 
opposite impact to what had been expected. Most of the DCX shares were being traded in 
Frankfurt and in 2003 the New York Stock Exchange accounted for only about 5% of all 
DCX stock volume. 
Before the takeover (December 31st, 1997) Daimler-Benz had had a market capitalization of 
$36 billion compared to Chrysler’s level at $23 billion. In stark contrast to the reluctance of 
Germans to invest in stocks, Daimler-Benz had 550,000 shareholders, mainly due to their 
practice of issuing shares to employees as part of their compensation plans. On the other side, 
Chrysler had 135,000 shareholders. In this regard Daimler-Benz had always been an anomoly 
within the German system, even before the creation of DaimlerChrysler. As Jürgens et al. 
(2000) have observed, Germany is generally cited as being a classical case for a non-
shareholder orientation, with only 6% of the population in Germany holding shares in 1998 
compared to 40% in the United States of America.  
The introduction of DCX as a global registered share was meant to be a tool of shareholder 
value enhancement by allowing quick, direct access to the markets for investors around the 
world, and by being tradable in both Deutsche Mark and U.S. Dollars. Part of the initial 
charisma and dynamism of Jürgen Schrempp at the beginning of his period in office as CEO 
at Daimler-Benz was his challenge to German society to wake up to the reality of world 
markets, globalization and the need to move quickly to a focus on shareholder value. In 
addition experts hoped that DCX would provide for more transparency as a result of the 
elimination of intermediary banks and the introduction of a “Global register” to 
simultaneously inform the Deutsche Boerse and Clearing and Depository Trust Company 
within an environment of genuine cross-border trading. DCX was also intended to prevent the 
phenomenon of flow-back, which constantly thrEatons international cross-listings. Flow back 
refers to the shifting of investment back to the home country of the mother company, in this 
case Daimler-Benz (Karoyli 2003). Although the DCX stock was being traded in two 
currencies, it was assumed that the issue of a single share would eliminate the tendency for 
investors to concentrate their activity in the home country of the country. DaimlerChrysler 
AG legal entity was that of a German AG and therefore its “home” stock exchange was 
located in Frankfurt. 
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Karoyli (2003) conducted a compendious comprehensive comparison of Daimler-Benz, 
Chrysler and DaimlerChrysler share activity worldwide between 1993 and 2003, also during 
the pre-takeover ADR and post-takeover GSR phases. To his surprise he ascertained that in 
the case of DCX the exact opposite developments took place than had initially been predicted. 
After the initial euphoria surrounding the surprise announcement of the takeover between 
May 5th and May 7th, 1998, the stocks began losing in value as of January 1999. More 
damaging was the fact that interest in DCX as an investment diminished rapidly. By February 
1998 daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange was less than 50% of what it had been 
for Chrysler’s stocks one year earlier. The trading on the NYSE comprised less than 5% of the 
total trading for DCX in 2003. Overall liquidity fell, price volatility increased, flow-back 
increased dramatically and there was no enhancement of shareholder value. Although Daimler 
continued to be listed on the NYSE after the disbandment of DaimlerChrysler AG in 2007, 
Daimler eventually delisted from the NYSE in 2010, due to a complete lack of investment 
interest on the other side of the Atlantic. The company was back to where it had been in 1993, 
when almost 99% of the daily turnover of Daimler shares was conducted in Frankfurt. The 
failure of the GSR issuing and the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG to implement DCX as a 
truly global share was one of the main reasons for the failure of the company to reach one of 
its most important declared justification of the takeover in the first place, namely the 
enhancement of shareholder value. 
Throughout the whole history of DaimlerChrysler AG the relationship between the company 
and CEO Jürgen Schrempp in particular and Wall Street was difficult and accompanied by 
very public condemnations on each side. The takeover had a high profile presence in the 
financial media and Schrempp constantly accused Wall Street and publications such as The 
Wall Street Journal of not understanding his company’s market potential. Certainly the 
introduction of DCX as a Global Registered Share posed a threat to the market hegemony of 
the NYSE as a critical institution for the hegemony of the United States of America as the 
world’s most important stock market. DCX meant possible substantial losses for American 
clearance banks and the possibility that stock trading could be carried out simultaneously 
worldwide, which potentially posed a long-term threat to the power of Wall Street. It should 
not be surprising that a number of American institutions took measures to counter this threat, 
starting with Standard & Poor’s refusal to list DCX on their 500 index and continuing with 
the NYSE’s almost complete disregard of DCX as an investment possibility. 
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5.1.3 The resiliency of national institutions 
 Germany is generally viewed as a classical non-shareholder value economy and consciously 
rejects the “Anglo-Saxon approach”, which places high value both on shareholder value and 
the salience of equity markets as critical tools of corporate governance (Hall and Soskice 
2001). Indeed it was not really until the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover that the topic really 
became an issue of public and corporate debate, which was seen as a threat to the dominating 
role of the banks, the system of co-determination and a company-centered management 
system (Streeck and Hopner 2004; Der Spiegel 20, 1998). In addition, the appearance of DCX 
coincided with Deutsche Bank’s decision to rid itself of all its industrial holdings including 
Daimler in December 1998. In addition Daimler-Benz’s expansion of production 
globalization raised threats to the so-called “Standort Deutschland” (location Germany), 
which perceived the major economic strength in its ability to manufacture high-quality goods 
for export. The threat to Germany as a manufacturing location would jeopardize the 
foundations of industrial peace within the country as evidenced later by Opel and Nokia.  
Furthermore, with the inclusion of 1400 senior executives in Daimler-Benz’s stock option 
plan in 1997, managers started to follow the fate of the company’s stock daily for the first 
time in the 112 year history of the company (Daimler-Benz AG Annual Report 1997). At first 
glance it appeared that CEO Schrempp was indeed radically changing the German business 
mindset. 
The wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, increasing globalization of the workforce, 
combined with radical financial risks to the country’s pension system and the expressed need 
to deregulate Germany’s financial markets all led to an increased perception, that the 
historical benefits of Germany’s long-term focus on corporate governance was outdated and 
in need of restructuring. Moreover, the increasing Europeanization of the German economy 
within the EU raised questions of the possible creation of a new non-German corporate 
charter for all European companies. 
Still, the emergence of DaimlerChrysler AG and its primary focus on profit maximization 
represents an anomaly within the German economic environment in terms of its sudden focus 
on shareholder value (Der Spiegel 15, 1995). Management behavior can only be impacted in 
countries where a sufficient part of the corporate sector is stock-market quoted and where the 
major investors are oriented in their decision making primarily driven by value enhancement. 
Before the takeover, the value of the stock market in Germany in 1997 accounted for only 
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approximately 30% of gross domestic product, compared to 100% in the USA (Jürgen et al. 
2000). Only 700 companies were listed and the DAX 30 listing of Germany’s largest blue-
chip companies, including the largest member of the group Daimler-Benz, accounted for over 
70% of total market capitalization. So although CEO Schrempp’s vision of shareholder value 
appeared to be revolutionary within a German economic context, it was still a relatively minor 
phenomenon. Despite a slight increase in private household’s interest in the stock market at 
the start of the dot.com frenzy, only 15% of all shares were held privately. Germans invest 
traditionally in short-term savings (28% in 1998) and insurance policies (19% in 1998). In 
addition, over 50% of all shares are owned by banks, insurance companies and other 
companies, closely integrated together within a network of long-term cooperation, guaranteed 
by cross-holdings of shares and the two-tier Board system, with its guarantee of co-
determination and strong labor presence. The dominating role of the banks is underlined not 
only by their own ownership of shares in large companies, but also by the German system of 
proxy voting (Depotstimmrecht), which gives them a majority of the voting rights at the 
annual general meetings of companies. This power is reinforced by the network of Germany’s 
business elite, which effectively protects them from the outside world and decreases the need 
for a focus on market value orientation. The system of co-determination including the 
separation of power of the management and supervisory board, the rights and influence of 
labor in institution such as the works council and the supervisory board all seem to generate a 
focus on long-term stakeholder oriented stability. The members of the supervisory board have 
to control company management and to prevent the misuse of power. At the same time, they 
are part of an encompassing network which functions as a means of social integration and 
cohesion among the business elites and to which they owe the position they have (Jürgen et 
al. 2000). This particularly German variety of capitalism has often been questioned by Anglo-
American critics, most predominantly by Jensen and Meckling (1979). If co-determination is 
beneficial to both stockholders and labor, why do we need laws which force firms to engage 
in it? Surely they would do so voluntarily. The fact that stockholders must be forced by law to 
accept co-determination is the best evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it. 
Despite this critique, Jürgens et al. (2000) find no substantial evidence to support this claim, 
arguing instead that the implementation of the instruments of corporate governance can vary 
substantially from company to company. So how can we explain Daimler’s attempt to focus 
on shareholder value, starting with its listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993, its 
introduction of the American accounting system GAAP and its issuing of quarterly reports? 
  
 
145 
Certainly Daimler as Germany’s largest company at the time wanted to throw in its weight in 
the ongoing discussion and attempts to liberalize the regulation of the country’s financial 
markets. These changes included the creation of the “Neuer Markt” (new market for venture 
capital) and an exodus of the major banks from industrial holdings, such was the case of 
Deutsche Bank in December 1998. The Neue Markt, created in 1997, aimed to allow new and 
developing companies easier access to venture capital in the form of Initial Public Offerings 
and in its first two years of existence outperformed the DAX by 400%. DaimlerChrysler AG 
and Schrempp viewed themselves as leading forces in an attempt to create a new business 
culture more suitable to an increasingly globalized world characterized by a significant 
increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions focusing on the purpose of value creation. 
Particularly the Mittelstand (medium-sized companies) in the automobile industry was 
particularly affected adversely in the 1990’s. Large American first-tier suppliers had been 
utilizing their capital to cherry pick the jewels of German engineering. Daimler was 
increasingly being forced to deal with the likes of Magna, Delta, Johnson Controls and 
Oxford as suppliers, as their traditional Swabian middle sized supplier companies disappeared 
one by one. At the same time, Daimler-Benz’s DAX presence made them a potential takeover 
victim, with Ford in particular buying up a number of luxury brands to consolidate their 
overall market competitiveness. The hostile takeover of Mannesmann and Pirelli’s attempt to 
takeover Continental was a wake-up call for corporate Germany and the allegedly invincible 
image of DAX 30 companies. 
However, Schrempp was not only facing changes and threats from the outside financial world 
of investing. The decision by the Deutsche Bank in December 1998 to liquidate all their 
industrial holdings and create a subsidiary, DB-Investor, represented a radical break from 
their hitherto relationship with Daimler-Benz. It was a decision to shift the bank’s focus to 
global shareholder value orientation, independent of any concern for German economic 
prosperity. This development by Daimler’s largest shareholder paralleled and, for the time 
being, supported Schrempp’s Welt AG strategy. These parallel strategies of Deutsche Bank 
and DaimlerChrysler had numerous practical ramifications, including the introduction in 
March 1999 of a new value oriented controlling system. This system defined a Return on Net 
Assets (RONA) of 15.5% before taxes for the company’s 24 business units. In addition to this 
profitability goal, stock options and performance-based salary systems were introduced to a 
larger selection of managers within the company. DaimlerChrysler AG was anxious to lead a 
paradigm shift away from the traditional tools of German corporate governance to a world in 
which “the investors have won the power struggle against the managers”. The failure of 
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DaimlerChrysler AG to enhance shareholder value is evidence of the enormous difficulties of 
implementing changes within German economic institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Whereas Schrempp focussed on trying to change German attitudes to shareholder value, he 
completely underestimated the reception of his DCX strategy on the other side of the Atlantic. 
On the American side the reaction to DCX was one of complete disinterest (Karoyli 2003). As 
already discussed, the Standard and Poor’s 500 decision caused investment and trust funds to 
sell their portfolios. Secondly, the attempt to establish DCX as the first Global Registered 
Stock posed a threat to American banks in the area of foreign investment, who had a lot to 
lose if the traditional system of American Deposit Receipts would disappear (Karoyli 2003). 
At the time of the takeover about 12% of investment on the NYSE was accounted by foreign 
investment. These institutional reactions provoked Schrempp, who was not used to having his 
plans questioned. Indeed his own behavior changed radically when things started going wrong 
both at Chrysler and on the NYSE in the second half of 1999 and through the year 2000. 
Whereas he originally went out of his way to remind potential investors about the strengths of 
his Welt AG strategies and the potential synergy savings, he suddenly went silent and become 
even openly aggressive towards the investment community. Investors, on their part, reacted 
negatively to events at Chrysler and Schrempp’s decision to invest in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation (MMC) and Hyundai. 
Yet investors gripe that Schrempp is not forthcoming enough about the merger's 
synergies. After announcing that DaimlerChrysler had saved $1.4 billion in 1999, the 
first full year of the takeover, through joint purchasing of steel and other commodities, 
Schrempp says he will no longer disclose any information on synergies because it is 
now one company. ''DaimlerChrysler's unwillingness to break out synergies creates the 
impression that they're not coming through at the anticipated rate,'' says Christian 
Breitsprecher, an auto analyst at Deutsche Bank (Business Week August 6th 2000). 
The general situation escalated when the Securities and Exchange Commission, the control 
instrument for the New York Stock Exchange and the United States government started 
investigating DaimlerChrsyler for bribery and other illegal trading practices (DaimlerChrysler 
AG Internet Appendix 5.1). The investigation resulted in a $185 million penalty in 2010 and 
reinforced American criticism about the failure of corporate governance stipulations to 
actually control German companies (Wall Street Journal May 18th 2010). At the time of 
Schrempp’s resignation in July 2005 DCX had been trading at around $44 dollars compared 
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to its high of $ 108 dollars in January 1999 (Wall Street Journal July 29th, 2005). In addition 
Deutsche Bank’s investment holding had at the same time begun the sale of 35 million shares 
of DCX, which was aimed at reducing its stake from 10.4 to 6.9%. Schrempp, the preacher of 
shareholder value, ironically caused the biggest jump in the price of the share in years by 
announcing his retirement as CEO. DCX jumped 9.8% on that day (Wall Street Journal July 
29th, 2005). Schrempp’s failure to establish DCX and a strategy of enhanced shareholder 
value as heuristic strategical tool had negative ramifications for the liberalization trend in 
German investment in industrial firms. By 2005 it was clear that his strategy of creating a 
truly global share had failed. 
5.1.4 DCX after Schrempp  
Although Daimler had been listed since 1993, share trading activity in the United States never 
moved above 5% of the total activity in any given year. In fact, as Karoyli (2003) has shown, 
activity on DaimlerChrysler AG’s DCX listing as the world’s first “global” share shifted to 
less than 1% within six months after its launch in November 1998. DCX was removed from 
the NYSE in 2007 after Daimler had sold 80% of its stake in Chrysler to Cerberus Capital 
Management. 
Initially German companies perceived a NYSE listing as an opportunity to gain exposure to 
larger equity markets and provide a platform for enterprise expansion within the NAFTA 
region, but that turned out to be an illusion (Wall Street Journal May 18th, 2010). The Daimler 
delisting was not solely about Daimler, but was symptomatic for a shift in thinking in 
corporate Germany. Before Daimler a dozen companies including Deutsche Telekom had 
decided to delist. Deutsche Telekom is also interesting because it had attempted 
unsuccessfully to trade GSR’s shares, which had been DaimlerChrysler AG’s strategy to 
circumvent the traditional means of foreign investing at the NYSE using American Deposit 
Receipts (Karolyi 2003). The departure of Daimler left only 4 German companies listed at the 
NYSE, namely Deutsche Bank, SAP, Fresenius Medical Centres and Siemens (Wall Street 
Journal May 18th, 2010). On the one hand international trading markets had become more 
global and efficient, while the USA had made it more complicated and expensive to meet 
investment regulations such as defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition, the financial 
crisis and scandals such as Enron had caused a loss of standing for the NYSE for foreign 
investors. In May 2010 Daimler announced its decision to delist its stock from the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). In the official Daimler press release the company mentioned two 
  
 
148 
reasons for the decision, lack of trading activity and the advantage of having only one form of 
financial reporting instead of the two forms it had had to employ since 1993 (Daimler Press 
Release from May 14th, 2010). The delisting had however one additional advantage for 
Daimler-Benz. Not being listed on the NYSE removed the company from the careful scrutiny 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which had documented wide scale 
practices of international corruption at DaimlerChrysler and Daimler-Benz since 1998, which 
resulted in legal proceedings against the company (DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 
5.1). 
5.2 If Mercedes knew what Mercedes knew: lack of standards  
The paradigm of lean production and mass production shaped the merger and takeover 
strategies of the 1990s (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). Cost reductions could only be 
achieved by leveraging economies of scale. Chrysler had achieved success in this area and the 
development of the Chrysler Operating System (COS) with the creation and optimization of 
its platform strategy beginning in 1992 (Lutz 1998). Platforms allowed Chrysler to overcome 
traditional rivalries between stylists, design engineers, engineers, production planning IT and 
marketing by grouping every facet of car production and development on one “platform”. 
This led to a dramatic reduction in development times and offered a maximum in flexibility in 
order to react to changes in market demand. Platform strategies at Chrysler included “badge 
engineering”, which involved the production of identical vehicles differing only in the use of 
company logos or so-called “badges”. Chrysler had been building identical vehicles with 
Mitsubishi since 1995. There was also extensive component and technology sharing across 
the Jeep, Plymouth and Chrysler brands. Plymouth was the most affordable brand within the 
group.  
Platform strategies have one major weakness. They thrEaton the integrity of existing brands. 
The critical question is the extent to which customers care about parts being used in vehicles 
with differing price tags. Volkswagen’s (VW) use of common platforms with Seat and Skoda 
models did thrEaton VW’s Passat and Golf higher price tags in the late 1990s. This issue was 
also at the centre of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. Whereas CEO Bob Eaton 
optimistically spoke about “definitely sharing components, engines and transmissions” and 
“ultimately maybe a few platforms”, Schrempp actually voiced a classical slip of the tongue 
with his statement that Daimler and Chrysler would “possibly, NO surely share components” 
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(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). In that initial press conference Schrempp went 
on to emphasize the importance of protecting the Mercedes brand.  
Mr. Schrempp made it abundantly clear today that one thing would remain separate 
from Chrysler: the prestige of Mercedes. Despite a wall-sized video presentation that 
showed Chrysler and Mercedes stars intermingling, Mr. Schrempp vowed to block any 
activity that might allow Chrysler’s middle-Class brand to tarnish the luxury image of 
Mercedes. (...) But that will make it more difficult for Mercedes to expand its presence 
in the United States and Chrysler to expand in Europe. Each company has only about 1 
percent of the market in the other’s territory, and they could take advantage of each 
other’s extensive network of dealerships. But that will not happen, Mr. Schrempp said, 
because it poses too much risk of mixing brand identities (...) “It is very important that 
we keep the brands separate,” he said. (New York Times May 8th, 1998) 
This emphasis stood in direct contradiction to the possibility of realizing major operational 
synergy effects. This stance confirmed the extensive studies carried out during the merger 
discussion back in 1995 had come to the conclusions that were few possibilities of achieving 
synergy effects (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). In addition to the question of brand protection, a 
deeper issue faced the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. At Mercedes in 1998 there was neither 
a common approach in engineering nor in production across model lines. Daimler-Benz had a 
long history of plant autonomy and model-line autonomy (Clarke 2005; Grunow-Osswald 
2006). Although Daimler had very few production lines, each of them was unique, even 
within the confines of the same facility such as the Sindelfingen plant near Stuttgart. 
Furthermore, engineers developing lighting systems for the C-class had very little contact 
with engineers developing lighting systems for the S-Class. One concrete result of the 
takeover was an increased consciousness of the need to standardize and define a Mercedes 
Production System (MPS) and Mercedes Development System (MDS) (Clarke 2005).   
Clarke describes the Mercedes Production System (MPS), which was introduced in 2000, as 
an attempt to introduce a company-wide common DaimlerChrysler AG production system. In 
actual fact, MPS addressed discrepancy issues only within the Mercedes organization. These 
issues were becoming increasingly critical with attempts to radically break out of German 
production systems with the introduction of the A-Class, Smart and M-Class. Although there 
were attempts to nominally adapt an umbrella DaimlerChrysler AG Operating Model, which 
included the Chrysler Operating System, within the context of post takeover integration 
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projects in 1998 and 1999, MPS never concerned itself with the possibility of integrating the 
Chrysler system. It was clear from the very beginning that the two production systems were 
simply incomparable as a result of the differences in degrees of production sophistication 
between the two companies. The development of a company-wide production system was 
identified as a priority of the post takeover integration process, but the situation at Mercedes 
did not permit a comparison between “Mercedes” and “Chrysler” models (Appel and Hein 
1998). Whereas Chryslers benchmarking and adaptation of Honda production models allowed 
the emergence of a unified platform production system (Lutz 1998) the situation at Mercedes 
was less transparent. 
In an interview I (Clarke) conducted with a former member of this team, it was pointed 
out that Chrysler had defined the topic Operating System as a Post Merger Integration 
Project (PMI) with the intention of driving home potential synergies. As pointed out 
above, Chrysler already had an operating system and in the context of the takeover, the 
question now arose, as to whether Daimler had something similar and if the two systems 
could be merged into one. However, as already stated, Daimler did not have one 
standard operating system and was now somewhat in a tight spot. Moreover, this shows 
that the creation of the common operating system was driven by Chrysler and the 
company’s positive experience with the Chrysler Operating System (Clarke 2005: 135). 
The Mercedes side of DaimlerChrysler AG was under tremendous pressure to create a unified 
approach to production, but given the time pressure involved and compared to the decades it 
required for the evolution of the industry benchmark Toyota Production System (Clarke 2005) 
it is not surprising that the “new” DaimlerChrysler AG Operating System presented to 
management in May 1999 merely documented and codified existing differences (Clarke 
2005). 
Figure 13: Proposed DaimlerChrysler Operating System 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.1; Clarke 2005 139 
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As the following passage from Clarke’s study shows, there never was a unified and merged 
DaimlerChrysler AG operating system. The concept was merely a convenient means of 
grouping two completely different approaches to production systems. More damaging was the 
fact that the Mercedes Production System (MPS) had not started to impact the different 
approaches to production within the different model lines. Clarke’s study focuses on the 
MPSprocess within the Untertürkheim facility, which has no passenger car assembly and 
therefore does not adequately take into account the difficulties involved in communizing 
model line production discrepancies. 
The Mercedes Production System project (MPS) and the parallel Mercedes Development 
System (MDS) project primarily addressed the tremendous variety of production and 
development systems within the Mercedes world. In addition to differences between locations 
there were also radical differences within the same facility between model lines and until the 
1990s there seemed no reason to question these differences. The Untertürkheim plant in 
Stuttgart was the producer of powertrains, which makes all of the axles, engines and 
transmissions for Mercedes passenger cars. There was no other Mercedes plant to be 
compared with. The axle, transmission and engine facilities within the commercial vehicle 
section had no central production facility. In terms of assembly, only the C-class production 
facilities in Sindelfingen and Bremen are similar, although the differences reflect the 
differences between sedans (Sindelfingen) and station wagons and convertibles (Bremen) 
respectively. Furthermore, the Sindelfingen facility also had radically different production 
facilities and development systems for the S- and E-Class, which reflected the rhythm of car 
development within the Mercedes system. In the 1990s each model had roughly a 6-year 
cycle, with 2 year breaks between new ramp-ups of the C-, E- and S-Classes respectively. As 
a result of Mercedes dedication to innovation each new model incorporated the innovations, 
which had appeared in each aspect of production or development. Therefore it was normal 
that, for example, robots from the same supplier were completely different due to the varying 
production startup times. This situation was exacerbated with the introduction of greenfield 
factories such as Rastatt (A-Class). Rastatt 1 was modeled on benchmarking results with 
Volvo (Jürgens 1995) and the need for some form of standardization was as much the result 
of complex works council issues as some need to coordinate production facilities between the 
A-Class and other model lines (Clarke 2005). In particular Rastatt’s complex system of shift 
flexibility and the higher degree of integration of suppliers in production areas required works 
council approval. Mercedes experimented initially with a team-oriented approach to assembly 
in areas such as wire harnessing, similar to the Volvo approach at its Uddevalla plant, but then 
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reverted back to a more classical assembly line approach. The arising problems were 
primarily protests centered on union and works council’s demands rather than the definition 
of production processes (Fischer, Zinnert and Streeb 1996). Furthermore, plans to establish a 
second A-plant production facility in Brazil required commonization and simplification both 
in the design and production processes of the vehicle. In addition, the new M-Class 
production facility in Tuscaloosa Alabama presented Mercedes with a completely new set of 
problems. Tuscaloosa was modeled on hybrid Toyota factories in the USA and the use of 
unskilled and poorly trained labor required a systemized documentation of even the simplest 
work processes, which was completely unnecessary at a German plan. The 1998 takeover of 
Chrysler and ensuing post merger integration projects made one thing clear, namely that there 
was no unified “Mercedes” approach to either production systems or passenger car 
development at Daimler-Benz. 
Within the context of a radically decentralized world of production systems at Mercedes and 
the pressure to create a “Mercedes” system as quickly as possible, it is not surprising that the 
results were hurried efforts to reach an acceptable level of minimal consensus. As Clarke 
correctly points out, such a solution remains necessarily vague and unclear in terms of its 
practical implementation. 
Keeping in mind the intention of the MPS, to represent a production system for the 
Mercedes-Benz passenger car production, the arbitrarily selected examples show that 
the methods the MPS contains are all kept at a very general, descriptive level. This runs 
like a red threat through all descriptions contained in the MPS. They do not specify 
HOW standards are to be drawn up, what further details are needed and what par- 
ticular steps should be undertaken. By failing to describe standards in-depth, the MPS 
standards in my opinion fail to provide regulatory control for production processes. 
They are far too general and indeed far too ambiguous to be considered as regulatory 
instruments. Indeed, the responsibility of defining standards in detail is, in some 
instances such as for example in “Tool 2.1.6 Standard Shift Change Procedure”, is to be 
“defined locally” (ibid.). That is, the standard as framework is given, but its content that 
is how this standard ought to be performed is defined locally, in other words, on the 
shop floor (Clarke 2005: 164).  
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover certainly contributed to a growing awareness within the 
Mercedes organization concerning the liabilities of a decentralized approach to production 
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and development in terms of the failure to realize synergy effects. The resulting paradigm 
shift would eventually impact development processes more than production processes. In 
1998, development engineers working, for example, on doors in the S- and C- class 
respectively, had little or no contact with each other. In fact, it was often the case that a 
system supplier had more information regarding the overall situation at Daimler than the 
respective Mercedes engineers. That started to change with the inception of MPS and MDS. 
At the same time it is salient to remark, that this was just the beginning of a paradigm shift, 
which would take years to implement. The lack of a unified approach to both production and 
development at Mercedes at the beginning of the takeover made it impossible to realize any 
positive synergy effects quickly in these areas with the Chrysler group. In particular MDS 
would help Mercedes achieve important synergy effects within its development processes. 
However any synergy fallout would not start until Zetsche’s arrival at Chrysler in late 2000 
early 2001 and the creation of the Executive Automobile Committee (EAC) in the same year 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000 6). 
5.2.1 The Executive Automotive Committee and brand protection  
The formation of the Executive Automotive Committee (EAC) in early 2001 is revealing 
because it embodies the integrative Board-level involvement in issues of operational synergies 
one would have expected at the time of the Chrysler takeover in 1998. The need to create this 
body is proof of the failure of the operative post takeover integration projects between 1998 
and 2001, a period covering almost three years of lost time. It also shows the idealized nature 
of chief DaimlerChrysler strategist Grube’s own published reports of post merger integration 
processes (Grube 2003). 
The EAC aimed to define and install an implementation platform for overall group strategy 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001 16-18). At the time of its creation, there were only 
two Americans (Sidlik and Valade) left on a reduced 13 member board. The EAC, headed by 
CEO Schrempp and Mercedes boss Hubbert had 5 members, all of whom were German. 
Chrysler was represented by their German CEO Zetsche and Mitsubishi was represented by 
another German, Bischoff. Although Bischoff was one of three German members of the 
Board at Mitsubishi, his actual responsibilities were in Aerospace and Industrial Businesses. 
Mitsubishi CEO, Rolf Eckrodt, was not a member of the DaimlerChrysler AG Board of 
Management. The EAC was created at a point of crisis in Schrempp’s Welt AG, where there 
were no illusions regarding a “merger of equals” or “strategic alliances”. Both Mitsubishi and 
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Chrysler were struggling for survival under German leadership and fighting against 
significant quality issues (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001). The results for the first 
quarter of 2001 provide transparency regarding the severity of the situation. DaimlerChrysler 
AG posted a loss of €600 million compared to profits of €2.5 billion for the same period in 
2000. Despite a massive advertising campaign and price rebate offers Chrysler sales had 
fallen 28% in the same first quarter (The Telegraph April 26th, 2001). Notwithstanding the 
restructuring and cost-saving measures at Chrysler and Mitsubishi, Mercedes head Hubert 
was still primarily concerned with preserving the unique identity of the Mercedes brand 
within the complete framework of DaimlerChrysler AG. It was Hubbert who had insulted the 
American side of the company in April 2001 with his Süddeutsche Zeitung interview. He 
claimed that his mother-in-law’s Plymouth had started falling apart after 2 and half years 
(Finkelstein 2002). 
The goals of the EAC were to achieve potential cost-saving synergies as a result of knowledge 
transfer. The areas of activities were basically the same that former Chrysler CEO Eaton had 
openly embraced and CEO Schrempp had cautiously avoided at the takeover press conference 
in May 1998 (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1) 
• Coordinating and optimizing the product portfolio 
• Identifying new technologies and innovations and selecting the products and brands in 
which they will be applied 
• Standardizing components 
• Steering the global production capacities of the DaimlerChrysler AG Group  
• Coordinating our global sales and marketing activities   
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001 16-18) 
It is significant to note that the three major cross-divisional segment strategies decided upon 
in 2001 did not involve any vehicles from the Mercedes brand. It was decided that Mitsubishi 
would provide Smart with the platform from the so-called B-segment to develop a four-seater 
version of the Smart. The vehicle was to be built at the existing Volvo-Mitsubishi facility in 
the Netherlands, which had been acquired when DaimlerChrysler AG purchased Volvo’s 
3.3% share of the Japanese company (Gill 2012). Secondly, it was decided to create a 
common platform for the Chrysler Neon and Mitsubishi Lancer, with an estimated production 
of 500,000 vehicles per year. The third decision also involved the Chrysler Group and 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation. In the D-segment both companies were to develop a common 
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platform for the successor models of the Chrysler Startus/Sebring and Mitsubishi Galant. 
There was very little evidence of a major change of focus in these decisions. Chrysler and 
Mitsubishi had been practicing so-called “badge engineering” before the creation of 
DaimlerChrysler with the Status/Sebring and Galant since 1995 at the Mitsubishi facility in 
Normal, Illinois. The American and Japanese models were identical vehicles, differing only 
with the logo on the cars’ grilles.  
The one project involving a German brand, the Smart four-seater project was also difficult to 
comprehend within Schrempp’s Welt AG strategy. Instead of tapping into Mitsubishi small-
car production experience in order to create a vehicle for the opening Asian markets in India 
and China, the ForFour was aimed at an already saturated European market. Moreover, by 
positioning the four-seater within the Smart brand, DaimlerChrysler AG risked diluting the 
unique two-seater brand identity of the Smart concept. Although the project did achieve a 
40% common platform target, the ForFour was a commercial failure and production only 
lasted from April 2004 until June 2006. Losses at Smart were over €4 billion in 2005 and 
ForFour sold only 14,000 units in the first quarter of that year (Der Spiegel 18, 2005).  
The EAC’s projects involving the Mercedes brand in the area of standardization and shared 
components in 2001 are also highly informative (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001). 
It was announced that a modified version of the Mercedes 5-speed automatic transmission 
would be integrated into Chrysler models. However, at that time, Mercedes was developing a 
seven-speed automatic transmission, which was introduced into Mercedes models in 2003. A 
second decision also provides evidence of Mercedes boss Jürgen Hubbert’s brand strategy. 
The Chrysler model Crossfire was to combine American sports car design with Mercedes 
engineered parts. These parts, however, were taken from the outdated predecessor of the 2001 
Mercedes SLK. Back in 1998 and 1999 Mercedes had rejected Chrysler’s suggestion to 
integrate development and production of the Mercedes M-Class and Jeep Grand Cherokee. 
The Board also rejected a suggestion to produce a modified version of the Mercedes E-class at 
the same time (W210). A quote from the 2001 Annual Report underlines the continued 
determination to protect the uniqueness of the Mercedes brand:   
A product example is the Chrysler Crossfire, in which Mercedes-Benz components are 
also used. In this case in particular, a crucial condition was that the interests of both 
brands, Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz, were fully taken into consideration. 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001 17) 
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It would be new German Chrysler CEO Zetsche who would finally force a higher degree of 
integration starting in 2001, but the new models would not be launched on the market until 
2004, at a time when the fate of Schrempp’s Welt AG had already been decided. 
5.2.2 Marketing and the last attempt to merge 
Between 1998 and 2006 there was no single marketing strategy, which pointed to 
DaimlerChrysler as the result of a merger between German and American engineering 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 4.1). It was not until Dieter Zetsche took over from 
Jürgen Schrempp that DaimlerChrysler AG mentioned the Mercedes and Chrysler brands in 
an advertising campaign. Staring in the summer of 2006, 8 years after the creation of 
DaimlerChrysler, the company launched a $225 million television and internet campaign 
(Spiegel Online July 10th, 2006). Speaking with a strong German accent and ending each spot 
with “Auf Wiedersehen”, CEO Zetsche personally tells his American audience that all the 
new Chrysler models combine the very best of “German and American engineering”. Zetsche 
attempts to tap into the tradition of CEO direct advertising, which started with CEO Iacocca 
in the 1980s. Whereas Iacocca stressed American patriotism and improved quality, Zetsche 
concentrates on trying to be funny by mocking his Germanness. At the same time he focuses 
on the role of German engineering in improving Chrysler quality. In addition to a series of TV 
commercials (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 5.2.), DaimlerChrysler AG launched a 
web site www.AskDrZ.com, featuring a comical trick film version of Zetsche. The campaign 
broke with the hitherto company policy of maintaining a strict demarcation between brand 
marketing, with a special focus on protecting the exclusiveness of the Mercedes brand in 
terms of innovation and safety. The break came at a critical point in the attempt to save 
Chrysler. Whereas Zetsche had radically downsized the American division of 
DaimlerChrysler AG during his tenure as CEO, sales still remained sluggish (Figure 14).  
Figure 14: Chrysler Car Sales 1998-2006 
 
 Source: Compiled by John Riach. DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.2 
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In an effort to boost the attractiveness of Chrysler products, Zetsche created the phrase 
“Disciplined Pizzazz”, which was used to define the unique blending of Mercedes (the 
“discipline”) – engineering and technology –with the strongest characteristics of Chrysler (the 
“pizzazz”) – American styling innovation and engineering (AutoBlog and DaimlerChrysler 
AG Press Release June 30th 2006). The Zetsche-led advertising campaign was combined with 
a $3,500 rebate offer (employee discount rate) and a 30-day bring back guarantee. The 
campaign was judged to backfire, especially with strong Chrysler brands such as Jeep and 
Dodge. Both brands build on their tough and proud and unbeatable “Americanness”. The 
message of German innovation and engineering competence improving these vehicles 
confused brand loyalists and contradicted their basic brand values as evidenced by the 
following Autoblog comment: 
Do they really think that the average Dodge buyer “Joe American” is going to want to 
be reminded he is buying a car made by a German company? He doesn’t want any “Jap 
Crap” or anything built by “Nazis”. Afterall, his daddy has plenty of stories about 
fighting those evil people in WWII. Yes, yes I know that is incredibly insensitive to 
modern German people, but living in the south has taught me that most people around 
here (and other more rural areas that aren’t in the south) have this type of mindset. 
Convincing them otherwise is almost impossible. I think they were better off playing 
the American and especially the historical (It’s got a Hemi, 300C, Charger, Challenger) 
cards. It sits better with their biggest market of buyers. (DaimlerChrysler Internet 
Appendix 5.2) 
Chrysler studies were pleased with the ads, claiming 600,000 visitors to the 
www.AskDrZ.com website in the first 6 weeks and a higher than industry average approval 
rate for the whole campaign (DaimlerChrysler Internet Appendix 4.3). However, despite 
interest in an Internet cult event and the chance to win cars for nothing, the results remained 
disappointing in terms of sales. Chrysler sales were down 17% in July 2006 compared to July 
2005. Similarly, the comical figure presented by Zetsche was confusing to people, who 
expected a more serious image from a CEO. In addition about 80% of people polled believed 
that Zetsche was only a fictional character. More disturbing was the fact that few believed the 
message regarding the combination of American and German engineering (Business Week 
January 29th, 2007; DaimlerChrysler Internet Appendix 5.3). The advertising campaign and 
Internet site were stopped in September 2006. 6 months later Daimler announced its intention 
to sell Chrysler. 
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5.3 DaimlerChrysler AG and quality issues 
The third goal of the takeover was to enhance customer satisfaction. It was this aspect of the 
takeover failure that perhaps had the most long term impact, namely the loss in value of the 
Mercedes brand. The drop in quality was clearly measurable and exhibited across the board of 
Mercedes, Chrysler and Mitsubishi products for most of the period of Schrempp’s Welt AG. 
5.3.1 Measuring quality 
One of the three most important goals to be announced at the press conference of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in May 1998 was to improve customer satisfaction 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). However, one of the most obvious shortcomings 
of the paradigm of lean production and mass production in the 1990s was quality at both 
Chrysler and Mercedes. At the time of the takeover announcement in May 1998, Chrysler had 
reduced its development times to 24 months. At the same time Mercedes had brought out 10 
new models in the previous 3 years. That compares significantly with the three new models, 
which had been launched in the previous ten years before 1995. Although both companies 
were able to achieve commercial success, quality issues started to crop up very quickly. 
The measurement of quality of a particular vehicle is widely accepted within the industry. In 
the United States of America customers turn to J.D. Power (Initial Quality Study and APEAL) 
and Consumers Report, two institutions that monitor customer satisfaction and measure 
technical reliability respectively. J.D. Power’s Initial Quality Study (IQS) is particularly 
telling, because it measures defects, malfunctions and design-based issues within the first 90 
days of ownership. Their benchmarking provides an industry-wide comparison of mistakes 
per vehicle, which is generally accepted as an objective measurement of vehicle quality. In 
the case of Mercedes models, specially prepared cars are tested at the company’s Long Beach 
Vehicle Preparation Centre (VPC) in California. So if these vehicles have problems they are 
truly indicative of general manufacturing and quality issues. In addition J.D. Power’s APEAL 
direct customer survey measures the rate of satisfaction of customers after the first ninety 
days of ownership of the vehicle of their choice. APEAL results have always been more 
controversial than IQS results because APEAL does not measure whether a Toyota is better 
than a Mercedes APEAL rather measures whether Mercedes customers are more satisfied 
with their Mercedes than Toyota customers with their Toyotas. Since dominating the rankings 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s J.D. Power rankings both for IQS and APEAL have always 
been considered internally at Mercedes as the year’s most important quality event. CEO 
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Jürgen Schrempp constantly defined and reiterated the goal of Mercedes’ quality offensives to 
reach the Number 1 ranking (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Meeting April 6th 2005). J.D. 
Power also conducts a Vehicle dependability Study (VDS), which monitors reliability after 
three year’s ownership, but this study does not match the industry’s focus on IQS and 
APEAL. Moreover, the increasing globalization of J.D. Power’s activities with expansion of 
its survey to Europe and Asia has also augmented its influence within the global automobile 
industry. Toyota, for example, used their high J.D. Power rankings in their attempts to expand 
their share of the German market. 
Although Consumers Report is less known in Europe than J.D. Power, it is a major annual 
publication for the car industry in North America. The magazine is published by Consumers 
Union, which is a non-profit consumer advocacy organization, acting in the interests of 
consumers since 1936. The magazine’s rejection of outside advertising has allowed it to 
achieve a reputation for fairness and objectivity. As will be shown further below, the negative 
ratings for Mercedes vehicles in the first decade of the 21st century contributed to the 
devaluation of the Mercedes brand.  
A third instrument for measuring quality is the governmental National Highway and Traffic 
Association (NHTSA), which provides open access to its database documenting 
comprehensively all safety recalls and technical defect investigations for all makes and 
models of vehicles registered in the USA. One example from the Mercedes-Benz M-Class 
(Figure 15) is included here to illustrate the comprehensive nature of NHTSA reporting. A 
full list of recalls for the Mercedes M-Class and E-Class vehicles during the critical years for 
Mercedes quality under Schrempp is included in the NHTSA Recalls Appendix (281 ff.). 
Because NHTSA recalls draw attention to serious safety issues, they are indicative are further 
underlying quality issues at any manufacturer. Safety doubts are particularly damaging to 
brands, such as Mercedes, which make safety a central component of their overall brand 
image. Recalls affecting the E-Class were particularly damaging to the overall customer 
perception of Mercedes quality in the USA. 
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Figure 15: NHTSA Recall Mercedes-Benz M-Class (2003) 
 
 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND CONNECTIONS 
 Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE 
POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE 
POWER STEERING PUMP.  
Remedy:  
DEALERS WILL INSTALL A NEW HOSE CLAMP ON THE POWER STEERING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING COOLER. DURING CLAMP 
REPLACEMENT, THE POWER STEERING COOLING HOSE WILL BE INSPECTED AND REPLACED AS NECESSARY. OWNER NOTIFICATION 
BEGAN JUNE 16, 2003. OWNERS WHO TAKE THEIR VEHICLES TO AN AUTHORIZED DEALER ON AN AGREED UPON SERVICE DATE AND DO 
NOT RECEIVE THE FREE REMEDY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME SHOULD CONTACT MERCEDES-BENZ AT 1-800-367-6372. 
Notes:  
MERCEDES-BENZ RECALL NO. 2003-040005. CUSTOMERS CAN ALSO CONTACT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION'S AUTO SAFETY HOTLINE AT 1-888-DASH-2-DOT (1-888-327-4236). 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND CONNECTIONS 
 Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE 
POWER STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH WITHOUT WARNING. 
Remedy:  
AN EARLIER RECALL REPAIR PERFORMED ON THESE VEHICLES MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT A FUTURE LEAKAGE OR 
FAILURE OF THE POWER STEERING HOSE CONNECTION (PLEASE SEE 03V121). SINCE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH INSPECTION TO 
IDENTIFY SPECIFIC VEHICLES THAT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PROPERLY REPAIRED, ALL VEHICLES REPAIRED PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 15, 2003, 
WILL BE REPAIRED AGAIN. THE RECALL IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN DURING NOVEMBER 2008. OWNERS MAY CONTACT MERCEDES-BENZ AT 1-
800-367-6372. 
Notes:  
MERCEDES-BENZ RECALL NO. 2003040005. CUSTOMERS MAY CONTACT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'S 
VEHICLE SAFETY HOTLINE AT 1-888-327-4236 (TTY: 1-800-424-9153); OR GO TO HTTP://WWW.SAFERCAR.GOV. 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
 Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE 
CRUISE CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, 
INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN 
RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE BRAKE PEDAL MAY 
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF DEACTIVATING 
CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN APPLYING 
CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
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Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
Remedy:  
DEALERS WILL REPAIR THE VEHICLES FREE OF CHARGE. THE SAFETY RECALL BEGAN DURING OCTOBER 2011. OWNERS MAY 
CONTACT MERCEDES-BENZ AT 1-800-367-6372. 
Notes:  
MERCEDES-BENZ CAMPAIGN NUMBER IS 2011090001. OWNERS MAY ALSO CONTACT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION'S VEHICLE SAFETY HOTLINE AT 1-888-327-4236 (TTY 1-800-424-9153), OR GO TO HTTP://WWW.SAFERCAR.GOV . 
 
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, West Building Washington DC 20590 USA  
1.888.327.4236 TTY 1.800.424.9153 
 
Source: NHTSA Recalls /nhtsa.gov: DaimlerChrysler Figures Appendix 5.3 
A fourth source of quality “information” is certainly the numerous Mercedes owners’ forums 
and Internet chatrooms. Although the objective understanding of the precise technical nature 
of certain issues cannot be trusted, the growing amount of “bad noise” between 1998 and 
2005 does indicate to a certain extent the general level of customer dissatisfaction.   
On the German side, the situation is less objective. Privacy laws are much tighter than in the 
USA. Furthermore, the industry tends to limit studies for internal use only and there is an 
understanding within the German car industry not to use this information against competitors 
(Wall Street Journal February 4th, 2001). Furthermore, studies such as the German 
Automobile Association’s ADAC “Pannenbericht” (car breakdown report) are less reliable 
instruments of quality and tend to put non-German manufacturers at a disadvantage. If a 
Mercedes driver has a breakdown, for example, they can notify the Mercedes call centre 
directly and that defect does not appear in the official statistics. Secondly, vehicle recalls are 
triggered by OEMs themselves and no public database is available as is the case with 
NHTSA. Thirdly, German car magazines depend heavily on advertising investments from the 
German OEMs and there is a close relationship between the magazines and the OEMs. The 
current head of Mercedes-Benz motorsport, for example, Norbert Haug, was the former head 
of Auto, Motor and Sport magazine. Fourthly, critical consumer publications such as Stiftung 
Warentest do not have the facilities to test cars in the same manner as Consumers Report. 
Consumers Report’s April issue on car quality and dependability is an annual event in the 
USA and the most important issue of the year for car buyers. Within this coordinated network 
of “protected” information in Germany, monitoring newspaper reports of consumer 
dissatisfaction provide important clues to the current quality status and customer satisfaction. 
In the case of Mercedes one of the most important customer bases are German taxi drivers. 
Perhaps more than any other customer segment, German taxi drivers helped to contribute to 
the brand’s reputation for product quality, reliability and durability. It is therefore worth 
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noting the increasing dissatisfaction of this group beginning with public protests against the 
bad quality of the W124 in the 1980s (Der Spiegel 48, 1986). This public and vocal 
dissonance grew louder in the 1990s and first decade of this century.  
Using all of these instruments the next sections will attempt to show that the DaimlerChrysler 
AG takeover did not cause “quality” problems at Mercedes and Chrysler, but rather served to 
augment and deepen the quality crisis at each company respectively. The discussion will 
focus on the Mercedes brand because its dramatic drop in industry ratings was the most 
critical quality event during the existence of DaimlerChrysler AG. It is also significant that 
Mercedes quality ratings started to improve after the disbandment of DaimlerChrysler AG. 
5.3.2 DaimlerChrysler AG and Mercedes quality 
The idea of a “merger of equals” could only have one result in terms of quality in the eyes of 
most customers. The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover would result in Chrysler improving its 
quality a little bit and Daimler worsening its quality. Paradoxically, Chrysler had no impact 
on the initial loss of quality in Mercedes products. The two vehicles most responsible for a 
loss of confidence in Daimler-Benz’s legendary reputation for reliability were being 
developed before the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, the 1997 M-Class (W163) and the 2002 
E-Class (W211). Chrysler engineers had no impact in the development of these two vehicles. 
Quality problems at Chrysler and Mitsubishi would indeed drain management energy at 
Mercedes after 2000/2001, but these issues did not create quality issues at Mercedes. The 
roots of the eventual deterioration of quality at Mercedes stem from the early 1990s and 
measures implemented to increase production capacity. 
In 1990 Mercedes was ranked number 1 in the industry’s most important APEAL and IQS 
quality indexes, the J.D. Power surveys. The name “Mercedes” was synonymous with quality 
of the highest order. You used to say in English “It is the Mercedes of …” which meant “the 
best of ...”. Indeed this linking of quality with the name Mercedes had been responsible for 
the success of the brand in the United States for decades. This situation changed in the 1990s. 
The crisis of 1992 at Mercedes led to a radical refocusing of strategy. Over 35,000 jobs were 
cut and for the first time in the company’s history financial controllers concentrated on 
finding cost cutting measures in development and production processes (Grunow-Osswald 
2006). Despite this focus on cost cutting, at the same time Mercedes accepted the paradigm of 
high-volume growth, which had been embraced by the industry after the appearance of the 
MIT automobile study (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The car industry accepted the 
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paradigm that no company with sales volumes under 1 million cars would survive in the 
future. This “knowledge” led BMW to take over Rover (Brady and Lorenz 2000) and 
powered Daimler’s decision to introduce smaller, cheaper, niche models to its brand, the A-
Class, Smart and the M-Class (Brady and Lorenz 2000). Daimler had no experience in 
building small cars or SUVs and faced enormous quality issues. Hitherto the precursor of the 
M-class had been part of the commercial vehicle division and the shift to the passenger 
vehicle division was a major revolution for the engineers. Moreover, with the opening of the 
new production facilities in Alabama (M-Class) and the upgrading of the East London CKD 
facility for full-scale C-class production, Mercedes started producing cars outside of Germany 
with employees who lacked the background of Germany’s vocational training system and 
little or no experience in building cars. The ensuing troubleshooting measures drained 
manpower resources in the German plants, which had a further negative impact on quality at 
home. Furthermore, by the mid 90’s the financial controllers had wrested control of car 
development from the engineers. Armed with Schrempp’s ideology of a 12% ROI, targets 
unrealistic for almost all models except the S-Class, development and production centres 
started to make dangerous compromises in terms of quality in order to meet budget targets. 
Cost-saving measures in each department led to an avalanche of quality problems in 
development, production planning and production, such as the corrosion problems with cars 
built between 1995 and 2001. This problem has not been documented comprehensively for 
the general public, but the avalanche of negative comments in Mercedes Internet forums does 
provide an indication of the severity of the problem. The press shop, body shop, paint shop 
and final assembly all introduced cost-cutting measures which turned a brand with one of the 
best corrosion ratings into one of the worst. Even new vehicles showed massive corrosion 
problems in corrosion prone environments such as Dubai, England and Canada as evidenced 
by one British Mercedes customer: 
Quite simply, most mercs from about 1995 onwards are not as well protected as they 
should be. There is little or no evidence of cavity-wax protection. The amount of primer 
on the metal is very little, especially on internal panel surfaces. And, of course, 
Mercedes changed to brittle water-based paints applied in extremely thin coats. Part of 
some general cost-cutting, which also included a downgrade in material quality, fit and 
finish of the interiors. I think it’s only now with the new 2003 M-Class that MB seems 
to have realised the error of their ways. 
All this is OK for sunny California, but in the UK and most places where salt is used on 
winter roads, it’s very bad news. I was surprised to see just how much rust had formed 
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on a nearly new SL320, just after 18 months. Even the brite-metal galvanise that MB 
use on most engine fittings, including nuts and bolts is not up to the job. Sorry to say 
this but if you compare with a BMW of similar vintage, you will see a different story 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 5.2) 
Official reports of Mercedes quality issues were only based on press leaks (Wall Street 
Journal February 4th, 2001). Such reports revealed that the Mercedes brand had serious 
problems as early as 1998, the year of the takeover. These reports focused on Mercedes lack 
of experience with models such as the A- and M-Class. The European-based New Car Buyer 
Survey from the beginning of 2001 showed that Mercedes has more negative points than 
Opel, a brand notorious for its poor quality image in Germany. (Wall Street Journal February 
4th, 2001). A further study by the German auto-inspection and research association (TÜV) put 
Mercedes in 12th place in terms of quality, reliability and durability (Wall Street Journal 
February 4th, 2001). Ironically the increase in quality issues coincided with an increase in 
sales. The appearance of lower cost models such as the A and M-Class and the Smart made 
the Mercedes brand more accessible to the general public, but many would be disappointed 
with the results. This is best evidenced with the M-Class, which appeared on the American 
market in 1997. 
5.3.3 M-Class quality issues 
The initial commercial success of the 1997 M-Class created paradoxically major concerns 
regarding the Mercedes brands as a result of numerous quality issues. Two factors emerged as 
the major sources of the problems. Firstly, Mercedes had never designed a SUV before and 
secondly, Daimler had never designed a Mercedes to be fully assembled outside of Germany. 
The employees of the new Tuscaloosa, Alabama facility had had no experience building cars. 
The first review by BBC television’s Top Gear television series was devastating 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 5.3). The steering, brakes, and engine were considered 
substandard, with steering issues the focus of NHTSA recall measures (Mercedes Quality 
NHTSA Recalls Appendix). The car was judged to be cramped and noisy and even some parts 
fell off the car during the show’s off-road test. BBC Top Gear presenter Jeremy Clarkson, 
himself a Mercedes enthusiast, openly questioned the rationale of building a Mercedes outside 
of Germany and found gaps between parts that were so big that you could see “people living 
down there” (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 5.3). In addition, the car was deemed 
simply too expensive. Despite numerous changes, the M-Class remained at the bottom of the 
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program’s quality ratings list for many years. The M-Class was also the focus of criticism of 
J.D. Power and Consumers Report.  
5.3.4 E-Class quality issues 
Whereas M-Class quality issues were the predictable result of the brand’s globalization of 
production, quality issues with the 2002 E-Class (W211) revealed deep structural 
contradictions in the brand’s production and marketing strategies. As the Wall Street Journal 
warned in 2001, it was one thing for Mercedes to have quality issues with the A- and M-
Class, but the new E-Class would have to meet other standards: 
The company may soon face the toughest test of its quality. Mercedes is preparing to 
launch the latest edition of its E-Class line of full-size sedans – for years a symbol of the 
brand. Unlike the M-Class, which is made in the U.S., and the A-Class, a daring venture 
downmarket, Mercedes will have no excuses if the E-Class hits a snag. (Wall Street 
Journal February 4th, 2001) 
 The E-Class had a tradition dating back to the 1960s and targeted the luxury market for 
company fleet cars (Grunow-Osswald 2006). By the 1990s the E-Class had become the “cash 
cow” of the Mercedes group (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1997). Part of Mercedes 
reputation is based on its innovative “first to market” approach. This approach backfired in 
the case of the W211 (E-Class from 2003), particularly concerning the number of electronic 
issues. This is evidenced both by the number of NHTSA recalls (Mercedes NHTSA Recalls 
Appendix 5.2) and the reaction of Mercedes owners in their Internet forums. In one case, even 
a Mercedes employee admitted the seriousness of the situation: 
I really am sorry you feel this way about both Mercedes-Benz as a company and the 
product. I know I am probably biased because I work for them. I see so many vehicles 
with faults on, being a Service Team Manager, and I have learned (and educated others) 
to think in terms of how many vehicles we see with regards to how many are out there 
on the roads all over the world. I know it doesn't help you in any way shape or form but 
at the end of the day, it's true, there are far more faultless vehicles than faulty. The 211, 
in my opinion, was brought out far too early, and as opposed to going through the strict 
testing regime, it's almost as if DCAG have used the purchasers as the quality 
controllers. DCAG have learnt their lesson and completely changed their technique on 
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the new SLK, A Class and forthcoming CLS and M Class (DaimlerChrysler Internet 
Appendix 5.4). 
Most notable was Mercedes inability to deliver reliably functioning electronic systems. The 
vehicle was technically over-complicated. Managers, like taxi-drivers, do not have time to 
send their cars to the repair shop and the continual flow of minor complaints deteriorated 
confidence in Mercedes reliability substantially.  
5.3.5 Mercedes and J.D. Power 
J.D. Power and Associates is a global marketing information services firm founded in 1968. It 
is most famous for its surveys on customer satisfaction in the automobile industry and the rise 
of Toyota’s popularity in the USA is closely connected to their positive showings in J.D. 
Power studies. Jürgen Schrempp took J.D. Power ratings as the measure of the quality of 
Mercedes, and their number 1 ranking in 1990 was the in-house benchmark and goal. Most 
significantly was the drop in quality ratings starting in the year 2000. As a result of a change 
in J.D. Power’s method of measurement in 1998, it is impossible to compare the results from 
the 1990s with the figures from 2000 onwards. During this time average industrial quality was 
actually improving as illustrated in figure 16 below, which documents the average number of 
mistakes per vehicle. The diagram shows Mercedes far behind industry leader Lexus in terms 
of numbers of mistakes. In addition, the ten-year period documents a lack of consistency in 
the Mercedes approach to quality. Jumps in numbers of mistakes are linked to the years in 
which Mercedes launched new models (i.e. E-Class 2002, S-Class 2005). In the intermittent 
years improvements are made as a result of rework and major face-lifts. However, the critical 
increases caused major damage to the brand’s reputation amongst its most important customer 
base. It is also pertinent to draw attention to the drop in the number of mistakes in the time 
period following the cessation of DaimlerChrysler AG in 2007. Daimler then had more people 
and more energy to focus solely on the Mercedes brand. 
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Figure 16: Mistakes per Vehicle (J.D. Power) 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.4 
More telling than the average number of mistakes is the overall ranking of the brand from 
2000 to 2012. In the late 1980s and early 1990’s Mercedes was consistently placed in the top 
three. Significant is the fact that between 2000 and 2006 between 6 and 24 other brands were 
judged to have higher quality. This negative trend was only stopped after the takeover failure, 
but has not remained stable as the 2012 results show. This is not only an indication of 
Mercedes quality issues, but points out the extent to which other brands have improved. This 
has made it more difficult for Mercedes marketing to draw attention to the exclusive nature of 
quality within the premium car segment. 
Figure 17:  Rankings Lexus vs. Mercedes 1999-2012 (J.D. Power) 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.5 ; n=63 
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Mercedes fixation on J.D. Power made it in part responsible for its own loss of image. The 
company did not really understand how J.D. Power works and why the APEAL survey in 
particular makes it very difficult for any European carmaker to do well. J.D. Power does not 
compare cars with each other. Its customer survey measures the ratio of the customer’s 
expectations and his/her experiences within the first six months of ownership. Americans 
buying European cars have high expectations and are thus more easily disappointed. Even 
“good” European cars such as the VW Golf end up far down the ranking due to this fact. On 
the other hand many Americans are delightfully surprised at the relatively good quality 
offered by Asian carmakers. So it is surprising that Mercedes placed so much emphasis in 
being good in J.D. Power. Brands such as BMW and Audi and Volkswagen have always 
placed less value on the study without any measurable negative impact on reputation or sales. 
Mercedes lack of local cultural knowledge put them at a disadvantage with the competition. 
The success of Toyota in America can be partially traced with the Japanese company’s 
relationship with J.D. Power. Unlike Consumers Reports, J.D. Power earns a lot of money by 
courting the companies it reviews. Toyota structured its customer service to insure the best 
possible results by inviting customers back to the dealership during the J.D. Power survey 
period. Most Mercedes dealers never see the customer in this time period. Toyota pays a lot of 
money to use J.D. Power advertising in its own marketing concept and this strategy ensured 
that J.D. Power had an interest in giving Toyota top marks. As ratings continued to sink 
Mercedes became increasingly aggressive towards the rankers, as the case of Consumer 
Reports illustrates. 
5.3.6 Mercedes vs. Consumers Report 
Consumers Report is a highly respected independent, expert and non-profit publication, which 
provides consumers with objective information about all kinds of consumer products. Its 
annual April issue is devoted exclusively to cars. With over 6 million subscribers it is 
arguably the most influential North American publication in terms of influencing people’s 
choices as to what kind of car they buy. Consumers Reports, as it states in its mission 
statement, has been able to maintain its independence and impartiality by refusing to print 
outside advertising, refusing to accept free samples, refusing to allow companies advertise 
with their results.  
Our mission: Consumers Union (CU) is an expert, independent, non-profit organization 
whose mission is to work for a fair, just, and safe marketplace for all consumers and to 
empower consumers to protect themselves. The organization was founded in 1936 when 
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advertising first flooded the mass media. Consumers lacked a reliable source of 
information they could depend on to help them distinguish hype from fact and good 
products from bad ones. Since then CU has filled that vacuum with a broad range of 
consumer information. To maintain its independence and impartiality, CU accepts no 
outside advertising and no free samples and employs several hundred mystery shoppers 
and technical experts to buy and test the products it evaluates (DaimlerChrysler AG 
Internet Appendix 5.3). 
Consumer Reports has its own testing facilities and obtains the vehicles tested on a random 
basis, a practice that deviates dramatically from a number of testing institutions, who allow 
manufacturers to prepare vehicles. Based on a survey of 2006 models, Consumer Reports 
ranked 3 Mercedes models (S-Class, E-Class, CLS) in their listing of the least reliable luxury 
cars. Similarly 3 of the 7 least reliable sports cars were from the Mercedes brand, the SL, 
CLK and SLK. The M-Class is listed as the least reliable SUV. More damaging is the fact that 
Consumer Report recommended none of the 11 Mercedes models tested in that year giving it 
the worst record of any automaker with that many models. All of these models were being 
developed either before the 1998 takeover of Chrysler or in the first years of DaimlerChrysler 
AG and reflect a general drop in quality for all models, including the most prestigious E- and 
S-Class. Mercedes belligerent response to the criticism made the story a front page response 
and negatively impacted the brand’s image. 
For the 2007 edition of its New Car Preview, Consumer Reports surveyed its six million 
subscribers about what serious problems they had with the cars they own. Some 1.3 
million responded and the results weren’t good for Mercedes-Benz. Here’s a brief blow-
by-blow: In a listing of the least reliable luxury cars, based on 2006 models, three of the 
six cars are Mercedes: the old S-Class (prior to the recent redesign), the CLS and the E-
Class Sedan (...) Same thing in sport cars. Mercedes hogged three of the seven slots for 
least reliable: the SL, the CLK and the V6 SLK. (...) Among mid-sized SUVs, the M-
Class, a quality disaster when it first came out, still ranks as the least reliable in its 
grouping. Quality problems have been a big issue at Mercedes for several years and the 
company keeps insisting it has a handle on them. But issues keep cropping up. 
Mercedes still makes superb automobiles - striking in design, sophisticated in 
engineering, exhilarating in performance. It attracts hugely loyal buyers and its cars 
retain value better than most. But being a leader means being constantly under attack by 
those behind you. Along with BMW and Lexus, Mercedes ranks in the top tier of luxury 
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brands. But until it can tame the devilish complexity of its cars into more reliable 
transportation, its position will remain precarious. And it doesn’t help to be in denial 
about the problems you face - or to attack the messenger who delivers the bad news 
(Forbes November 20th, 2006). 
Consumers Report documented what many Mercedes engineers had been complaining about 
for years. Development at Mercedes since the early 90s had become controller-driven and 
quality had been sacrificed to the goals of cost reduction in development at the Mercedes 
Technology Centre and higher output in production. In addition, development processes were 
being outsourced to first tier suppliers, who were profiting from Daimler know-how and 
passing it on to other OEMs. At the same time Daimler engineers were spending increasingly 
more time managing the suppliers instead of developing cars. A radical reduction of the 
development cycle from 72 to 36 months meant that more and more parts had not reached 
serial production maturity before being launched.  
In the midst of this situation DaimlerChrysler AG’s reaction to Consumer reports criticisms 
was a major intercultural blunder. They decided to question the objectivity of the results. 
Mercedes claimed that the data in the Consumer Reports rankings “is totally out of sync with 
what we’re seeing in the mainstream research as well as our own customer satisfaction and 
warranty data” (Forbes November 20th, 2006). Mercedes attempted to shift consumer focus to 
the positive assessment Mercedes receives for ride, handling, comfort, safety and overall 
engine performance. However, Mercedes’ complaints only contributed to a further spread of 
the quality crisis in the USA. Suddenly the story was in all the newspapers, televisions 
programs and Internet sites. Now the word was definitely out, that Mercedes had major 
quality issues. The bad quality of the vehicles had cost Daimler dearly in its own customer 
base. The reaction of the company and its vicious attacks on Consumers Reports hurt its 
reputation. In the whole affair Mercedes came across as very arrogant and unprofessional 
organization, fitting the negative stereotype images that some Americans have of Germans. 
The policy of denying that they had any problems and also attacking the deliverer of the bad 
news soured many Americans on Mercedes, especially as the evidence was overwhelming. 
The W211 E-Class, the cash cow of the Mercedes Car Group, ended up spending more money 
on warranty and good will costs than on development cost and the news of this discrepancy in 
the press would cost the head of Mercedes development his job. The negative impact can be 
seen in the continuous drop in sales for the American market after the initial 2003/2004 
market launch. 
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Figure 18: Mercedes E-Class USA Sales 
 
          2002 2003      2004      2005       2006      2007 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.6 
 
As the Wall Street Journal commented upon the ocassion of Schrempp’s resignation in July 
2005. His continued denial of quality issues was also at the centre of his undoing as CEO of 
DaimlerChrysler: 
Yet in a March interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Schrempp was upbeat. He 
dismissed questions about whether he'd stay on until 2008, saying, "I don't know why 
you're asking - I'm sitting here in '05, and I'm in good shape, and I'm very happy." He 
also insisted Mercedes quality problems were overblown - and fixed. "The quality of the 
cars coming off the line now is the best ever, 100%," he said. But less than a month 
later, Mercedes announced a recall of 1.3 million cars, its largest ever, for a variety of 
mechanical problems (Wall Street Journal July 29th, 2005). 
5.4 Failed Welt AG strategy 
The next chapter looks at the failure of the so-called Welt AG strategy. The first section will 
point out the strategical contradiction between the idea of a Welt AG and the promise of a 
merger of equals between Daimler and Chrysler. The following chapter will examine how the 
lack of a homogenous “Mercedes” approach contributed to confusion in the interaction with 
other partners. The third section focuses on the failure of Daimler and Chrysler to agree on the 
strategical direction of the company. Section four focuses on the failed Asian strategy. 
Ironically it was the internal critique from the German side of Schrempp’s Asian policy in 
general and his acquisition of Mitsubishi in particular, which would weaken the CEO the 
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most and force his eventual resignation. This criticism stemmed from German shareholders, 
German members of the Board (e.g. Bernhard) and the German media. The final section 
considers to what extent the failure of the Welt AG can be reduced to the person of CEO 
Jürgen Schrempp. 
5.4.1 Strategical contradictions 
The Welt AG strategy refers to the strategical vision presented by Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen 
Schrempp as the company’s new direction after he succeeded Reuter in 1995. Although most 
commentaries tend to conflute the Welt AG strategy with Schrempp’s takeover of Chrysler, 
the two strategies are in actual fact contradictory. Daimler’s decision to acquire Chrysler was 
a part of a more comprehensive worldwide strategy. The Welt AG strategy pointed to the 
vision of a German dominated worldwide expansion of activities concentrating on the 
commercial and passenger vehicle units of the company. Specifically, the North American 
and Asian markets were being targeted with the specific aim of reducing the company’s 
dependence on the luxury Mercedes brand. In the emerging Indian and Chinese markets the 
search was on to find a suitable manufacturer, preferably Japanese, with expertise in the 
production of small affordable compact cars. Although Mercedes inability to establish proper 
partners for the Chinese market would continue to hamper expansion in the coming years, the 
company already had well-established production and distribution network for its luxury 
brands for many decades (Grunow-Oswald 2006). The expansion of the Mercedes marque to 
include the A-, B- and M-Class had already been decided on by Werner before Schrempp had 
the opportunity to exercise his influence on the company’s most important business unit. 
Schrempp’s initial focus on a 12% ROCE and increased shareholder value provided criteria 
for the early elimination for the company’s most inefficient business units, but after the 
Chrysler takeover it became increasingly clear that the Welt AG was to be limited to the 
company’s original strength in the passenger and commercial vehicle divisions. In the coming 
years most divisions such as the Adtranz (trains) and the creation of EADS (aerospace) would 
provide evidence of the shift of focus, even though DASA was the largest owner in the newly 
created European consortium with 33% (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). Even 
key automobile-related subsidiaries such as the auto-electronics specialist TEMIC were sold 
in the year 2001. In early 2001 the remaining 10% of Debitel shares were sold to Swisscom 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001). In January 2002 DaimlerChrysler AG sold its 
49.9% involvement in T-Systems (originally Systemhaus under Reuter) to Deutsche-
Telekom.  In order to raise equity, DaimlerChrysler AG also sold part of Chrysler’s financial 
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service to GE (GeneralElectric) Capital, mostly in the form of real estate assets 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2001).  
Schrempp’s prioritization of the vehicle units was evidenced not only by the involvement at 
Mitsubishi (2000) and Hyundai (2000) but also the American truck maker Freightliner’s 
acquisition of North American truck maker Western Star and Detroit Diesel in the year 2000 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). In the DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report for 
the year 2000, Schrempp could report than now 90% of DC’s revenues were coming from the 
passenger and commercial vehicle units. That ratio would continue to increase in the 
upcoming years as the reversal of Reuter’s 1985 strategical “turn” was completed 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Reports 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The basic idea of the Welt AG, however, stood in stark contrast to the promise of a merger of 
equals and it is worth drawing attention to the fact that it was Schrempp who discussed Asian 
expansion at the press conference announcing the takeover, making it clear to insiders that the 
Chrysler deal was just one part of an overall strategy of world-wide expansion. Chrysler 
remained a North American based company with now perhaps the hope of increasing their 
European presence with Daimler’s aid. Chrysler had had extensive limks with Mitsubishi 
stretching back to the early 1970s, when they had acquired a stake in the Japanese company. 
But under Iacocca in the 1980s these relationships were weakened and limited to production 
of two Chrysler models (Chrysler Sebring and the Dodge Stratus) at the Mitsubishi factory in 
Normal Illinois. Although Chrysler engineers were willing to adapt Mitsubishi’s ideas to their 
own practices both companies had continue to reduce and limit their cooperation with each 
other until the Germans stepped in in the spring of 1999. The idea of expanding to Asia had 
been analyzed by Chrysler during the 1995 shareholder crisis but judged to be unrealistic 
(Vlasic and Stertz 2000).  
Schrempp’s shift of focus away from Chrysler and towards the search for an Asian partner in 
early 1999 only 7 months after the takeover was a major source of conflict on the Board 
between Americans and Germans (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). The NYSE also reacted 
negatively upon news of Schrempp’s plans. Chrysler executive pressure, combined with a 
sharp drop in the value of DCX, forced Schrempp to abandon his plans, but there was now a 
clear rift between the two sides. Schrempp’s Asian strategy was a clear proof to the 
Americans that the promise of a merger was only a rhetorical ploy. Eventually Chrysler’s 
most important executive on the Board was forced to resign in September 1999 (Vlasic and 
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Stertz 2000). The logic of the German Welt AG exposed the emptiness of the promise of a 
merger of equals. At the same time, the decision not to become involved with Nissan, exerted 
additional pressure for Schrempp to find another partner. 
5.4.2 The Asian dilemma 
The Schrempp era from 1995 to 2005 at Daimler-Benz and DaimlerChrysler AG (as of May 
1998) is known as the Welt AG era of the company. It included not only the transatlantic 
acquisition of the American Chrysler Corporation, the main focus of this case study, but also 
entailed plans for radical expansion in the Asiatic region and the search for suitable Japanese, 
Korean and Chinese partners, alliances and possible takeovers. In addition, Schrempp 
intended to expand on former Mercedes CEO Werner’s policy of globalizing and stretching 
the Mercedes brand both in the passenger and commercial vehicle sectors. Schrempp had 
already been praised for his “ungermanlike” visionary global aggressiveness in his takeover 
of Chrysler, which earned him the manager of the year award in Germany in 1998. Initially 
both the stock market and industry observers applauded the symbolic liberation from 
Germany’s post-war Deutschland AG and the implementation of DaimlerChrysler AG’s Welt 
AG strategy (Der Spiegel 20, 1998) under German leadership. The hitherto champions of 
coordinated market economies in the automobile branch, Japan and Germany, were both 
perceived to have been suffering in the late 1990s due to their conservative unwillingness to 
adapt to the emergence of more liberal global economic institutions. Globalization seemed to 
require a switch to a more liberal variety of capitalism. Schrempp’s Welt AG vision was seen 
by Germans as a welcome step in the right direction.  
In 1999 the whole industry saw Asia as the main opportunity for expansion, especially for 
small cars in the emerging Indian and Chinese markets. Although Daimler was actively 
stretching its Mercedes brand to include the A-. B-, and M-Class, these models were not 
expected to penetrate the Asian market. Daimler was looking for competencies in the 
production of small affordable cars and also competencies in conventional engine technology 
to match their own competitive advantage in the area of diesel engine technology for larger 
and heavier vehicles such as the C-, E- and S-Class. The wave of merger and takeover activity 
in the automobile industry continued into the spring of 2000. In addition to Daimler’s €2.1 
billion 34% investment in Mitsubishi, General Motors acquired a 20% share of Fiat for $ 2.4 
billion, Ford purchased Land Rover from BMW for $2.9 billion and VW bought a 19% 
interest in the Swedish commercial vehicle producer Scania. The merger frenzy had reached 
  
 
175 
its peak, with both Ford and GM battling over the Korean carmaker Daewoo Motors, whereas 
DaimlerChrysler AG had set its sights on a strategic partnership with Hyundai in order to 
create what would be called the General Engine Alliance (GEA) with Mitsubishi.  
However this impression of strategic vision and optimism is completely misleading. 
DaimlerChrysler AG stumbled into the Mitsubishi Motors Corporation deal, part of a 
Japanese “Keiretsu”, which was failing economically in almost the entirety of its complex 
network of enterprises (Bremner and Thorton 1999). DaimlerChrysler AG CEO Schrempp 
had promised an increase of the company’s presence in Asia during the announcement of the 
takeover of Chrysler in May 1998, but his initial strategy had not been successful. Toyota was 
clearly not for sale and their Lexus brand had emerged as DaimlerChrysler AG’s most 
dangerous competitor against the luxury Mercedes brand. Lexus had been eroding Mercedes’ 
market share in the late 1990s, especially in the critical USA market. The protective nature of 
the Japanese zaibatsu (family-holding companies) and keiretsu (corporate alliances) made a 
hostile takeover impossible. DaimlerChrysler AG’s first choice, Honda, had made it publicly 
clear that it wished to retain its independence. The German carmaker was again focusing on 
supplementing its resource-based market edge in the area of diesel engine technology with the 
quality of Honda’s engineering in the area of conventional (Otto) fuel-combustion engines 
and their innovative edge in styling both in Asian and North American markets. Both Toyota 
and Honda were protected in a manner similar to the family-held protection offered by 
Porsche and BMW in Germany. The sole opportunity for foreign investment lay in the deep 
crisis within the Japanese economy in the late 1990s and especially the increasing awareness 
of structural weakness of Japan’s top 30 industrial, financial and service companies. 
In the late 1980s it appeared as if the Japanese variety of capitalism was about to surpass the 
USA. Especially in the automobile industry the so-called lean production approach had 
dramatically impacted the North American market, specifically with the establishment of 
hybrid factories in Canada and the USA (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). The Japanese were 
producing high quality vehicles at more reasonable prices than their Big 3 competitors. And 
although studies such as the vast MIT survey (1990) of the global automobile industry 
focused on Toyota, Mitsubishi had also been part of the “revolution”. Throughout the 1980s 
Japan’s fourth largest automaker had been increasing market share by 27% annually. The 
electronics arm of the Mitsubishi keiretsu was advancing its share of the television market as 
well. The feared “Mitsubishification” of America reached its heights with the 51% acquisition 
of the symbolic Rockefeller Center in New York City in 1989 (Bremner and Thornton 1999).  
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However, the historical strengths of the Japanese keiretsu system suddenly became 
weaknesses in the changed global economic situation as of the mid 1990s. In a manner not 
unlike the emerging structural conservatism of the Deutschland AG coordinated market 
economy (CME), the intricate connection of industrial and banking cross-shareholdings and 
family ties made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to react self-critically and adapt to 
new challenges. In addition and most risky, each keiretsu groups’ own banks had been 
providing uncovered inexpensive equity, which had encouraged significant overcapacities in 
Japanese industry. By 1999 there were no less than 11 passenger and commercial vehicle 
producers. Other industries such as the steel industry and the semiconductor sector were 
equally plagued with radical over capacities in production (Bremner and Thornton 1999). In 
the finance segment there were no fewer than 17 investment banks. Mitsubishi was typical for 
the crisis. By the beginning of 1999 the company was so heavily in debt that it publicly 
sought help from overseas investors. The difficulties within the automotive division were 
augmented by Mitsubishi Electric’s announcement in February that it expected a $330 million 
loss as well as losses of $200 million at Mitsubishi Materials Corp. and Mitsubishi Chemical 
Corp. respectively. The disintegration of the Mitsubishi empire was even more serious than 
the decline of Reuter’s envisioned technology vision at Daimler-Benz in the mid 1990s 
because it also included a major crisis of the group’s Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. In the face of 
internal meltdown the bank had been forced to acquire $2 billion in additional funds. The 
focus on achieving higher turnover at the expense of return on equity or Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE) could not cope with a situation of domestic zero growth. Whereas US 
companies expected a return on equity approaching 15%, the rate at Mitsubishi was less than 
5% (Bremner and Thornton 1999). In this situation of the seeming collapse of the coordinated 
market economies in Japan and Germany, industry leader’s focus on shareholder value such 
as DaimlerChrysler AG CEO Schrempp appeared visionary. However, Mitsubishi’s decision 
to allow DaimlerChrysler AG to acquire shares was a humiliation within the context of 
Japan’s protective and patriotic automobile sector and indeed primarily a proof of the serious 
nature of Mitsubishi’s lack of liquidity rather than any attractiveness as a takeover object 
(Bremner and Thornton 1999).       
Moreover, Mitsubishi was not even Daimler’s second choice after Honda. In early 1999 
Schrempp was attempting to secure a strategic share of Japan’s number three automaker, 
Nissan, which like Mitsubishi was struggling to survive. Talks between the two companies 
began in January 1999 and when rumors of an impending equity stake acquisition became 
public the DCX share fell 6% on January 11 (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). Schrempp’s 
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plans were controversial inside the Board, and provided the reason for the first major rift 
between him and the American members lead by Thomas Stallkamp (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
It was the beginning of an open conflict, which would eventually lead to Stallkamp’s forced 
resignation in September 1999. Chrysler executives were concerned that the integration of 
Daimler and Chrysler would only become more complex with a premature decision to add an 
Asian partner. Although Japanese companies had performed well on American soil, there 
were no major positive examples of industrial American-Japanese mergers. The newly formed 
DaimlerChrysler AG was less than one year old and the initial market euphoria had been 
replaced with an increasing consciousness of the enormous difficulties facing an integration 
of the German and American sides at the operative level. Moreover, at the strategic level 
chess expert Schrempp’s Nissan gambit served as further proof to Chrysler executives, that 
their company was merely a pawn in a German-led Welt AG. The Board was able to block 
Schrempp and force a cessation of the negotiations (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). The markets 
received the announcement of a failure of the talks on March 10th, 1999 positively. Whereas 
Nissan posted a negative return of 10.9% DCX shares rallied by 5% (Blaško, Netter and 
Sinkey 2000). When Renault did eventually acquire 37% of Nissan, both financial and 
industry experts did not expect the new alliance to succeed (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000). 
After his failure to acquire Nissan, Schrempp turned his attention to Mitsubishi, Japan’s 
fourth largest vehicle manufacturer. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation chairman Kawasoe 
initially rejected DaimlerChrysler AG’s offers. Similar to Daimler, Mitsubishi could only 
envisage a possible form of cooperation without any equity dovetailing. However, by the 
spring of 2000 Mitsubishi was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to accept the German offer 
of €2.6 billion (later €2.4 DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). The initial deal from 
March 27th, 2000 allowed Mitsubishi to save face and the same time provide DaimlerChrysler 
AG with de facto control of the Japanese company. By acquiring 34% of MMC 
DaimlerChrysler AG was limited to 3 of the company’s 10 Board members, but it obtained 
veto power allowing the Germans to overturn any executive decisions. In terms of market 
share the alliance increased DaimlerChrysler AG’s proportion to almost 11% in Japan and just 
under 10% in the remaining Asian-Pacific region. Although the passenger and commercial 
vehicle maker still had $31 billion in revenues, Mitsubishi had lost over $1 billion in the 
previous two years and had $17 billion of debt (Bremner and Thornton 1999). The deal did 
however make DaimlerChrysler AG the world’s third largest carmaker, after GM and Ford. In 
addition, achieving 10% market share fulfilled CEO Schrempp’s publicly stated goal in 
Tokyo in January 1999. The Mitsubishi agreement also entitled DaimlerChrysler AG to 
  
 
178 
increase its share without limitation of the company after a holding period of 3 years. In a 
separate move in September 2000, DaimlerChrysler AG acquired 9% of the Korean 
manufacturer, Hyundai Motors (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). On paper, at 
least, it appeared that a further important mosaic stone in his Welt AG vision had been set.  
In April 2001, DaimlerChrysler AG upped its share to 37.3% by acquiring Volvo’s 3.3% 
share of Mitsubishi. This acquisition cost an additional € 760 million, but provided access to 
the Born plant in the Netherlands, which would be the facility to build the Smart-Mitsubishi 
Forfour car as part of the Z-car project. Daimler hoped to profit from the Japanese experience 
in the design, development and production of small 4-seat vehicles. The 6th generation 
Mitsubishi Colt had a degree of maturity comparable to the VW Golf and initially the plan to 
produce a 4-seat Smart appeared plausible. Furthermore, in contrast to the lack of a common 
platform development between Mercedes and Chrysler, the new Colt and Smart’s Forfour did 
share 40% exact same parts. Commonality appeared to have been reached, without the risk of 
so-called badge engineering in which two identical cars just receive a different emblem (i.e. 
Chrysler and Mitsubishi vehicles from the Normal Illinois factory). Unfortunately, the car was 
not a market success. Although it almost succeeded in reaching the sales target of 50,000 in 
2004, the goal of 80,000 units in 2005 idled 40,000 vehicles below expectations. The decision 
to cease production was made in early 2006 and the last vehicle was produced in July 2006. 
Gill (2012) has raised interesting questions concerning the success of the Renault-Nissan 
alliance compared to the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG-Mitsubishi project. The author 
correctly points out that the former case has received high-profile attention, including a book 
by one of the main protagonists, Renault CEO Ghosn (Ghosn and Ries 2003). Gill suggests 
that Ghosn was better able to understand and accommodate the cultural dimensionality of 
Nissan (Hofstede 2001). Ghosn has certainly been able to express his commitment to saving 
Nissan in a manner never exhibited by his DaimlerChrysler AG counterpart Eckrodt. 
However, both turnover plans were dramatic cost slashing restructurings of the fundamental 
institutions of the Japanese economy. Eckrodt reduced the total number of employees by 16% 
in his first year as Chief Operative Officer (COO). This abolition of the traditional Japanese 
life-long work guarantee was continued throughout Eckrodt’s tenure, with an additional 9,500 
jobs from the remaining 65,000 employees being axed in 2004 (Gill 2012). In addition 
material costs were reduced by 15% and the number of platforms was reduced by 50%. 
Eckrodt’s measures were able to stop Mitsubishi’s losses briefly in 2001, but the seriousness 
of the situation at Mitsubishi was more dramatic than Nissan and transcended the leeway of 
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management strategy. Gill (2012) is certainly correct in ascertaining that Gnosen took greater 
efforts to integrate Japanese managers in his turnaround plans. Eckrodts decision to replace 
senior Japanese managers with younger less experienced German managers certainly added 
fat to the fires of intercultural humiliation being experienced by Mitsubishi employees. This 
was worsened by the fact that the German managers were planned for short-term 
troubleshooting tasks with no transparent long-term commitment to salvaging the company.  
Gill (2012) does, however, underestimate the severity of the situation at Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation compared to Nissan, which severely limited possible success for German options. 
Both Nissan and Mitsubishi cultures within the traditional keiritsu exhibit a deep reluctance to 
scrutinize and adequately control the financial situation of individual projects and budgets. 
However, Daimler’s 34% acquisition of Mitsubishi in March 2000 was plagued by more 
serious organizational cultural issues of a criminal nature. Just 4 months after the agreement 
had been signed, Mitsubishi became involved in one of the most serious scandals in the 
history of the Japanese automobile industry. This led to the arrest of several senior executives. 
Police authorities found documents revealing that company officials had been systematically 
and intentionally holding back information from customers about vehicle defects and quality 
issues going back to the 1970s. The first wave of revelations led to a summer recall of 
approximately 500,000 vehicles, which was about a third of the company’s yearly production 
in 2000 (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). As a reaction to these developments the 
stock market price of the company dropped by 13%.  A second raid by authorities in August 
deepened the crisis. More than one million vehicles had to be recalled and the stock market 
price had now dropped by 30%. The situation was so serious that DaimlerChrysler AG 
renegotiated the original purchasing agreement from March and was able to acquire its stake 
for €200 million less than the original price. Furthermore, Mitsubishi’s chairman Kawasoe 
was forced to resign. However, the quality problems continued to worsen, and a further 1.5 
million cars had to be recalled in early 2001, including over one million in the USA. Daimler 
had hoped for a strong Japanese partner, which could help them to leverage their Asian 
presence in the small car segment. Instead DaimlerChrysler AG inherited a worldwide quality 
disaster, which would negatively impact group profits. According to the 2000 annual report 
recall issues at Mitsubishi amounted to €700 million. As announced in the same report the 
“refocusing” of Mitsubishi would entail cutting 9,600 jobs (-14%) and reducing plant capacity 
by 20% (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2000). 
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Daimler responded by sending in German executives to cut costs and restructure the firm, 
placing Eckrodt at the head of day-to-day operations. Together with the recalls the planned 
cuts led to record losses of $2.2 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31st 2001 (New York 
Times March 31st 2001). Furthermore the recalls would damage Mitsubishi’s reputation 
particularly in Japan and the USA and see a further plummet in sales in 2001 and 2002. The 
situation in Japan was exacerbated by a general economic recession. Altogether over 2 million 
vehicles will be recalled in the first year of DaimlerChrysler AG’s alliance with the Japanese 
company. The need to send German executives to Japan in early 2001 was compounded by 
the dramatic plunge in Chrysler’s profits throughout the year 2000 from €5.1 billion in 1999 
to €0.5 billion in 2000. The drop led to the installment of Germans Dieter Zetsche and 
Wolfgang Bernhardt as CEO and COO at Chrysler respectively. The Germanization of both 
their American and Asian activities severely stretched and weakened management resources 
at the parent Mercedes brand. The 1998 “marriage in heaven” metaphor used by Schrempp 
provided increasingly critical employee, press and shareholder observers with an infinite 
source of satirical rhetoric. Schrempp’s polygamy was spinning out of control as early as 
January 2000, less than 2 years after the takeover and less than 1 year after the 37% 
acquisition of Mitsubishi. From the perspective of the company’s Annual Report for the year 
2000, Schrempp and his executives viewed the situation at Chrysler to be more dramatic than 
the situation at Mitsubishi (DaimlerChrysler 2000). The 126-page document continually 
refers to the planned “turnaround” at Chrysler, whereas the more mild need for a “refocusing” 
at Mitsubishi is proclaimed. The upcoming years will prove the inaccuracy of this assessment 
of the seriousness of DaimlerChrysler AG’s dilemmas in the Asia market. The word 
“turnaround” does not crop up until the 2001 Annual Report (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual 
Report 2001). 
Although Eckrodt’s initial measures appeared to eliminate the worst aspects of the Mitsubishi 
crisis, their success was short-lived. Mitsubishi’s reputation was damaged especially in Japan 
and in the USA. In addition, many models were actually in competition with Chrysler 
vehicles.  
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Figure 19 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation Sales (1999-2005) 
 
Source: DaimlerChrysler AG Figures Appendix 5.7 
The saturated market situation was augmented by tough rebate offers in this market segment. 
Mitsubishi embarked on a 0% financing and $0 dollar down payment financing plan in order 
to attempt to regain its share of the market. The plan backfired completely as customers 
simply worked away from their vehicles when it came to the first installment. The program 
had a negative impact of $450 million dollars on DaimlerChrysler AG’s operating profits 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 2003). Eckrodt resigned as Mitsubishi COO and left the 
DaimlerChysler organization. By 2004 the Board was no longer willing to pump more money 
into Mitsubishi. This decision was the first major public defeat suffered by Jürgen Schrempp 
since 1995 and signaled the failure of his Asian policy. By 2005 it was clear that 
DaimlerChrysler AG would sell its 37% share of the company (The Economist July 28th, 
2005). The Mitsubishi disaster also impeded the development of a clear strategy for China 
during this period. In addition, Schrempp’s Mitsubishi’s disaster weakened his support both at 
the senior executive and Board levels. His chosen successor, Wolfgang Bernhard, openly 
challenged the wisdom of continuing to support Mitsubishi. Although this revolt led to 
Bernhard’s resignation, Schrempp’s tenure as CEO was now only a question of time.  He 
announced his decision to step down as DaimlerChrysler AG CEO in July 2005, although his 
contract was valid until 2008. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
The failure of the Welt AG strategy was triggered by a number of negative decisions and 
negative events at Mercedes, Chrysler and Mitsubishi respectively. All of these factors mirror 
the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover to realize any of its proposed goals. 
After the initial positive reaction of the stock markets, shareholder value first plummeted 
independently of the performance of the company. Despite record results for the year 1998, 
the decision to delist the stock from Standard and Poors 500 scared off American trust and 
investment fund brokers. The value of DCX was further impacted negatively with rumors of a 
Nissan takeover in January 1999 and the defection of top Chrysler executives to other 
companies (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). The value of DCX shares would remain at less 
than 50% of its January 1999 high until the announcement of Schrempp’s resignation in July 
2005. The lack of interest in DCX for American investors was exacerbated by the dramatic 
drop in third quarter profits in 2000. Suddenly and seemingly unexpectedly, Chrysler sales 
had become a serious liability. 
The results were equally disappointing in the area of operational synergy effects. Mercedes 
insistence on strict brand separation would cause a delay of 3 years before the Executive 
Automotive Committee was created to coordinate commonizing activities. Indeed it was only 
after Mercedes managers Zetsche and Bernhard took over the management of Chrysler that 
any serious efforts were made to integrate technologies and platforms. Before that American 
managers had been frustrated by Mercedes rejection of possible cooperation in projects such 
as the M-Class / Jeep Grand Cherokee or R-class / Pacifica (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
Throughout the history of DaimlerChrysler real synergy effects were neverachieved in the 
area of engineering, with the possible exception of the Chrysler 300 M, but even those were a 
case of too little too late. 
The drop in Chrysler sales coincided with the takeover of Mitsubishi Motors Cooperation 
(MMC) in the second half of 2000. DaimlerChrysler’s participation in the Japanese firm was 
disastrous from the very beginning, triggered by massive criminal activity stretching back 
over 20 years and leading to the recall of more than 2 million vehicles in the years 2000-2002. 
The case impacted sales the company’s reputation in the U.S.A and Japan. The relationship 
between the two companies ended effectively in the spring of 2004 with the DaimlerChrysler 
Board’s rejection of further financial help for its Asian subsidiary. 
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Difficulties at Mitsubishi and Chrysler drained management energy from its German parent 
company Daimler. This drain restricted DaimlerChrysler’s ability to fix quality issues at 
Mercedes. This was augmented by the speed of Mercedes brand expansion into the 
development and engineering of vehicles in area where the company had no real previous 
experience (Smart, A-Class, B-Class, M-Class, R-class). Especially in the USA, the drop in 
quality had negative repercussions for the perception of Schrempp’s vision of a Welt AG. 
Despite some signs of an economic recovery at Chrysler under Zetsche, the situation at 
Mitsubishi and Mercedes caused German shareholders, management and media to pressure 
Schrempp into resigning in July 2005. 
Chapter 6 will now proceed to analyze how the post-takeover strategy of a “merger of equals” 
created an atmosphere of distrust from the very start of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover and 
inhibited the creation of a new DaimlerChrysler AG organizational culture, which would have 
been necessary to implement successful strategies.  
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6 THE “MERGER OF EQUALS” LIE AND TRUST 
Chapter 6 consists of 5 sections, each dealing with one of the central metaphors of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, the promise of a “merger of equals”. Chapter 6.1 discusses the 
semantic ambiguity in the terms “merger”, “acquisition” and “takeover”. Chapter 6.2 provides 
an overview of the classical typologies of mergers and acquisitions (Marks and Mirvis 1998) 
and shows the ramifications of the DaimlerChrysler AG “best of both” post merger strategy 
for issues of organizational culture and trust. Chapters 6.3 through 6.5 then dissect how the 
inherent contradiction of the alleged “merger of equals” and the Welt AG takeover strategy 
poisoned the organizational culture within the new company and resulted in a destruction of 
any trust, which may have been left. These sections apply approaches to the phenomena of 
trust as a factor of successful organizational culture from an economic perspective.  
In order to accomplish this task the section will utilize Cohen and Prusak’s concept of “social 
capital” (2001). The analysis of social capital will consist of an examination of the functions 
of the 4 factors Cohen and Prusak consider essential in order to create the high social capital 
that is necessary to deal with volatile and demanding issues of change management such as a 
“best of both cross-border mergers”. Those factors are trust, networks and communities, space 
and time to connect, and fourthly, social talk and storytelling. The four factors will be applied 
to the DaimlerChrysler AG case to demonstrate how all four actually led to the destruction of 
whatever levels of social capital were available at the beginning of the takeover within the 
Daimler and Chrysler organizations respectively 
6.1 Semantic differences between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers 
One of the most salient aspects of all discussions on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is the 
semantical asymmetry between the two terms. The word “merger” is sometimes the exact 
opposite of the word “acquisition”. The word “merger” means a voluntary and reciprocal 
coming together of two or more parties. It’s the kind of “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch 
yours” (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 5.1) relationship which constitutes the 
foundation of market-based economic life. The term “merger” implies an equal balance of 
power between the contracting parties. On the other hand the term “acquire” leans in the 
direction of one-sidedness and implies a kind of domination by one party. Why is it possible 
that we use two different terms to discuss one economic event? 
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The economic area of activity known as Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) necessarily 
confounds semantically a wide range of intentions. This confusion often intentionally serves 
to conflate the multi-layered justifications, threats and opportunities, which are being 
communicated to the employees of both firms involved and to external shareholders and 
stakeholders. Such conflation arises naturally in such radically changing situations. The term 
“merger” serves to alleviate any pain and uncertainty. 
Despite this intermixture there is nevertheless a spectrum of meaning stretching from the 
more positive connotations of the word “merger” via the more neutral connotations of the 
word “acquisition” to the more definitely negative association of the word “takeover”.  In a 
personal conversation the linguist Scot Bell once explained the difference between the three 
words in terms of marriage as follows; “When I first met my wife it was an “acquisition” 
because I had never had a bird before. When we decided to get married it was a “merger”. 
Now that she is clearly in charge of things it is obviously a “takeover”. This anecdote from a 
scholar who has obviously led an “examined life” helps to explain why we say M&A in 
business activity and not M&A&T. The word to be avoided at all costs is the taboo T-word, 
“takeover”. An “acquisition” can be friendly or unfriendly, a “takeover” sounds unfriendly 
and forced and entails, even when a company wants to be taken over, that one side has to 
relinquish its autonomy. This differentiation is extremely helpful when applied to the 
DaimlerChrysler AG case. The DaimlerChrysler AG story travels through both radical ends of 
the M&A&T spectrum, as the main protagonist, CEO Jürgen Schrempp, announces a “merger 
of equals” (1998) and later admits to a “takeover” of Chrysler (2000).  
The two memorable phrases and metaphors emerging from the initial press conference on 
May 7th 1998 announcing the creation of DaimlerChrysler AG was Schrempp’s declaration of 
a “marriage made in heaven” and his promise of a “merger of equals”. The image of the 
“marriage made in heaven” would gift newspapers and economic journals with hundreds of 
wonderful headlines for the upcoming years, whereas the metaphor of a “merger of equals” 
would provide a barometer of trust for employees on both sides of the Atlantic in their 
interaction with each other. The “trust” timeline would end in October/November 2000, with 
Schrempp’s admittance in a Financial Times newspaper interview that his intention had been 
to “take over” the company from the very beginning and that his talk of “merger” had been 
purely tactical (Financial Times October 30th , 2000). 
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6.2 Strategies for post-merger outcomes; the “merger of equals” dilemma 
The classical literature on mergers and acquisitions (Marks and Mirvis 1998) distinguishes 
between the degrees of changes between the acquired and the acquiring company in order to 
define five unique strategies for post-merger outcomes.  In the matrix below (Figure 20) it is 
essential to see that a “perfect” theoretical balance between acquired and acquiring company 
is only realized in the Type 5 “best of both” merger strategies. This was precisely the strategy 
that DaimlerChrysler AG proposed to implement.  
Figure 20: Models of Mergers and Acquisitions 
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A merger or acquisition involves implementing processes of “assimilation” or “integration 
depending on the degree of change in the “acquiring” and “acquired” firms (Harzig and 
Ruysseveldt 2004). In a Type 1 merger illustrated above, the degree of change in both 
companies is low and the acquired company is permitted to preserve its independence and 
retain its cultural autonomy. This has been more or less the case with Daimler’s acquisition of 
both the American truck builder Freightliner (1980) and the Japanese commercial vehicle 
sector of Mitsubishi Fuso (2000). In contrast to Daimler’s acquisition of Chrysler, both of 
these takeovers have been successful. The market for commercial vehicles is highly 
regionalized and regulated and thus it makes little sense to try and implement European 
market customization in the Americas or Asia. So Freightliner cabs are made out of aluminum 
because of high consumer corrosion sensitivity and the heavy use of aggressive salt on North 
American roads. Cab size and freewheeling “cowboy” individuality are key factors in the 
USA markets, whereas the European market is defined by legal restrictions and regional 
differences. The dream of a “universal” cab stumbles over trite details such as differences in 
highway networks, travel distances and the physical size of truck drivers in different parts of 
the world.  
A type 1 merger does not rule out cross-border cooperation as evidenced by Freightliner’s 
cooperation with the Daimler commercial vehicle division in Argentina. In addition, even 
brand sensitive firms such as IBM can choose this strategy if the acquired company is heavily 
dependent on its unique company culture and brand as was the case with the takeover of 
Lotus Notes. 
Marks and Mirvis (1998) refer to the Type 2 merger as “absorption”, if the changes at the 
acquired company are high while those of the acquiring company remain low. This is 
particularly the case if the culture of the acquiring firm is so strong that it simply cannot 
accommodate any internal competition in order to continue functioning efficiently. This was 
the case when Daimler-Benz acquired Hanomag-Henschel in 1969. Daimler assimilated their 
product segment into the existing commercial vehicle production facilities before turning the 
acquired Bremen facility into a factory for car production of the new “Baby Benz” line 
(Grunow-Osswald, 2006). The acquisition was motivated by British Leyland’s talks with the 
parent company Rheinstahl and the threat that Leyland could gain entry to the lucrative 
German market. The Hanomag-Henschel brand disappeared from the market in 1974.  
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This is also true of Chrysler’s takeover of the British Rootes Group in the late 1960s as a 
means of gaining entry to a new overseas market; a traditional weakness of Chrysler that has 
been previously discussed. By 1971 Rootes had simply vanished from the market. Type 2 
mergers are particularly predominant when operational activities and cooperate identity are 
closely connected such as at General Electric and Siemens. In the car business the importance 
of brand identity tends to determine the degree of absorption. Although Chrysler acquired 
Dodge in 1928, the brand continues to exist till this day. The same is true of GM’s acquisition 
of Opel in 1929. The Plymouth brand was not so fortunate. The economy price member of the 
Chrysler family was discontinued in 2001 in an attempt to get customers to focus on Chrysler 
as the name of a brand rather than the name of a company (DaimlerChrysler AG Annual 
Report 2001). 
A third possibility for post-merger assimilation is the case if both companies decide to change 
drastically. Marks and Mirvis (1998) refer to this type as “transformation”. In the history of 
the car industry this Type 3 merger has been relatively seldom. Radical transformations in the 
car industry more often take the form of joint ventures rather than mergers. The NUMMI joint 
venture between Toyota and General Motors from 1984 until 2010 exemplifies how both 
companies wanted to achieve something dramatically new. This was Toyota’s first plant in 
North America. GM wanted to gain first-hand experience of Japanese production methods 
with American workers.  
In addition, fundamental change in the automobile sector has often taken the form of new 
companies being founded rather than merging. Walter Chrysler left GM and Ferdinand 
Porsche resigned from Daimler-Benz in order to establish two entirely new companies 
respectively. Transformation means losing brand power and this only makes sense if a brand 
is deeply in trouble. This is perhaps the case in the late 1960s with the creation of “British” 
Leyland as part of the ill-fated attempt to stave off the complete meltdown of the British car 
industry. 
In the chemical industry, the merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz paralleled a radical shift in 
branding with the creation of the “life sciences” concern Novartis in 1996. In particular, 
Sandoz’s image had been suffering significantly since the fire in its productions facilities in 
1986 and the resulting pollution of the Rhine River. 
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The vision of DaimlerChrysler AG as a “multi-brand” company as proclaimed at the initial 
press conference in 1998 made this Type 3 merger impossible. There are a number of studies 
documenting the danger of brand “corrosion” and “dilution” in the car industry as the result of 
mergers and acquisitions (Strach and Everett 2006; Homburg and Bucerius 2005; Chen and 
Chen 2000). The German side of the new company was acutely aware of this problem. 
Indeed, the absence of the name “Mercedes” in the new name DaimlerChrysler AG was 
perceived as a conscious effort to protect the world’s most famous luxury car brand. At the 
time of the merger most Americans would have associated the name “Daimler” with a Jaguar 
brand. Even CEO Robert Eaton pronounced the name of his new company “Dameler-Benz”, 
thus using the English pronunciation of the Jaguar brand in the first press conference 
(DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). Indeed, the name of the new company 
DaimlerChrysler AG led to a legal dispute and it wasn’t until 2007 that DaimlerChrysler AG 
obtained the rights to the name “Daimler” from Ford. Although German manger Dieter 
Zetsche would attempt to modify a strict separation of the brands with his “Ask Dr Z” 
strategy at Chrysler, which was analyzed in chapter 5, at the time of the takeover it was clear 
that a Type 3 merger was to be avoided at all costs.   
Fourthly, it is also possible for the acquired company to retain its identity while the acquiring 
company is revolutionized. Marks and Mirvis (1998) refer to this Type 4 merger as a “reverse 
merger”, where the acquired company dominates and dictates the new strategy. This may be 
possible if the acquiring company is desperately in need of a shift in direction, perhaps in the 
form of innovative technologies or management available from the smaller acquired company 
(Prabhu et al. 2005). This happened to a certain degree at Chrysler with their acquisition of 
American Motors Company (AMC) in 1987. When the decision was made to take AMC’s 
study of production platforms at Honda as their future model, former AMC management took 
over major roles at Chrysler and replaced Iacocca and his Ford team (Lutz 1998).  
In the case of DaimlerChrysler AG we witness a fifth possibility. The Type 5 “merger of 
equals” suggests that there is no dichotomy between the acquiring and acquired companies. A 
merger of equals envisages a mutually agreed upon selection of best practices at both 
companies. This intent to create a “best of both” merger is outlined in the DaimlerChrysler 
AG Chairman’s Integration Council 10 principle guidelines for post-merger activities (Meyer 
et al. 2002). This council was the core of the Board’s team members directly responsible for 
the implementation of post-merger integration activities (Grube 2003; Dowling, Festing and 
Engle 2008). 
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10 Guidelines for Post Merger Integration 
1. Speed, speed, speed 
2. Attend to the day-to-day business 
3. Merger of equals. There is neither a “German” nor an “American” side; do not look for 
“DaimlerBenz” or “Chrysler” decisions. Look only to make the right decisions. 
4. Walk the Talk: DaimlerChrysler AG top executives will set the tone for the integration by 
their example and personal behavior. 
5. Accountability and transparency: Involve all top executives in leading the integration, with 
clear responsibilities for implementation and delivery of financial performance targets. 
6. Leverage the strength of both. Only by combining our strengths will DaimlerChrysler AG 
achieve its purpose of being “a global provider of automotive and transportation products 
and services, generating surplus value for our customers, our employees, and our 
shareholders.” 
7. Maximum autonomy to the integration task forces. Financial performance targets must be 
delivered on time. 
8. Principle of minimal intervention. Concentrate on few changes for major impact (the 80/20 
rule) 
9. Responsiveness. Listen to the other side at all times and watch the tone-setting 
10. Openness: Don’t mess around and don’t play games. There will be no place to hide. 
Notwithstanding the threat in Guideline number 10, it is essential to consider the critical pre-
requisites for the success of a “best of both mergers”. Stahl et al. (1998) point out with 
explicit reference to DaimlerChrysler AG that this “promise of no pain” is very rare and very 
difficult. Can both sides trust each other? They see the necessary “degree of fairness”, “strong 
mutual respect” and “similar culture” being fulfilled in cases such as AstraZeneca and 
Exxon/Mobil but not in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover.  
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The strength of a culture comes from the internal consistency of the practices, which 
may not be there when the “best” parts are put together. Another danger in the “best of 
both” integration process is that it may become too political and time consuming. Who 
decides what is “best”? The process of making the decisions can be very complex. If 
both companies declare that the merger is one of equals, does that mean that top 
management is split 50/50, even in terms of excellence the split is 80/20? The 
controversy surrounding the DaimlerChrysler AG merger is a visible example of this 
frequent dilemma. Without strong mutual respect for the knowledge and skills of each 
company, this kind of strategy will not work. (Stahl et al. 2000 96) 
As the authors point out, the very term itself “best of both” is vague and must be interpreted 
by both sides in the same way. A more exhaustive discussion particularly of the complex of 
factors concerning organizational culture and trust will be conducted in the next chapter, but 
here it is also important to remark that many of the clear decisions actually made in the initial 
phase of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover had nothing to do with a “best of both” type of 
merger, but were normal “hierarchical” decisions as explained by Williamson (1981). The 
question is whether these hierarchical decisions served to foster a climate of trust or not. In 
certain areas of a newly merged company certain commonalities are necessary and self-
evident in order to do anything. A merged company cannot i.e. maintain distinct e-mail 
systems or distinct legal identities. In the case of DaimlerChrysler AG, IT was placed in 
American hands and Chrysler’s Lotus Notes quickly replaced Daimler’s Outlook software 
environment. There are a number of reasons for having one or the other system, but someone 
has to decide. The basis for the decision was not mutual agreement, because there was only 
one Chief Information Officer at DaimlerChrysler AG. Similarly, the option of becoming 
registered simultaneously as both an American and German or a German-American company 
did not exist. As Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) have pointed out, no true merger between 
Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler Inc. ever occurred. Chrysler became a fully owned subsidiary 
of DaimlerChrysler AG.  
Despite these two “hierarchical” examples, there were still more than a 1,000 post-merger 
integration projects to assess the success of the takeover. Interestingly enough, less than 50 of 
these groups were in the area of human resources (Dowling, Festing and Engle 2008) and the 
members of the Board responsible for Human Resources were not members of the Chairman’s 
Integration Council, the most important committee for designing and implementing the post 
merger integration strategy. 
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Two issues picked out by Stahl et al. (1998) as criteria for the failure of a Type 5 merger of 
equals will be analyzed in the next chapter; differing organizational culture and lack of trust. 
It will be argued that although the organizational cultures of Chrysler and Daimler varied 
greatly, that is in itself is not enough to explain the failure of the takeover. At the heart of the 
inability of the two companies to “share a common vision” (co-CEO Robert Eaton) is the role 
of “trust”. Trust is part of one of the “animal spirits” described by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) 
in their adaption of the Keynesian term (Keynes 1936). Just as Akerlof and Shiller employ the 
“animal spirits” to uncover the source of underlying instability in Adam Smith’s reliance on 
the efficiency and fairness of the invisible hand, so too does this upcoming chapter point to 
the “animal spirits” as the critical source of the destruction of trust and the DaimlerChrysler 
AG myth of a “merger of equals”.   
6.3 Differing organizational culture and trust at DaimlerChrysler AG  
As we noted in the previous chapter, the Type 5 DaimlerChrysler AG merger of equals is the 
most difficult of mergers because it relies on similar corporate cultures and the perception of 
the principle actors that decisions are being made in a framework of trust. The next section 
will therefore take a look at these factors to determine if all or any of them are necessary and 
sufficient conditions to determine the failure of a “best of both” cross-border merger. The 
following aspects will be examined; the first section will briefly consider some aspects of 
organizational culture. Organizational or corporate culture is not a self-explanatory category 
for economists (Hermalin 2000) and is often relegated to the “sloppier” realms of sociology 
(Schein 1980) or political economy (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, building on the work 
of Porter (1980), Kreps (1980) and Baron and Kreps (1999) a consistent framework will be 
generated for an analysis of the roles of differing organizational cultures in the success or 
failure of cross-border mergers from the perspective of economic theory. Specifically, it will 
be argued that although organizational culture plays a significant role in the fate of a merger, 
it is not a showstopper in itself. It is rather the case that the greater the cultural differences in a 
“merger of equals” the more important it becomes to build on the creation of trust in order to 
both facilitate reciprocal decision-making and enable the possibility of overcoming 
incomplete and inefficient contracting.  
In a further step the second section will consider the organizational pre-requisites that are 
necessary for an atmosphere of trust to be created and allowed to exist, to be maintained, and 
to thrive or to decline. As can be shown from the structure of organizations, any form of 
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reciprocal interaction requires a certain amount of trust and fairness. Company organizations 
are more complex than the micro-economic tools of game theory and agent theory suggest. 
Game theory helps to explain how self-interest can generate trust and cooperation between 
contracting parties, but even a transaction cost approach has to admit its limitations (Baron 
and Kreps 1999), as will be illustrated in the next section. Although Leeson (2009) has shown 
how pirates can generate some common denominators of trust, the existence of “animal 
spirits” should not make it surprising that piracy or membership in a political organization, for 
example, is often less stable than being a member of more internally consistent organizational 
cultures such as the Mafia or working for Daimler-Benz. Therefore in a further step, the 
following section will look specifically at the amounts of trust necessary in order to deal with 
radical changes in organizations such as mergers. In order to accomplish this task the section 
will utilize Cohen and Prusak’s concept of “social capital” (2001). 
The analysis of social capital will consist of an examination of the functions of the 4 factors 
Cohen and Prusak consider essential in order to create the high social capital that is necessary 
to deal with volatile and demanding issues of change management such as a “best of both 
cross-border mergers”. Those factors are trust, networks and communities, space and time to 
connect, and social talk and storytelling. The four factors will be applied to the 
DaimlerChrysler AG case to demonstrate how all four actually led to the destruction of 
whatever levels of social capital were available at the beginning of the takeover within the 
Daimler and Chrysler organizations respectively. Without this social capital the promise of a 
merger of equals was over as early as November 2000, when Schrempp’s interview publicly 
documented a clear breach of trust. As of January 2001 the focus shifted to a fight for the 
survival of Chrysler under German management. 
6.3.1 An economic framework for organizational culture 
The discussion of the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) already 
encountered a concept of organizational culture. In their attempt to unite the disciplines of 
economics and political economy their understanding of organizational culture plays a central 
role in Hall and Soskice’s differentiation between liberal market (LME) and coordinated 
market economies (CME). Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992) the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach emphasizes the continued existence of coordination issues even within hierarchical 
settings, problems that can only be explained through the existence of other factors such as 
“culture, informal rules and history”. 
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Many actors learn to follow a set of informal rules by virtue of experience with a 
familiar set of actors and the shared understandings that accumulate from this 
experience constitute something like a common culture. This concept of culture as a set 
of shared understandings or available “strategies for action” developed from experience 
of operating in a particular environment is analogous to those developed in the 
“cognitive turn” taken by sociology (Swidler 1986; DiMaggio and Powell 1991).  Our 
view of the role that culture can play in the strategic interactions of the political 
economy is similar to the one Kreps (1990) accords it in organizations faced with 
problems of incomplete contracting. (Hall and Soskice 2001 13) 
This definition is compatible with that of the leading sociological theory of organizational 
culture as expressed by Edgar Schein (1980; 2004). 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and is passed on to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein 2004). 
Although Schein’s wording is not identical to that of Hall and Soskice, the intention is the 
same. Both approaches are trying to grasp holistic phenomena, which play a role in decision-
making and which cannot be derived from the atomistic assumptions of either contracting 
parties or the interaction of hierarchies. Schein’s complex theory goes beyond the needs of 
this discussion and an attempt to “match” his theoretical concepts to the DaimlerChrysler AG 
takeover would run the risk of getting sidetracked in secondary details. It is rather more 
productive to adhere to Schein’s intention of establishing a rather general definition, in order 
to avoid the risk of prematurely eliminating factors which may influence organizational 
culture at Company A or Company B. 
From the perspective of micro-economic theory this approach is certainly uncomfortable at 
best and perhaps inexcusable or just plain “esoteric” at worst. As Hermalin (2000) has pointed 
out the reasons for this are quite obvious: 
In particular, with a few exceptions (notably Kreps 1990; Cremer 1993; Lazear 1995; 
Hodgson 1996), economists have ignored the issue of corporate culture in their studies 
of firms and other organizations. There are many reasons for this lack of attention: 
culture is not relevant in most economic modeling; culture is not rational (or at least not 
obviously so) and, hence, does not fit well with the rational-agent methodology of 
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neoclassical economics; and culture is difficult to define or measure, making it hard to 
use or control for in econometric analyses (Hermalin 2000: 1) 
In his seminal paper on corporate culture and economic theory, Kreps (1990) uses agency 
theory and the theory of repeated games and reputation as a means of bridging the gap 
between Williamson’s (1985) expanded concept of transaction costs and the need to create a 
theoretical framework to explain the central role of organizations in making strategic 
decisions concerning the future. It suffices for this study that Kreps considerations are 
consistent with factors relevant to the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover situation. Indeed, agency 
theory and game theory can go a long way in helping economists to understand the nature of 
reciprocity and reputation in repeated interactions. It can explain the need for simple, clear, 
concise communication between employees and between generations of employees in an 
organization. Game theory can also explain conditions under which a hierarchical relationship 
can be replaced by a more balanced one. However, game theory has severe limitations as 
Kreps himself points out. Game theory assumes that the parties have the correct expectations 
about how other parties will act and react. This accounts for the wide variety of equilibrium 
possible. Game theory does not explain which particular set of expectations will be used. In 
our analysis of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure it will be shown that the Daimler 
side, for example, completely underestimated the rationale of top Chrysler executive’s 
strategy to leave the firm. The rationale of their behavior can only be ascertained with 
knowledge of past reputation and the organizational culture and history of Chrysler. Secondly, 
game theory provides us no idea as to what determines the objectives of the parties involved. 
In games such as prisoner’s dilemma the parameters are simple and fixed, but in real life 
intangible factors such as honor, revenge, kin, greed, ego etc. play a significant role, even in a 
real life example as simple as two thieves finking or not finking during police interrogation. 
In a situation as complex as a takeover involving 400,000 employees it is much more difficult 
to ascertain the critical objectives. Why did Chrysler employees follow Iacocca in 1980, Lutz 
in 1992 but not Schrempp in 1998? That is a question only a precise analysis of the case can 
suggest. In Baron and Krep’s (2003) own words these limitations of game theory are where 
“economics meets the other social sciences”. 
Nevertheless the nature of DaimlerChrysler AG executive’s decisions of how best to 
implement the goals of a merger of equals do indeed involve factors described and modeled 
by Kreps (1990). Executives do not decide as individual agents but rather in roles and 
directives given to them by the firm. The willingness to do so is a “faith” in the authority to 
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do so. This faith is the “glue” which permits transactions that are both mutually beneficial and 
minimize transaction costs. In order for employees to make decisions about unforeseen 
circumstances in the future they need a sense of expectation of “how things are done and how 
things are meant to be done”. This is what Kreps refers to as corporate culture. This 
understanding of corporate culture also corresponds to economist Michael Porter’s (1980) 
definition, which refers to “norms of conduct, work attitudes, and the values and assumptions 
about relationships that govern behavior at the organization”. The ideas of Hall and Soskice 
(2001), Schein (1980), Porter (1980), Krep (1990) and Baron and Krep (1999) thus provide us 
with a common sociological, political economical and economical framework, in order to 
discuss the impact of corporate cultural differences on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. 
6.3.2 Conflicting cultures cannot explaining takeover failures 
 
A number of studies point to conflicting organizational cultures as one of the main reasons 
behind the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000; 
Weber and Camerer 2003; Vlasic and Stertz 2000). But while many cross border mergers do 
fail, some of them do succeed despite radical differences in organizational culture. What is it 
specifically about differing cultures which seem to stand in the way of success in cases such 
as DaimlerChrysler AG but is neither a necessary nor sufficient showstopper in other cases 
such as Daimler-Benz / Freightliner or Renault-Nissan? 
Thus far this study has shown how both Daimler and Chrysler in early 1998 were under 
tremendous pressure to do something in the highly dynamic “urge to merge” phase of the 
global car industry in the 1990s. This pressure perhaps forced them into a quick and unwise 
decision to agree to a takeover. This was particularly evident in the radically different 
outcomes of the negotiations in 1995 and 1998 between the two companies. Although 
Chrysler was being targeted for a leverage buyout by its biggest stockholder and a former 
CEO in 1995, the offer of “help” from Daimler in the role of being a white knight was 
carefully weighed up until both sides agreed to remain friendly but to enter no form of 
cooperation. As Vlasic and Stertz (2000) have shown in their analysis of the Lone-Star and Q-
Star alternatives discussed at the time, the working groups scrutinized all the options 
meticulously and could ascertain no meaningful synergy interfaces between Daimler and 
Chrysler. This was not the case 3 years later when Daimler CEO approached Chrysler CEO 
Eaton at the Detroit automobile show in January 1998. A group of less than 10 people, 
concerned primarily with strategic considerations and far removed from operative reality, met 
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and decided the biggest takeover in industrial history in less than 4 months (Vlasic and Stertz 
2000). 
Secondly, as was discussed in the last chapter, the study has also shown how a “merger of 
equals” is the most difficult kind of merger to implement. Stahl et al. (2004) suggest that the 
fate of DaimlerChrysler AG was sealed due to differing company cultures. The discussion of 
the different types of mergers in the last chapter was an important pre-requisite for narrowing 
down our search for the reasons behind the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. A 
“merger of equals” is only one of five “models” of post-merger strategies and this focus 
allows us to start making sense of a lot of the inconsistencies and frustrations in the seemingly 
unending stream of studies of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. As soon as one starts 
looking at 10 or 100 or 1,000 case studies the statistical results are biased if one does not first 
discriminate between different merger strategies. This bias can then lead to blanket 
generalizations such as Weber and Camerer’s claim (2003) that the DaimlerChrysler AG 
takeover failure was simply indicative of the expected failure of any merger due to 
incompatible company cultures: 
Differences in culture between the two organizations were largely responsible for this 
(DaimlerChrysler AG) failure Operations and management were not successfully 
integrated as “equals” because of the entirely different ways in which the Germans and 
Americans operated: while Daimler-Benz’s culture stressed a more formal and 
structured management style, Chrysler favored a more relaxed, freewheeling style (to 
which it owed a large part of its pre-takeover financial success). In addition, the two 
units traditionally held entirely different views on important things like pay scales and 
travel expenses. As a result of these differences and the German unit’s increasing 
dominance, performance and employee satisfaction at Chrysler took a steep downturn 
(Weber and Camerer 2003 401). 
Although all of the individual details in the above quote are somehow correct details of the 
story, the analytical conclusion is incorrect due to a lack of cohesion in the explanation and a 
failure to differentiate between details, consequences and reasons. A shopping list is not a 
recipe and the description of varying cultures is not sufficient to explain why their integration 
must necessarily fail. There is a risk of reductionism present here which is similar to the 
previous chapter on Hofstede (1980) and intercultural differences. Moreover Weber and 
Camerer’s claim (2003) that their experimental approach shows why practically all mergers 
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between companies with varying cultures must necessarily fail is empirically unproven. As 
Very, Lubatkin and Calori (1996) have argued, in some cases cross-border mergers between 
different national and company cultures the presence of obvious differences can elicit feelings 
of attraction rather than negative tension. Building on the work of Schein (1985) and 
Rousseau (1990), they point out that organizational culture might be so unique in each case, 
that practically no two companies can be identical, a fact which begs the question concerning 
the chance of success for any merger. Their major contention is simple but powerful. 
The objective fact that two merging organizations’ cultures differ does not necessarily 
imply that the selling firm will naturally resist any post-merger consolidation attempts. 
Indeed, the acquired firm, for various reasons, may be attracted to the buying firm’s 
values, and may willingly assimilate their ways (Very, Lubatkin and Calori 1996) 
Analogous to the DaimlerChrysler AG metaphor of the „marriage made in heaven“, it is 
obviously true that many couples thrive based on the attraction of opposites. For example, 
some German women are attracted to some Canadian men in part because they are different, 
whereas some German women are not attracted to Canadian men because they are not 
German. No one gave the Renault-Nissan Alliance a chance when it began at the same time as 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. This was a clash not only of two radically differing 
national cultures but also a clash of two radically differing corporate cultures. However, it has 
worked. Despite the financial crisis and the horrendous Tsunami last year, Renault-Nissan has 
posted record results in the last three year, with a growth rate of 10% in 2011 and sales of 
more than 8 million vehicles (DaimlerChrysler AG Internet Appendix 6.1).  It is sometimes 
possible to choose the best of both possible worlds. The children of the author have a German 
mother and a Canadian father. When it comes to sports they support Germany in football and 
Canada in ice hockey. Weber and Camerer (2003) cannot explain such examples.  
Similarly in their study of approximately 350 French and British firms which had been 
acquired, Very, Lubatkin and Calori (1996) could not ascertain that executives either for 
reasons of national cultural or organizational differences experienced the change as 
necessarily “stressful”. The possible “positive” impact of combining two radically differing 
national and corporate culture has also been suggested by Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) 
and Larsson and Risberg (1998), papers which have already been mentioned in the discussion 
of Hofstede’s theory. Failure seems to be dependent on a description of exactly how the 
company executives in a merger actually perceive the ramifications of obvious differences, 
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rather than on the evident fact that there will always be differences between two 
organizational cultures. Stahl et al. (2004) describe the reluctance of the Japanese tire giant 
Bridgestone to move in and “clean up the mess” after they acquired the US firm Firestone as a 
case of false management perception. Fears of being perceived as “the ugly Japanese” 
overruled the common sense realization that Firestone required a radical restructuring of its 
corporate culture. In such cases it is quite possible that the management of the acquired 
companies is fully conscious of its weaknesses and would be pleased for an external force to 
intervene, in much the same manner as an external consulting firm is regularly pulled into 
organizations in order to overcome internally gridlocked situations.  The willingness to 
perceive differing corporate cultures as positive depends on a number of factors, which were 
not present in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover, but as the next section will argue, the 
existence of differing corporate cultures in a merger of equals is not a conditio sine qua non 
for their failure. 
6.3.3 The Daimler-Benz culture: pride and arrogance  
Almost every study of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure points to differing company 
cultures as the reason for the failure. In order to succeed it is easier if both companies have 
similar cultures. This was not the case at DaimlerChrysler AG. Cross-border mergers 
involving different languages, different legal structures, different form of corporate 
government and different brand approaches put a tremendous burden on the interaction 
processes in the post-takeover integration phase. Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) begin and 
end their analysis of value creation in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover with the same quote. 
On balance, we conclude by echoing and expanding on the words of Myers (1976), who 
said “Mergers are tricky; the benefits and costs of proposed deals are not always obvious” . 
To wit we add: International mergers are even trickier; the benefits and hidden costs of 
these combinations are even less obvious (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000 100). 
The presence of radically different corporate cultures made this task even more difficult. It is 
not very difficult to make a list of the differences between Daimler and Chrysler. It is, 
however, more important to scrutinize the details in order to ascertain as precisely as possible 
which aspects of the respective cultures facilitated or prevented a “merger of equals”. This 
section will argue that certain core aspects of Daimler’s corporate culture of “pride and 
arrogance” prevented them for being able to learn from Chrysler’s achievements in the same 
manner as Chrysler was forced to eat humble pie in the early 1990s. Faced with bankruptcy, 
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the Chrysler Board had the courage to fire its iconic CEO Lee Iacocca and install a new 
Chrysler management, which accepted the fact that they needed to learn from companies like 
AMC and Honda.  
This section will begin by exploring the most salient aspects of Daimler culture. The analysis 
will restrict itself to aspects of Daimler-Benz surrounding the Mercedes brand in the 
passenger car division because this is interface to the Chrysler takeover. Of course Daimler-
Benz in 1998 was also building commercial airplanes, military vehicles, commercial trucks 
etc. However, these business units were not directly affected by the Chrysler deal. In a 
previous chapter it has been shown how the expansion and diversification of Daimler-Benz in 
the 1980s and 1990s had led to an alienation of the passenger car division within the Daimler-
Benz kingdom. Negative events over a 15-year period had culminated in a rivalry between the 
headquarters’ driven visionaries of CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s Welt AG and the operative level 
defenders of the Mercedes brand led by Helmut Werner. Round 1 of the battle between Welt 
AG and the Mercedes team was won by Schrempp, when he successfully forced Werner to 
leave the company in early 1997 (Der Spiegel 4, 1997). The success of a “merger of equals” 
however, would require motivating Mercedes executives to adapt their prevailing mindset and 
do their best to generate operative synergy effects between themselves and Chrysler. 
So what makes the Mercedes car division different from other company cultures? Joining a 
new organization means learning a great number of big and small details, which go far 
beyond the scope of an HR job description. To re-quote Kreps, it entails finding out “how 
things are done and how things are meant to be done”.  In the case of Mercedes this means 
stepping into a 125 year old tradition, extending in some families over 4 generations. In a 
country justifiably proud of their prowess in engineering, this is one of the most prestigious of 
all German firms. As one Mercedes commercial spot puts it, “we did not invent the wheel, but 
we are happy to talk about the rest”. Benz did invent the automobile (1886). Daimler did 
invent the modern racing car (1900) and the list of innovative accomplishments in the areas of 
engines, safety, and styling is very long and impressive. The continuity of Daimler-Benz has 
been dependent on the creation of a unique corporate culture. Even before the occupations 
associated with building cars existed, Daimler was intent on building a company permanently 
centered on the kind of “craftsmanship” which characterized the automobile industry until 
Ford entered the scene. The Sindelfingen location was chosen in 1915 because the town had 
an abundant supply of highly skilled leather tanners, a trade require hand dexterity (Ehrmann 
1998). There were no metal workers in 1915. But there were trained workers and existing 
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hierarchies of journeymen and Meister (masters). On the development side there was a strong 
core of engineering, stemming from German institutions of higher education such as the 
Fachhochschulen (Polytechnical) in Esslingen (1886), the technische Hochschulen (Institute 
of Technology) in Stuttgart (1876) in the greater Stuttgart area. With close proximity to first 
tier suppliers such as Bosch (1886), Müller (1863) and Weingarten (1866) Daimler was 
perfecting the art of “clustering” before the concept was invented. The first 36 cars were 
hand-made and sold collectively for over 3 million dollars in today’s money (Lengert and 
Dreher 2010).  Up until the 1990s executives would point to the more than one million 
options available to customers as proof of the continuation of the original Mercedes’ 
philosophy. Most employees join companies without any real knowledge of the company’s 
past and often that is not important. That is not possible at Daimler. The apprenticeship centre 
in the Sindelfingen flagship facility displays a replica of Carl Benz’s invention and every day 
VIPs visit the facility. The indoctrination into this special environment is complex and long. 
One does not become a Meister overnight and quick promotion is viewed as a sign of 
weakness in the face of experience. The first public appreciation of services rendered to 
company employee is presented after 25 years and the celebration of a career does not occur 
until after 40 years of membership in the Daimler family. Throughout its history the company 
has been technocratic in nature and it is often joked that Daimler is so strong that it can 
survive the worst of CEOs, a claim that has indeed often been tested to the limit in the last 
125 years (Der Spiegel 37, 1985). 
A job at Mercedes was always considered the safest forms of employment available and even 
into the 1930s workers were called “Beamte”, the German term for civil servants (Grunow-
Osswald 2006; Thieme 2004). Reductions in the workforce until the 1990s were unheard of 
and even crisis situations in one division were managed by the practice of sending workers 
into another division. Wages were higher than in the rest of the industry, and employees had a 
20% reduction on the price of a new car, which until the 1990s could be sold at a profit after 
one-year ownership. Pensions were high and the company even offered cheap mortgages to 
allow workers to achieve the loftiest of Swabian dreams, building their own house. Despite 
the fact that union membership in the mid 1980s was over 90%, there was an extremely high 
degree of identification with the firm. Being employed by Mercedes was like being a member 
of a large extended family with its own unique forms of communality and kinship rights. 
Becoming a member of the Daimler family meant passing through several acts of initiation. 
This initiation involves acquiring new words and ways of communicating to adapt and enable 
new employees “to learn the ropes”. At Mercedes you look for “Wertanmutung” (sense of 
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value) when judging the aesthetic appeal of a new model. You need the “Rahmenheft” for 
technical specifications. Meetings in production are called “Ständerling” (quick and dirty 
meetings) to emphasize their short and pragmatic nature and the tradition of not sitting down. 
You can say “Mahlzeit” (Enjoy your meal) at any time of the day in the huge Sindelfingen 
facility near Stuttgart and has nothing to do with eating. It means “hello” and “I belong here”. 
It involves knowing why the Sindelfingen workers don’t really like the workers at their 
“sister” plant in Bremen and deeply believe the northern “Fischköpfe” (fish heads) should be 
building ships instead of cars. In a personal discussion a member of the S-Class team just 
shrugged upon hearing that the C-class production was to be moved to the United States with 
the comment; “It’s not really a Mercedes anyway.” In a big company like Daimler it takes 
years to acquire the vocabulary and style of doing business and interacting with internal and 
external friends and foes. This indoctrination allows most of the actors to learn “the rules of 
the game” and for a few the opportunity of knowing when to break these rules to become 
more successful or powerful or both.  
At the core of the Mercedes mindset is a fierce sense of pride, which unfortunately often 
manifests itself as arrogance, both inside and outside the company. The car division considers 
itself to be superior to the commercial vehicle division. The S-Class people see themselves as 
superior to the C-class. And this attitude was clearly evident in their dealings with Chrysler 
employees. The Chrysler people were sensitive to this issue for two reasons: Firstly, 
arrogance could have no place in a true “merger of equals”. Secondly, Chrysler’s success in 
the 1990s was the result of consciously overcoming their previously arrogant attitude towards 
suppliers and Japanese approaches to building cars. Chrysler had gone through a radical phase 
of changing their corporate culture. They had actually “learned” from Honda and generated an 
American version of the Japanese company’s approach to trust relationships with suppliers. In 
actual fact, Chrysler rightfully felt that they could offer a lot to the German side. However, the 
unwillingness of the Mercedes people to really listen, as will be exemplified in the story of 
the M-Class in the next chapter, was the key factor in preventing the creation of an 
atmosphere of trust.   
Mercedes pride and arrogance caused Chrysler executive’s to experience negatively the 
highly visible different ways the two companies had doing business. Meetings were longer 
and more detailed at Mercedes. For Mercedes this was the price of paying attention to detail. 
For Chrysler it was a sign of inefficiency. Mercedes had more headcount to prepare their 
presentations and agendas meticulously and to record the results in comprehensive reports. 
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But at the time of the takeover, the bottom line for Chrysler was their ability to produce twice 
as many cars as Mercedes with as little bureaucracy as possible. In the time between 1988 and 
1996 Chrysler had reduced its development time from 60 to 24 months. Their Research and 
development costs were $550 per vehicle compared to $2,000 at Mercedes (Meyer et al. 
2002). That’s what made them different from GM and Ford and Daimler. They were fast and 
could tap in quicker to the rapidly volatile market situation. This speed and trendiness was 
mirrored by Chrysler’s whole business environment. Dress code was casual at Chrysler 
whereas even junior managers wore suits and ties at Mercedes. The offices at Mercedes were 
twice as large as their Chrysler counterparts. Mercedes executives flew business or first class 
and had huge travel budgets, whereas Chrysler kept a close eye on such costs. Still, Chrysler 
executives earned much higher salaries and could afford a much higher private standard of 
living than their counterparts in Stuttgart. Chrysler people saw this as an understandable 
reward for the high risk-taking and volatile American car industry. Their German 
counterparts’ life-long job security was viewed as an obstacle to fast decision-making. 
German executives worked long hours whereas their American counterparts went home early. 
All of these differences were very visible and not conducive to progressing successfully with 
a merger of equals. But they could have been overcome if Mercedes had been willing to 
consider the advantages Chrysler had to offer. 
In order to succeed it is easier if both companies have similar cultures. This was not the case 
at DaimlerChrysler AG. Cross-border takeoverss involving different languages, different legal 
structures, different forms of corporate government and different brand approaches put a 
tremendous burden on the interaction processes in the post-takeover integration phase. That 
entails an even more important role for “fairness” and “trust”.  Success requires both sides 
being willing to trust each other and being willing to hand over power to the other side if 
necessary. It also entails having both sides perceive that the process is “fair” If neither side is 
willing to sacrifice nor is there anyone forcing a decision, then probably both sides will 
tactically agree not to find common ground. The necessity of creating the Executive 
Automotive Committee is evidence that both sides were following this strategy in the initial 
post merger integration projects. 
Evidence of this tension, arrogance and lack of equality is present in the very first press 
conference in London on May 7th, moderated by both co-CEOs, Jürgen Schrempp and Bob 
Eaton (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 1.1). In his announcement Eaton says the most 
important goal is to have “a shared culture and vision”. At the same time both CEOs stressed 
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the importance of their own brands, yet curiously draw attention to the importance of realizing 
synergy effects by cooperating in the areas of manufacturing and engineering. What does that 
mean concisely? One reporter’s question directed to Bob Eaton asked about common 
platforms. He answered that he certainly expected “common parts and components and 
engines and maybe platforms”. In the same press conference Schrempp highlights Chrysler’s 
manufacturing superiority in terms of manufacturing (platforms) but he prioritizes uniqueness 
and brand identity (no platforms), thus leaving one New York Times reporter puzzling about 
the source of any possible synergies. In their May 8th comment of the biggest industrial 
takeover in history the reporter differentiated between what looks good “on paper” and the 
“practical difficulties”. 
Mr. Schrempp made it abundantly clear today that one thing would remain separate 
from Chrysler: the prestige of Mercedes. Despite a wall-sized video presentation that 
showed Chrysler and Mercedes stars intermingling, Mr. Schrempp vowed to block any 
activity that might allow Chrysler’s middle-class brand to tarnish the luxury image of 
Mercedes. (...) But that will make it more difficult for Mercedes to expand its presence 
in the United States and Chrysler to expand in Europe. Each company has only about 1 
percent of the market in the other’s territory, and they could take advantage of each 
other’s extensive network of dealerships. But that will not happen, Mr. Schrempp said, 
because it poses too much risk of mixing brand identities. (New York Times May 8th, 
1998) 
Schrempp himself expresses this contradiction in the press conference when he says; “We 
possibly will exchange, no we certainly will exchange component parts” (DaimlerChrysler 
AG Video Appendix 1.1). It is not surprising that these comments confused anyone involved 
in development, engineering and manufacturing at Chrysler and Mercedes. Of course, a press 
conference is not a complete post-merger integration process, but the dominance of the 
German CEO set the tone. Schrempp set out his vision of a Welt AG, mentioning the search 
for a further partner in the Asiatic sphere. Eaton was left to struggle with the pronunciation  
the names of the members of the Board, in which the Germans had more members anyway. It 
was also announced that Eaton would retire within 3 years, leaving Schrempp as sole CEO. 
For any insider, it was obvious who was in control.  
Still it is the metaphors of the “marriage made in heaven” and the “merger of equals” which 
survived the press conference. The promise of the “best of both” merger propagated by 
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Schrempp and Eaton provide us with criteria for judging the success of creating a shared 
vision. Will they use each other’s facilities? Will they exchange common parts, components 
and maybe platforms etc? Will both sides work together? Those questions cannot be answered 
by pointing out differences in company culture alone. The answer requires an examination of 
how the two merging companies actually approached each other in the post takeover 
integration phase. The next section will examine the role of low levels of “social capital” at 
both firms as a means of measuring the failure of the takeover. 
6.4 Social capital and the takeover failure  
In their comprehensive study of mergers and acquisitions, Marks and Mirvis (1998) see the 60 
to 80% failure rate as a result of the difficulties of bringing together different organizational 
cultures to create a high level of what Cohen and Prusak (2001) refer to as “social capital”. 
Mergers and acquisitions mean radical changes for most major actors at both companies and 
most companies make the mistake of underestimating the “soft factor” role of human 
interaction in favor of comparing quantifiable financial assets, technologies and markets. Both 
Daimler and Chrysler were evaluated by external consulting companies, who had no real 
means of measuring the quality of the existing organizational cultures from the outside. And 
although economists are pained to avoid factors which are not easily quantifiable it is obvious 
that the willingness to trust each other reciprocally plays a big role in the post merger 
integration process, especially if the strategy is being presented as a merging of two equal 
partners and not a acquiring/acquired situation as described by Marks and Mirvis (1998). 
Quoting an internal study investigating the reasons behind the failed British Telekom / MCI 
merger, Cohen and Prusak (2001) draw attention to the critical conclusion that the company in 
the future would need to conduct a “robust cultural audit” before embarking on organizational 
changes. Cohen and Prusak see “social capital” as the key human resources pre-requisite for 
making business organizations work well. Their concept of “social capital” is comparable to 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) understanding of “culture” and “history” in company organizations. 
Both approaches see these factors as a necessary expansion of the narrow neo-classical 
reliance on markets and hierarchies to explain the coordination of economic activity 
(Williamson 1981)  
Social capital consists of the stock of active connections among people: the trust, 
mutual understanding and shared values that bind the members of human networks and 
communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusak 2001 4) 
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Although Cohen and Prusak shy away from any attempts to quantify “social capital” the 
component parts initiative, creativity, interaction, commitment, collaboration and trust 
can be measured in terms of positive or negative, high or low within a company. Relying on 
various aspects of their concept of social capital it is possible to show that both Daimler and 
Chrysler were not up to the immense change management demands of the largest industrial 
takeover in history. There seems little evidence that much attention was paid to conducting a 
“cultural audit” as described by Cohen and Prusak. Although the results of such a “cultural 
audit” do not allow us to automatically predict the outcome of radical change events such as 
mergers or restructuring plans, they do provide us with a good idea of the scope and nature of 
the task at hand. When Lee Iacocca took over Chrysler in 1978 company morale was at an all-
time low, as the company seemed destined for bankruptcy. The genius and success of Iacocca 
was his willingness to first address this central topic of morale before proceeding to technical, 
financial and marketing issues (Abodaher 1982).  Similarly when Renault took over Nissan in 
1998 and radically restructured the organizational culture of the Japanese side, social capital 
was very low. Not only Nissan employees but also Japanese society as a whole was incensed 
at this French destruction of their way of organizational culture (Gill 2012). However, in 
contrast to the verdict on DaimlerChrysler AG, experts tend to view the directness and 
severity of Renault’s strategy as a key to the success of the merger (Morosini 2005). This 
judgment contrasts starkly with the fate of DaimlerChrysler AG, which went from the dream 
start of a “marriage made in heaven” in 1998 to the Spiegel article announcing the Valentine’s 
Day 2007 divorce as the “marriage made in hell”. Ironically, overconfidence on the German 
side, especially on the part of CEO Jürgen Schrempp, seems to have led the company to 
underestimate the role of social capital in the merger and the consequences of his broken 
promises for employees on both sides of the new company. Less than a year into the takeover 
Schrempp was focusing his energy on the search for a suitable Asian partner to complete the 
“Welt AG” and seems to have almost completely neglected crucial post merger integration 
issues at Chrysler (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000) 
This chapter will look at all 4 factors of “social capital” as understood by Cohen and Prusak 
(2001) as a means of analyzing the failure of the takeover. Those factors are: 
1. trust 
2. networks and communities 
3. space and time to connect  
4. social talk and storytelling 
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The four factors will be applied to the DaimlerChrysler AG case to demonstrate how all four 
actually led to the destruction of whatever levels of social capital had been available at the 
beginning of the takeover within the Daimler and Chrysler organizations respectively.   
6.4.1 Lack of trust after the takeover 
Ironically the issue of social capital was especially important in the case of DaimlerChrysler 
AG because of the nature of the promise of a “merger of equals”. This most difficult form of 
merger (Marks and Mirvis 1998) needs to use trust and open cooperation and commitment to 
transcend the conventional role distribution into “acquiring” and “acquired” firm. Cohen and 
Prusak’s concept of social capital builds an important interface to the challenge of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG merger of equals. Both depend on trust. In his announcement of the 
takeover in May 1998, Schrempp set out three major goals; increase in shareholder value, 
increase in customer satisfaction, and a maximization of synergy effects at the operational 
level of the business. The last goal involves the “social capital” factors, which go beyond 
many economists’ rational approach to decision-making. 
In Animal Spirits, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) see “trust” as a central component and multiplier 
of confidence. In the course of the business cycle it allows us to explain both why people trust 
more in good times thus impulsively generating more good times and why bad times become 
even worse once people become distrustful. 
[According to most economists] a confident prediction is one that projects the future to 
be rosy; an unconfident prediction projects the future as bleak (...) But if we look up 
confidence in the dictionary, we see that it is more than a prediction. The dictionary says 
it means “trust” or “full-belief”. The word comes from the Latin fido, meaning “I trust.” 
The confidence crisis that we are at the time of this writing (2008) is also called a credit 
crisis. The word credit derives from the Latin credo, meaning “I believe.” (...) Given 
these additional shades of meaning, the economists’ point of view, based on dual 
equilibra or rosy vs. bleak predictions, seem to miss something. Economists have only 
partly captured what is meant by trust or belief. Their view suggests that confidence is 
rational: people use the information at hand to make rational predictions; they then 
make a rational decision based on those rational predictions. Certainly people often do 
make decisions, confidently, in this way. But there is more to the notion of confidence. 
The very meaning of trust is that we go beyond the rational. Indeed the truly trusting 
person often discards or discounts certain information. She may not even process the 
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information that is available to her rationally; even if she has processed it rationally, she 
still may not act on it rationally. She acts according to what she trusts to be true. 
(Akerlof and Shiller 2009 12) 
In order to obtain efficient market synergy results, both sides would have to be willing to sit 
down department by department at one table and decide rationally what and who can be 
preserved and what and who must be sacrificed for the common good. If there is to be only 
one head of non-productive purchasing for the company worldwide, then the other head has to 
negotiate his/her own exit; something most improbable at the best of times. Still Daimler and 
Chrysler were considered to be the most economically efficient automobile companies in their 
respective markets, so why didn’t such a neutral evaluation of the market situation occur? 
Akerlof and Schiller (2009) and Cohen/Prusak (2001) provide us with the answer; neither side 
trusted the other. For our purposes this raises the methodological question about how we can 
ascertain evidence of a lack of trust in the DaimlerChrysler AG case. Indeed, Cohen and 
Prusak describe positive examples of trust. As their description of Jewish diamond dealers in 
New York City shows, trust is a measurable economic cost factor. Furthermore, they point to 
a deep level of trust within the United Parcel Service (UPS) organization. Chrysler’s radical 
decision to build a platform of trust with their suppliers as one of the main reasons for the 
company’s comeback in the 1990s and this strategy allowed them to circumvent the 
economies of scale approach being employed by Ford and GM at the same time (Dyer 1996; 
Lutz 1998).  
However, it is always easier to secure published information on success stories rather than 
failures, especially in the American world of business and its huge market demand for 
popularized success stories all waiting to top the New York Times bestseller list. The failure 
of DaimlerChrysler AG takeover is still too fresh to expect objective information in the form 
of questionnaires or interviews. Too many of the major actors are still on the main stage. And 
those who have departed or were forced to depart are still occupied with justifying their role 
in the drama. Still it is possible to puzzle known events together and align them with the 
major aspects of high and low social capital as described by Cohen and Prusak (2001). 
Indeed, the very announcement of details of Board membership and other aspects of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in 1998 aroused rumors of distrust on the American side and 
raised questions of Schrempp’s sincerity on the German side. Schrempp and Eaton were to be 
co-CEO’s, but Eaton was to retire within 3 years and leave Schrempp as sole CEO of 
DaimlerChrysler AG. American executives could not buy that storyline as a “merger of 
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equals”. This “inequality” was also mirrored by German domination of both Boards (Blaško, 
Netter and Sinkey 2000). To them the Germans were more equal than the Chrysler people. 
The November 18th edition of the New York Times was entitled “Germans Tighten Grip at 
DaimlerChrysler AG” (The New York Times November 18th, 1998). That was one day after 
the company’s new stock, DCX, started on the Frankfurt and New York Stock Exchanges, 
and first real concrete details about the structure of DaimlerChrysler AG started to emerge in 
public. 
The issue of “confidence” and trust was also a problem within the Mercedes organization.  
Many managers at Daimler just did not “trust” their own new leadership under Schrempp. He 
had headed DASA and bought Fokker, one of the many decisions that Mercedes employees 
regarded as misdirected during Reuter’s era of a diversified technology vision of Daimler-
Benz. Together with his inner circle of former DASA executives, Cordes and Grube, they 
formed the Welt AG strategy team that had ousted Mercedes boss Werner in a very public and 
brutal power showdown between 1995 and 1997. Under CEO Reuter, Werner had been 
relatively independent in his handling of Mercedes. Although Werner had been brought in as 
a Daimler outsider from Continental in the late 1980s, he came to be known as Mr. Mercedes 
and was highly regarded as the man most responsible for saving the automotive division of 
the company after the crisis of 1992. After his resignation the title of Mr. Mercedes would be 
passed on to Hubbert. The name came to symbolize opposition within the Mercedes 
organizational culture to the Welt AG plans of CEO Schrempp and the fear that radical cost 
cutting and the reduction of development time were all adding up to the destruction of the 
world’s most famous luxury car brand.  
In contrast to Schrempp, Werner had established a good reputation amongst both blue- and 
white-collar employees as head of Mercedes. So while Schrempp was celebrated in the press 
as getting Daimler back on course after replacing Reuter in 1995, he and the rest of “bullshit 
castle” at the headquarters were deemed to be untrustworthy by Mercedes executives (Der 
Spiegel 38, 1997). The conflict climaxed when Werner wrote an open letter to Mercedes 
executives asking for their support to prevent Schrempp from gaining too much influence in 
the car passenger division. In addition he took his case openly to influential German magazine 
Der Spiegel and started giving interviews to the German press to support his cause. Schrempp 
squelched the rebellion and forced Werner’s resignation in January 1997. Despite the positive 
results at Daimler in 1996 and 1997, Werner’s firing and a shift to shareholder value were 
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seen as real future threats for the Mercedes car division. Mercedes’ people just did not trust 
Schrempp. 
The problem with trust lies in its fragility (Cohen and Prusak 2001). They point to the 
example of a good marriage, which can function well for 20 years and then be destroyed by 
one partner’s indiscretion. In Schrempp’s case, symbolically, his announcement of his divorce 
from his wife of many years as a choice of “career over marriage” was greeted with cynical 
smiles when he one year later announced his marriage to his assistant with whom he had had 
an open and well-known long year relationship. Parallels were quickly drawn to his “marriage 
with Chrysler” and the press and employees alike started to wonder about possible 
indiscretions. Indeed Schrempp’s rhetorical imaginary of a “marriage made in heaven” would 
come back to haunt him, especially after his October 2000 interview in the Financial Times 
quoted his intention to have always wanted to takeover Chrysler.  
DaimlerChrysler AG was a “takeover right from the start and was never supposed 
to be “a merger of equals.”( …) “Me being a chess player, I don’t normally talk about 
the second or third move” (The Financial Times October 30th, 2000). 
Although Schrempp would later deny the interview before an American court, the damage 
was done (N.Y Times Dec. 10th, 2003). Already two reporters from the Detroit News, Vlasic 
and Stertz, had published a 400-page documentary of “a bold German takeover of an 
American icon (2000; 2001). The book was widely read in the American automobile industry 
and even updated at the end of 2000 to take into account the unfolding “current crisis at 
DaimlerChrysler AG”. After the November 2000 interview at the latest, it was impossible for 
anyone on the Chrysler side to “trust” the Germans’ intentions. This had already been 
weakened by the forced retirement of Thomas Stallkamp, the last champion of an independent 
Chrysler cause in September 2000 and the resulting installation of Germans Dieter Zetsche 
and Wolfgang Bernhard as CEO and COO at Chrysler (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). This was 
accompanied by a restructuring of the Board, which witnessed a reduction of the American 
participation from 8 to 2 members. Schrempp’s interview merely confirmed in writing the 
breach of trust the American side had been experiencing since the very announcement of the 
takeover.  
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6.4.2 Destruction of networks after the takeover 
In addition to “trust” Cohen and Prusak (2001) emphasize the role of networks and 
communities in the creation and retention of high social capital. Following Fukuyama (1997) 
they define a network as “a group of individuals that share informal norms or values beyond 
those necessary for ordinary market transactions”. In fact, it is an illusion to assume that large 
companies can function without the existence of such informal ties and bonds, which go 
beyond rational decision making strategies. We have already seen evidence of that with both 
Iacocca’s takeover of Chrysler in 1978 and Bob Lutz’s restructuring of Chrysler. Iacocca 
brought in his most trusted co-workers from Ford in order to implement required changes. His 
biographer finds an almost religious devotion between Iacocca and his inner circle, but also a 
real measure of hate and resentment of his tyrannical powers from those outside of this circle 
both at Chrysler and Ford (Abodaher 1982). Lutz describes his reliance on perhaps a dozen 
key networked players who implemented the Chrysler turnaround in a company with more 
than 100,000 employees (Lutz 1998). Unfortunately these networks were consciously 
destroyed at the outset of DaimlerChrysler AG takeover and weakened the positive social 
capital, which Chrysler had created in the years leading up to the takeover. In comparison to 
GM, Ford or even Daimler with over 300,000 employees, Chrysler’s relative “smallness” 
made it easier for the power of networks to effect change. It was also the reason why Lutz had 
opposed Daimler’s first approach to cooperate with Chrysler in 1995 and why he would have 
preferred a partnership with the smaller BMW (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). Indeed in April 1998, 
just one month before the takeover, Lutz had negotiated a deal with BMW to build engines 
together in Brazil. Schrempp had been aware of the talks between Mercedes head Werner and 
Lutz and for that reason excluded Lutz from any of the 1997 takeover talks. Back in 1995, and  
after extensive studies, both Werner and Lutz agreed there was too little common ground 
between both companies to justify any form of joint venture let al.one a takeover (Vlasic and 
Stertz 2000). After the announcement of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover in May 1998, Bob 
Lutz resigned a few months later initiating an exodus of the people responsible for Chrysler’s 
success. Indeed about 20 of the top 30 executives at Chrysler before the takeover left the 
company within the first three years of DaimlerChrysler AG (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). 
Without the most important network of executive know-how and power responsible for 
Chrysler’s success, there was no one left to direct Chrysler strategy in their dealings with 
Daimler. Executives such as Stallkamp were quickly isolated and stood alone against 
Schrempp. As Vlasic and Stertz (2000) put it, “there simply was no Chrysler game plan”. 
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On the German side, Schrempp’s network was based on his long career in South Africa and 
later his team at DASA, including DaimlerChrysler AG Board members Cordes and Grube. 
Together with a few external consultants they formed the Welt AG strategy team that single-
handedly negotiated the DaimlerChrysler AG deal. The Welt AG team under Schrempp was 
perceived to be “outsiders” by executives inside the Mercedes passenger car division. During 
the Reuter years (1985-95) the head of Mercedes, Werner, was considered more powerful 
than CEO Reuter. His Mercedes division was responsible for 70% of sales and 90% of 
Daimler’s profits (Meyer et al. 2002). It was Werner who single-handedly initiated merger 
talks with Chrysler in 1995, and Schrempp knew that he was his most powerful rival once he 
became CEO in the same year (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). The two-year power struggle between 
the two led to Werner’s departure from the company and isolated the most important 
networks inside the Mercedes organization from Daimler’s Welt AG team at the critical time 
of the takeover. There was no significant group network of executives on the Mercedes side to 
make the “headquarters’ merger” work in terms of creating synergy effects. Even though 
Mercedes’ executives Zetsche, Hubbert and Bernhard became critical members of 
Schrempp’s team, the relationships remained pragmatic and tenuous. Bernhard and Zetsche, 
Mercedes best operational people, were sent off to save Chrysler at the end of 2000. Hubbert, 
who made no secret of his dislike for Chrysler, remained head of Mercedes, but was shortly 
before retirement.  
Cohen and Prusak (2001) show how networks combine to access the most important 
knowledge inside a company within a relatively safe and flat environment, in order to be at 
the centre of decision-making. Indeed despite its eventual failure, one of the initial successes 
of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was certainly the remarkable speed of the negotiations 
and the fact that it remained a secret until the formal announcement was made in May 1998. 
Even the otherwise well-informed German magazine Der Spiegel” reacted with its cover story 
of the surprise announcement with the title; “Das ist der Hammer” (This is a strike of 
lightning).That is testament to the power of networks. Schrempp, Cordes and Grube and a few 
other trusted members of the Welt AG strategy team negotiated the deal with Chrysler and 
later Mitsubishi, with very little further involvement of people within an organization 
comprising more than 300,000 employees.  
On the other hand, limits of the Welt AG strategy team network can be witnessed when 
Cordes took over as head of the Mercedes car group after Hubbert’s retirement in 2004. He 
started criticizing Zetsche’s handling of the situation at Chrysler, in full confidence that he 
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would now be Schrempp’s successor. However, Zetsche was a hero at Mercedes and had a 
strong network of fellow travellers going back to his days as head of the development 
department. Mercedes executives were indignant that Zetsche’s valiant efforts to save 
Chrysler and DaimlerChrysler AG were now being criticized by the people who had caused 
the problem in the first place. With a Schrempp ally now at the control of the Mercedes Car 
Group, the social capital on the German side deteriorated even further. Up until 2004 the 
Schrempp gang had stayed clear of the powerful car passenger division daily operations, but 
now there was fear that Welt AG team would also destroy the most important part of the 
company. Cordes had been head of the commercial vehicle division since 2000 and had no 
network of powerful friends inside the Mercedes Car Group. The beginning of the Welt AG’s 
downfall exemplifies Cohen and Prusak’s (2001) remark on the greatest weakness of 
networks, namely their tendency to dissolve into a “groupthink” modus, which can isolate the 
network from reality. Everyone inside the company with the exception of Schrempp’s Welt 
AG team was conscious of the weakness of the Mercedes brand in the wake of cost-cutting, 
deteriorated relationships to suppliers, reduced development times and confused marketing 
strategies. Although Welt AG team member Cordes remained head of Mercedes for less than 
a year his radical cost-cutting CORE program was perceived by insiders as a final deathblow 
to Mercedes’ quality.  
6.4.3 Negative space and time after the takeover 
In addition to networks and communities, Cohen and Prusak also point out the need for “time 
and space to connect” in order for social capital to develop. They consider waiting for 
airplanes, having a drink at the bar, coffee breaks, training course, lunches and car pools to be 
just as important as regular meetings and presentations and business calls. This is particularly 
true for managers and executives in large companies, where knowing what is in the “pipeline” 
has enormous consequences for department headcount, budgeting and project commitment. 
Space and time are the a priori concepts necessary for trust and networks to develop. It is 
only when one leaves the narrow framework of the meeting’s agenda or the presentation 
slides that executives experience to what extent they share common interests and to what 
extent they can rely on each other. That irrational part of confidence is best nurtured after the 
second glass of wine or having survived an unpleasant business trip together. Whereas Cohen 
and Prusak (2003) expend a lot of energy to expose the positive impact of creating such space 
and time, the DaimlerChrysler AG case demonstrates the exact opposite. 
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The space and time, which allows people to connect and bond, can also be used for spreading 
negative judgments, estimates and predictions about the situation within an organization. 
DaimlerChrysler AG did provide an enormous amount of negative space and time. Especially 
before the company Airbus was refitted in order to cross the Atlantic non-stop, the trip from 
Detroit to Stuttgart via Iceland was particularly time-consuming and tiring for the American 
side. Losing a night’s sleep, they would arrive over-tired and exhausted for an early morning 
meeting in Germany. German managers had similar experiences on their long flights to the 
East London facility in South Africa or the 18-hour trip from factory to factory from Stuttgart 
to Alabama. Missing a connecting flight from Atlanta to Birmingham or from Atlanta to 
Stuttgart gave Mercedes executives and employees lots of time to ponder the wisdom of the 
Welt AG strategy. More critical was the fact that the Daimler side was mostly travelling with 
fellow Germans and the Chrysler side with fellow Americans. There was very little time for 
connecting between Germans and Americans, and even fewer possibilities to clarify the fear, 
gossip, rumors and misunderstandings which accompany any radical change within an 
organization such as a restructuring or takeover. The evening meals during post merger 
integration projects were tense and more business-like because of the stakes on the line for 
both sides during the daytime and offered fewer opportunities for the kind of bonding, which 
normally takes place. Events such as the famous kick-off party at Seville, Spain in December 
1998 were the exception rather than the rule (Vlasic and Stertz  2000).  
The Welt AG strategy team was almost completely disconnected from the rest of both the 
Daimler and Chrysler organizations. The deal was started in the offices of Bob Eaton in 
Auburn Hills and negotiations conducted at secret hotels in Switzerland, New York and 
London. Schrempp’s Welt AG team spent most of their time bunkered down in the so-called 
“War Room” at the Stuttgart-Möhringen headquarters, producing spreadsheet numbers and 
visions for bankers and potential investors, while the rest of the company was trying to 
produce cars and trucks. It was therefore not surprising that Schrempp successor Zetsche 
closed down the headquarters in Stuttgart-Möhringen as one of his first decisions as new 
CEO. Built by Reuter in the late 1980s, Möhringen had come to symbolize the Board’s loss of 
contact with the real world. The palatial office complex incorporated the rift between the 
strategical visions of Schrempp’s Welt AG and the operational reality of the Mercedes 
passenger car division. Under Zetsche the headquarters was relocated to its original site 
within the premises of the Mercedes Untertürkheim factory. The whole culture, network, 
space and time of the Reuter-Schrempp era were eradicated in one executive decision. 
Zetsche made the need for a change in culture from the very beginning; 
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Next month Dieter Zetsche, Mr Schrempp’s successor, will go even further back to 
basics when his top managers move out of Möhringen to squeeze into a jumble of offices 
around the giant Untertürkheim engine factory, one of the oldest Mercedes factories, down 
in the industrial valley. Only some administration offices will remain up on the hill. Mr 
Zetsche explains the reasoning for the move: “There used to be an atmosphere of them and 
us,” he says, referring to the Daimler-Benz people on the hill and the car business people 
of Mercedes at the factory. “To overcome it, we decided we needed a symbol that we were 
one automotive company making cars and trucks every day, morning, noon and night.” 
(Economist March 30th, 2006) 
6.5 Stories at the core of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure 
 
The fourth critical factor in the concept of “social capital” is the quality of the “social talk” 
transmitted in conversation and informal communication within the time and space described 
by Cohen and Prusak (2001). One of the key factors in this context is the function of 
storytelling. 
Storytelling plays a central role in the creation and or destruction of social capital. People 
don’t just talk about technical things when developing, building and selling cars. Their 
conversations involve developing a mutual understanding on how to solve a problem, hold a 
meeting, exercise power, and a myriad of other communicative interactivity. This network of 
communication is different within each company and reflects the history of each company. 
With the exception of housing, automobiles are the most expensive consumer investments 
people make. And few consumer products are designed, produced and marketed with such 
high emotions. You can love or hate a particular car model, but the greatest worry of any 
producer is that customers find the styling neutral, boring or indifferent. This is still a major 
criticism of Japanese models and their history of copying American and European trends.  
The car industry is an industry famous for its stories. Larger than life legends such as Ford, 
Durant and Sloan at GM, Chrysler, Iaccoca, as well as Daimler, Maybach, Benz, Porsche and 
Ferrari are the subject of dozens of books and stories. Stories can be good or bad, just as the 
social capital within a company can be high or low. We will see that understanding the nature 
of the bad and good stories at both Daimler and Chrysler at the time of the takeover made it 
impossible to develop the framework required to implement a “merger of equals”. 
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Stories reflect both the history of an organization and provide important pillars of the 
framework for interaction. Every Chrysler employee can identify with Bob Lutz’s decision to 
title his autobiography “Guts” as a word symbolizing the comeback kid, roller coaster history 
of a company either going bankrupt or revolutionizing the market (Hyde 2003). Similarly, 
each new apprentice at the Daimler Sindelfingen facility works past a replica of the world’s 
first automobile and knows the tale of Benz’s wife stealing the car to drive from Mannheim to 
Pforzheim to visit relatives as the first automobile trip, including the tale of how she used her 
garter stockings to replace a broken fan belt. Consumers don’t flock to museums to look at 
washing machines, but in 2010 more than 650,000 people walked through eight office floors 
depicting the Mercedes legends in the areas of car design, car racing, car safety and car 
innovations of the last 125 years.  
Beyond the official and publicly distributed legends of iconic companies like Daimler and 
Chrysler, there is a huge collection of insider stories which contribute to the initiation of each 
new employee. Some stories are known throughout the company, whereas others are 
restricted for a chosen few and serve to cement the identity of a facility, or center or 
department. Such inside stories are not documented and thus cannot be told here and belong 
to an internal code of honor. Nevertheless their existence and significance for the quality of 
reciprocal interaction of the members of an organization cannot be denied. They center on 
great achievements or historical failures, power struggles, innovations, turf wars, and the 
other entire “events” one could imagine in the history of a business. Some are true, many are 
tremendous fictions, but all contribute to the acquired shared consciousness of an 
organization.  
The next sections will focus on three major stories, which illustrate why DaimlerChrysler AG 
failed. The first story focuses on the fate and loyalty of American executives at Chrysler after 
major acquisitions or restructurings. The second story focuses on the brand loyalty of 
Mercedes executives and their sense of pride and arrogance. The final story focuses on the 
fate of the M-Class after the takeover of Chrysler, and illustrates how the first two stories 
prevented DaimlerChrysler AG from achieving synergy benefits in an area of overlapping 
experience, where the German side could have profited from the superior SUV (sports utility 
vehicle) experience, know-how and success of their American counterparts. 
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6.5.1 Institutionalized disloyalty at Chrysler 
The tradition of storytelling in the US automobile sector is industry-wide, due to the fact that 
the 3 biggest companies are situated in the Greater Metropolitan Detroit Area. Executives 
move back and forth from company to company as top executives can be quickly fired and 
rehired at a pace unknown to the German automobile sector. Examples such as Wolfgang 
Bernhard’s move from Daimler to Volkswagen are still a rarity and usually marked by failure 
at the new company. Most executives at Daimler respect their competitors at BMW or Audi, 
but they could not imagine actually changing loyalties. A young engineer might become 
impatient by the pace of life at Mercedes and switch to Porsche, but not an experienced 
executive. In the German automobile business the culture of the company molds the executive 
and not the other way round.  
On the other hand, the whole history of the American car industry is full of powerful and 
tyrannical owners fighting and firing dynamical and headstrong engineers and executives. 
Loyalty is often short-lived. Walter P. Chrysler was responsible for making Buick a profitable 
part of General Motors. When ousted GM founder Bill Durant again regained control of GM 
in 1916 and made a number of unsuccessful investments in an attempt to diversify the 
company into farm machinery, Chrysler attacked him, resigned and decided to start up his 
own company (Abodaher 1982). At the very first auto show GM blocked upstart Walter 
Chrysler from getting a stand, so he exhibited his car in the lobby of a hotel in New York. The 
car was an instant success and the Chrysler story was born. The tyrannical nature of Henry 
Ford sent many an executive to GM and Chrysler and was one of the reasons for Ford 
slipping into 3rd place behind both companies as he became more irrational and arbitrary in 
his later years (Banham 2002; Abodaher 1982). The industry developed a tradition for high 
salaried but often short-lived careers, where it was perfectly normal and necessary to change 
back and forth. This tradition will play a role in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure as 
the story of Lee Iacocca’s rise and fall at Chrysler exemplifies. Iacocca had previously 
worked at Ford for 32 years. He was perhaps the most innovative marketing person in the 
history of the American automobile business. He invented car leasing, car payment plans and 
the first warranties. He saved Ford in the 1960s as the creator of the famous Ford Mustang. 
He foresaw the threat of Japanese imports and came up with a small, fuel- efficient American 
car, the Pinto in the early 1970s. As he fought his way to the top of Ford he created an inner 
circle of trusted engineers and executives, but a circle that aggressively combated everyone 
else within the organization, including Henry Ford II, the founder’s grandson. Despite his 
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success and dedication to the Ford brand, Iacocca became a threat to Henry Ford II, a man 
notorious for possessing his grandfather’s quick and arbitrary temper. Rumors had been 
circulating around the city for months of an imminent break between Ford and his President. 
Such “gossip” is part of the Detroit scene and fuelled by industry-centered publications such 
as the Detroit Free Press and the Automotive News, so it was not surprising that Iacocca 
heard of his 1978 dismissal from a Detroit reporter on the phone (Abodaher 1982).  
In addition the American love for entertainment make it more likely that both winners and 
losers “sell” their version to the public, whereas Germans tend to be more careful and 
maintain discretion. Public critique and discussion of in-company events is looked down upon 
as “Nestbeschmutzung” (washing your dirty laundry in public). In his best-selling 
autobiography from 1986 Iacocca commented on his former boss: “If a guy is over 25 percent 
jerk, he’s in trouble. And Henry was 95 percent“ (Iacocca 1986). Ford fired Iacocca and paid 
him 2 million in severance pay upon condition that he not work for any competitors for at 
least 2 years. Iacocca rejected the offer and agreed to take over Chrysler in 1978, which 
seemed headed for certain bankruptcy. Market analysts thought he was crazy but this was the 
beginning of one of America’s great business stories and the beginning of a culture of change 
management for the generation of Chrysler managers and executives who would be 
confronted with the Daimler takeover 20 years later. At Ford, Iacocca was renowned for his 
ability to motivate people and sell products.   He had worked his way up from selling trucks at 
a small dealership to becoming President of the company, answering only to Henry Ford II. 
At Chrysler he used his rhetorical ability and determination to create a new culture. Typical is 
the famous cake story (Abodaher 1982). An employee had written an open letter criticizing 
the laziness and lack of attention to quality in her department. She was mobbed by fellow 
Chrysler employees. They had interpreted her action as an unacceptable case of whistle 
blowing. Iacocca heard of the incident and invited the employee to his office. She brought 
with her a cake as a present. Iacocca took the cake home and claimed it was the best cake that 
he had ever Eaton and asked the lady to bake some more for his family. He praised the lady 
for her honesty and determination to improve the situation at Chrysler. Iacocca turned a 
critical incident into a successful team motivation speech. The cake became a company 
symbol for the need to work harder and change attitudes at Chrysler. Similarly he invited 
frustrated and critical dealers, asked openly about the weaknesses of their products and 
promising quick changes. Outside the company, Iacocca was becoming a national figure. He 
took on the job of convincing the American government to help bail out Chrysler, arguing that 
the Japanese car industry and unrealistic government regulations on fuel efficiency and anti-
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pollution innovations were making American cars unaffordable for middle-class Americans. 
The Wall Street Journal countered that Chrysler should be allowed to go bankrupt and battled 
Iacocca for two years in numerous editorials. Iacocca countered that the loss of 150,000 jobs 
would cost the government more in welfare benefit costs that the amount being sought to save 
the company. Iacocca even put a member of the United Auto Workers union on his Board and 
persuaded the unions to take pension benefit cuts of $400 million. He cut his own salary to a 
symbolic $1 dollar per year until the company was again making a profit. With the 
government aid he invested in new models and sold them with aggressive marketing 
techniques. He went on TV personally and challenged Americans to “Buy a better car if you 
can find one” (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 6.2). The revamping of Chrysler was 
complete when he created the minivan, a new segment product for the generation of Mustang 
drivers, who had now married and had kids. Generation “soccer moms” was born and Iacocca 
achieved a kind of national hero status, both inside and outside Chrysler. However this great 
story had a downside to it. In order to restructure Chrysler, Iacocca brought in his former 
inner circle at Ford and threw out Chrysler executives. He even stole Ford’s advertising 
agency, a nationally televised event and put them to work for Chrysler (Abodaher 1982). The 
message of the story was clear and would not be forgotten at Chrysler. Change means 
changing the whole team at the top. 
The same story was to be repeated when Lutz implemented his new Honda- based platform 
strategy at the end of Iacocca’s reign at Chrysler in 1992. Lutz replaced Iacocca’s Ford-
Chrysler team of executives with executives from American Motor Company, acquired in 
1987. In a personal conversation this shift was referred to by Chrysler executives as “the day 
the mouse ate the cat”, as Lutz took advantage of AMC’s intensive studies on Honda’s 
production strategies. In the same conversation the Chrysler executive mentioned that he had 
joined the PMI team as a chance to see Germany and the Mercedes facilities, but that he did 
not expect a long life within the DaimlerChrysler AG organization. By 1992 Iacocca had 
become as tyrannical and autocratic as Henry Ford II, and the company was again heading for 
bankruptcy. He was still powerful enough to install former GM president Robert Eaton as his 
successor, but none of his team remained.  
In both cases the message of the story was passed on to executives facing the Daimler 
takeover. In times of radical change such as having a new CEO or acquiring a firm, one of the 
first ramifications is the removal of top executives at Chrysler. In order to protect themselves, 
these executives had special “golden parachute” clauses in their contracts, providing them 
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with the possibility to leave the company and receive enormous severance packages within 2 
years of any major “event”, such as a takeover or merger or threatening bankruptcy. It is not 
surprising then, that the majority of the top 30 Chrysler executives took this option and either 
resigned or changed to Ford, GM or first tier suppliers such as Magna (Blaško, Netter and 
Sinkey 2000). For them it was part of the Chrysler story. There is no loyalty at Chrysler and 
fame can be extremely short-lived. Iacocca had come from Ford. His successor, Bob Eaton, 
came from General Motors. Robert Lutz had defected from Ford via BMW. In that vein, one 
American reporter suggested that at the time of the takeover Bob Eaton was taking advantage 
of the current success at Chrysler by picking the optimal exit strategy before the company’s 
fortunes took their normal business cycle drop (New York Times May 8th, 1998).  
In the American automobile industry the reputation of an individual executive is even more 
important than his company affiliation. The risky nature of his/her relationship to 
shareholders and owners requires higher compensation than in Germany and “golden 
parachutes” for unexpected situations, which compensate loss of power with monetary solace. 
Furthermore, it is always possible to jump from company to company. The careers and 
abilities of individual executives are relatively transparent throughout the whole industry, 
with the most-talented mavericks doing their own public relations. When Lutz left 
DaimlerChrysler AG, he wrote a book including his own “laws of business”, a book which 
helped him to come out of retirement and continue his career at Cunnigham and later at GM at 
the age of 72. Such is the power of the individual executives that when Iacocca unsuccessfully 
participated in the 1995 attempt of shareholder Kirk Kerkorian to take over Chrysler, part of 
the peace agreement stipulated that Iacocca not talk about his former employer in public for 
the next 5 years (Vlasic and Stertz 2000). This did not stop Dieter Zetsche from reactivating 
Iacocca for an advertising campaign in 2005, in a final effort to save Chrysler by tapping into 
Iacocca’s magical marketing charisma (DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix 6.3). 
As Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000) point out, the agency problems surrounding the loyalty 
of Chrysler executives were the only threat publicly acknowledged in the company’s proxy 
report to its shareholders seeking approval of the deal: 
In considering the recommendation of the Chrysler Board, stockholders of Chrysler 
should be aware that, as described below, certain members of Chrysler’s management 
and the Chrysler Board may have interests in the Chrysler merger that are different 
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from, or in addition to, the interests of Chrysler stockholders generally, and that these 
interests may create potential conflicts of interest (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000: 84). 
Specifically the authors draw attention to the approximately $100 million in severance 
payment, which would accrue to the top 35 Chrysler executives. Two factors made the choice 
easy for most of them. Firstly, they were getting paid a lot of money to leave the company. 
Secondly, past stories suggested they would have no role in the future shaping of 
DaimlerChrysler AG anyway.  Unaware of these “stories”, German executives were shocked 
at the massive exodus of know-how and regarded this as an act of treachery. The resignations 
were very public and very expensive events on the Detroit stage and as Blaschko has analyzed 
(2000) had a negative impact on value creation. These defections served as a further irritation 
to the already strained relationship between CEO Schrempp and American executives when 
he openly pronounced at a press conference that they could all leave if they wanted because 
the company did not need Chrysler know-how anyway (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). By 
September 2000 the last of the original “Chrysler guys”, Thomas Stallkamp, was forced to 
resign from the company after a long series of open conflicts with German executives (Vlasic 
and Stertz 2000). One year later two Germans were placed in charge of the company. 
Ironically, the American side had expected that much sooner, but the rhetoric of a “merger of 
equals” now made the breaking of a promise an issue of resentment at Chrysler. When 
newcomers Zetsche and Bernhard started to seriously restructure the company there was no 
more know-how to tap into the lessons learnt during the 1990s. 
6.5.2 The Mercedes brand and a culture of pride and arrogance 
On the German side of the company, one of their great “stories” also had a negative impact on 
the takeover’s chances for survival. The hallmark of Daimler-Benz was the “Mercedes” 
brand. Benz invented the automobile in 1886 and Daimler perfected the art of building 
powerful engines. The originator of the brand was Austrian businessman, Emil Jellinek 
(Grunow-Osswald 2006). He lived in Vienna and Monte Carlo and had excellent contacts to 
Europe’s wealth and aristocracy. A passionate racing driver he piloted Daimler-made vehicles 
under the pseudonym “Mercedes” to domination in racing in the first decade of the 20th 
century. In addition to his love for racing, he was also an excellent businessman and become 
one of Mercedes’ first dealers. He agreed to buy the first 36 passenger cars of a newly 
designed series of passenger cars if Daimler agreed to name them after his daughter, who was 
called Mercedes. The only condition to be stipulated for the technical specification of the new 
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series was the famous motto, “the best or nothing”. The cars were worth around 3 million 
Euros in 2005 money according to the company’s history of the brand (Lengert and Dreher 
2010). An order for another 36 was placed just 4 weeks later. With Mercedes vehicles 
dominating the Nice Racing Week in 1901 to such an extent that the competition withdrew 
from all events, the fame of the brand was born instantly. Within months the complete 
production capacity was sold out. From the very moment of its creation the word “Mercedes” 
was to be associated with the highest standards of quality, engineering excellence and 
innovation. The cost of the first cars was more expensive than the yearly wages and salaries of 
99.99% of the population of Prussia (Grunow-Osswald 2006).  
The success of the brand, however, had a double-edged consequence. It was on the one hand a 
source of deserved pride and at the same time a source of arrogance. Despite pressure from 
the banks after World War I to merge with Benz Cie, fear of mixing the Mercedes’ brand with 
its hated rival delayed the deal for 6 long years. In the early 1930s sales skyrocketed as 
Mercedes’ arrogance quickly blended into the superior race ideology during the Hitler years. 
Decades later, Flick’s decision to acquire Audi for Daimler-Benz in the late 1950s lasted only 
4 short years with brand rivalry and Mercedes arrogance at the center of the conflict. 
Brand consciousness was at the center of a long battle at the Board in the 1970s, whether of 
not to produce cheaper models which create higher market volume. When the “Baby Benz”, 
known today as the C-class, was finally produced in 1982 it created a major rift both inside 
the company and amongst customers. Purists thought the C-class did not deserve a Mercedes 
star and in both production and development areas only the S- and E-Class people saw 
themselves as defenders of the “best or nothing tradition”. That was escalated when mass 
production number were accompanied by serious quality issues, which led to the revolt 
against Mercedes by key customer bases such as German taxi drivers in the late 1980s. For 
decades taxi drivers had been one of Mercedes’ most effective word-of-mouth propaganda 
agents with cars racking up millions of reliable kilometers. After the doubling of production 
capacity and the introduction of cheaper models in the 1980s, stories of bad quality and 
engines that couldn’t be turned off started to emerge in the German press (Der Spiegel 34, 
1987). The “old school” inside the company saw that as proof of their concerns about brand 
dilution. That resentment was increased with the addition of even smaller compact models 
such as the A- and B-Classes and finally the decision to build the M-Class outside of 
Germany in the 1990s. Mercedes was synonymous for “made in Germany” and one of the 
symbolic companies of the German “Wirtschaftswunder” (economic miracle). The 
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globalization and stretching of the Mercedes name was diluting the brand. This consciousness 
was to negatively impact the reaction to the takeover within the Mercedes organization. 
At the time of the Chrysler takeover the “brand story” had two ramifications for the failure of 
the takeover. First there was no unified “Mercedes” way of building cars. Instead there was 
rivalry between the Germany assembly facilities at Rastatt (A-Class), Bremen (C-class) and 
Sindelfingen (C-, E- and S-Class). They, in turn, had a common enemy at the headquarters in 
Stuttgart-Möhringen. In addition, within facilities such as Sindelfingen there was animosity 
both in production and development between all the model lines. The M-Class development 
was originally part of the commercial vehicle division and its upgrading to passenger car and 
subsequent location switch from Stuttgart-Untertürkheim to Sindelfingen raised more 
eyebrows of contempt. All of the German facilities looked down upon the expanding plants in 
the USA and South Africa as low-skilled, unnecessary threats to jobs in Germany and time-
consuming development projects binding people and other resources badly needed at home. 
So there was no real “common identity” and in terms of Cohen and Prusak’s approach (2001) 
the level of social capital was low going into the takeover. 
The “Mercedes brand story” had a second impact on Daimler employee behavior towards 
Chrysler. The fear of further brand dilution made the Germans blind to any possible know-
how they could have, and in the spirit of a “merger of equals”, should have picked up from 
Chrysler. This was especially true in the markets segments SUV, minivan and small compact 
cars, where Chrysler had had more experience and success. The German determination to 
“protect the brand” was symbolized in an interview given by Mercedes head Hubbert in 
which he cynically commented that his mother-in-law had bought a Chrysler Plymouth and 
that it had started falling apart after only 2 years (Finkelstein 2002). The belief in the brand 
was understood as “unwarranted arrogance” from the Chrysler side.  
6.5.3 The M-Class synergy failure story 
This case study has relied on an analysis of the M-Class synergy failure because it represents 
the one clear production interface to Chrysler. At the same time the M-Class became a “story” 
both within the Mercedes organization and on the Chrysler management side. The 
globalization of the Mercedes passenger division tried to imitate the success of the 
globalization of the commercial vehicle division. At the centre of this discussion within the 
car division culture was the decision to move the M-Class development away from the 
commercial vehicle development centre in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim to the passenger vehicle 
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development centre in Sindelfingen. News and rumors of quality issues with the M-Class 
hindered their integration within the rest of the passenger vehicle division and provide the 
other model lines with a common target of criticism, which permitted them to sublimate and 
deny their own quality issues. 
After the takeover of Chrysler the lack of success of dovetailing M-Class and Chrysler SUV 
activities became the centre of the Chrysler storyline on the (Daimler-Benz) Mercedes lie of a 
“merger of equals”. The complexity of working together as equals and the resulting lack of 
results can best be seen in the case of the M-Class and the Jeep Grand Cherokee. As 
Schrempp had mentioned in his initial press conference, these were the only two products, 
which overlapped in the takeover (DaimlerChrysler Video Appendix 1.1). And perhaps here 
was the possibility to synergize efforts most effectively. Mercedes had had no experience in 
building SUV’s when the first generation M-Class started production in 1997, one year before 
the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover. The product development process was a radical departure 
from Mercedes German tradition (Priess and Schweer 2004). Similar to BMW’s new facility 
in South Carolina, Mercedes had tried to learn from Japanese production models in order to 
build a niche product exclusively aimed at the North American market. In comparison to other 
Mercedes model lines, the vehicle was to have a radically reduced number of options and be 
built by a young unskilled team of workers. In 1999 the average age of the 2,000 employees 
was 34 and one third of the staff was female (Priess and Schweer 2004). Mercedes brought in 
a former Toyota manger, Bill Taylor, from Toyota’s best North American facility to organize 
the new Mercedes plant in Alabama. Taylor was confronted with the challenge of convincing 
German engineers and executives that their European approaches wouldn’t work in North 
America, let al.one in the southern state of Alabama, with an almost complete local workforce 
of people who had no working experience in the automobile industry.  
The M-Class story was a story of good and bad news. Initially it was a commercial success 
that exceeded even Mercedes’ marketing expectations. Manufacturing capacity at the 
Alabama plant had already been expanded by 30% by 1998 and the time of the takeover, 
Mercedes still could not meet demand. In addition, the European market had been attracted to 
the vehicle. This created logistics problems, because the nearest Vehicle Preparation Centre in 
Florida was only designed to accept delivery of German–made cars and German-made 
components such as engines. Exporting the M-Class back to Europe had not been part of the 
original game plan. Furthermore, the Tuscaloosa facility could not build right-hand-drive 
versions for the emerging world market demand. 
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These factors combined to offer the newly founded DaimlerChrysler AG with a “quick-hit”, a 
means of saving money without the long process of common platform development. Chrysler 
had been producing their Jeep Grand Cherokee European model at the Steyr-Daimler-Puch 
assembly facility, owned by the Austro-Canadian supplier Magna in Graz, Austria since 1994. 
The line had excess production capacity free and was shareable with the M-Class, because the 
vehicles were similar in character. Chrysler officials were anxious to make public their 
willingness to help out their Mercedes colleagues, as evidenced by production head Thomas 
Stallkamp’s interview with the Neue Wiener Zeitung (Aug. 8th, 1998), especially because this 
European-built version of the Grand Cherokee was perhaps the highest quality Chrysler 
product at the time. From a Mercedes perspective however, the question was whether this 
quality was a result of Chrysler’s efforts or due to the longstanding reputation for excellence 
of the Graz facility, which had previously been owned by Daimler-Benz. In fact, Mercedes 
had been producing the famous G-class at Graz since 1979 and the experts at Magna had been 
instrumental in the development of the 4-matic all-wheel-drive version of the E-Class. That 
vehicle was also being built in Graz since 1996. Furthermore, Mercedes had been working 
closely with Magna in the development of a new production concept for the Smart vehicle to 
be built in France. The Graz facility had both a history and reputation for high quality and it 
was reasonable to suspect that both the Grand Cherokees and M-Classes coming out of the 
European facility would have a higher level of quality than their American-produced 
counterparts.  
For many people inside Mercedes in Germany, the decision for Graz was in part against 
Chrysler and against the M-Class Alabama production facility. The additional 15,000 M-
Class vehicles would provide quality experts at Mercedes with plenty of comparisons of 
differences between the American and European made products. This posed a threat to the 
management in Alabama, who were becoming more and more aware of the quality issues 
facing any green field production facility, especially one that had already increased its 
production capacity by 30% in less than two years. The message from the Stuttgart 
headquarters of Mercedes was clear. Europeans build better cars, and they even build better 
Chrysler vehicles.  
The official press release announcing the start of the production of the M-Class in Graz, 
Austria in May 1998 went even further. Mercedes boss Hubbert prioritized the need to 
separate the brands in order to assure that the Jeep Grand Cherokee production system met 
Mercedes standards. 
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Tools to be used exclusively for one particular model are marked with the appropriate 
color, and separate but stringent final quality checks for both models are a key element 
of the brand separation policy (DC press release May 26, 1998). 
Hubbert is not referring to common parts in his statement. Both vehicles were developed 
independently of each other before the takeover even took place, so there could no question of 
sharing parts. Rather here Hubbert points out that even the tooling has to be separate in order 
to assure Mercedes brand quality. This was a slap in the face to Chrysler, who at the time was 
one of the most successful builders of SUVs. Mercedes had no experience in this field and 
were trying to “transnationalize” (Pries and Schweer 2004) their production methods to be 
able to learn from Japanese success in the establishment of hybrid facilities in North America. 
Furthermore, the M-Class development department had a controversial status within the 
Mercedes organization. The project had started off as an offshoot of the G-class within the 
commercial vehicle division, located in the Neckar valley. The decision to produce a luxury 
SUV entailed moving the development department to the passenger vehicle division at the 
new Mercedes Technology Center in Sindelfingen for the planning of the second-generation 
successor M-Class models (W164, X164). Aside from employee unrest due to the need to 
relocate and accept dramatically increased commuting times; the transplant of a “truck 
planning” unit into the world of luxury carmakers was a rough ride. So there was internal 
disagreement surrounding the M-Class project even before Daimler acquired Chrysler. This 
situation was exacerbated with awareness of the quality issues in the first generation W163 
M-Class. The vehicle was a commercial success but a quality nightmare, a development that 
led many German officials to question the rationale for trying to build a Mercedes outside of 
Germany.  
In fact, as has already been described in detail, the quality issues with the M-Class coupled 
with troublesome electronic issues in the new E-Class (W211) would almost ruin Mercedes’ 
reputation for quality in the USA in the next couple of years. The perception of Mercedes 
quality in the USA had plummeted dramatically within a short period of time. Whereas the 
influential magazine Consumer Reports had voted the 1996 Mercedes E-Class as “the best car 
at any price” (Meyer et al. 2002), the same magazine would be describing the Mercedes brand 
as the least reliable of all carmakers less than 10 years later (Bloomberg Business Week 
March 20th, 2007). Daimler’s public criticism of the magazine’s testing methods and 
objectivity only made the situation worse. As CNNMoney would report in November 2006 
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But what is striking about Mercedes’ performance is its consistency. Of the 11 models 
reviewed by Consumers, none are recommended. Seven are left off the list because of 
poor reliability; the remaining four are considered too new to predict (...) Mercedes has 
the worst record of any automaker with that many models. For a brand that claims to be 
“engineered like no other car in the world,” that is fairly frightening (DaimlerChrysler 
Internet Appendix 6.2). 
This final Mercedes’ brand image disaster shortly before the final chapter of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was also intertwined with the initial M-Class story back in 
1998. In the early years of the takeover Mercedes products would fall below industry average 
in the critical J.D. Power ratings scale. This lead to rumors that Chrysler’s influence was 
responsible for the decline of the Mercedes brand. This “story” back in 1998 incensed 
executives such as Stallkamp, because both products had been designed, developed and 
engineered before the takeover. To be sure, the negative impact of the takeover on the 
Mercedes brand was partially related to the loss of key Mercedes talent tied up in the 
restructuring both of Chrysler and Mitsubishi. The deterioration of Mercedes’ quality was a 
product of its own doing, as there was hardly cooperation between the two companies at the 
beginning of the takeover. In addition, the collection of bad stories on both sides of the 
Atlantic in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure combined to make the consummation of 
the “merger of equals” highly unlikely and quickly allowed an atmosphere of mutual distrust 
at the operational level to deteriorate even more. The obvious radical differences in 
organizational culture could only have been counteracted by high levels of positive social 
capital in what Cohen and Prusak (2001) describe as absolute pre-requisites for the “challenge 
of volatility”.  
When Chrysler did enter the stage, it was obvious that they just had a lot more experience and 
success at building SUV’s, a classical American kind of vehicle. This segment had been able 
to negate Japanese dominance in the conventional sedan market and allow American 
carmakers to make a comeback in the 1980’s and 1990’s. It would be logical to give the 
Chrysler side the lead in the development of the second generation M-Class. However, 
distrust was high on both sides. Despite pressure from his German colleagues from the 
development and production planning departments, Alabama facility boss Taylor wanted to 
stick to his understanding of Toyota hybrids in North America. This was quite different to 
Chrysler’s adaptation of Honda’s platform philosophy.  
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This is documented in the fact that the production on the Chrysler line in Graz was phased out 
before production of the W163 ceased in Alabama in 2005. Furthermore the development 
team for the M-Class could not come up with a common platform for the second-generation 
M-Class (W164, X164)/ Jeep Grand Cherokee platform with carry over parts. The search for 
commonization stretched the development cycle times but produced no tangible results. No 
Chrysler was ever built in Alabama. No second generation M-Class was ever built at the 
Chrysler Graz facility.  
The M-Class story shows how Mercedes arrogance in the face of Chrysler competence in the 
SUV sector provided company insiders with a bad story which contributed to a further 
deterioration of the already extremely low levels of social capital in the crucial operational 
sectors at Mercedes and Chrysler among the people responsible for negotiating the changes 
necessary to achieve cost-saving synergy effects.  
6.6 Conclusions 
 
In his October 2000 interview with The Financial Times then DaimlerChrysler AG CEO 
Jürgen Schrempp made allusions to his passion for chess while explaining the reasons for his 
deceptive strategy. Chapter 6 has illustrated significant differences between chess and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Chess players know that they are competing against each 
other.  In the case of mergers and acquisitions that is not so clear. Such events are major 
triggers of dishevels for both the acquiring and acquired firms. In the case of the 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover the promise of a “merger of equals” provided both sides with a 
deception. On the German side this allowed the retention of an arrogant culture of Mercedes 
brand hegemony. This hegemony precluded the willingness to learn from Chrysler in areas 
which could have benefitted both sides (M-Class story). On the American side the lie of 
equality justified the radical migration of top executives.  By the time the Board’s Executive 
Automotive Council started to force commonization in 2001, three valuable years had been 
lost. Furthermore, the team of executives behind Chrysler’s turnaround in the 1990s had left 
the company.  
Between May 1998 and the Schrempp interview in November 2000 the lie of the merger of 
equals had prevented the creation of a spirit of mutual trust, which would have been necessary 
to implement the radical changes in interorganizational culture. From the perspective of 
company culture it is clear that the takeover was a radical failure already by the end of the 
year 2000.  
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7 LESSONS LEARNT 
 
This chapter will go beyond the specific detail of the previous 5 chapters and attempt to draw 
general conclusions from the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure. Furthermore, the 
generalizations in this chapter will not attempt to document similarities with previous 
research. As was mentioned in the introduction, this case study differs from other research 
with its consistent reference to the DaimlerChrysler AG as the failure of a German company 
to takeover an American company as part of its global Welt AG strategy. The radical nature 
of this particular failure risks seducing any analysis into making negative generalizations 
about all cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which do not withstand the scrutiny of 
empirical observations (Weber and Camerer 2003; Wübben 2007). 
7.1 Methodology 
 
When assessing the rationality of mergers and acquisitions the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
failure underlines the need to research the history of firms for a longer period of time than is 
common in contemporary financial and company performance analysis. This includes the 
necessity of understanding the exact nature of the organizational culture of the companies. 
This was observed in the case of Chrysler. The legends of “guts” and iconic CEOs such as 
Lee Iacocca during the 1980s, for example, need to be put into perspective. In actual fact, a 
longer view of executive culture within the Chrysler organization reveals a culture of 
disloyalty as evidenced with Iacocca’s choice of Robert Eaton as his successor (1992) and 
Iacocca’s later attempt to wrest control of the company from Eaton and Lutz (1995). This 
culture of disloyalty explains the completeness of the defection of key Chrysler executives 
after the 1998 takeover (Blaško, Netter and Sinkey 2000). 
A historically more longitudinal perspective also provides better insight into the rationales of 
the acquiring and acquired companies. CEO Schrempp had inherited a serious strategical 
blunder from his predecessor (Reuter). He also was witness to a seemingly successful strategy 
of the expansion and globalization of the Mercedes brand from his strongest rival (Werner). 
His ensuing Welt AG strategy seemed sensible within the mindset of the car industry in the 
1990s. In the case of Chrysler, the short-term success in the 1990s could not hide the fact that 
the company had limited possibilities for further growth. Moreover, in a globalized 
automotive sector its solitary presence in the NAFTA region was a serious liability. The 
prospect of a sellout to a company with more resources also seemed rational within the 
framework of the merger and acquisition frenzy of the late 1990s.  
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In terms of methodology this resulted in the need to take the complete histories of both 
companies into consideration. The strength of the legend of the Mercedes brand can only be 
appreciated with a comparison of production numbers between 1896 and 2007. Vehicles that 
helped create the Mercedes brand, such as the gull-door SL 350 from 1954 (total production 
1,400 vehicles), mostly had complete serial production numbers that are lower than the daily 
production numbers for contemporary C- and M-Class models. These comparisons make 
transparent the radical change of organizational culture, which accompanied the shift from 
“craftsmanship” to mass production as of the 1980s.   
7.2 Merger and acquisition strategies 
 
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure provides an excellent example of choosing the 
wrong strategy for the wrong situation. There can never be a justification for pretending that a 
takeover is a merger of equals. The need to protect the Mercedes brand could have co-existed 
with the acquisition of the equally strong Jeep and Dodge brands, as exemplified by 
Chrysler’s takeover of Dodge in the 1920s and Chrysler’s purchase of American Motors 
Corporation (AMC) in the 1980s. Both brands were able to retain their uniqueness within the 
Chrysler organization. Although Toyota is a strong brand in its own right, it has also been 
able to create the unique luxury brand Lexus. 
In the case of DaimlerChrysler, the contradictions between brand uniqueness and the promise 
of synergy effects between premium and affordable brands had disastrous consequences. 
Common platforms were not established and synergy effects were not realized. Furthermore, 
the contradiction between the Welt AG strategy and the promise of a merger of equals 
illustrate the necessity of logically cohesive strategical goals. The incompatibility of these 
strategic goals precluded any opportunity of their realization at the operative level. The 
incoherent choice of strategy made an implementation of the Chrysler and Mitsubishi (MMC) 
takeovers impossible from the very beginning. 
7.3 Cross-border M&As and intercultural differences 
 
The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure cannot be reduced to conflicts between national 
cultural differences. Indeed, the case study offers a refutation of many of the main claims of 
the most important theory in this academic field (Hofstede 1980). This is not surprising, based 
on the accelerated expansion of globalization (Nakata 2009). This result is also of importance 
for the field of management training. Ironically, the popularity of Hofstede’s work has itself 
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contributed to a refutation of the axiom that cultural dimensionality is a kind of innate 
“software of the mind”. Organizations can and need to reflect on their intercultural roots and 
the need to modify strengths and weaknesses accordingly. It is not a question of denying the 
existence of a specific kind of “Germanism” within the Daimler-Benz tradition or a specific 
kind of “Americanism” within the Chrysler tradition. It is rather the observation that “being 
German” means something different in the 16th century, 1896 and 2012. Successful cross-
border mergers require that the acquiring firms take these national differences into account 
without falling victim to a belief in their impermeability. The fact that this is a management 
problem also helps to explain the academic inconclusiveness of comparative empirical 
studies.  
7.4 Cross-border M&As and interorganizational differences 
 
The same can be said about interorganizational differences. The comparisons between 
Renault-Nissan and DaimlerChrysler are highly instructive in this regard. Renault’s 
restructuring of Nissan represented a radical change of organizational culture at the Japanese 
company on a much larger scale than the differences between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. 
This study concludes that successful cross-border mergers involve the management task of 
achieving a form of organizational culture, which matches the post-merger outcome strategy.  
7.5 Trust and communication as key implementation tools  
 
If intercultural and interorganizational differences are management obstacles, which can be 
overcome, this automatically points to the critical role of trust and communication. Trust is a 
central moment in the reciprocal nature of all free market economic activity. The blatant 
abuse of trust in the DaimlerChrysler AG “merger of equals” lie represents one of the most 
manifest strategic mistakes in the Welt AG. It is acceptable to takeover another firm. It is 
unacceptable to pretend one is not doing so. Furthermore, communication has to be the 
product of an authentic attempt to provide employees with the necessary means to achieve the 
goals of the takeover. The destruction of all these components has been discussed in the 
DaimlerChrysler AG failure. The Renault-Nissan case provides an excellent counter example. 
7.6 It is premature to talk about truly global companies 
 
DaimlerChrysler AG was a German AG (public stock company). This fact had ramifications 
for tax law, corporate governance and indeed it was the key to understanding why the strategy 
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of the Welt AG precluded equal partnerships with its American and Japanese divisions. The 
DaimlerChrysler AG takeover justifies the need to continue framing political and economical 
analysis within a differentiated approach to Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The DaimlerChrysler failure points to the resiliency of national institutions and the 
complementarities, which create comparative economic advantage. Part of the decline of the 
value of the Mercedes brand can be traced to the company’s attempt to decalibrate the 
connectedness to its tradition of skilled labor, strong unionization and instruments of 
traditional German corporate governance. If the Mercedes tradition for quality is limited to 
instruments of marketing, it will only be a question of time until customers abandon their 
loyalty. In this regard it will be interesting to observe whether German customers will remain 
loyal to the brand when the C-Class is built in Alabama. 
 
7.7 The myth of shareholder value 
 
As Stout (2012) has argued from the perspective of corporate law, shareholder value is one of 
the strongest ideologies in corporate governance in the 20th century. Schrempp’s fear of 
takeover and his adherence to the goals of shareholder value were one of his biggest 
strategical mistakes in his Welt AG. However, the German CEO was in good company with 
Deutsche Bank. Their decision to shift away from their traditional role within the German 
coordinated market economy accompanied the downfall of the Welt AG.  
Industrial corporations with long-term product development cycles are poorly suited to the 
short-term expectations of stock markets. As witnessed in the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover 
failure, the long-term stakeholders in the form of American trust and investment brokers were 
the first to abandon the company. It is interesting to consider whether Schrempp could have 
better protected the Mercedes brand by seeking private options to a public trading company.  
 
7.8 Academic research in the automobile industry 
 
Academic research in the automobile industry is notoriously inaccurate. Fordism, Sloanism 
and lean production have all come and gone as standard paradigms. And even the multi-
strategy approach of the GERPSIA has misjudged the situation at Renault-Nissan. With the 
exception of real estate, cars are the most expensive commodity, which people acquire in their 
lifetimes. Just as speculation in real estate has historically triggered numerous recessions and 
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depressions in the history of capitalism (Galbraith 1954), so too does the car industry appear 
to be most sensitive to economic change. There is much truth in the old adage that GM gets 
pneumonia when the American economy catches the flu. The car industry is plagued with 
chronic overcapacity and a chronic inability to match consumer demand. Even when it taps 
into consumer wishes, production capacity cannot be adapted to satisfy that demand. 
DaimlerChrysler experienced that problem with the PT Cruiser and the A-Class in South 
America. They could not produce enough PT Cruisers to satisfy the market at the time. 
Meanwhile, Mercedes billion dollar project in South America, which had capacity to produce 
70,000 M-Classes, actually produced less than 5,000 in all before production was ceased. 
Relatively long development and production facility cycle times are chronically out of sync 
with short-term marketing and customer perceptions of reality. 
Furthermore, the interaction between global strategies and global incongruence is often 
arbitrary and unpredictable. Electrical cars were declared dead over a hundred years ago 
(Kirsch 2000), yet Toyota’s rediscover of hybrid technologies were a surprise market success 
in the USA, which usually is indifferent to environmental issues. DaimlerChrysler’s heavy 
expenditure in the area of fuel-cell technology turned out to be a poor investment. At the same 
time the Mercedes’ brand is the subject of criticism in Europe for its inability to development 
environmentally-friendly models. Paradoxically, the brand’s current success with the M-Class 
and S-Class in India and China is completely independent of European developments. In 1998 
everyone at Mercedes believed that Asian success dependent on the development of small, 
energy-saving inexpensive models. The latest Annual Report is testimony to the exact 
opposite expectation. 
7.9 Varieties of Capitalism 
 
This case study has relied heavily on a modified version of the varieities of capitalism 
approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The historical successes and failures of Mercedes 
(Daimler-Benz), Chrysler and Mitsubishi can be explained to a certain extent on the 
respective complementaries offered by the national institutional systems. Furthermore, within 
the context of the globalization of production systems each company has engaged in what 
Hall and Soskice refer to as “institutional arbitrage”. This refers to the practice of shifting 
“particular activities to other nations in order to secure the advantages that the institutional 
frameworks of their political economies offer for pursuing those activities (Hall and Soskice 
2010 57; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paneuscu 2010). Mercedes tried to exploit the 
advantages of non-unionized labor markets in their expansion plans for the North American 
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market in Alabama. Chrysler relied on the highly qualified Austrian labor market for its 
production of the high-quailty European version of its Grand Cherokee. However, the 
varieities of capitalism approach has to be modified to accompany for the specific national 
and trans-national nature of the global automobile sector (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000) much 
in the same manner as Lange (2010) and Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu (2010) 
ascertain in their analysis of the bio-tech and high-tech sectors respectively. Specifically, this 
case study follows Schneider et al. in the comment that “the institutional configurations 
compatible with high-tech success cut across generally accepted typologies” (Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu 2010 259). In our case, Daimler-Benz was involved in both 
radical and incremental innovation in sectors encompassing cars, airplanes and computer 
technologies. Significant for our results was the strategical mistake of trying to clone the 
successful globalization of the Mercedes brand in commercial vehicles to the passenger 
vehicle division. As Boyer and Freyssenet point out (2010) the key to Mercedes success has 
always been its quality profit strategy, which is at odds with its globalization expansion plans. 
The institutional framework which explains the reasons for this success are best accounted for 
within the varieties of capitalism approach. Despite the critique of Hall and Soskice (Hancké, 
Rhodes, and Thatcher 2008), this case study reiterates its advantages as pointed out by 
Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu (2010). The VoC approach is firm-centered, it 
focuses on sector-specific comparative advantage and finally it remains state of the art 
(Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu 2010 248).   
 
7.10 Limits of this research 
 
The complete story of the failure of the DaimlerChrysler AG and the Welt AG can only be 
told when researchers gain access to the comprehensive documents of the actors involved. 
Until then, researches, such as this case study, will be faced with the unsatisfactory task of 
relying on secondary sources for salient information. Having personally witnessed the history 
of DaimlerChrysler AG from the inside, the author is acutely aware of this study’s 
shortcomings. Many events could not be published due to lack of additional independent 
documentation or for fear of legal repercussions.  
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Fig. 1  Globalization of major Mercedes production facilities before Schrempp’s Welt 
AG.  
 Source: Created by John Riach based on data from Grunow-Osswald (2006) 
 and http://www.daimler.com/dccom. Reference 1.1. 
 
Fig. 2 CEO Schrempp’s WELT AG Strategy. 
  Source: Created by John Riach based on data from Grunow-Osswald (2006) 
  and http://www.daimler.com/dccom. Reference 1.2. 
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Fig. 3 Overview of Six Strategical Failures of Welt AG. Source: Created by John 
Riach. Reference 1.3. 
 
Fig. 4  DaimlerChrysler Takeover Timeline. 
  Source: Adapted by John Riach from Blaško, Netter and Sinkey (2000);  
  DaimlerChrysler AG Annual Report 1998; Retrieved from:   
  http:// www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/ 1364408_1998_ 
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Daimler-Benz Operating Profits/ Losses 
Year Operating Profit in billion DM 
1995 -7.197 
1996 2.423 
1997 4.328 
       Reference 2.2. 
 
Fig. 6 Hofstede Cultural Dimensions. Created by John Riach based on Hofstede 
(1980). Reference 3.1. 
Fig. 7  Research and Development Costs 1998-2006. Compiled by John Riach, 
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 http://www.cms.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1364408_1998_
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Stuttgart 2000. Retrieved from   
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  DaimlerChrysler AG, Annual Report, Stuttgart 2006. Retrieved from  
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  /1003905_DCX_2006_Annual_Report.pdf. 
 
Data base for Figure 7: Refrence 3.2. 
 
Year R&D Costs 
DaimlerChrysler 
R&D Costs Mercedes 
Car Group in million € 
R&D Costs 
Chrysler Group in 
million € 
1998 6.693 in 1.930 1.695 
1999 7.575 2.043 2.000 
2000 7.395 2.241 2.456 
2001 6.008 2.402 2.201 
2002 6.156 2.794 2.062 
2003 5.571 2.687 1.689 
2004 5.658 2.634 1.570 
2005 5.649 2.418 1.710 
2006 5.331 2.176 1.638 
 
 
Fig. 8 DC operating profits. Source DaimlerChrysler Annual Report 1997. Reference 
3.3. 
 
Fig. 9  Car production DMG (Daimler), Benz&Cie. and combined 1894-1925. 
 Compiled by John Riach from Grunow-Osswald 2006. Reference 4.1. 
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Year DMG Benz&Cie. Combined Year DMG Benz&Cie. Combined 
1894 1 0 1 1908 109 348 457 
1895 8 0 8 1909 671 787 1.458 
1896 24 0 24 1910 1.106 1314 2.420 
1897 26 0 26 1911 1.490 2265 3.755 
1898 57 0 57 1912 1.866 3095 4.961 
1899 108 0 108 1913 1.567 2673 4.240 
1900 96 385 481 1919 621 988 1.609 
1901 144 226 370 1920 1.616 2026 3.642 
1902 197 172 369 1921 1.581 1777 3.358 
1903 232 0 232 1922 962 1733 2.695 
1904 698 0 698 1923 1.020 1382 2.402 
1905 863 0 863 1924 1.333 1584 2.917 
1906 546 0 546 1925 1.406 2260 3.666 
1907 149 0 149     
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Fig. 10  Car production Daimler-Benz AG from 1926-1997. Compiled by John  
  Riach based on Grunow-Osswald (2006). Reference 4.2. 
 
 
926 2.169 1948 5.116 1970 280.419 1992 536.117 
1927 7.918 1949 17.417 1971 284.230 1993 486.239 
1928 6.859 1950 33.906 1972 323.878 1994 594.366 
1929 7.797 1951 42.222 1973 331.682 1995 600.314 
1930 5.715 1952 36.824 1974 340.006 1996 645.156 
1931 3.297 1953 34.975 1975 350.098 1997 726.686 
1932 5.807 1954 48.816 1976 370.348 
  
1933 7.967 1955 63.683 1977 401.255 
  
1934 11.255 1956 69.601 1978 393.203 
  
1935 15.199 1957 80.899 1979 424.667 
  
1936 22.994 1958 99.209 1980 435.745 
  
1937 27.955 1959 108.440 1981 447.233 
  
1938 27.662 1960 122.684 1982 464.911 
  
1939 26.505 1961 137.431 1983 481.845 
  
1940 14.842 1962 146.393 1984 483.881 
  
1941 8.863 1963 153.182 1985 547.342 
  
1942 4.166 1964 165.532 1986 600.025 
  
1943 52 1965 174.007 1987 604.447 
  
1944 1 1966 191.625 1988 565.268 
  
1945 0 1967 200.470 1989 546.060 
  
1946 214 1968 216.284 1990 581.912 
  
1947 1.045 1969 256.713 1991 585.162 
  
 The data in the above figure (10) are the compilation of the data from individual  
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chapters in Grunow-Osswald (2006), but which are not presented comprehensively in  this publication.  
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Annual Report 1990: 8. Retrieved from:  http:/www.daimler.com/   
Projects/c2c /channel/ documents/1364429_1990_Daimler_Benz 
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Fig 15 NHTSA Recall Mercedes-benz M-Class 2003. Retrieved from: Retrieved from: 
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Fig. 16  Mistakes per Vehicle. Compiled by John Riach. Retrieved from CNN Money 
2000-2009. Reference Number 5.4. 
Fig. 17 Rankings Lexus vs. Mercedes 1999-2012. Compiled by John Riach Sources: 
CNN Money 2000-2009. Reference 5.5. 
 
YEAR 
Ranking 
Mercedes 
Mistakes/Vehicle     
Mercedes Toyota Chrysler 
Industry 
Average Lexus 
Ranking 
Lexus 
2000 9 137 122 155 158 107 5 
2001 10 129 121 137 147 85 1 
2002 13 128 111 133 133 8 8 1 
2003 15 132 121 136 133 76 1 
2004 10 106 104 123 119 87 1 
2005 6 104 105 121 118 81 1 
2006 25 139 106 120 124 93 2 
2007 5 111 112 151 124 94 2 
2008 5 104 104 142 118 99 3 
2009 6 101 101 136 108 84 1 
2010 3 87 117 122 109 88 4 
2011 4 94 101 100 107 73 1 
2012 9 96 88 116 102 73 1  Fig. 18 Mercedes E-Class US Sales. Retrieved from: DaimlerChryslerAG Annual 
Report 2002. Retrieved from: 
http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1364395_2002_Dai
mlerChryslerAG_Annual_Report.pdf. 
DaimlerChryslerAG Annual Report 2003. Retrieved from: 
http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1364393_2003_Dai
mlerChryslerAG_Annual_Report.pdf. 
DaimlerChryslerAG Annual Report 2004. Retrieved from: 
http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/629486_DCX_2004_
Annual_Report.pdf. 
DaimlerChryslerAG Annual Report 2005. Retrieved from: 
http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1364375_2005_Dai
mlerChryslerAG_Annual_Report.pdf.  
DaimlerChryslerAG Annual Report 2006. Retrieved from: 
http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/1364373_2006_Dai
mlerChryslerAG_Annual_Report.pdf. Reference 5.6. 
 
Fig. 19 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation Sales (1999-2005): Retrieved from: Annual 
Report, Tokyo 2000. Retrieved from 
  http://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/en/corporate/ir/library/pdf/annual00e.pdf 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2001. Retrieved from 
http://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/en/     
corporate/ir/library/pdf/annual0107e.pdf. 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2002. Retrieved from 
http://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/en/ corporate/ir/library /pdf/annual0207.pdf 
  Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2003. Retrieved  
  from http://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/en/corporate/ir    
  /library/pdf/annual2003.pdf. 
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  Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2004. Retrieved  
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  ir/library/pdf/annual0410.pdf 
  Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2005. Retrieved  
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  Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Annual Report, Tokyo 2006.Retrieved  
  from http://www.mitsubishi-        
            motors.com/en/corporate/ir/library/pdf/annual2006.pdf. Reference 5.7. 
 
Fig. 20  Models of Mergers and Acquisitions. Source: Adapted from Strategies for 
  Post-Merger Outcomes (Marks, M.L. and Mirvis, P.H. 1998). Reference 6.1.  
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http://media.daimler.com/dcmedia/0-921-614814-1-1273768-1-0-1-0-0-0-11701-
614318-0-1-0-0-0-0-0.html. 
 
3.2 Daimler Patents 2009: Retrieved from: 
 http://gb2009.daimler.com/de/lagebericht/ertragslage/forschung-und-
entwicklung.html. 
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3.3  Case study: merging IT at DaimlerChrysler: Retrieved from: http://www. 
 cioinsight.com/c/a/Past-News/Case-Study-Merging-IT-at-DaimlerChrysler/3/ 
3.4  Statistical Analysis of Research and Development Costs in the German Automobile 
 Industry: Retrieved from: http://www.stifterverband.info/statistik_und 
 _analysen/index.html. 
 
5.1  Securities and Exchange Commission Complaint Filing against DaimlerChrysler:
 Retrieved from: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-51.pdf. 
 
5.2 Complaints about Mercedes Quality:. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.joystiq.com/profile/32700/page/8/; Autoblog: Posted June 30th 2006). 
 
5.3.  Mission statement from Consumer Report. Retrieved from 
 http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/overview/index.htm. 
 
6.1  Renault-Nissans financial results. Retrieved from 
www.finanzen.ch/nachrichten/aktien/Renault-Nissan-Alliance-Posts-Record-Sales-in-
2011-for-Th8649. 
 
6.2 CNN Money from November 20th 2006. Retrieved from: 
 http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/17/autos/pluggedin_Taylor_Mercedes.fortune/index.ht
 ml. 
 
DaimlerChrysler AG Video Appendix  
 
1.1 DaimlerChrysler Press Conference May 7th, 1998. Retrieved from: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfgrNYHyEkc.  4.1  Daimler “Best or Nothing” commercials. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0729vkCqOA; 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RrV1zz7ZkY. 
 
5.1  Chrysler Commercials 1998-2005. Retrieved from:     
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUbsCO5pWSk;     
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87oPk73Md6A&feature=related;   
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UggoZ1qHdGI&feature=related. 
 
 
5.2 Dr. Z Chrysler Commercials 2006. Retrieved from:  
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tVglVG3SFc&feature=related. 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GwZbRs57Yw&feature=relmfu. 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIG1B50-6-k&feature=relmfu. 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cp95QkfelWA&feature=relmfu. 
 
 Ask Dr. Z commercials for DaimlerChrysler – Effective?: 177. Retrieved from: 
 http://townhall-talk.edmunds.com/direct/view/.f0dda42/. 
 
5.3  Top Gear Mercedes M-Class 1998 Retrieved from: 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8C9DJAsGPYM. 
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6.1  Stephen Pinker on reciprocity: 204 Retrieved from: http://fora.tv/2011/02/04/ 
 Steven_Pinker_Language_as_a_Window_into_Human_Nature. 
6.2. Lee Iacocca Commercials 1982-84. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nppKMomMP-4; 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v6nmCFTmPnE&feature=related; 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BziuXz5lu9M&feature=related 
 
6.3 Lee Iacocca Commercial 2005. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJGWVLK6sJU. 
 
NHTSA Recalls Appendix 
 
4.1 Example from M-class (2003): 179-180 Retrieved from: Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2003&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=104566&PrintVersion=YES 
See also Fig. 4.3. 
 
4.2 NHTSA recalls for Mercedes M- and E-Class vehicles in the USA 1999-2005 
 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:40 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  1999 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 1999 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, INC. Mfr's Report Date: OCT 07, 1998 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 98V256000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: AIR BAGS:FRONTAL 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 4,163 
Summary:  
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: PASSENGER VEHICLES. A WRONG CLAMP MAY 
HAVE BEEN INSTALLED ON THE WINDOW AIR BAG UNITS. 
Consequence:  
THE WINDOW AIR BAG MAY NOT FULLY DEPLOY IN A SIDE-IMPACT 
COLLISION, INCREASING THE RISK OF INJURY TO THE VEHICLE OCCUPANT. 
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=1999&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=81092&PrintVersion=YES 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:41 AM  
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Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  1999 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 1999 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE 
THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP.  
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 1999 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
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Model Year: 1999 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS 
AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE CRUISE CONTROL 
SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE 
THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE 
PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE 
ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ 
HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE 
BRAKE PEDAL MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS 
EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF 
DEACTIVATING CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. 
SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN 
APPLYING CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY 
BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE 
THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 1999 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, INC. Mfr's Report Date: NOV 22, 1999 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 99V328000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SEAT BELTS:FRONT:ANCHORAGE 
  
Summary:  
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: SPORT UTILITY VEHICLES. THE LATCHING 
MECHANISM ON THE SEAT BELT ASSEMBLY WAS NOT ASSEMBLED 
CORRECTLY. IF THE PLASTIC COVER IS LOOSE DURING THE ENGAGEMENT OF 
THE BUCKLE TONGUE TO THE LATCH MECHANISM, THE BUCKLE COULD 
UNLATCH. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A CRASH, THE SEAT OCCUPANT MAY NOT BE PROPERLY 
RESTRAINED, INCREASING THE RISK OF PERSONAL INJURY. 
   http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=1999&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=81543&PrintVersion=YES 
  
 
284 
2000 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:42 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  2000 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: APR 15, 2001 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 01I005000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ00013  
Component: AIR BAGS:SIDE/WINDOW 
  
Summary:  
THIS IS NOT A SAFETY RECALL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAFETY ACT. 
HOWEVER, IT IS DEEMED A SAFETY IMPROVEMENT CAMPAIGN BY THE 
AGENCY. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: 2000 SLK AND E-CLASS VEHICLES. SIDE AIR 
BAG DEPLOYMENTS HAVE OCCURRED WHEN THE VEHICLE IS LEFT PARKED 
IN HIGH TEMPERATURES DURING WARMER MONTHS. 
 
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2000&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=84119&PrintVersion=YES 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:42 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  2000 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 25, 2000 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 00V203000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SEAT BELTS:FRONT:WARNING LIGHT/DEVICES 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 4,354 
Summary:  
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES FAIL TO 
CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF FMVSS NO. 208, "OCCUPANT CRASH 
PROTECTION." AN AUDIBLE SEAT BELT BUZZER WARNING SOUNDS FOR 
APPROXIMATELY TWO SECONDS WHEN THE VEHICLE IGNITION IS TURNED 
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TO THE ON OR START POSITION AND THE DRIVER SEAT BELT IS FASTENED. 
THIS BUZZER ACTIVATION EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE 
STANDARD. 
Consequence:  
DRIVERS MAY BECOME CONFUSED REGARDING THE PURPOSE OF THE 
CHIME. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: OCT 27, 2000 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 00V352000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SEAT BELTS 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 16,246 
Summary:  
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: PASSENGER VEHICLES. THE SEAT BELT ANCHOR 
IN THE REAR FOLDING MIDDLE SEATING POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN 
MANUFACTURED WITH OUT-OF-TOLERANCE HARDWARE. 
Consequence:  
IF THIS IS THE CASE, THE SEAT BELT ANCHOR MAY NOT COMPLY WITH 
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE 
THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP.  
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
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Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
 Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2000 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS 
AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE CRUISE CONTROL 
SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE 
THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE 
PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE 
ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ 
HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE 
BRAKE PEDAL MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS 
EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF 
DEACTIVATING CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. 
SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN 
APPLYING CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY 
BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE 
THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2000&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
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TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=84569&PrintVersion=YES 
 
2001 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:52 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  2001 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2001 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: FEB 21, 2001 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 01V061000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:WIRING 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 377 
Summary:  
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: PASSENGER VEHICLES. CERTAIN ALL ACTIVITY 
MODULE II (AAM II) COULD HAVE A SUB-COMPONENT THAT COULD CAUSE 
THE MODULE TO INTERMITTENTLY NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY. THE AAM II 
CONTROLS A NUMBER OF SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE HIGH BEAM LIGHTS, 
INSTRUMENT CLUSTER, DOOR LOCKS, AND WIPER SYSTEMS. 
Consequence:  
THIS CONDITION COULD CAUSE AN INTERMITTENT NON-FUNCTIONING OF 
THESE SYSTEMS. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2001 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE 
THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP.  
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 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2001 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2001 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS 
AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE CRUISE CONTROL 
SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE 
THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE 
PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE 
ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ 
HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE 
BRAKE PEDAL MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS 
EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF 
DEACTIVATING CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. 
SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN 
APPLYING CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY 
BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE 
THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
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Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2001&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=92709&PrintVersion=YES 
 
2002 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:54 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  2002 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2002 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: FEB 13, 2002 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 02V058000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: TIRES:SIDEWALL 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 172 
Summary:  
CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH DUNLOP SP5000 TIRES. 
SOME OF THESE TIRES HAVE A SEPARATION AROUND THE ENTIRE 
CIRCUMFERENCE IN THE AREA OF THE SIDE WALL AND TREAD. 
Consequence:  
THIS COULD RESULT IN PREMATURE TIRE WEAR. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2002 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 26, 2002 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 02V203000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SEAT BELTS:FRONT:WARNING LIGHT/DEVICES 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 3,603 
Summary:  
CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208, 
S7.3, "OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION." THE SEAT BELT CHIMES MAY NOT 
FUNCTION AS DESIGNED AND IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE STANDARD. 
Consequence:  
IF THE DRIVER BUCKLES HIS SEAT BELT PRIOR TO STARTING THE 
VEHICLE, THE CHIME WILL NOT SOUND AT ALL WHEN THE VEHICLE IS 
STARTED. 
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 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2002 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE 
THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP.  
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2002 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2002 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
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Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS 
AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE CRUISE CONTROL 
SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE 
THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE 
PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE 
ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ 
HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE 
BRAKE PEDAL MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS 
EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF 
DEACTIVATING CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. 
SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN 
APPLYING CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY 
BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE 
THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
    
Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2002&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=97548&PrintVersion=YES  
2003 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:55 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  2003 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: AUG 01, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V289000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: STEERING 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 554 
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE NUT ON THE BOLT WHICH 
CONNECTS THE STEERING GEAR TO THE STEERING COUPLING MAY NOT BE 
TIGHTENED CORRECTLY. 
Consequence:  
THE LOOSENING OF THE NUT COULD RESULT IN A SLIPPING OF THE 
  
 
292 
CONNECTION OVER TIME, INCREASING THE RISK OF A CRASH. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUN 22, 2004 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 04V296000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING SYSTEM OF THE 
SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) IS DESIGNED TO MONITOR THE 
PRESSURE GRADIENT WITHIN THE HIGH PRESSURE LINE OF THE BRAKE 
SYSTEM. IF AN UNACCEPTABLE PRESSURE GRADIENT IS DETECTED, THE 
SYSTEM WILL SWITCH, AS IT IS DESIGNED TO DO, INTO THE HYDRAULIC 
FUNCTION MODE. 
Consequence:  
IF VEHICLES ARE NOT ROUTINELY SERVICED AND HAVE EXTREMELY 
HIGH MILEAGE COMBINED WITH A HIGH NUMBER OF BRAKE ACTUATIONS, 
OR A HIGH BRAKE ACTUATION FREQUENCY, THE PUMP MOTOR OF THE SBC 
MAY RUN OUT OF PERMISSIBLE TOLERANCES, THEREBY TRIGGERING THE 
HYDRAULIC FUNCTION MODE. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2005 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 05V133000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) 
SYSTEM MAY PREMATURELY SHIFT TO THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP FUNCTION 
MODE, DUE TO DETERIORATION OF THE WIRING HARNESS CONNECTION, OR 
DUE TO PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE HYDRAULIC PUMP. 
Consequence:  
IN THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP MODE, THE DRIVER HAS BRAKING POWER 
SUFFICIENT TO STOP THE VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH GREATER BRAKE PEDAL 
PRESSURE IS REQUIRED AND THE BRAKE PEDAL TRAVEL WILL BE 
NOTICEABLY LONGER. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
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Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 03, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V303000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING MY 2006-2008 M-CLASS, R-CLASS, MY 2005-
2009 SLK-CLASS, MY 2005-2008 C-CLASS, MY 2003-2004 AND 2006-2008 CLK-
CLASS, MY 2003-2008 E-CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2008 CL-CLASS, MY 2008 CLS-
CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2007-2008 S-CLASS, MY 2003 G-CLASS, AND MY 2003-2004, 
2006 AND 2009 SL-CLASS VEHICLES. A SOFTWARE CALIBRATION NUMBER 
(SCN) CODING RECEIVED ON THE AFFECTED VEHICLES DURING A RECENT 
WORKSHOP VISIT WAS INCORRECT. DEPENDING ON THE MODEL YEAR AND 
MODEL AFFECTED, THE RESULTS OF AN INCORRECT SCN CODING CAN 
AFFECT A NUMBER OF VEHICLE SAFETY AND EMISSION FUNCTIONS 
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNCTIONS: (1) THE FUEL GAUGE 
READINGS MAY BE INCORRECT; (2) A STUCK FUEL-LEVEL SENSOR MAY NOT 
BE DISPLAYED IN THE INSTRUMENT CLUSTER; (3) THE OBD SYSTEM MAY 
CAUSE THE CHECK ENGINE LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE INCORRECTLY; AND, (4) 
THE SPEEDOMETER MAY BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A VEHICLE CRASH, THE ELECTRICAL FUEL PUMP MAY 
NOT RECEIVE A CRASH SIGNAL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FUEL PUMP TO 
DISCONNECT AND PREVENT FUTURE FUEL DELIVERY AS DESIGNED. 
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2003&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=104131&PrintVersion=YES 
 
 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:56 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  2003 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 26, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V121000  NHTSA Action Number: PE03006  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
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Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE 
THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING 
FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP.  
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2003 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2011 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 11V208000  NHTSA Action Number: PE10050  
Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:CRUISE CONTROL 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING CERTAIN MODEL YEAR 1999-2002 M-CLASS 
AND MODEL YEAR 2000-2003 M-CLASS AMG VEHICLES. THE CRUISE CONTROL 
SYSTEM IN THE AFFECTED VEHICLES ALLOWS THE DRIVER TO DISENGAGE 
THE SYSTEM IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING TAPPING THE BRAKE 
PEDAL, USING THE CRUISE CONTROL STALK, OR BRAKING THE VEHICLE 
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ENOUGH TO REACH A CERTAIN RATE OF DECELERATION. MERCEDES-BENZ 
HAS DETERMINED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES USE OF THE 
BRAKE PEDAL MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGE CRUISE CONTROL AS 
EXPECTED BY THE DRIVER, ALTHOUGH THE OTHER MEANS OF 
DEACTIVATING CRUISE CONTROL REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE. 
SPECIFICALLY, WHERE THE DRIVER PUMPS THE BRAKES RATHER THAN 
APPLYING CONSISTENT PEDAL FORCE, THE LEVEL OF FORCE REQUIRED MAY 
BE UNUSUALLY HIGH. 
Consequence:  
DIFFICULTY OR DELAY IN DISENGAGING CRUISE CONTROL CAN INCREASE 
THE RISK OF A CRASH.  
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2003&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=104566&PrintVersion=YES 
2004 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:57 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  2004 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2004 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: DEC 17, 2003 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 03V534000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SEAT BELTS 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, SOME SEAT BELT BUCKLES MAY 
HAVE A BURR ON A METAL COMPONENT OF THE LOCKING MECHANISM. THE 
PRESENCE OF THE BURR COULD PREVENT THE SEAT BELT FROM LOCKING 
UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.  
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A CRASH, THE SEAT OCCUPANT MAY NOT BE PROPERLY 
RESTRAINED, INCREASING THE RISK OF INJURY.  
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2004 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUN 22, 2004 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 04V296000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
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Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING SYSTEM OF THE 
SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) IS DESIGNED TO MONITOR THE 
PRESSURE GRADIENT WITHIN THE HIGH PRESSURE LINE OF THE BRAKE 
SYSTEM. IF AN UNACCEPTABLE PRESSURE GRADIENT IS DETECTED, THE 
SYSTEM WILL SWITCH, AS IT IS DESIGNED TO DO, INTO THE HYDRAULIC 
FUNCTION MODE. 
Consequence:  
IF VEHICLES ARE NOT ROUTINELY SERVICED AND HAVE EXTREMELY 
HIGH MILEAGE COMBINED WITH A HIGH NUMBER OF BRAKE ACTUATIONS, 
OR A HIGH BRAKE ACTUATION FREQUENCY, THE PUMP MOTOR OF THE SBC 
MAY RUN OUT OF PERMISSIBLE TOLERANCES, THEREBY TRIGGERING THE 
HYDRAULIC FUNCTION MODE. 
Remedy:  
DEALERS WILL INSPECT THE SBC HYDRAULIC UNIT, REPLACING IT IF 
NECESSARY. THE RECALL BEGAN ON OCTOBER 21M 2004. OWNERS SHOULD 
CONTACT MERCEDES-BENZ AT 1-800-367-6372.  
Notes:  
MERCEDES-BENZ RECALL NO. 2004 050014. CUSTOMERS CAN ALSO 
CONTACT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'S 
AUTO SAFETY HOTLINE AT 1-888-DASH-2-DOT (1-888-327-4236). 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2004 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2005 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 05V133000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) 
SYSTEM MAY PREMATURELY SHIFT TO THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP FUNCTION 
MODE, DUE TO DETERIORATION OF THE WIRING HARNESS CONNECTION, OR 
DUE TO PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE HYDRAULIC PUMP. 
Consequence:  
IN THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP MODE, THE DRIVER HAS BRAKING POWER 
SUFFICIENT TO STOP THE VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH GREATER BRAKE PEDAL 
PRESSURE IS REQUIRED AND THE BRAKE PEDAL TRAVEL WILL BE 
NOTICEABLY LONGER. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
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Model Year: 2004 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 03, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V303000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING MY 2006-2008 M-CLASS, R-CLASS, MY 2005-
2009 SLK-CLASS, MY 2005-2008 C-CLASS, MY 2003-2004 AND 2006-2008 CLK-
CLASS, MY 2003-2008 E-CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2008 CL-CLASS, MY 2008 CLS-
CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2007-2008 S-CLASS, MY 2003 G-CLASS, AND MY 2003-2004, 
2006 AND 2009 SL-CLASS VEHICLES. A SOFTWARE CALIBRATION NUMBER 
(SCN) CODING RECEIVED ON THE AFFECTED VEHICLES DURING A RECENT 
WORKSHOP VISIT WAS INCORRECT. DEPENDING ON THE MODEL YEAR AND 
MODEL AFFECTED, THE RESULTS OF AN INCORRECT SCN CODING CAN 
AFFECT A NUMBER OF VEHICLE SAFETY AND EMISSION FUNCTIONS 
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNCTIONS: (1) THE FUEL GAUGE 
READINGS MAY BE INCORRECT; (2) A STUCK FUEL-LEVEL SENSOR MAY NOT 
BE DISPLAYED IN THE INSTRUMENT CLUSTER; (3) THE OBD SYSTEM MAY 
CAUSE THE CHECK ENGINE LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE INCORRECTLY; AND, (4) 
THE SPEEDOMETER MAY BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A VEHICLE CRASH, THE ELECTRICAL FUEL PUMP MAY 
NOT RECEIVE A CRASH SIGNAL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FUEL PUMP TO 
DISCONNECT AND PREVENT FUTURE FUEL DELIVERY AS DESIGNED. 
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2004&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=112855&PrintVersion=YES 
 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:57 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M CLASS 
Model Year:  2004 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M CLASS 
Model Year: 2004 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: SEP 16, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V465000  NHTSA Action Number: RQ08002  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST:HOSE, PIPING, AND 
CONNECTIONS 
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Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING 125,228 MY 1998-2004 M-CLASS VEHICLES. 
THE HOSE CLAMP USED TO SECURE THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING 
HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS CONNECTION.  
Consequence:  
THE LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED 
POWER STEERING OVER TIME AND ULTIMATELY CAN DAMAGE THE POWER 
STEERING PUMP. THIS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTROL AND A CRASH 
WITHOUT WARNING. 
   http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2004&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M%20CLASS&component_id=0&
TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=494774&PrintVersion=YES 
2005 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:58 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  2005 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2005 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUN 22, 2004 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 04V296000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING SYSTEM OF THE 
SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) IS DESIGNED TO MONITOR THE 
PRESSURE GRADIENT WITHIN THE HIGH PRESSURE LINE OF THE BRAKE 
SYSTEM. IF AN UNACCEPTABLE PRESSURE GRADIENT IS DETECTED, THE 
SYSTEM WILL SWITCH, AS IT IS DESIGNED TO DO, INTO THE HYDRAULIC 
FUNCTION MODE. 
Consequence:  
IF VEHICLES ARE NOT ROUTINELY SERVICED AND HAVE EXTREMELY 
HIGH MILEAGE COMBINED WITH A HIGH NUMBER OF BRAKE ACTUATIONS, 
OR A HIGH BRAKE ACTUATION FREQUENCY, THE PUMP MOTOR OF THE SBC 
MAY RUN OUT OF PERMISSIBLE TOLERANCES, THEREBY TRIGGERING THE 
HYDRAULIC FUNCTION MODE. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
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Model Year: 2005 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAR 31, 2005 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 05V133000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: SERVICE BRAKES, HYDRAULIC 
  
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN VEHICLES, THE SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL (SBC) 
SYSTEM MAY PREMATURELY SHIFT TO THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP FUNCTION 
MODE, DUE TO DETERIORATION OF THE WIRING HARNESS CONNECTION, OR 
DUE TO PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE HYDRAULIC PUMP. 
Consequence:  
IN THE HYDRAULIC BACK-UP MODE, THE DRIVER HAS BRAKING POWER 
SUFFICIENT TO STOP THE VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH GREATER BRAKE PEDAL 
PRESSURE IS REQUIRED AND THE BRAKE PEDAL TRAVEL WILL BE 
NOTICEABLY LONGER. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2005 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 03, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V303000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING MY 2006-2008 M-CLASS, R-CLASS, MY 2005-
2009 SLK-CLASS, MY 2005-2008 C-CLASS, MY 2003-2004 AND 2006-2008 CLK-
CLASS, MY 2003-2008 E-CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2008 CL-CLASS, MY 2008 CLS-
CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2007-2008 S-CLASS, MY 2003 G-CLASS, AND MY 2003-2004, 
2006 AND 2009 SL-CLASS VEHICLES. A SOFTWARE CALIBRATION NUMBER 
(SCN) CODING RECEIVED ON THE AFFECTED VEHICLES DURING A RECENT 
WORKSHOP VISIT WAS INCORRECT. DEPENDING ON THE MODEL YEAR AND 
MODEL AFFECTED, THE RESULTS OF AN INCORRECT SCN CODING CAN 
AFFECT A NUMBER OF VEHICLE SAFETY AND EMISSION FUNCTIONS 
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNCTIONS: (1) THE FUEL GAUGE 
READINGS MAY BE INCORRECT; (2) A STUCK FUEL-LEVEL SENSOR MAY NOT 
BE DISPLAYED IN THE INSTRUMENT CLUSTER; (3) THE OBD SYSTEM MAY 
CAUSE THE CHECK ENGINE LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE INCORRECTLY; AND, (4) 
THE SPEEDOMETER MAY BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A VEHICLE CRASH, THE ELECTRICAL FUEL PUMP MAY 
NOT RECEIVE A CRASH SIGNAL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FUEL PUMP TO 
DISCONNECT AND PREVENT FUTURE FUEL DELIVERY AS DESIGNED. 
   Link: http://www-
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odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2005&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=114724&PrintVersion=YES 
2006 
 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 07:59 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  E CLASS 
Model Year:  2006 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: E CLASS 
Model Year: 2006 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 03, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V303000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING MY 2006-2008 M-CLASS, R-CLASS, MY 2005-
2009 SLK-CLASS, MY 2005-2008 C-CLASS, MY 2003-2004 AND 2006-2008 CLK-
CLASS, MY 2003-2008 E-CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2008 CL-CLASS, MY 2008 CLS-
CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2007-2008 S-CLASS, MY 2003 G-CLASS, AND MY 2003-2004, 
2006 AND 2009 SL-CLASS VEHICLES. A SOFTWARE CALIBRATION NUMBER 
(SCN) CODING RECEIVED ON THE AFFECTED VEHICLES DURING A RECENT 
WORKSHOP VISIT WAS INCORRECT. DEPENDING ON THE MODEL YEAR AND 
MODEL AFFECTED, THE RESULTS OF AN INCORRECT SCN CODING CAN 
AFFECT A NUMBER OF VEHICLE SAFETY AND EMISSION FUNCTIONS 
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNCTIONS: (1) THE FUEL GAUGE 
READINGS MAY BE INCORRECT; (2) A STUCK FUEL-LEVEL SENSOR MAY NOT 
BE DISPLAYED IN THE INSTRUMENT CLUSTER; (3) THE OBD SYSTEM MAY 
CAUSE THE CHECK ENGINE LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE INCORRECTLY; AND, (4) 
THE SPEEDOMETER MAY BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A VEHICLE CRASH, THE ELECTRICAL FUEL PUMP MAY 
NOT RECEIVE A CRASH SIGNAL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FUEL PUMP TO 
DISCONNECT AND PREVENT FUTURE FUEL DELIVERY AS DESIGNED. 
   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2006&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=E%20CLASS&component_id=0&T
YPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=418772&PrintVersion=YES 
Report Date :  July 31, 2012 at 08:00 AM  
Search Type :  VEHICLE 
Make:  MERCEDES BENZ 
Model or Model No.:  M-CLASS 
  
 
301 
Model Year:  2006 
 
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M-CLASS 
Model Year: 2006 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: MAY 13, 2005 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 05V224000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: STEERING:HYDRAULIC POWER ASSIST SYSTEM 
Potential Number of Units Affected: 7,191 
Summary:  
ON CERTAIN PASSENGER VEHICLES, A HOSE CLAMP THAT SECURES THE 
POWER STEERING FLUID COOLING HOSE TO THE POWER STEERING FLUID 
COOLER MAY NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLAMPING FORCE FOR THIS 
CONNECTION. 
Consequence:  
A LOSS OF POWER STEERING FLUID CAN DAMAGE THE POWER STEERING 
PUMP AND MAY RESULT IN DIMINISHED POWER ASSIST FOR STEERING 
WHICH COULD LEAD TO A CRASH. 
   
 Make: MERCEDES BENZ  Model: M-CLASS 
Model Year: 2006 
Manufacturer: MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC. Mfr's Report Date: JUL 03, 2008 
NHTSA CAMPAIGN ID Number: 08V303000  NHTSA Action Number: N/A  
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
  
Summary:  
MERCEDES-BENZ IS RECALLING MY 2006-2008 M-CLASS, R-CLASS, MY 2005-
2009 SLK-CLASS, MY 2005-2008 C-CLASS, MY 2003-2004 AND 2006-2008 CLK-
CLASS, MY 2003-2008 E-CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2008 CL-CLASS, MY 2008 CLS-
CLASS, MY 2004 AND 2007-2008 S-CLASS, MY 2003 G-CLASS, AND MY 2003-2004, 
2006 AND 2009 SL-CLASS VEHICLES. A SOFTWARE CALIBRATION NUMBER 
(SCN) CODING RECEIVED ON THE AFFECTED VEHICLES DURING A RECENT 
WORKSHOP VISIT WAS INCORRECT. DEPENDING ON THE MODEL YEAR AND 
MODEL AFFECTED, THE RESULTS OF AN INCORRECT SCN CODING CAN 
AFFECT A NUMBER OF VEHICLE SAFETY AND EMISSION FUNCTIONS 
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNCTIONS: (1) THE FUEL GAUGE 
READINGS MAY BE INCORRECT; (2) A STUCK FUEL-LEVEL SENSOR MAY NOT 
BE DISPLAYED IN THE INSTRUMENT CLUSTER; (3) THE OBD SYSTEM MAY 
CAUSE THE CHECK ENGINE LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE INCORRECTLY; AND, (4) 
THE SPEEDOMETER MAY BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. 
Consequence:  
IN THE EVENT OF A VEHICLE CRASH, THE ELECTRICAL FUEL PUMP MAY 
NOT RECEIVE A CRASH SIGNAL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE FUEL PUMP TO 
DISCONNECT AND PREVENT FUTURE FUEL DELIVERY AS DESIGNED. 
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   Link: http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallresults.cfm?start=1&SearchType=DrillDown&type=VEHICLE
&year=2006&make=MERCEDES%2520BENZ&model=M-
CLASS&component_id=0&TYPENUM=1&SUBMIT=Retrieve%20Recalls&prod_id=20620
7&PrintVersion=YES 
 
U.S. National Transportation Statistics Appendix 
 
1.1. Retrieved from: http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/. 
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EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG 
 
Hiermit versichere ich, John Riach, die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig und unter 
ausschließlicher Verwendung der angegebenen Literatur und Hilfsmittel erstellt zu haben. 
Alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß veröffentlichtem oder unveröffentlichtem 
Schrifttum entnommen sind, habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 
in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch nicht 
veröffentlicht. 
 
 
Paderborn, den 22.10. 2012  
 
 
